Academic literature on the topic 'Time consciousness, Mental time travel, Episodic Memory, Autonoetic Consciousness'

There is ongoing theoretical debate regarding episodic memory and how it can be accurately measured, in particular if the focus should be content-based recall of episodic details or something more experiential involving the subjective capacity to mentally travel back in time and “re-live” aspects of the original event. The autonoetic subscale of the Episodic Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI) is presented here as a new test instrument that attempts to redress theoretical and methodological shortcomings in autobiographical memory assessment. The EAMI merges a phenomenological detail-based approach with an assessment of autonoetic consciousness, departing considerably from traditional Remember/Know paradigms used within this field. We present findings from an initial pilot study investigating the potential markers of autonoetic consciousness that may accompany episodic retrieval. Key behavioural indices of autonoetic consciousness, notably those of viewer perspective, visual imagery, and emotional re-experiencing, emerged as being inextricably bound with the level of phenomenological detail recalled and the overall re-living judgment. The autonoetic subscale of the EAMI permits conceptually refined assessment of episodic personal memories and the accompanying subjective experience of mental re-living, characteristic of episodic memory.

Autobiographical memory comprises episodic and semantic components mediated by dissociable states of consciousness, one promoting the experience of the self at a specific moment in the past, and the other involving self-knowledge that does not require “mental time travel.” These components can be difficult to dissociate using retrospective autobiographical stimuli collection. In this study, we manipulated the episodic/semantic distinction within prospectively collected autobiographical stimuli. Over several months, participants made recordings documenting specific episodes, repeated episodes, and world knowledge. These recordings were later played back to participants during scanning with functional MRI. The results indicated overlapping but distinct patterns of brain activity corresponding to episodic and semantic autobiographical memory. Both episodic and semantic autobiographical memory engaged the left anteromedial prefrontal cortex associated with self-reference, but the episodic condition did so to a greater degree. The episodic condition uniquely engaged the medial temporal, posterior cingulate, and diencephalic regions associated with remote memory recovery. Whereas the episodic condition engaged the right temporo-parietal cortex involved in reconstruction of spatial context and attentional orienting, the semantic condition engaged the left temporo-parietal and parieto-frontal systems involved in egocentric spatial processing and top-down attentional control. Episodic recollection was also associated with suppression of emotional paralimbic regions. These findings support a functional neuroanatomical dissociation between episodic and semantic autobiographical memory, providing concordance to amnesic syndromes with disproportionate impairment in one of these two forms of autobiographical memory.

Investigations in the cognitive abilities of different animal species and children at different ages have revealed that consciousness comes in degrees. In this review, I will first address four cognitive abilities that are important to discriminate levels of consciousness: mirror self-recognition, theory of mind, mental time travel, and the capacity to entertain secondary representations. I will then examine putative relations between these abilities and assign them to three levels of consciousness (anoetic, noetic, autonoetic). Finally, I will discuss the implications of differences in consciousness for the understanding of behavioral organization in animals and humans and for animal welfare science. I will argue that, on one hand, implicit behavioral rules may account for results obtained in research on theory of mind and mental time travel abilities in animals and children. On the other hand, secondary representations may be the key to explain behaviors based on semantic memory as well as semantic future planning abilities observed in great apes and young children. These considerations are in accordance with the view that an explicit theory of mind and a continuous self through time are unique to humans.

AbstractIn this article, we address an apparent paradox in the literature on mental time travel and mind-wandering: How is it possible that future thinking is both constructive, yet often experienced as occurring spontaneously? We identify and describe two ‘routes’ whereby episodic future thoughts are brought to consciousness, with each of the ‘routes’ being associated with separable cognitive processes and functions. Voluntary future thinking relies on controlled, deliberate and slow cognitive processing. The other, termed involuntary or spontaneous future thinking, relies on automatic processes that allows ‘fully-fledged’ episodic future thoughts to freely come to mind, often triggered by internal or external cues. To unravel the paradox, we propose that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are ‘pre-made’ (i.e., each spontaneous future thought is a re-iteration of a previously constructed future event), and therefore based on simple, well-understood, memory processes. We also propose that the pre-made hypothesis explains why spontaneous future thoughts occur rapidly, are similar to involuntary memories, and predominantly about upcoming tasks and goals. We also raise the possibility that spontaneous future thinking is the default mode of imagining the future. This dual process approach complements and extends standard theoretical approaches that emphasise constructive simulation, and outlines novel opportunities for researchers examining voluntary and spontaneous forms of future thinking.

The main objective of this master thesis is to clarify the nested structure in time consciousness, depending on mental time travel and episodic memory. Time consciousness, mental time travel and episodic memory are connected, and function depending on each other. Mental time travel ability enables us to imagine personal future events. Episodic memory allows us to travel mentally into both past and future. Similarity between remembering the past and imagining the future indicates that episodic memory system contribute to future-directed personal mental time travel competence, and justifies the relation between episodic memory and mental time travel into both past and future. Episodic memory requires autonoetic consciousness, which can be applied to mental time travel competence, and mental time travel is a function of episodic memory. Distinguishing humans and non-humans is a method to understand the role of episodic memory and mental time travel in time consciousness. Episodic memory and mental time travel indicate to a higher-level time consciousness in humans, because mental time travel, episodic memory, autonoetic consciousness and recursive language are unique to humans, while non-humans show future-directed acts, possess episodic-like memory, and communicate with limited ways. Time consciousness is derived from the notion of autonoetic consciousness and it is a sort of temporal consciousness which enables us to be conscious of ourselves who travels in time and aware of ourselves along the temporal line. Non-humans have a rudimentary form of time consciousness, even they are deprived of autonoetic consciousness.