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Chakraborty, Sreetama. "Animal Ethics: Beyond Neutrality, Universality, and Consistency." Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 7, no. 3 (January 2, 2017): 34–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/bioethics.v7i3.30951.
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This paper reflects a possibility of going beyond the postmodernists way of ethically examining non-human animals based on the tripartite pillars of neutrality, universality, and consistency. My concentration focuses on some interrelated queries, such as What does animal ethics conventionally mean? How did power, hierarchy, and domination separate humans from other animals? How does the fate of non-human animals (whether they ought to be morally considered or not) depend on humans moral values? How far is it justified to secure animal rights in the age of perilous animal use, especially for food or during animal experimentation? While examining these issues, I bring into light the several arguments and positions put forward by thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Carl Cohen, Brian Berry, and others. Moreover, my search is for a non-anthropocentric sustainable paradigm, to balance human interests and animal needs together, in order to sustain the future generations of human and non-human intimacy.
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Paccagnella, Amanda Formisano, and Patricia Borba Marchetto. "Animal welfare versus animal abolitionism: a comparison of the theories by Peter Singer and Tom Regan and their influence on the Brazilian Federal Constitution." Revista de Direitos e Garantias Fundamentais 20, no. 2 (December 20, 2019): 251. http://dx.doi.org/10.18759/rdgf.v20i2.1493.
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With the emergence of environmental concerns and the awakening regarding animal treatment issues, the anthropocentric paradigm has begun to shift, causing many countries to review their position on the legal status of animals. Within the movement for animals, there are two mainly followed philosophical theories: the animal welfare perspective, which has Peter Singer as its leading author, and the animal rights theory, likewise known as the abolitionist movement, with Tom Regan as its central theorist. Utilizing the method of comparative analysis, this article seeks to analyze each author’s thought process and compare theories, contrasting each viewpoint’s moral and philosophical foundations and which principle each author has determined as most fundamental. The main differences between them will also be compared, as well as their conclusions and effects on society, with a particular focus on their influences on the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.
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Weisberg, Zipporah. "“The Simple Magic of Life”." Humanimalia 7, no. 1 (October 5, 2015): 79–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.52537/humanimalia.9983.
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This paper explores the important contribution phenomenology can make to animal ethics. The underlying assumption is that animal ethics is as strong as the conception of animal ontology it takes for granted. I contend that Peter Singer’s reductive ontology of animals as suffering beings leads him astray not least because it prevents him from opposing killing animals as a matter of principle. Other leading ethicists such as Martha Nussbaum and Tom Regan offer more nuanced accounts of animal ontology and correspondingly richer theories of justice and rights, but they do not go far enough. Nussbaum even contradicts her own theory of capabilities by also refusing to refuse killing. Marc Bekoff, Jonathan Balcombe, and other ethologists, on the other hand, do a marvellous job of filling in the gaps in our understanding of the complexity of animals’ emotional, social, and moral lives. Not surprisingly, as a result of their insights into animal ontology, they categorically reject killing animals and advocate for the total transformation of their conditions of existence. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment, I suggest here offers another crucial inroad into a more meaningful and robust animal ethics by illuminating the complex perceptual dimensions of animal subjectivity.
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Demetriou, Dan, and Bob Fischer. "Dignitarian Hunting." Social Theory and Practice 44, no. 1 (2018): 49–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201811928.
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Faced with the choice between supporting industrial plant agriculture and hunting, Tom Regan’s rights view can be plausibly developed in a way that permits a form of hunting we call “dignitarian.” To motivate this claim, we begin by showing how the empirical literature on animal deaths in plant agriculture suggests that a non-trivial amount of hunting would not add to animal harm. We discuss how Tom Regan’s miniride principle appears to morally permit hunting in that case, and we address recent objections by Jason Hanna to environmentally-based culling that may be seen to speak against this conclusion. We then turn to dignity, which is especially salient in scenarios where harm is necessary or justifiable. We situate “dignitarian” hunting within a larger framework of adversarial ethics, and argue that dignitarian hunting gives animals a more dignified death than the alternatives endemic to large-scale plant agriculture, and so is permissible based on the kinds of principles that Regan endorses. Indeed, dignitarian hunting may actually fit better with Regan’s widely endorsed animal rights framework than the practice of many vegans, and should only be rejected if we’re just as willing to condemn supporting conventional plant agriculture.
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WANG, Yungling. "對虐貓事件的儒家生命倫理學思考——兼論動物權利." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 5, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.51445.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.二O O 六年春，中國發生了一次女子虐貓引發民眾憤怒的事件。許多批評者措詞激烈，不少媒體也介入了對該事件的報道和評論。在這種報道和評論中，包括記者和專家在內，幾乎毫無例外地對女子虐貓的行為給予了否定，他們認為女子虐貓行為殘忍變態，激進者認為虐貓行為侵犯動物權利，中國應當對動物權利保護立法。但是這些認識和評論或者源於生活經驗，或者源於道德直覺，或者源於糢糊不清的道德認知，卻缺乏其正理性的深入的哲學或者倫理學思考，在儒家生命倫理學看來是荒謬的。對動物權利的主張起源於動物保護運動， 今天的主要代表人物是辛格和湯姆．雷根 (Tom Regan)。但在儒家生命倫理學看來，他們關於動物與人平等和動物享有權利的觀點都是站不住腳的。儒家生命倫理學認為， 萬物之中人為貴， 人的地位無可爭辯地高於動物。儒家思想家幾乎從來沒有把動物放在與人平等的地位上加以考慮， 而是把人放在差等之愛的最高地位。此外，在儒家思想體系中， 動物不但地位低下，而且其心智、認識、行為均不可與人相比。儒家思想家會同意湯姆．雷根關於人是“生活的主體”的觀點，但卻不承認動物也能成為“生活的主體”，理由很簡單，動物沒有父子之親，沒有男女之別，沒有行為規範。儒家經典著作認為，人獸之別，還在於人有禮，而動物則沒有。在儒家看來，道德與倫理只與人類生活有關，而與動物無闕，人與動物的關係不能成為道德之一倫。總之，動物權利無法得到儒家生命倫理學的辯護。動物權利論危害甚大。抬高動物的權利地位，其實質就是降低人類的權利地位，傷害人類，或者說反人類。主張為動物權利或動物福利立法，是十分危險的事情。In the spring of 2006, a Chinese woman maltreated a cat and caused indignation in Chinese society. Many individuals launched critiques on the woman with severe tongue, and public media took part in the report and critique of the incident. Some individuals argue that the woman infringed animal rights and the Chinese government should formulate a law to protect animal rights. This essay draws on Confucian moral and intellectual resources to contend that animals do not have rights and the Chinese government should not issue any law on animal rights.The proposition of animal rights came from the modern Western "animal-protecting movement". The primary representative scholars who attempt to argue for animal rights are Peter Singer and Tom Regan: they hold that human beings and animals are equal and animals should have rights. This view, however, cannot fit into Confucian bioethics. On the Confucian view, human beings are the noblest beings in the world. The status of human being is without question higher than the status of animals. Confucian scholars would never give a position to animals that would be same as human beings. Although Confucian scholars can agree with Tom Regan on the view that human beings are "the subjects of life," they cannot accept the view that animals could be "the subjects of life." The Confucian arguments are very clear: Animals do not have the virtue of qin (intimacy) between the father and the son; they do not have the virtue of bie (difference) between the male and the female; and they do not have behavior norms (de). In short, human beings and animals are essentially difference, on Confucianism, because human beings can cultivate the virtues based on the practice of rituals (li, 禮), while animals do not have the practice of rituals at all. Accordingly, from the Confucian perspective, morality or ethics is only related with human life, but is outside of animal life. The relationship between human beings and animals does not belong to the moral relationship. In a word, animal rights cannot be accepted by Confucian bioethics.Upholding animal rights is consequently undesirable. Heightening animal status is equivalent to debasing human status. This is to harm human beings. This paper concludes that legalizing animal rights is very dangerous.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 169 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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Takooshian, Harold. "Book Review." Society & Animals 1, no. 1 (1993): 101–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853093x00181.
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AbstractThe aim of the book is to "capture the movement's moral vision and sense of mission, with sensitivity to its concerns but also an awareness of some of its excesses" (book jacket). It is a brave book in its attempt to provide a dispassionate account of what has become (along with abortion) one of the most passionate controversies of our era. The authors are two sociologists currently at New York University, with long and prolific careers writing about the interface of science and social values. Jasper has written widely on nuclearism, technology, and social change, and Nelkin on genetic engineering, biotechnology, AIDS, nuclearism, ecology, and job safety. Regarding animals, apparently their only two prior studies were co-authored presentations at recent sociology meetings (Jasper & Poulsen, 1989; Jasper, Nelkin, & Poulsen, 1990). Seven of the 12 chapters analyze the nature of the movement. Over the centuries, several social forces (urbanization, industrialization, democratization) have caused a shift in humans' view of animals, from instruments to be used for food, clothing, and farm work to companions to be cherished - pets given a name and family status. It has led to what the authors term "sentimental anthropomorphism," people's attribution to animals of human sentiments such as the abilities to feel emotions and communicate, and to form social relationships. Borrowing tactics from other reformist movements, animal advocates have become more effective in several ways - protests, litigation, boycotts, lobbying, and public relations. Since the 1970s, philosophers like Peter Singer and Tom Regan have honed a notion of "animal rights," providing an important ideological base that has further accelerated the movement. The remaining five chapters focus on five specific themes of the crusade: Regarding "animals in the wild," strong protests have been mounted against large-scale seal hunts, dolphin-safe tuna, trapping, and hunting. "From rabbits to petri dishes" describes the dramatic drop in industrial testing of cosmetics, drugs and toiletries since 1980, to the point where the once-routine Draize and LD-50 tests are now viewed by many as obsolete. "Test tubes with legs" documents the dramatic rise in biomedical research after World War II, and the effectiveness of protests challenging this- reportedly more easily at some labs (Cornell, Berkeley, Museum of Natural History) than at others (New York University, Stanford). "Animals as commodities" concludes that the crusade has persuasively made moral issues of factory farming, humane slaughter, and fur production (both wild and ranch). Finally, in "Animals on display," earlier protests against pit bull and cock fighting have now expanded to rodeos, circuses, Hollywood films, zoos, and animal shows, with only partial impact. Jasper and Nelkin present an overview of the evolution of the animal rights movement by dividing the movement into three parts: (1) Since the 1860s, the original SPCA "welfarists" were part of a larger humanitarian tradition of helping others; (2) Since the 1970s, more assertive "pragmatists" like Henry Spira have demanded "animal rights," using stronger methods in order to force negotiation with those who violate these rights; (3) Since the 1980s, "fundamentalists" like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) have sought to protect animal rights without "hobnobbing in the halls with our enemy" (p. 154) or compromising. Even in the 1990s, welfarist groups like the HSUS and SPCA remain the largest in both membership and funding. Yet there has been a meteoric rise of the crusader factions, eclipsing the welfarists - pragmatists like Spira's Animal Rights International, Joyce Tischler's Animal Legal Defense Fund, Cleveland Amory's Fund for Animals, as well as fundamentalists like PETA, Trans-Species Unlimited, and the Animal Liberation Front. Moreover, the achievements of the crusader groups are telling. For instance PETA grew from its two founders in 1980 to 300,000 in 1990 (p. 31), and between 1980-87 much of the cosmetics industry had come to pledge an end to all animal testing and allocated $5,000,000 for research on alternatives (p. 2). Some of this strength comes from alliance with parallel movements against pollution, racism, sexism, nuclearism, agribusiness, even cholesterol.
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Lengauer, Erwin. "Tom Regan’s Philosophy of Animal Rights: Subjects-of-a-Life in the Context of Discussions of Intrinsic and Inherent Worth." Problemos 97 (April 21, 2020): 87–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.97.7.
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Modern animal rights debates began in the 1970s, mainly as part of the budding field of applied ethics in Anglo-American philosophy. In just a short time, these animal rights discourses received international academic respect, especially through analytically trained philosophers. Central for this development was the analysis that rights language can be principally used species neutrally. This paper’s contribution is to examine the central terms of Tom Regan’s still widely discussed theory for their actuality and usefulness. Hence strengthening these arguments for modern animal rights theory as a serious approach in (inter)national ethical and legal disputes.
Translated from German by Gary Steiner, Bucknell University
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Probucka, Dorota. "O moralnych obowiązkach ludzi wobec zwierząt. Etyka Gary’ego Francione." Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae 13, no. 2 (June 30, 2015): 93–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/seb.2015.13.2.05.
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The purpose of my article is to present and analyze the ethical views of Gary Francione – the leading, contemporary representative of the Animal Rights Movement. He built his theory by criticizing the views of two other supporters of the idea of animal liberation: Peter Singer and Tom Regan. In his opinion, neither of these philosophers did not escape from the anthropocentric paradigm binding the moral obligations to animals with the primacy of human interest. Singer believed that only humans have the ability to plan their own future, and only they want to live and extend their own existence. While according to Regan, in conflict situations, respect for human interest should be dominant. Francione agrees that only people understand a deeper meaning of their own existence, but it does not follow that only they want to live and do not want to die. The need to preserve and continue life is not the result of mental states, but it is a consequence of sensitivity – the biological trait which aims to safeguard and continuation of life. According to Francione, if every sensitive creature has an interest in preserving his own life and avoiding suffering it they also have a moral right to life and not being treated in a cruel manner.
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Leite, Fábio Carvalho. "Liberdade de Crença e o Sacrifício de Animais em Cultos Religiosos." Veredas do Direito: Direito Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentável 10, no. 20 (April 14, 2014): 163. http://dx.doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v10i20.370.
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O presente artigo tem por propósito analisar em que medida a proteção à fauna pode impor-se como um limite à prática de cultos religiosos nos quais ocorrem sacrifícios de animais. A questão é delicada se assumirmos que a liberdade religiosa só tem sentido se compreendida como o direito não apenas de ter uma crença, mas de se determinar em razão dela. Como, por outro lado, nenhum direito ou valor pode ser compreendido em seu sentido absoluto, a premissa acima, embora necessária à caracterização do caso como um problema constitucional, está longe de ser suficiente para a sua solução. Nesse quadro, o trabalho pretende identificar critérios minimamente seguros para uma interpretação constitucional adequada dos valores em questão nos casos de sacrifícios de animais em rituais religiosos. AbstractThis work intends to analyze to what extent animal protection may be a limit to animal sacrifice rituals. It’s a delicate point if we agree that religious freedom should be understood not only as a right to hold religion belief, but also the right to self-determination based on the same religion beliefs. On the other hand, if there are no ‘absolute’ rights, the premise above, even though it is necessary to depict such case as a constitutional problem, it is far from sufficient. In this scenario, I try to identify minimally safe criteria to a constitutional interpretation that is adequate to those values when it comes to animal sacrifice rituals. KeywordsReligious freedom. Animal protection. Cruelty to animals.
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Soble, Alan. "Rights, Killing, and Suffering. R. G. FreyAnimals and Why They Matter. Mary MidgleyThe Case for Animal Rights. Tom Regan." Ethics 96, no. 1 (October 1985): 192–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292733.
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DeGrazia, David. "Book ReviewsCarl, Cohen, and Tom. Regan, The Animal Rights Debate.Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. Pp. 323. $19.95 (paper)." Ethics 113, no. 3 (April 2003): 692–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/345630.
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Scherer, D. "The Case for Animal Rights By Tom Regan. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983. xvii + 425 pp. Notes and index. $24.95)." Environmental History Review 9, no. 1 (March 1, 1985): 77–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3984121.
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Ebert, Rainer. "Mental-Threshold Egalitarianism." Social Theory and Practice 44, no. 1 (2018): 75–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201812330.
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Mental-threshold egalitarianism, well-known examples of which include Jeff McMahan’s two-tiered account of the wrongness of killing and Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights, divides morally considerable beings into equals and unequals on the basis of their individual mental capacities. In this paper, I argue that the line that separates equals from unequals is unavoidably arbitrary and implausibly associates an insignificant difference in empirical reality with a momentous difference in moral status. In response to these objections, McMahan has proposed the introduction of an intermediate moral status. I argue that this move ultimately fails to address the problem. I conclude that, if we are not prepared to give up moral equality, our full and equal moral status must be grounded in a binary property that is not a threshold property. I tentatively suggest that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is such a property, and a plausible candidate.
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Scruton, R. "Animal Rights and Wrongs." Proceedings of the British Society of Animal Science 2001 (2001): 262. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1752756200006244.
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Animals are an object of concern, and, as we extend our control over the earth’s resources, ever more so.The old way of distinguishing humans from other animals - in terms of the soul, God’s purpose, and the after-life - is no longer universally accepted, and the Darwinian theory of species has unsettled people’s moral perceptions. Is there any way of making the distinction between humans and other animals, therefore, that could recommend itself to modern, secular, sceptical people who believe nevertheless in the difference between right and wrong?
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Chartier, Gary. "Natural Law and Animal Rights." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 23, no. 1 (January 2010): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s084182090000480x.
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The new classical natural law theorists have been decidedly skeptical about claims that non-human animals deserve serious moral consideration. Their theory features an array of incommensurable, nonfungible basic aspects of welfare and a set of principles governing participation in and pursuit of these goods. Attacks on animals’ interests seem to be inconsistent with one or more of these principles. But leading natural law theorists maintain that animals do not participate in basic aspects of well being in ways that merit protection, that the so-called “argument from marginal cases” is unsuccessful as a basis for claims that animals have moral standing, and that affirming that animals have rights leaves one with no basis for maintaining that humans do as well. In response, I suggest that animals can be understood to participate in some aspects of well being, defend the argument from marginal cases, and offer reasons why we might believe that affirming that animals have rights does not undermine the claim that humans have rights.
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Pivetti, Monica. "Animal rights activists' representations of animals and animal rights: An exploratory study." Anthrozoös 18, no. 2 (June 2005): 140–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.2752/089279305785594252.
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Hagendorff, Thilo. "Animal Rights and Robot Ethics." International Journal of Technoethics 8, no. 2 (July 2017): 61–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijt.2017070105.
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This paper investigates challenges which anthropocentric and pathocentric ethics have to face when confronted with moral considerations about non-human animals, especially so-called disenhanced animals, and a new class of technological artifacts, namely social robots. Referring to the case of animal welfare, robot ethics emerges as a new discipline that has not yet reflected on the ideological biases that commonly underlie moral judgments toward animals and find expression in robot ethics, too. As a consequence, robot ethics perpetuates the “work of purification,” that is, the isolation and definition of a particular entity possessing a moral status. Whenever such an entity is defined, the definition excludes all those entities which could likewise possess a moral status but do not fit exactly to the pre-specified definition. The crucial question, then, is whether to seek an ethic of unconditional compassion that doesn't allow itself to be restricted by ideology and is therefore convenient for animal rights and robot ethics as well.
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Dolby, Nadine, and Annette Litster. "Animal Welfare and Animal Rights." Society & Animals 27, no. 5-6 (October 15, 2019): 575–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685306-12341493.
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AbstractVeterinarians routinely position themselves as the professionals who are most knowledgeable about non-human animals, and the public turns to them for guidance in matters of animal health and welfare. However, as research indicates, there is a considerable gap between what the public thinks veterinarians know and the actual veterinary curriculum. This study investigates the perspectives of veterinary students towards issues of animal welfare and animal rights, based on the results of a 2012 survey. Results indicate that veterinary students have limited and narrow understandings of both concepts, and that their knowledge is shaped by their professional socialization in veterinary education. Despite the enormous ethical complexity and diversity of philosophical perspectives that are inherent to both animal welfare and animal rights positions, veterinary students typically are not adequately prepared for a career that is located at the very center of these debates.
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Stucki, Saskia. "Towards a Theory of Legal Animal Rights: Simple and Fundamental Rights." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 40, no. 3 (2020): 533–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaa007.
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With legal animal rights on the horizon, there is a need for a more systematic theorisation of animal rights as legal rights. This article addresses conceptual, doctrinal and normative issues relating to the nature and foundations of legal animal rights by examining three key questions: can, do and should animals have legal rights? It will show that animals are conceptually possible candidates for rights ascriptions. Moreover, certain ‘animal welfare rights’ could arguably be extracted from existing animal welfare laws, even though these are currently imperfect and weak legal rights at best. Finally, this article introduces the new conceptual vocabulary of simple and fundamental animal rights, in order to distinguish the weak legal rights that animals may be said to have as a matter of positive law from the kind of strong legal rights that animals ought to have as a matter of future law.
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Freeman, Carrie Packwood. "Framing Animal Rights in the “Go Veg” Campaigns of U.S. Animal Rights Organizations." Society & Animals 18, no. 2 (2010): 163–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853010x492015.
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AbstractHow much do animal rights activists talk about animal rights when they attempt to persuade America’s meat-lovers to stop eating nonhuman animals? This study serves as the basis for a unique evaluation and categorization of problems and solutions as framed by five major U.S. animal rights organizations in their vegan/food campaigns. The findings reveal that the organizations framed the problems as: cruelty and suffering; commodification; harm to humans and the environment; and needless killing. To solve problems largely blamed on factory farming, activists asked consumers to become “vegetarian” (meaning vegan) or to reduce animal product consumption, some requesting “humane” reforms. While certain messages supported animal rights, promoting veganism and respect for animals’ subject status, many frames used animal welfareideology to achieve rights solutions, conservatively avoiding a direct challenge to the dominant human/animal dualism. In support of ideological authenticity, this paper recommends that vegan campaigns emphasize justice, respect, life, freedom, environmental responsibility, and a shared animality.
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Xavier, Fernando Cesar Costa. "Animal rights and environmemntal rights in Brazilian Supreme Court." Law Enforcement Review 2, no. 1 (April 12, 2018): 133–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.24147/2542-1514.2018.2(1).133-140.
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The subject. The article analyzes the arguments of the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil, used in the consideration of disputes concerning animal rights, in comparison with the developments of theorists in this field.The purpose of the article is to justify the necessity of respect for the rights of animals and the “animal dignity” by the courts.The methodology includes formal-legal analysis of courts’ decisions, comparative-legal analysis and synthesis as well as formal-logical analysis of scientific researches in the field of animal rights.The main results and scope of application. It is wrong to claim that the Brazilian Supreme Court decision in “Vaquejada” case (or even in “Farra do Boi” or cockfights cases) would be an increase in the process of a supposed recognition of animal rights in the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction. In such cases, most of the Judges who participated in the trial pondered and reinforced the prevalence of environmental law, including it wildlife protection (and non-submission of the animals to cruelty), pursuant to Art. 225, § 1, VII, of the Brazilian Constitution. In this way, it would have been disregarded the categorical difference between environmental law and animal rights. The Constitution itself encourages confusion between those categories when dealing with the prohibition of animal cruelty in a chapter on the environment (chap. VI). This article argues that the focus on the statement of environmental law, the Supreme Court allows them to be strengthened arguments considered as obstacles to the defenders of animal rights, particularly the anthropocentric argument that the balanced environment is important to make possible to human beings more quality of life. Analyzing the decisions, especially in of Vaquejada and Farra do Boi cases, it appears that points many important analyzed in the theoretical debate about animal rights, such as the notions of “animal dignity” and “flourishing life” are totally neglected. The article uses widely the arguments presented by Martha Nussbaum in her text Beyond “Compassion and humanity”: Justice for Nonhuman Animals, particularly to show that the approach of “capabilities” developed by it can provide a better theoretical orientation of the approaches Kantian contractualism and utilitarianism to the animal rights, mainly because it is able to recognize the breadth of the concept of “animal dignity”. It is considered that the central point to be faced in order to recognize the rights of animals is the one raised by the High Court of Kerala in the case of Nair v. India Union (June 2000), which Nussbaum highlights as the epigraph of the her text: “Therefore, it is not only our fundamental duty to show compassion to our animal friends, but also to recognize and protect their rights [...] If human beings have a right to fundamental rights, why not animals?”.Conclusions. Understanding the prohibition of animal abuse as a measure of environmental protection for the benefit of present and future generations is incorrect and does not take into account the basic principles that form the core of animal rights.Brazilian law will go a long way towards protecting animal rights when (and if) it expressly recognizes that animals (at least some of them) are creatures created for a decent existence”; when, for example, it permits the trial of habeas corpus filed in favour of a bull locked up in a farm or slaughterhouse.
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Taylor, Matthew. "Grounding Animal Rights in Mutual Advantage Contractarianism." Les ateliers de l'éthique 9, no. 3 (March 12, 2015): 184–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1029065ar.
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Contrary to critics and advocates of contractarianism alike, I argue that mutual advantage contractarianism entails rights and protections for animals. In section one I outline the criteria that must be met in order for an individual to qualify for moral rights on the contractarian view. I then introduce an alternative form of ‘rights,’ which I call ‘protectorate status,’ from which an individual can receive protections indirectly. In section two I suggest guidelines for assigning animal rights based on two ways of categorizing animals. On the basis of the categorization according to benefit derived, I argue that animals used for companionship, security, hunting assistance, transportation, entertainment, medical service, nourishment, or clothing will tend to qualify for basic rights against starvation, predation, and disease. On the basis of the categorization according to species, I argue that, on top of the basic rights above, dogs tend to qualify for rights against abuse, and against frivolous medical experimentation, as well as further negotiated rights. Cows have the basic rights against starvation, predation, and disease, but squirrels and bears have no rights. In section three I argue that some animals qualify for protectorate status, which would establish various protections for different animals, but would also generally prohibit cruelty towards animals.
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Vahid qızı Nuri, Fidan. "Historical and legal basis of animal rights." ANCIENT LAND 03, no. 03 (May 29, 2021): 12–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/2706-6185/03/12-14.
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As we know, animals take care of each other without any legal obligation and, if necessary, even protect others at the cost of their own lives. The concept of "law" was conceived by us humans, and it does not apply to any living thing other than man. So why are we talking about animal rights? The answer is simple: animal rights are the rights that govern the boundaries of human-animal relations. If we cannot determine the extent of human-animal relations, then we cannot hold some people accountable for cruelty to animals. Humans must be held accountable for their cruelty to animals. That's where animal rights come from. Key words: right, animal rights, welfare of animals, protection of animal rights
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Bryant, Clifton D., and Keith Tester. "Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights." Contemporary Sociology 22, no. 4 (July 1993): 557. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2074416.
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Ritvo, Harriet, and Keith Tester. "Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights." American Historical Review 97, no. 4 (October 1992): 1180. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2165521.
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Cooke, Steve. "Animal Kingdoms: On Habitat Rights for Wild Animals." Environmental Values 26, no. 1 (February 1, 2017): 53–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3197/096327117x14809634978555.
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WAHLBERG, BIRGITTA. "RE-EVALUATION OF ANIMAL PROTECTION BY THE FINNISH ANIMAL RIGHTS LAWYERS SOCIETY." Society Register 3, no. 3 (January 2, 2020): 123–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/sr.2019.3.3.07.
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The recognition of animals as sentient beings in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) gave rise to expectations as to real concern and care for animal welfare and a balance of human-animal interests. However, both the EU-legislation and the Finnish animal protection legislation is based on an animal welfare paradigm, meaning that animals have a weak legal status compared to humans that makes it impossible to de facto balance human and animal needs and interests in an effective manner from an animal point of view. The weak legal status of animals in the hierarchy of norms in the Finnish legal system contributes to the continuation of the oppression and exploitation of animals. The Finnish Animal Rights Lawyers Society have therefore made a proposal to strengthen animals’ legal status by including animals in the Finnish Constitution (FC) by safeguarding animals’ certain fundamental rights, thereby providing tools for balancing of human-animals interests. This article focuses on the re-evaluation of animal protection from an animal and constitutional point of view.
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McAllister Groves, Julian. "Are Smelly Animals Happy Animals? Competing Definitions of Laboratory Animal Cruelty and Public Policy." Society & Animals 2, no. 2 (1994): 125–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853094x00144.
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AbstractRegulations surrounding laboratory animal care have tried to address aspects of an image of laboratory animal cruelty publicized by animal rights activists. This image of cruelty, however, is not consistent with the experiences of those charged with the day-to-day care of laboratory animals. This article examines the incongruities between the public image of cruelty to animals in laboratories as promoted by animal rights activists, and the experiences of laboratory animal care staff who apply and enforce laboratory animal care regulations. In doing so, the article illuminates why regulations surrounding laboratory animal care are difficult to comply with on the part of the policy enforcers, and are continuously contested by both animal rights activists and animal research personnel.
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Lansdell, Herbert. "Laboratory Animals Need Only Humane Treatment: Animal “Rights” May Debase Human Rights." International Journal of Neuroscience 42, no. 3-4 (January 1988): 169–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3109/00207458808991594.
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Nelson, John O. "Brute Animals and Legal Rights." Philosophy 62, no. 240 (April 1987): 171–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064019.
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Various proponents of animal rights—for example, H. J. McCloskey— maintain that while brute animals (henceforth ‘animals’) cannot have; moral rights they can have legal rights. Indeed, McCloskey himself goes so far as to maintain that even inanimate objects are able to have legal rights.1 And why should not inanimate objects be able to? After f all, for there to be a legal right is anything more required than that whatever agency is empowered to issue legal rights simply legislate or proclaim that so-and-so has that legal right?
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Crowe, Jonathan. "Levinasian Ethics and Animal Rights." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 26, no. 2 (October 1, 2008): 314. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v26i2.4548.
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What can we say, in good faith, about the moral status of animals? This article explores the above question through the prism of Emmanuel Levinas’ theory of ethics. I begin by examining the ambiguous position of non-human animals in Levinas’ writings. I argue that Levinas’ theory is best read as suggesting that nonhumans present claims for recognition as ethical beings, but that these demands have a different character to those presented by humans. I then explore the implications of Levinas’ view of ethics for the structure of moral reasoning. I contend that Levinas’ theory yields a conception of moral reasoning as reflective, good faith engagement with primordial social judgements of ethical significance. In the final part of the article, I suggest that it is both possible and constructive to thematise the ethical claims of non-human animals in the language of rights. Indeed, from a Levinasian perspective, animal rights might properly be viewed as a model for the notion of human rights, since they capture the essential asymmetry of the ethical encounter.Que peut-on dire, de bonne foi, au sujet du statut moral des animaux? Cet article examine cette question à travers le prisme de la théorie d’éthique d’Emmanuel Levinas. J’examine d’abord la position ambiguë des animaux non humains dans les écrits de Levinas. Je soutiens que la meilleure façon d’interpréter la théorie de Levinas, c’est qu’elle suggère qu’il y a des raisons de reconnaître un caractère éthique aux êtres non humains, mais que ces raisons diffèrent de celles relatives aux êtres humains. J’examine ensuite les implications de la façon dont Levinas voit l’éthique pour la structure du raisonnement moral. Je prétends que la théorie de Levinas présente une conception du raisonnement moral comme étant un engagement réflectif, de bonne foi, avec des jugements sociaux primordiaux ayant une portée éthique. Dans la dernière partie de l’article, je suggère qu’il est possible et qu’il est constructif de faire une thématique des prétentions éthiques d’animaux non humains en utilisant le langage des droits. En fait, dans la perspective de Levinas, on peut correctement voir les droits des animaux comme modèle pour la notion des droits de la personne, car ils saisissent l’asymétrie essentielle de la rencontre éthique.
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Dufala, Martin, and Lenka Grešová. "Do Animals Have Any Rights in Slovakia?" Studia Iuridica Lublinensia 30, no. 3 (September 16, 2021): 47–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/sil.2021.30.3.47-65.
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This article focuses on assessing whether the current Slovak legal framework provides animals with a sufficient level of protection against cruelty and maltreatment. Past and current Slovak legislation on animal protection was analyzed in light of the major animal welfare challenges that Slovakia faces today. Contrary to what the title of the study suggests, a different approach was chosen to strengthen the protection of animals – not through the concept of animal rights, but the concept of human rights to a favourable environment. In addition, the possibility of using the already existing environmental law legal instruments when the well-being of animal is threatened was discussed.
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Schwaller, John F. "Environmental Historian: An Interview with Alfred W. Crosby." Americas 72, no. 2 (April 2015): 309–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/tam.2015.5.
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Alfred W. Crosby is the author of such influential works as The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492(New York: Greenwood Press, 1973).He lives in retirement on Nantucket Island with his wife Frances Karttunen, noted in her own right for important works in linguistics and history. In September, 2013, I had the opportunity to carry on a long conversation with Crosby about his work, American Studies, and the future for environmental history. Crosby suffers from Parkinson's disease. His mind is sharp and his insights are keen. The Columbian exchange is the phenomenon of the contact period in which European crops and animals were imported into the New World, while New World crops and animals were introduced into Europe.
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Pallotta, Nicole. "Origin of Adult Animal Rights Lifestyle in Childhood Responsiveness to Animal Suffering." Society & Animals 16, no. 2 (2008): 149–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853008x291435.
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AbstractThis qualitative study examines the childhood experiences of adult animal rights activists regarding their feelings about, and interactions with, nonhuman animals. Central to children's experiences with animals is the act of eating them, a ritual both normalized and encouraged by the dominant culture and agents of socialization. Yet, despite the massive power of socialization, sometimes children resist the dominant norms of consumption regarding animals. In addition to engaging in acts of resistance, some children, as suggested in the biographical narratives of adult vegan animal activists, also possess a predisposition to respond to the perceived suffering of animals. This predisposition is a variant of the trait empathy but is specifically animal-oriented. In open-ended interviews with 30 vegan animal activists about their paths into the movement, this study examined these childhood experiences and the predisposition that may help set the stage for later adoption of a vegan, animal-rights lifestyle.
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Janovic, Nikola. "Biopolitics: Animals, meat, food." Filozofija i drustvo 20, no. 2 (2009): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid0902041j.
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The general idea of this text is to reflect biopolitical constitution of the society and its implications related to the issues of animal welfare. Since animal in biopolitical formation is technically reduced to an object - commodity for contentment of the industry and of the people needs - critical public advisories are calling from moral, ethical and legal standpoint for attention to the fact that is necessary to protect animals from the unnecessary exploitation. It is obvious that animal protection is evoking animal rights question. But in the last instance protection of animal rights is related to the nutritional dilemma of animal food use. Question is arising: does animal rights in particular also envisage change in food politics (abandonment of meat food use), what is for instance the extreme veg(etari)an option taking for granted? This challenge sent to the culture of all-food eaters is opening up new questions and dilemmas. First of all, there is a question linked to the right of men to choose his own nutritional option, and of course dilemma which is related to scruples about meat-eaters and their (non)ability to love animals.
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Rafique, Zoheb. "Animal Rights and Use of Animals in Biomedical Research." Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 6, no. 1 (August 1, 2015): 11–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/bioethics.v6i1.24399.
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Experiments on animals have always been considered as necessary for scientific research, both fundamental and applied. In addition to scientific suitability criteria, this practice also must be justified from a moral point of view. This concern arises from the demand of our civilization that a certain moral value be recognized to animals. In this paper it is discussed in detail that how animals should be handled while doing research and what are animal rights and their uses in biomedical research.Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2015 Vol.6 (1):11-14
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Beauchamp, Tom L. "Opposing Views on Animal Experimentation: Do Animals Have Rights?" Ethics & Behavior 7, no. 2 (June 1997): 113–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327019eb0702_3.
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Lindburg, Donald G. "Zoos and the rights of animals." Zoo Biology 18, no. 5 (1999): 433–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1098-2361(1999)18:5<433::aid-zoo9>3.0.co;2-u.
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Milburn, Josh. "John Hadley: Animal Property Rights: A Theory of Habitat Rights for Wild Animals." Res Publica 23, no. 1 (December 9, 2016): 147–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9345-y.
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Nelson, Michael L. "Book Review: Animal Rights and Welfare: A Documentary and Reference Guide." Reference & User Services Quarterly 55, no. 2 (December 16, 2015): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/rusq.55n2.175a.
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Animal Rights and Welfare: A Documentary and Reference Guide is a collection of fifty-one primary source documents relating to the topics of animal rights and animal welfare. The preface states that these are separate and distinct philosophies: animal rights advocates such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals and the Animal Liberation Front hold that humans and animals have the same rights (thereby precluding their use even as pets or assistive animals), whereas animal welfare adherents like the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the American Humane Society endorse the use of animals for agriculture, work, biomedical research, etc., but in a manner that minimizes pain and suffering.
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Nibert, David A. "Animal Rights and Human Social Issues." Society & Animals 2, no. 2 (1994): 115–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853094x00135.
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AbstractUsing survey data from a sample of residents of Clark County, Ohio, the author explores the relationship between support for animal rights and opinions on eleven social issues pertaining to gun control, acceptance of violence, and rights for minority groups. Findings show that support for animal rights is significantly related to seven of the eleven variables, suggesting the existence of an important link between one's disposition toward human and nonhuman animals.
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LUCASSEN, SACHA. "ANIMAL-BASED MEASURES: A STEP TOWARDS RIGHTS FOR FARM ANIMALS?" Society Register 3, no. 3 (January 2, 2020): 159–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/sr.2019.3.3.10.
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While more than ever we are discussing animal rights and considering the possibility to extend the circle of our moral consideration, we are also more than ever inflicting suffering on more animals than in any time in history. This is especially the case for farm animals. This article aims to demonstrate that introducing animal-based measures into the legal system can be a practical and realistic step towards changing the familiar perspective of farm animals as mere commodities into the sentient beings they are.
Currently, legislation on farm animals builds on what are called resource-based measures. These measures are not based on the animals but on their environment and the conditions in which the animals are living. They are very compatible with the legal system being relatively easy to assess, less subjective and highly repeatable. However, compliance with resource-based measures does not always mean good animal welfare, since these measures are generally considered to be less well correlated to the experiences of the animal.
Animal-based measures, on the other hand, measure the state of the animal based on the actual animal, its behaviour (e.g. repetitive behaviour, human-animal relationship) and/or appearance (posture, facial expression, body condition).
A change where laws on animals actually require looking at the animals has the potential to improve the relationship to the animals and is an essential shift towards farm animals being regarded as someone and not something. By acknowledging animals as whole sentient beings, we do not just see a complex system of ‘behaviours’ (e.g. walking), but first and foremost we see a “behaver”, a dynamic living being, whose movements are always meaningful and psychological expressive.
In conclusion, animal-based measures force us to look at animals and recognize that they are able to feel pain, love, joy, loneliness and fear. Implementing animal-based measures for farm animals makes us, in a practical and realistic way, take those animals that are mostly considered as mere commodities, into our moral consideration, and unveils aspects of their sentience, which are currently hidden by the law.
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Peters, Anne. "Rights of Human and Nonhuman Animals: Complementing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." AJIL Unbound 112 (2018): 355–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.84.
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In May 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump spoke about illegal border crossings: “We have people coming into the country, or trying to come in … . You wouldn't believe how bad these people are. These aren't people. These are animals.” Such dehumanization (in this case of undocumented migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border) has been a standard discursive strategy to prepare, instigate, facilitate, and exculpate violence committed by humans against other humans throughout history. It is exactly in reaction to excesses of such dehumanizing mass violence committed in the Third Reich and during World War II that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted in 1948. This essay argues that the objectives of the UDHR itself would be furthered if the United Nations (or another international body such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, or the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)) engaged in work on a universal animal rights declaration. While animal welfare is increasingly protected in domestic jurisdictions, animal rights are still hardly recognized, although they would serve animals better. Animal rights would need to be universalized in order to have an effect in a globalized setting. The international legal order is flexible and receptive to nonhuman personhood. The historical experience with international human rights encourages the international animal rights project, because it shows how the equally pertinent objection of cultural imperialism can be overcome. Animal rights would complement human rights not least because the entrenchment of the species-hierarchy, as manifest in the denial of animal rights in many cases, condones disrespect for the rights of humans themselves.
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Galvin, Shelley L., and Harold A. Herzog. "Attitudes and Dispositional Optimism of Animal Rights Demonstrators." Society & Animals 6, no. 1 (1998): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853098x00014.
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AbstractMail-in surveys were distributed to animal activists attending the 1996 March for the Animals. Age and genderdemographic characteristics of the 209 activists who participated in the study were similar to those of the 1990 March for the Animals demonstrators. Most goals of the animal rights movement were judged to be moderately to critically important, although beliefs about their chances of being realized varied considerably. Movement tactics judged to be least effective included the liberation of laboratory animals and the harassment of researchers. Education was seen as being a particularly important instrument of future social change. Demonstrators' scores on the Life Orientation Test - a measure of dispositional optimism - were significantly greater than scores of comparison groups of college students and of patients awaiting coronary bypass surgery. There was a significant positive relationship between levels of optimism and activists' perceptions of the achievement of movement objectives.
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Midgley, Mary. "Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science. Tom Regan." Ethics 97, no. 4 (July 1987): 879–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292908.
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Plante, Courtney N., Stephen Reysen, Sharon E. Roberts, and Kathleen Gerbasi. "“Animals Like Us”: Identifying with Nonhuman Animals and Support for Nonhuman Animal Rights." Anthrozoös 31, no. 2 (March 4, 2018): 165–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08927936.2018.1434045.
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Donaldson, Sue. "Animal Agora." Social Theory and Practice 46, no. 4 (2020): 709–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202061296.
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Many theorists of the ‘political turn’ in animal rights theory emphasize the need for animals’ interests to be considered in political decision-making processes, but deny that this requires self-representation and participation by animals themselves. I argue that participation by domesticated animals in co-authoring our shared world is indeed required, and explore two ways to proceed: 1) by enabling animal voice within the existing geography of human-animal roles and relationships; and 2) by freeing animals into a revitalized public commons (‘animal agora’) where citizens encounter one another in spontaneous, unpredictable encounters in spaces that they can re-shape together.
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Hull, Debra B. "Animal Use in Undergraduate Psychology Programs." Teaching of Psychology 23, no. 3 (October 1996): 171–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009862839602300310.
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Chairpersons of undergraduate institutions that offer a psychology major but no graduate program were surveyed concerning their use of animals currently and 5 years ago. Results show that, despite the efforts of animal rights activists, there has been little change in the number of schools that use animals (about 50%) or in the aversive procedures to which animals are subjected. Surprisingly few institutions have had direct contact with animal rights activists. Chairpersons in departments that use animals report that students generally respond favorably to animal use and that American Psychological Association and National Institutes of Health guidelines are appropriate. Alternatives to animal use reported by respondents include computer simulations, video presentations, prepared slides, and human participants.
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Adam, Margaret B., David L. Clough, and David Grumett. "A Christian Case for Farmed Animal Welfare." Animals 9, no. 12 (December 11, 2019): 1116. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani9121116.
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It is now common to blame Christianity for broader society’s general inattention to the needs and comfort of animals in general, and farmed animals in particular. This critique of Christianity claims that certain biblical themes and particular biblical passages form the foundation for an anti-animal position that Christianity has imposed on Christians and on wider Western society. This article concedes that Christianity has often been used to justify exploitation of animals, but argues that it is a mistake to consider Christianity inevitably opposed to concern for animals. After reviewing the views of critics such as Lynn White Jr., Peter Singer, and Tom Regan, the article demonstrates the complexity of interpreting biblical passages and the possibility of readings that affirm the importance of treating animals well. It shows that Christians have indeed been advocates for animals, notably in relation to the first legislation against animal cruelty in the early nineteenth century and the formation of the RSPCA. Finally, it proposes a constructive framework for a Christian ethics of farmed animal welfare that could provide the basis for Christian action to reduce consumption of animals and shift to higher welfare sources of animal products.
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Oliver, Kelly. "Animal Ethics: Toward an Ethics of Responsiveness." Research in Phenomenology 40, no. 2 (2010): 267–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156916410x509959.
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AbstractThe concepts of animal, human, and rights are all part of a philosophical tradition that trades on foreclosing the animal, animality, and animals. Rather than looking to qualities or capacities that make animals the same as or different from humans, I investigate the relationship between the human and the animal. To insist, as animal rights and welfare advocates do, that our ethical obligations to animals are based on their similarities to us reinforces the type of humanism that leads to treating animals—and other people—as subordinates. But, if recent philosophies of difference are any indication, we can acknowledge difference without acknowledging our dependence on animals, or without including animals in ethical considerations. Animal ethics requires rethinking both identity and difference by focusing on relationships and responsivity. My aim is not only to suggest an animal ethics but also to show how ethics itself is transformed by considering animals.