Academic literature on the topic 'Tobruck, Battles of, 1941-1942'

Studying operational documents from military archives, an analysis was made of the number of personnel losses during the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation (December 25, 1941 - January 2, 1942) and further battles on the bridgehead captured by Soviet troops with the participation of navy forces. The current assessments of the irretrievable losses of servicemen have been criticized.

Abstract Workers in Le Havre developed resilience through trade union activism, political commitment and community engagement in the pre-war period. This resilience allowed them to display their anger at new hardships that appeared at the start of the German occupation. In particular, workers rioted at a major building site and demanded and achieved wage rises; and, as the RAF bombed their town day and night, they continuously made demands for danger money. Indeed, they did not change their behaviour because the circumstances in which they now lived had changed; they continued to use the skills they had learnt during pre-war industrial battles to make demands that would improve the material situation of themselves and their fellow trade unionists. This analysis differs from most of the major historiography on workers during the Occupation which claims workers during the first two years of the Occupation were broadly passive and cite the miners’ strike in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais as the exception which proves the rule.

The article is dedicated to the usage and types of Red Army heavy and super heavy artillery during the Great Patriotic War. The purpose of the article is to define the exact reasons of low intensity use of Soviet heavy and super-heavy artillery during the war: virtually retreat during 1941-1943 and slow increase of usage during 1944-1945. High intensity of heavy artillery service took place just in 1945. This question has several answers: Red Army high command concerns about expensive guns lost in combat, specific conditions on the Eastern front, incompetence of command is all invalid. Research is based on comparison of archival materials in the field of ordnance production and expenditure. By the use of statistics it described the ordnance production and inventory. The materials show that ordnance production for heavy and super-heavy artillery in USSR was inadequate before the war. Due to the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 the situation worsened. The exact cases were analyzed on the basis of technical and managerial decisions. Ordnance prices and plants involved in ordnance production have also been considered by the research. Exact samples of heavy artillery usage are described with necessary statistics about it: Rzhew battles in 1942, Volkhov battles in 1943. Red Army statistics is compared with Wehrmacht statistics and US statistics of ordnance expenditure. In conclusions it has been shown the interconnection between intensity of use and ordnance provided by war economy.

Military diaries of the Great Patriotic War are a rare type of sources that requires detailed study. The diary entries of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Commander of the 7th Guards Tank Destroyer Artillery Brigade, Colonel Borsoev Vladimir Buzinaevich, published in this article, are to introduce new documents into scientific use and to expand the research field. The archaeographic method of research has made it possible to compile a short historical description of the diary and to publish three diary entries for July 5 – August 13, 1943, that describe author’s participation in the famous Battle of Kursk; the Kursk Bulge was the game changer of the Great Patriotic War. The diary is stored in the State Archive of the Republic of Buryatia; it is of great interest to researchers, since it reflects events of the war and front-line everyday life from the perspective of a Soviet officer all through war. Its entries begin on July 10, 1941 and end on March 7, 1945 (with the author’s death from a fatal wound). There are 274 entries in the diary, which are unevenly distributed over the years. For five and a half months of 1941 V. B. Borsoev made 116 records, while for three full years from 1942 to 1944 he made 152 entries. The records for 1941 are distinctive in completeness of description of military operations, as well as in analysis of artillery battles. The scenes of hostilities give way to worries about his family. In the records for 1942, military events alternate with description of the military officer’s daily life, which consisted of reading and analyzing books, for example, L. Tolstoy's “War and Peace,” of watching movies, playing chess, etc. 1943–44 are represented by records stating confidence in victory and describing offensive operations in which the author took part. For more than two months of 1945 there are only six short entries. The diary of V. B. Borsoev is a unique source that includes different information layers from description of hostilities to front-line daily life. Thus, the diary deserves serious scientific research and publication.

This book argues that the transition from the New Deal to a mobilized wartime economy during World War II restored corporate hegemony in collaboration with a state apparatus dominated by military elites. The purported losers in this transition were New Deal reformers committed to a planned economy and an extensive social welfare state, and groups like labor and small business whose interests were represented by reform elites. Organized chronologically, Waddell's account traces the development of the military-industrial complex from the War Industries Board in World War I to what Waddell asserts is a neocorporatist pattern of governance that had become established by the late 1940s and early 1950s. For the intervening years, he devotes attention to the trade association movement of the 1920s, the National Recovery Administration in the early 1930s, the New Deal turn to Keynesian economics, Harry Truman and the Marshall Plan, and the National Security Act of 1947; but the book focuses on the three periods associated with mobilization for World War II. These three periods are prewar mobilization from September, 1939 to December, 1941; the institutionalization of wartime mobilization from early 1942 through early 1943; and the battles over postwar reconversion that began in 1943 and continued into the immediate postwar era.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is die grootste nederlae wat Suid-Afrika in sy militêre geskiedenis ervaar het. Ten spyte van hul omvang, word daar min van Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk verstaan of onthou. Na ‘n hewige interne debat wat tot konflik tussen Afrikanernasionaliste en pro-Britse Suid-Afrikaners gelei het, het Suid-Afrika op 6 September 1939 oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar. Suid-Afrika se politieke verdeeldheid het saamgeval met die Unie se totale onvoorbereidheid vir oorlog, wat gestrek het van kritieke tekortkominge in kusverdediging, tot die ontoereikende grootte van die leër en lugmag en die totale afwesigheid van ‘n vloot. Gedurende die eerste ses maande van 1941 het Suid-Afrika ‘n beduidende rol gespeel om die Italiaanse koloniale magte in Oos-Afrika te verslaan. Dié veldtog was egter nie effektiewe voorbereiding vir die uitdagings waarteen die Suid-Afrikaners kort daarna in Noord-Afrika te staan sou kom nie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse troepe het daarby hul tyd daaraan bestee om vestings in Egipte te herbou in plaas daarvan om noodsaaklike opleiding te ondergaan om hul “bosoorlog”-leër vir ruwe woestynoorlogvoering voor te berei. ‘n Huiwerige, teensinnige politieke besluit het die onvoorbereide Suid-Afrikaners tot Operasie Crusader verbind. Die onervare Suid-Afrikaners het op 23 November 1941 by Sidi Rezegh teen die geharde Afrika Korps te staan gekom, waar oorweldigende magte hulle verpletter het. ‘n Heroorweging van hierdie vergete veldslag aan die hand van primêre en sekondêre bronne het aan die lig gebring dat die Suid-Afrikaners ‘n hoë tol van die Duitse pantser geëis het, wat besmoontlik die ware keerpunt in Operasie Crusader gebring het. In Mei 1942 het Rommel se Afrika Korps deur ‘n reeks blitsige bewegings wat die greep van die Spilmagte op gekombineerde operasies gedemonstreer het, daarin geslaag om die kritiese hawe van Tobruk, waar die onervare Suid Afrikaanse generaal-majoor H.B. Klopper in bevel was, te isoleer. Sy oorgawe binne ‘n enkele dag word dikwels vergelyk met die vorige beleg van Tobruk toe die Australianers Rommel onder vergelykbare omstandighede vir 244 dae teruggehou het totdat die beleg opgehef is. Klopper se oorgawe het ‘n politieke krisis vir Winston Churchill en Jan Smuts geskep, deurdat dit aansienlike spanning binne sowel die Gealieerde kamp as Suid-Afrika veroorsaak het. Die herevaluering van die gebeure het interessante feite uit die primêre bronne na vore gebring ten opsigte van die toestand van Tobruk se verdedigingstellings, die ongelukkige bevelvoerder, en hoe die Verenigde Koninkryk in samewerking met Suid-Afrika die ware feite wou toesmeer. Die onmiddellike naoorlogse geheuebeeld van die gebeure by Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is geskep en verwring deur sensitiewe politieke oorwegings wat die verhouding tussen Suid-Afrika en die Verenigde Koninkryk beïnvloed het. Sedertdien het ‘n nasionalistiese Afrikaner-regering en daarna ook die demokraties-verkose, post-apartheid-regering die herinneringe aan Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk tot die vergetelheid verdoem; nie een van die twee het die nut daarvan gesien om dié twee mylpale in die nasionale geheue te verewig nie. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis narrates and analyses the experiences of a sample of South Africans who were captured during the Second World War. The research is based on oral testimony, memoirs, archival evidence and to a lesser degree on secondary sources. The former prisoners-of-war (POW) who participated in the research and those whose memoirs were studied were all captured at the Battle of Sidi Rezegh in November 1941 or during the fall of Tobruk in June 1942. The aim of the research is to present oral and written POW testimony in order to augment the dearth of knowledge regarding South African POW historical experience. The scope of the research includes the decision to volunteer for the Union Defence Force, the experiences in North Africa, capture and initial experiences in the so-called ‘hell camps of North Africa’, the transportation to Italy and life in the Italian prison camps, events surrounding the Italian Armistice and the consequent escape attempts thereafter. For those POWs who did not escape, the experience of captivity continued with transport to Germany, experiences in German camps, including working in labour camps and the Allied bombing campaign. Lastly, the end of the war and the experience of liberation, which in most cases included forced marches, are dealt with before the focus turns once again towards South Africa and the experience of homecoming and demobilisation. The affective and intellectual experiences of the POWs are also investigated as their personal experience and emotions are presented and examined. These include the experience of guilt and shame during capture, the acceptance or non-acceptance of captivity, blame, attitudes towards the enemy and towards each other, as well as the experience of fear and hope, which was especially relevant during the bombing campaign and during periods when they were being transported between countries and camps. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the POW experience which looks at aspects relating to identity among South African POWs. The final conclusion is drawn that the POW identity took precedence over national identity. As a result of the strong POW identity and their desire for complete freedom and desire to claim individuality, the POWs did not, on the whole, display great interest in becoming involved in South African politics after the war even though many of them strongly disagreed with the Nationalist segregationist ideologies that claimed increasing support between 1945 and 1948.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis beskryf en ontleed die ervarings van dié Suid-Afrikaners wat tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gevange geneem is. Die navorsing is gebaseer op mondelinge getuienis, memoires, argivale bewysmateriaal en, in ’n mindere mate, op sekondêre bronne. Die voormalige krygsgevangenes wat aan die navorsing deelgeneem het en wie se memoires bestudeer is, is almal in November 1941 by die Geveg van Sidi Rezegh of in Junie 1942 met die val van Tobruk gevange geneem. Die doel van die navorsing is om mondelinge en skriftelike getuienisse van krygsgevangenes aan te bied ten einde die gebrekkige kennis ten opsigte van Suid-Afrikaanse krygsgevangenes se historiese ervaring uit te brei. Die omvang van die navorsing sluit die besluit in om vrywillig diens te doen vir die Unie-verdedigingsmag, die ervarings in Noord-Afrika, gevangeneming en eerste ervarings in die sogenaamde “helkampe van Noord-Afrika”, die vervoer na Italië en lewe in die Italiaanse gevangeniskampe, gebeure rondom die Italiaanse wapenstilstand en die daaropvolgende ontsnappingspogings. Vir die krygsgevangenes wat nie ontsnap het nie, het die ervaring van gevangenskap voortgeduur deur vervoer na Duitsland, ervarings in Duitse kampe, waaronder strafkampe, en die bombarderings deur die Geallieerdes. Ten slotte word aandag gegee aan die einde van die oorlog en die ervaring van vryheid, wat in die meeste gevalle gedwonge marse behels het, voordat die fokus terugkeer na Suid-Afrika en die ervaring van tuiskoms en demobilisasie. Die affektiewe en intellektuele ervarings van die krygsgevangenes word ook ontleed, aangesien hul persoonlike ervarings en emosies ondersoek en aangebied word. Dit sluit die ervaring van skuld en skaamte tydens die gevangeneming in, die aanvaarding of nie-aanvaarding van gevangeskap, blaam, houdings teenoor die vyand en mekaar, sowel as die ervaring van vrees en hoop, wat veral belangrik was gedurende die bombarderingsveldtog en vervoer tussen lande en kampe. Die tesis sluit af met ’n ontleding van aspekte wat verband hou met identiteit onder die Suid- Afrikaanse krygsgevangenes. Die bevinding is dat die krygsgevangene-identiteit voorrang geniet het bo die nasionale identiteit. Verder het die sterk drang na volkome vryheid en die begeerte om hul individualiteit terug te kry daartoe gelei dat die voormalige krygsgevangenes na die oorlog oor die algemeen ’n ambivalensie jeens Suid-Afrikaanse politiek openbaar.

The Pacific War was particularly difficult for the media to cover. The long distances, the terrible weather, the tendency of Douglas MacArthur and Ernest King to prioritize operational security, especially during the defeats of 1941 and 1942, and media bosses in the United States who focused more on Europe than Asia all meant that the fighting in the Pacific was often shrouded from the American public. The situation did not start to improve until 1943 and 1944, as US forces took the offensive, and the army and navy engaged in a dynamic rivalry to grab the biggest share of the headlines. But while the war continued in Europe, even major battles like those fought on Saipan and Okinawa were often buried on the inside pages.