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Journal articles on the topic 'Tradable permit markets'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 18 February 2022

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1

WADA, Kentaro, and Takashi AKAMATSU. "AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE NETWORK PERMIT MARKETS." Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser. D3 (Infrastructure Planning and Management) 67, no. 3 (2011): 376–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2208/jscejipm.67.376.

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2

Maeda, Akira. "Impact of banking and forward contracts on tradable permit markets." Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 6, no. 2 (June 2004): 81–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf03353932.

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3

Cason, Timothy N., and Lata Gangadharan. "Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61, no. 2 (October 2006): 199–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.007.

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4

Liao, Chao-ning, Hayri Önal, and Ming-Hsiang Chen. "Average shadow price and equilibrium price: A case study of tradable pollution permit markets." European Journal of Operational Research 196, no. 3 (August 2009): 1207–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.04.032.

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5

Schmalensee, Richard, and Robert N. Stavins. "The design of environmental markets: What have we learned from experience with cap and trade?" Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 4 (2017): 572–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grx040.

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Abstract This article reviews the design of environmental markets for pollution control over the past 30 years, and identifies key market-design lessons for future applications. The focus is on a subset of the cap-and-trade systems that have been implemented, planned, or proposed around the world. Three criteria led us to the selection of systems for review. First, among the broader class of tradable permit systems, our focus is exclusively on cap-and-trade mechanisms, thereby excluding emission-reduction-credit or offset programmes. Second, among cap-and-trade mechanisms, we examine only those that target pollution abatement, and so we do not include applications to natural resource management, such as individual transferable quota systems used to regulate fisheries. Third, we focus on the most prominent applications—those that are particularly important environmentally, economically, or both.

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6

Toušek, Z. "Market for tradable pollution permits." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 50, No. 5 (February 24, 2012): 199–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/5189-agricecon.

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Structural changes that were following the transformation from the centrally planed economy to market oriented one brought among other things new perceptions that of the hither to mainly reglected environmental issues. The Czech Republic as one of the few developed countries has achieved a tremendous decline in a emission production by huge investments. Because of the Kyoto protocol ratification by the EU, this issue is getting more important. The practical consequence of this ratification process is the creation of the unified European market for tradable emission permits that should be fully functioning by the year 2005. It is essential to fully understand basic theoretical principles of tradable emission permits market for homogenous and heterogeneous pollutions to achieve maximal benefits out of it.

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7

Dragoi, M. "Tradable permits in logging operations." Journal of Forest Science 48, No. 1 (May 17, 2019): 38–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/11855-jfs.

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The paper presents a new system of tradable permits combined with ecological bonds that is able to promote environment-friendly logging technologies, supposed to be less harmful to the forest ecosystem. All loggers deposit in advance ecological bonds on to-be-harvested volume basis and a certain number of permits to damage is freely given per each cubic meter, by the public authority. After surveying the damage caused throughout all harvested tracts, the number of permits on the volume basis is recomputed for each logger according to the magnitude and importance of damage caused. The logging company that caused smallest damage and saved most permits is allowed to sell to another competitor the number of permits which makes the difference between the two companies. The main section of the paper presents five simulations based on reliable scenarios that have been developed on some effective data referring to two types of damage produced by seven Romanian logging companies in 1999, in Suceava state county forest. Firstly, the deterministic scenario shows that environment-friendly companies become more competitive due to the new system because they have an additional income from sold permits. Conversely, companies unable to protect the environment are to pay more for being in business and thus their capacity to buy more timber is diminished. Assuming that companies able to get money due to this kind of trade are also able to improve their technology and can afford to buy more timber, it was demonstrated that the technological transfer is encouraged by the new system that might be combined with a regular compensation paid to the landowner as well. The greater the bond, the more advantageous the system for fewer and fewer companies. The lower the bond, the more companies can take advantage of the system but less money is collected from a given market.

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Morthorst, P. E. "Interactions of a tradable green certificate market with a tradable permits market." Energy Policy 29, no. 5 (April 2001): 345–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0301-4215(00)00133-6.

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Morthorst, P. E. "Interactions of a tradable green certificate market with a tradable permits market." Fuel and Energy Abstracts 43, no. 4 (July 2002): 289. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6701(02)86512-2.

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10

Andersson, Fredrik. "Small Pollution Markets: Tradable Permits versus Revelation Mechanisms." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32, no. 1 (January 1997): 38–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0954.

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11

O'Doherty, Richard, Ian Bailey, and Alan Collins. "Regulatory Failure via Market Evolution: The Case of UK Packaging Recycling." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21, no. 4 (August 2003): 579–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c0036j.

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The introduction of new market-based instruments (MBIs), such as eco-taxes and tradable permits, has prompted major changes in the implementation of environmental policy in the European Union. However, rather than wholeheartedly embracing the logic of environmental economics, governments have preferred to introduce MBIs alongside more traditional command-and-control measures, ostensibly to guarantee that policy objectives are met. Where such regimes of governance have underperformed, this raises the question as to whether difficulties are caused principally by flawed theory or regulatory failure, namely errors in policy design that distort MBIs from intended changes in market behaviour. Analysis of a tradable-permit scheme in Packaging Recovery Notes introduced to implement the UK Packaging Regulations reveals that, in this case, the difficulties experienced with an MBI were, in fact, traceable to regulatory failure. Different types of regulatory failure are identified and discussed.

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12

Needham, Katherine, Frans P. Vries, Paul R. Armsworth, and Nick Hanley. "Designing markets for biodiversity offsets: Lessons from tradable pollution permits." Journal of Applied Ecology 56, no. 6 (March 18, 2019): 1429–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1365-2664.13372.

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13

WADA, Kentaro, and Takashi AKAMATSU. "AN E-MARKET MECHANISM FOR IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE BOTTLENECK PERMITS." Doboku Gakkai Ronbunshuu D 66, no. 2 (2010): 160–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2208/jscejd.66.160.

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14

DE FEO, GIUSEPPE, JOANA RESENDE, and MARIA-EUGENIA SANIN. "OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS UNDER UPSTREAM–DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIC INTERACTION." International Game Theory Review 14, no. 04 (December 2012): 1240003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912400038.

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In this paper, we analyze environmental regulation based on tradable emission permits in the presence of strategic interaction in an output market with differentiated products. We characterize firms' equilibrium behavior in the permits and in the output market and we show that both firms adopt "rival's cost-rising strategies". Then, we study the problem of the regulator that aims at maximizing social welfare, proposing an efficient criterion to allocate permits between firms. We find that the optimal allocation criterion requires a perfect balance between the difference on firms' price-cost margins in the permits market and the difference on firms' mark ups in the output market. In light of the previous result, we use a simulation to obtain the optimal allocation of permits between firms as a function of output market characteristics, in particular as a function of goods substitutability.

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15

Brands, Devi K., Erik T. Verhoef, Jasper Knockaert, and Paul R. Koster. "Tradable permits to manage urban mobility: Market design and experimental implementation." Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 137 (July 2020): 34–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2020.04.008.

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16

Wang, Ge, Qi Zhang, Bin Su, Bo Shen, Yan Li, and Zhengjun Li. "Coordination of tradable carbon emission permits market and renewable electricity certificates market in China." Energy Economics 93 (January 2021): 105038. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.105038.

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17

Hartig, Florian, Martin Horn, and Martin Drechsler. "EcoTRADE – A multi-player network game of a tradable permit market for biodiversity credits." Environmental Modelling & Software 25, no. 11 (November 2010): 1479–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2009.01.003.

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18

Tang, Maogang, Zhen Li, Fengxia Hu, Baijun Wu, and Ruihan Zhang. "Market failure, tradable discharge permit, and pollution reduction: Evidence from industrial firms in China." Ecological Economics 189 (November 2021): 107180. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107180.

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19

Pizer, William A., and Xiliang Zhang. "China’s New National Carbon Market." AEA Papers and Proceedings 108 (May 1, 2018): 463–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181029.

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On December 19, 2017, China announced the official start of its national emissions trading system (ETS) construction program. When fully implemented, this program will more than double the volume of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions covered by either tax or tradable permit policy. Many of program's design features reflect those of China's pilot programs but differ from those of most emissions trading programs in the United States and Europe. This paper explains the context and design of China's new carbon market, discusses implications and possible modifications, and suggests topics for further research.

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20

Hagem, Cathrine, and Hege Westskog. "Allocating Tradable Permits on the Basis of Market Price to Achieve Cost Effectiveness." Environmental and Resource Economics 42, no. 2 (May 10, 2008): 139–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-008-9210-3.

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21

Eriksson, Marcus, and Lennart Vamling. "Heat pumps and tradable emission permits: On the carbon dioxide emissions of technologies that cross a tradable emission market boundary." Energy Conversion and Management 47, no. 20 (December 2006): 3510–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enconman.2006.03.018.

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22

Park, Kyungwon, Taeyeon Yoon, Changsub Shim, Eunjin Kang, Yongsuk Hong, and Yoon Lee. "Beyond Strict Regulations to Achieve Environmental and Economic Health—An Optimal PM2.5 Mitigation Policy for Korea." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 16 (August 7, 2020): 5725. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17165725.

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Growing concern about particulate matter (PM2.5) pressures Korea to reduce the health risks associated with its high dependency on fossil fuels. The Korean economy relies heavily on large thermal power plants—a major source of PM2.5 emissions. Although air quality regulations can negatively impact local economies, the Korean government announced two strict air quality mitigation policies in 2019. We develop a regional static computable general equilibrium model to simulate the economic and environmental impacts of these polices under alternative hypothetical scenarios. We separate two regions, Chungcheongnam-do, the most polluted region, and the rest of the country, in our model. As policy options, we introduce a regional development tax and a tradable market for PM emission permits, similar to an air pollution tax and a carbon permits market, respectively. The results show that allowing higher tax rates and a tradable permits market gives the optimal combination, with the PM2.5 emissions reduced by 2.35% without sacrificing economic growth. Since alternative options present, for example, a 0.04% loss of gross domestic product to reduce PM emissions by the same amount, our results here may present a new policy paradigm for managing air pollutants such as PM2.5.

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23

Drechsler, Martin. "The impact of cost feedbacks on the land-use dynamics induced by a tradable permit market." Ecological Complexity 29 (March 2017): 82–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecocom.2017.01.003.

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24

OJHA, VIJAY P. "Carbon emissions reduction strategies and poverty alleviation in India." Environment and Development Economics 14, no. 3 (June 2009): 323–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x0800497x.

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ABSTRACTThis paper, based on a computable general equilibrium model of the Indian economy, shows that a domestic carbon tax policy that recycles carbon tax revenues to households imposes heavy costs in terms of lower economic growth and higher poverty. However, the decline in economic growth and rise in poverty can be minimized if the emissions restriction target is modest, and carbon tax revenues are transferred exclusively to the poor. India's participation in an internationally tradable emission permits regime with grandfathered emissions allocation is preferable to any domestic carbon tax option, provided the world market price of emission permits remains low. Even better would be if India participated in a global system of tradable emission permits with equal per capita emission entitlements. India would then be able to use the revenues garnered from the sale of surplus permits to speed up its economic growth and poverty reduction and yet keep its per capita emissions below the 1990 per capita global emissions level.

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25

Germain, Marc, Vincent Van Steenberghe, and Alphonse Magnus. "Optimal Policy with Tradable and Bankable Pollution Permits: Taking the Market Microstructure into Account." Journal of Public Economic Theory 6, no. 5 (December 2004): 737–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00189.x.

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26

Springer, Urs. "The market for tradable GHG permits under the Kyoto Protocol: a survey of model studies." Energy Economics 25, no. 5 (September 2003): 527–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-9883(02)00103-2.

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27

CHIMELI, ARIASTER B., and JOHN B. BRADEN. "A capital scarcity theory of the environmental Kuznets curve." Environment and Development Economics 14, no. 5 (October 2009): 541–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x08004981.

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ABSTRACTThis paper offers a theory of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) based on the scarcity of capital relative to environmental quality. In a unified treatment of both market and transition economies of the former Soviet Bloc, we characterize a dynamic economy subject to two sources of market failure: a pollution externality and a pure public good ‘environmental quality’. We derive a policy rule to implement the social optimum in market and transition economies and show how, in general, a pollution tax or tradable permits can only implement the social optimum if accompanied by other taxes on consumption or profits.

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28

Zhou, Li Ping. "Literature Review of the Domestic Research on Emission Trade." Advanced Materials Research 424-425 (January 2012): 179–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.424-425.179.

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Emission trading means that, on the premise that environment and resources belongs to the nation and the total amount of emission is under regulation, the government sells the permit of a certain amount of emission to the polluter by issuing tradable emission licences. This paper discusses the emission trading in China in the recent 30 years. By reviewing the research field,research orientation and the status quo, this paper aimed at do some fundamental theoretical research on the application of the emission trading theory and the establishment of the emission trading market in China

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29

Chen, Y., and B. F. Hobbs. "An Oligopolistic Power Market Model With Tradable NO<tex>$_rm x$</tex>Permits." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 20, no. 1 (February 2005): 119–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2004.840440.

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30

Caffera, Marcelo, and Carlos Chávez. "The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance in the Lab: Effect on Quantities, Prices, and Implications for the Design of a Cost-Effective Policy." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 16, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 727–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0202.

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Abstract Recent theoretical developments show the conditions under which it is cost-effective for the regulator to induce perfect compliance in cap-and-trade programs. These conditions are based on the ability that a regulator with perfect information has to induce the firms to emit any desired level with different combinations of the number of permits supplied to the market and the monitoring probability, assuming that firms are expected profit maximizers. In this paper, we test this hypothesis with a series of laboratory experiments. Our results suggest that firms may behave significantly different from what these models predict precisely when the different combinations of the supply of permits and the monitoring probability induce compliance versus noncompliance. More specifically, by allowing noncompliance in a manner consistent with theory, the regulator could produce a decrease in emissions and an increase in the market price of tradable permits that is not predicted by the theoretical models. The implications for the cost-effective design of environmental policy are discussed.

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Brînzan, Oana, Marian Drăgoi, Dalia Bociort, Eugenia Țigan, Nicoleta Mateoc-Sîrb, and Monica Lungu. "A Market-Based Economic Instrument to Better Use Water in Agriculture." Sustainability 12, no. 4 (February 17, 2020): 1473. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12041473.

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The paper presents a market-oriented system of returnable guarantees that can be combined with tradable permits to encourage farmers to use alternative sources of water instead of the regular watering network, or to steer the farming system toward environmentally-friendly systems like low tillage and/or organic farming. Factual data from real farming were bootstrapped to test whether or not a set of farms could save water and reduce chemical input due to the higher cost of maintaining the status quo. Based on interactions between water, pesticides, fertilizers, and crops, the system of returnable guarantee determines the farmers to reduce the amount of water harvested from aquifers, generates benefits for the most environmentally-friendly farmers, and stimulate conversion to organic farming.

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32

Zolfagharipoor, Mohammad Amin, Azadeh Ahmadi, and Alireza Nikouei. "Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran." Water Policy 23, no. 4 (July 5, 2021): 912–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2021.251.

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Abstract Cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has led to environmental benefits in some groundwater markets by restricting and economically reallocating water permits. However, top-down approaches for capping permits may face resistance from every affected stakeholder. This paper presents an efficient policy framework to improve the implementation of C&T policies in a real shared aquifer in Iran. To this end, groundwater permits for water-selling farms are capped through a bottom-up capping (BUC) policy. A policy analysis that employs static and dynamic bargaining techniques incorporates farms' utilities. Results reveal that the bargaining techniques propose more acceptable capping strategies than the top-down approach. The BUC policy analysis introduces the proposed strategy by dynamic bargaining as the tradable groundwater permits. The effects of irrigation water sales to the industry sector, evaluated using a cooperative game-based optimization model, show that with the fair reallocation of water trading benefits, the current net benefits of agriculture and industry sectors increase by 55 and 27%, respectively. Furthermore, farms reduce their groundwater withdrawals by 35% compared with the current mode. Therefore, the BUC policy for inter-sectoral groundwater trading under dynamic bargaining can lead to the sustainable use of limited groundwater resources by facilitating the capping strategies and improving the water permits productivity.

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33

Blackman, Allen, Zhengyan Li, and Antung A. Liu. "Efficacy of Command-and-Control and Market-Based Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries." Annual Review of Resource Economics 10, no. 1 (October 5, 2018): 381–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100517-023144.

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Like their counterparts in industrialized countries, environmental regulators in developing countries rely principally on two types of instruments: command-and-control (CAC) policies, such as emissions and technology standards, and to a lesser extent, market-based instruments (MBIs), such as emissions fees and tradable permits. But these regulators often lack the capacity to implement, monitor, and enforce CAC and MBI policies. As a result, the efficacy of those policies is an empirical matter. We review emerging experimental and quasi-experimental evidence on CAC and MBI policies in developing countries, specifically, from 32 studies of CAC policies and 8 studies of MBIs. Although drawn from a small and decidedly nonrandom sample of countries and policy types, the evidence clearly indicates that CAC and MBI policies can have significant environmental benefits in developing countries. In addition to cataloging and reviewing this evidence, we discuss data and methodological challenges to augmenting it and suggest directions for future research.

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34

А.В., Череп, and Каткова Н.В. "ХЕДЖУВАННЯ ЕКОЛОГІЧНИХ РИЗИКІВ ПІДПРИЄМНИЦЬКОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ: МІЖНАРОДНА ПРАКТИКА." Economics and Management, no. 86(2) (May 22, 2020): 30–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.36919/2312-7812.2.2020.30.

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The article discusses hedging tools and insurance of environmental risks used in international practice. It was noted that so-called environmental derivatives are used as financial instruments for hedging environmental risks. Environmental derivatives are financial instruments that can be used by organizations or individuals to reduce the risk of adverse and unforeseen weather conditions or environmental catastrophes (in particular, weather derivatives, carbon credits and greenhouse gases emissions quotas, as well as futures and options for them, exchange trade funds based on ESG indicators, including environmental, social and management strategies). The main types of weather and carbon derivatives, as well as ways to trade them are considered. Thus, weather derivatives are usually based on an index that measures a certain weather aspect: cooling degree days, heating degree days, snowfall, snow depth, wind speed or chill level. Weather options and futures for trading (call) and put (put) are traded on exchanges, and on the over-thecounter markets (OTC) weather derivatives take various forms - from swaps to forward contracts. Carbon financial instruments include such as tradable pollution permits and credits, green trade, carbon derivatives, natural securities, carbon investment funds. The following carbon assets are traded on the EU spot carbon market: EU quotas, EU aviation quotas, certified emission reductionunits, emission reduction units. There are primary and secondary markets for carbon assets, as well as a market for derivatives — futures and options for quotas. Index exchange traded funds (ETFs), which are formed on the basis of ESG indicators (environmental, social and management strategies), are also considered as a tool for hedging environmental risks. Environmental, social and management strategies are increasingly popular in the indexing and ETF industries as investors seek to apply social values to investment portfolios.

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35

Sturm, Bodo, and Tim Mennel. "Energieeffizienz – eine neue Aufgabe staatlicher Regulierung?" Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 58, no. 1 (April 1, 2009): 3–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zfwp-2009-0102.

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AbstractIn the political debate, calls for regulation of energy efficiency are usually based on environmental or resource economic arguments. This paper analyses the case for energy efficiency regulation as a policy to curb excessive resource consumption, to protect the climate and to achieve energy security. The economic rationale for regulation on these grounds is market failure due to externalities and asymmetric information as well as intergenerational distributive justice. We show, however, that most instruments used in energy efficiency regulation, such as standards, subsidies and white certificates, do not meet the criterion of cost efficiency. Tradable emission permits and specific energy taxes are more effective in achieving the policy goals and less costly. Energy efficiency is shown to be a result, not a means of sound environmental and resource policy.

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36

Wang, Chao, Jiang Liu, Li Huang, and Wei Li. "Exploring the Relationship between Industrial Economic Growth and Environmental Pollution - An Empirical Analysis Based on Cointegration and Granger Causality Test." Applied Mechanics and Materials 423-426 (September 2013): 1377–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.423-426.1377.

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This paper aims at investigating the cointegration relationship between industrial economic growth and environmental pollutions from the timing dimension by using three types of environmental pollution indicators of industrial emissions and going further to test whether this relationship is bidirectional Granger causality. Firstly, the cointegration analysis’ result shows that the relationship between industrial economic growth and environmental quality may not meet the hypothesis of EKC curve. In the timing period analyzed, the relationship is linear and positive. Hence, promoting the relationship to be negative when only relying on self-regulation of the market will probably not be achieved. Secondly, based on cointegration test, this paper goes further to conduct Granger causality test of cointegration relationship. The result shows industrial economic growth causes pollution emission but it is not true vice versa. The reasons possibly include that that the technological progress in recent years may not embody on the reduction of pollution emission intensity, the absence of resources product market, the lack of tradable emission permits market and no effective incentives of green production behaviors of enterprises to react up on encouraging enterprises’ development. These generate external pressure to the transformation of industrial economic growth pattern.

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O'CONNOR, DAVID. "Applying economic instruments in developing countries: from theory to implementation." Environment and Development Economics 4, no. 1 (February 1999): 91–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x99000078.

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The paper describes a number of developing country applications of economic instruments (EIs), focusing on how policy makers—mostly in Asia and La tin America—have addressed implementation problems. The informational and institutional demands of EIs can be as great as with regulations; in any event, the former are mostly used to complement not replace the latter. Consideration of political acc eptability has conditioned both instrument design (e.g. grandfathering of tradable permits, non-compliance fees rather than simple pollution charges) and phasing of implementation (e.g. starting with local experimentation, setting low initial charge rates). With the advance of market-oriented economic reforms in the developing world, the policy and institutional environment should become more conducive to applying EIs; with greater political openness in many countries, the scope for involving the media, n on-governmental organizations, and the public at large in environmental enforcement (e.g., through information disclosure programmes) should also increase.

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38

Wiener, Jonathan B. "Hormesis, hotspots and emissions trading." Human & Experimental Toxicology 23, no. 6 (June 2004): 289–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/0960327104ht451oa.

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Instrument choice - the comparison of technology standards, performance standards, taxes and tradable permits - has been a major topic in environmental law and environmental economics. Most analyses assume that emissions and health effects are positively and linearly related. If they are not, this complicates the instrument choice analysis. This article analyses the effects of a nonlinear dose-response function on instrument choice. In particular, it examines the effects of hormesis (highdose harm but low-dose benefit) on the choice between fixed performance standards and tradable emissions permits. First, the article distinguishes the effects of hormesis from the effects of local emissions. Hormesis is an attribute of the dose-response or exposure-response relationship. Hotspots are an attribute of the emissions-exposure relationship. Some pollutants may be hormetic and cause local emissions-exposure effects; others may be hormetic without causing local emissionsexposure effects. It is only the local exposure effects of emissions that pose a problem for emissions trading. Secondly, the article shows that the conditions under which emissions trading would perform less well or even perversely under hormesis, depend on how stringent a level of protection is set. Only when the regulatory standard is set at the nadir of the hormetic curve would emissions trading be seriously perverse (assuming other restrictive conditions as well), and such a standard is unlikely. Moreover, the benefits of the overall programme may justify the risk of small perverse effects around this nadir. Thirdly, the article argues that hotspots can be of concern for two distinct reasons, harmfulness and fairness. Lastly, the paper argues that the solution to these problems may not be to abandon market-based incentive instruments and their cost-effectiveness gains, but to improve them further by moving from emissions trading and emissions taxes to risk trading and risk taxes. In short, the article argues that hormesis does not pose a general obstacle to emissions trading or emissions taxes, but that in those cases where hormesis does pose such a problem, a shift toward risk trading or risk taxes would be the superior route.

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39

Grame Nimmo, Dale. "Environmental Principles and Policies: An Interdisciplinary Approach." Pacific Conservation Biology 14, no. 1 (2008): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/pc080074.

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In recent years, debate over the most efficient means of dealing with environment problems has heightened. This is particularly true for issues such as habitat loss and climate change, whose environmental ramifications are of global significance. In the past two decades much of this debate has centered on so called ?economic instruments? for environmental protection, such as tradable permits, quota systems, environmental taxes and conservation banks. The recent emphasis on instruments signifies a departure from traditional environmental policy, which focused almost exclusively on legal regulation (i.e., so called ?command and control? regulations). Ostensibly, the purpose of economic instruments is to protect the environment in the most economically efficient manner, by turning a ?zero sum game? into a situation where environmental and social costs are integrated into market process to find ?optimal? levels of environmental degradation. It is within this intellectual mine-field that Sharon Beder launches her recent publication, Environmental Principles and Policies: An Interdisciplinary Approach.

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van Ierland, Ekko, Corjan Brink, Leen Hordijk, and Carolien Kroeze. "Environmental Economics for Environmental Protection." Scientific World JOURNAL 2 (2002): 1254–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1100/tsw.2002.289.

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Environmental economics deals with the optimal allocation of production factors and correcting market failure in protecting the environment. Market failure occurs because of externalities, common property resources, and public goods. Environmental policy instruments include direct regulation, taxes/subsidies, tradable permits, deposit systems, voluntary agreements, and persuasion.Environmental policies usually focus on one pollutant or environmental issue but may have substantial impacts on other emissions and environmental problems. Neglecting these impacts will result in suboptimal policies. We present an integrated optimisation model for determining cost-effective strategies to simultaneously reduce emissions of several pollutants from several sources, allowing for interrelations between sources and abatement options. Our integrated approach in regard to acidifying compounds and greenhouse gases will be able to provide cost-effective policy options that will result in lower overall abatement costs.This paper shows that efficient emission reduction can be calculated, but we argue that, for transboundary air pollution and climate change, it is difficult to implement the socially optimal solution because strong incentives exist for “free-riding”. In order to implement efficient policies, international environmental agree-ments like the Gothenburg or the Kyoto Protocol are necessary to establish stable coalitions. The stability of these agreements depends on the distribution of costs and benefits over countries and on the redistribution of the gains of cooperation.

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Kohn, Michael. "Energy, Environment and Climate: Economic Instruments." Energy & Environment 7, no. 2 (March 1996): 147–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0958305x9600700204.

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The Report discusses the role and effectiveness of Economic Instruments in the field of energy and environment. Economic Instruments are applicable to a wide range of environmental concerns around the world, but this Report focuses primarily on potential global climate change. Although the emphasis for action on potential global climate change presently rests firmly on the shoulders of the industrialised countries and economies in transition, actions should be taken on the basis of equity and in accordance with the common, but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of different countries. Thus, this Report is directed mainly at the North, but also has relevance for the South. To determine which policy instruments is most appropriate, cost/benefit analysis should be used, but environmental impacts are difficult to value in monetary terms. Thus, only qualitative criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, equity, flexibility and acceptability) can be used to determine which instrument, or mix of measures, would be most effective in mitigating potential global climate change. This Report concludes that: Direct regulation has historically been the most common means by which governments have limited pollutant emissions. The main drawbacks of direct regulation are their lack of flexibility and the increasing costs and complexity of this form of instrument. Tradable permit schemes distribute emissions permits between businesses and enable companies to buy and sell unused emissions quotas and have the potential to achieve more cost-effective emissions reductions than direct regulation. There is an increasing possibility of an international system for controlling emissions of carbon dioxide, although there are significant difficulties to overcome in allocating initial permits/quotas. Subsidies can be used to artificially improve the economics and acceptability of a policy. Short term subsidies can produce environmental benefits, but if applied in the longer term they give the wrong economic signals and distort market behaviour. Ecotaxes relay on market forces to lead producers and consumers towards more environmentally-acceptable goods and services, and are limited to cases where there is price elasticity in energy demand. Energy and carbon taxes are ineffective at reducing carbon dioxide emissions unless set at unrealistically high rates. Tax measures can detrimentally remove capital for environmental investments and improvements from industry and commerce. Ecotaxes need to be co-ordinated internationally to avoid distortions on export competitiveness, that would require an unprecedented degree of co-operation. Thus, it appears that ecotaxes are not the panacea they are widely promoted to be. Voluntary approaches (including joint implementation) seem to offer flexibility, which is a key attraction for industry. They have the potential to reduce administration and implementation costs, although it is recognised that the operation of such schemes requires close monitoring. Voluntary approaches are expected to receive wider support than non-voluntary approaches. Joint implementation schemes have been highlighted as a potentially powerful mechanism for mitigating potential climate change. A mix of economic and voluntary approaches offers the optimal solution: the mix should be tailored to the needs of individual country situations and priorities. A minimum regret policy should be followed. Until a full understanding of environmental problems has been determined on a sound, scientific basis, caution needs to be exercised in the use of economic instruments.

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Stranlund, John, and Wei Zhang. "Bankruptcy Risk and the Performance of Tradable Permit Markets." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1014386.

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Kijima, Masaaki, Akira Maeda, and Katsumasa Nishide. "Equilibrium pricing of contingent claims in tradable permit markets." Journal of Futures Markets, 2009, n/a. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/fut.20430.

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Kerr, Suzi, and David C. Maré. "Transaction Costs and Tradable Permit Markets: The United States Lead Phasedown." SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1082596.

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Reichenbach, Johanna, and Till Requate. "Potential anti-competitive effects of emission permit markets – A survey on theoretical findings and evidence." Review of Economics 64, no. 3 (January 1, 2013). http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/roe-2013-0302.

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AbstractEmissions trading has been established as an important instrument of pollution control in many world regions. However concerns have been raised whether or not emission-trading schemes may distort competition either on the permit market itself or on related output markets. In this paper we review tradable emission-allowance schemes with special reference to anti-competitive effects. Such distortions may be caused by large firms exercising market power on the allowance market by holding down supply or suppressing demand in order to manipulate prices to their advantage. Firms may also try to abuse the allowance market to put other firms, with whom they compete on the output market, at a competitive disadvantage. Further distortions and abuses may be caused by special or ill-defined rules on the allowance market or other markets. In this paper we survey theoretical insights on potential anti-comptitive effects of emissions trading and also provide some empirical evidence for market power abuses on auctioned and grandfathered allowance markets with a particular focus on the (alleged) allowance market abuse by power utilities in Germany and California.

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MacKenzie, Ian A., Nick Hanley, and Tatiana Kornienko. "A Permit Allocation Contest for a Tradable Pollution Permit Market." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1102217.

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Lapan, By Harvey E., and Shiva Sikdar. "Strategic environmental policy and international market share rivalry under differentiated Bertrand oligopoly." Oxford Economic Papers, December 18, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpaa035.

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Abstract We analyse strategic environmental policies under international Bertrand oligopoly when firms in different industries, located in different countries, produce differentiated products. Under cooperation, emission prices always exceed the joint marginal damage from pollution. Under non-cooperation, internationally nontradable and tradable emission permit prices are always higher than the domestic marginal damage from emissions (the Pigovian tax); emission taxes can also exceed the Pigovian tax. The non-cooperative emission prices under all instruments can exceed the joint pollution damage. Internationally tradable permits generate outcomes closest to cooperation — they result in the lowest pollution and the highest welfare among all instruments under non-cooperation. Pollution is the highest and welfare the lowest with taxes. Our results provide support for allowing international trade in emission permits even when governments choose their permit levels non-cooperatively.

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Hanley, Nick, and Ian A. MacKenzie. "The Effects of Rent Seeking over Tradable Pollution Permits." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 10, no. 1 (July 7, 2010). http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.2497.

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Abstract The establishment of a tradable permit market requires the regulator to select a level of aggregate emissions and then distribute the associated permits to specific groups. Both these decisions create opportunities for rent seeking. In this paper, we use a contest model to analyse the incentives to rent seek for pollution permits and to analyse the consequences for social welfare. We find differences in firms' rent-seeking choices compared to a conventional rent-seeking contest. We see that a fundamental aspect of firms' incentives to rent seek depends on the market value of the permits, that is, the value of the ex post reallocated rents. This impact depends on the responsiveness of the regulator to aggregate rent-seeking effort. The responsiveness, in some cases, may improve welfare by reducing the per-unit value of permits, which may lower the rent-seeking effort more than it increases the damages experienced from the additional emissions.

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Brands, Devi, Erik T. Verhoef, Jasper Knockaert, and Paul Koster. "Tradable Permits to Manage Urban Mobility: Market Design and Experimental Implementation." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3323642.

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Jiang, Minxing, Xingliang Feng, and Liang Li. "Market Power, Intertemporal Permits Trading, and Economic Efficiency." Frontiers in Energy Research 9 (July 29, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fenrg.2021.704556.

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The banking and borrowing (BB) system has been developed gradually in the tradable permits market to perform a role as an environmental management tool. One question naturally arises as to how it will impact the behaviors of firms and the efficiency in presence of market power in the permits market. This paper considers market power in two cases: with and without the BB system. The equilibrium behaviors of the firms are identified in two cases. The findings show that the producing and discharging behaviors of firms depend on the permits price elasticity of output price without BB system, while they only depend on the growth rate of the output price in the BB system. Although both cases fail to obtain efficient solutions, the market with a BB system is capable of alleviating the inefficiency arising from market power compared with that without a BB system. The path of permits price satisfies the Hotelling rule in the case of the BB system, while it is closely related to the path of output price and output price elasticity of permits price in the case without the BB system.

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