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Journal articles on the topic 'Tragedy of the Anticommons'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 8 February 2022

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1

King, Ronald F., Ivan Major, and Cosmin Gabriel Marian. "Confusions in the Anticommons." Journal of Politics and Law 9, no. 7 (August 30, 2016): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n7p64.

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Tragedy of the anticommons is the logical reciprocal to the better-known tragedy of the commons. It is generally characterized as a legal regime in which multiple owners hold rights of exclusion over a resource in demand. The resource cannot be put into use without a bundling of approvals from the various separate owners, yet bundling entails serious bargaining complications resulting in systematic Pareto underutilization. Nevertheless, we argue, the anticommons concept often has been employed without consistency and appropriate precision. Illustrations come primarily from the writings of Michael Heller, whose oft-cited work has been central to the anticommons literature. This paper presents a simple version of the formal anticommons model and demonstrates that relevant applications can be constructed with uniformity and analytic rigor.

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2

Gröndahl, Boris. "Die Tragedy of the anticommons." PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 32, no. 126 (March 1, 2002): 89–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v32i126.714.

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The patent system is one part of the triad of intellectual property, besieged by technological progress, globalisation and political criticism. In addition to the well-known argument that patents have unwanted moral or ecological consequences because they function, an immanent argument gains ground in the economic debate that they actually do not work as intended. In complex technologies such as biology, computers and software, the argument goes, patents tend to create a „tragedy of the anticommons“, stifling capitalist development.

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3

Park, Jason Y. "The Tragedy of the Microarray Anticommons." Clinical Chemistry 56, no. 11 (November 1, 2010): 1683–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1373/clinchem.2010.154740.

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4

Zhou, Yi. "The Tragedy of the Anticommons in Knowledge." Review of Radical Political Economics 48, no. 1 (June 26, 2015): 158–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0486613415586992.

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5

Parente, Michael D., and Abel M. Winn. "Bargaining behavior and the tragedy of the anticommons." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84, no. 2 (November 2012): 475–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.08.002.

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6

Robson, Victoria. "Land fragmentation in southern Ontario: A tragedy of the spatial anticommons." SURG Journal 5, no. 2 (April 22, 2012): 22–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21083/surg.v5i2.1328.

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Competition between agricultural operations, urban transplants, and ecological interests is changing the nature of property rights and land use in rural Ontario. In a region with valuable ecosystems and climate, soil, and location traditionally well-suited for crop and livestock production, plot sizes are decreasing as land is subdivided and allocated to non-agricultural residential use. Although this practice can increase property value for farmers, Michael Heller’s spatial anticommons may also be observed, such that “each owner receives a core bundle of rights, but in too small a space for the most efficient use” [2]. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new application of Heller’s anticommons theory, examining how the increasingly patchwork-like distribution of rural land parcels can be expected to affect farm and ecosystem productivity. Ultimately, deadweight loss occurs because neither agricultural nor ecological economies of scale can be recognized on plots that are too small for efficient use. Using rural planning reports and habitat ecology studies, trends in the fragmentation process are described and compared to the aims of provincial land-use policy, including the Provincial Policy Statement, the Greenbelt Act, and the Places to Grow Act. While the goals of farmers and conservationists may at times seem discrete or incompatible, the anticommons framework may be used to identify shared challenges. Thus the two parties might consider how collective action could be used to overcome the difficulties of reuniting subdivided tracts of land.

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7

Hunter, Dan. "Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons." California Law Review 91, no. 2 (March 2003): 439. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3481336.

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8

Heller, Michael. "The Tragedy of the Anticommons: A Concise Introduction and Lexicon." Modern Law Review 76, no. 1 (January 2013): 6–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12000.

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9

Yoon, Yong J., and William F. Shughart. "Stackelberg on the Danube: Games in the Anticommons." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 31, no. 1 (April 1, 2013): 199–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569213x15664519748686.

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Abstract We model the tragedy of the anticommons - the underutilization of a resource in the presence of multiple rights to exclude - as a Stackelberg price-leader game. We show that the equilibrium outcomes when the players move sequentially are more inefficient than when they move simultaneously in a ‘static’ version of the game. The results have important implications for the design of modern regulatory institutions, including the appointment of ‘super-bureaucrats’ or regulatory ‘czars’, the emergence of so-called patent trolls, tribal toll-collectors on the road from Pakistan to Afghanistan, climbing Mt. Everest, rent seeking contests, and antitrust law enforcement.

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10

Vanneste, Sven, Alain Van Hiel, Francesco Parisi, and Ben Depoorter. "From “tragedy” to “disaster”: Welfare effects of commons and anticommons dilemmas." International Review of Law and Economics 26, no. 1 (March 2006): 104–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2006.05.008.

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11

Coelho, Manuel Pacheco, José António Filipe, and Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira. "Ethics and Natural Resources Management." International Journal of Organizational and Collective Intelligence 3, no. 3 (July 2012): 56–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijoci.2012070104.

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This paper proposals are: first, to show how the utilization of common resources can carry important ethical problems; second (and mainly), to stress that the many attempts to solve tragedies in fisheries, by creating interesting projects in aquaculture, are confronted with many obstacles and barriers in the approval process. These obstructions conduct to inefficiencies and carry out also important ethical problems. The Portuguese aquaculture case is used to develop an empirical study on the emergence of an “anticommons tragedy”. The control regime of Common Fisheries Policy is discussed.

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12

Micelotta, Evelyn Rita, and Frank Wijen. "The Tragedy of the Anticommons: The Partial Institutionalization of a Commons Logic." Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, no. 1 (January 2016): 12866. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.12866abstract.

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13

Biddle, Justin B. "Tragedy of the Anticommons? Intellectual Property and the Sharing of Scientific Information." Philosophy of Science 79, no. 5 (December 2012): 821–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/667874.

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14

Palma-Oliveira, José Manuel, Benjamin D. Trump, Matthew D. Wood, and Igor Linkov. "Community-Driven Hypothesis Testing: A Solution for the Tragedy of the Anticommons." Risk Analysis 38, no. 3 (July 11, 2017): 620–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/risa.12860.

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15

Loehr, Dirk. "Land Reforms and the Tragedy of the Anticommons—A Case Study from Cambodia." Sustainability 4, no. 4 (April 23, 2012): 773–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su4040773.

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16

Sim, Loo-Lee, Sau-Kim Lum, and Lai Choo Malone-Lee. "Property rights, collective sales and government intervention: averting a tragedy of the anticommons." Habitat International 26, no. 4 (December 2002): 457–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0197-3975(02)00021-8.

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17

Heller, Michael A. "The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets." Harvard Law Review 111, no. 3 (January 1998): 621. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1342203.

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18

Mitchell, Matthew, and Thomas Stratmann. "A tragedy of the anticommons: local option taxation and cell phone tax bills." Public Choice 165, no. 3-4 (December 2015): 171–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0302-7.

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19

Mancuso, Olivia. "Arctic meltdown: A problematic property rights structure translates into poor resource management." SURG Journal 6, no. 2 (July 9, 2013): 5–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.21083/surg.v6i2.2210.

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As access to the Arctic region continues to grow, many land-use issues have become increasingly prominent. The exposure of shorter shipping routes, unresolved maritime boundaries between the bordering states, and most importantly, the plethora of renewable and non-renewable resources in the region have created a strain on international relations between the states bordering the Arctic. Rising global temperatures have created the promise and opportunity of better access to natural resources in the coming years, raising the likelihood of potentially substantial economic gains to the bordering states. However, the current property rights structure in the Arctic, as governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), dictates that the jurisdiction of each coastal nation state shall not exceed past 200 nautical miles beyond the coastline of each respective state. The goal of this report is to provide an assessment of the basic property rights that govern the Arctic territory in an attempt to illuminate how current and future inefficiencies in natural resource extraction and management can result from a poor property rights structure. The current property rights structure has led to a departure from an efficient allocation of rights and as a result currently operates under an anticommons scenario, while also setting the stage for a tragedy of the commons in the not so distant future. To move away from these sub-optimal outcomes and toward more efficient resource management, open communication, cooperation, and better defined property rights are important components needed to strengthen resource management among Arctic states. Keywords: Arctic land-use and property rights (assessment of); natural resource extraction and management (inefficiencies in); anticommons scenario; tragedy of the commons; Arctic Council; UNCLOS

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20

Hostettler, Martin. "Planen in einer spontanen Ordnung (Essay)." Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Forstwesen 163, no. 8 (August 1, 2012): 300–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.3188/szf.2012.0300.

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Planning in a spontaneous order (essay) Planning is necessary for certain public activities. In land use planning and environmental planning very different instruments come into use, the description of which frequently cannot be directly related to the public activity planned. Four achievements in coordination can be attributed to land use and environmental planning. The most important consists in the creation of a consensus, since the Tragedy of the Anticommons can thus be mitigated. The supply of valuable goods is still controversial, since this takes place both by means of procurement and by regulation. Planning in a spontaneous order can only make adjustments, which is why it is wise to proceed with prudence and modesty.

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21

Vakili, Keyvan. "STRATEGIC PATENTING AND THE TRAGEDY OF ANTICOMMONS: A CLOSER LOOK AT FIRMS’ PATENTING BEHAVIOR." Academy of Management Proceedings 2011, no. 1 (January 2011): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2011.65870401.

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22

Major, Ivan. "A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis." International Advances in Economic Research 20, no. 4 (October 29, 2014): 425–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11294-014-9494-8.

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23

Parente, Michael D., and Abel M. Winn. "Corrigendum to: “Bargaining behavior and the tragedy of the anticommons” [J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 84 (2012) 475–490]." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 85 (January 2013): 306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.026.

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24

Babie, Paul, Paul Leadbeter, and Kyriaco Nikias. "Property, Unbundled Water Entitlements, and Anticommons Tragedies: A Cautionary Tale From Australia." Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law, no. 9.1 (2020): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.9.1.property.

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As water becomes an increasingly scarce resource, a lack of clarity in relation to its use can produce both conflict among and inefficient use by users. In order to encourage markets in water and to ensure the viability and functionality of those markets, governments in many jurisdictions have moved away from commons property as a means of water allocation, and towards systems of private property in water. In doing so, one policy and legal option is “unbundling”, which seeks carefully to define both the entitlement to water and its separation into constituent parts. Advocates claim that unbundling makes water rights easier to value, monitor, and trade. But is unbundling the most efficient means of allocating water use rights? Or might such fragmentation produce what has come to be called an “anticommons tragedy”? To answer these questions, this article contains four parts. The Introduction provides the legal background to the modern means of allocating the use of water amongst competing, or rivalrous, users. Part I considers the theoretical nature of property, and the way in which such theory might be extended to water allocation through unbundling. Part II presents unbundling as it has been implemented in the Australian state of South Australia. This allows us to assess the extent to which the stated policy rationale for unbundling—certainty and transferability of entitlements—has been achieved and the extent to which this is a desirable outcome. Our analysis can be applied to any jurisdiction, most notably the arid and semi-arid southwestern United States, considering unbundling as a legal and policy option for the allocation of water use. The Conclusion reflects upon the potential for unbundling water entitlements in arid or semi-arid environments. The South Australian experience reveals a reluctance to embrace unbundling, both on the part of the state in terms of implementing, and on the part of market actors holding existing proprietary interests in water. This reluctance ought to be viewed by other jurisdictions as a warning about the effectiveness and efficiency of unbundling. We show that unbundling efforts may not only fail to provide efficiency gains, but also, and much more worryingly, may in fact drive anticommons tragedies that entirely inhibit any beneficial use. We propose that our anecdotal and theoretical analysis of South Australia requires empirical research both in Australia and in other jurisdictions climatologically, hydrologically, and in underlying legal framework, similar to Australia. Such empirical research will test our conclusions in relation to South Australia, both in respect to the operation of the water market and as to the behavior of market actors.

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25

Nguyen, Thanh Bao, Erwin Van de Krabben, and D. Ary A. Samsura. "A curious case of property privatization: two examples of the tragedy of the anticommons in Ho Chi Minh City-Vietnam." International Journal of Urban Sciences 21, no. 1 (August 9, 2016): 72–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/12265934.2016.1209122.

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26

Goudreau, Mistrale. "Commentaires d’arrêt : l’affaire Euro-Excellence Inc. c. Kraft Canada Inc. en Cour suprême." Revue générale de droit 37, no. 2 (October 23, 2014): 515–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1027095ar.

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Le 26 juillet 2007, dans l’affaire Euro-Excellence Inc. c. Kraft Canada Inc., la Cour suprême du Canada a jugé que le détenteur d’une licence exclusive de droit d’auteur sur les logos figurant sur des emballages de tablettes de chocolat ne pouvait pas invoquer la Loi sur le droit d’auteur pour empêcher l’importation parallèle et la distribution des marchandises portant ces logos. La décision est fort complexe puisque quatre juges ont rédigé des motifs largement divergents sur la question. Cette affaire illustre deux problèmes qui perturbent le régime canadien de propriété intellectuelle. La Loi sur le droit d’auteur est un texte de loi alambiqué, qui renferme des concepts nébuleux comme celui de « concession par licence d’un intérêt dans ce droit d’auteur ». Compte tenu de la nature évasive des dispositions législatives, il n’est pas surprenant que les juges soient parvenus à des conclusions discordantes sur les droits d’action du licencié exclusif. L’affaire met aussi en lumière un des aspects de la « Tragedy of the Anticommons » qui survient lorsque trop de titulaires détiennent des droits exclusifs. Lorsque plusieurs formes de propriété intellectuelle se chevauchent et protègent simultanément différents éléments du même produit, les règles applicables à l’une des formes de protection peuvent contrecarrer les politiques législatives élaborées pour un autre droit de propriété intellectuelle. Pour cette raison, une étude plus globale des répercussions du cumul des droits de propriété intellectuelle et une rédaction plus cohérente des lois seraient souhaitables.

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27

Lehavi, Amnon. "Re-romanticizing Commons and Community in Israeli Discourse: Social, Economic, and Political Motives." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 19, no. 2 (August 14, 2018): 671–703. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/til-2018-0032.

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Abstract Public discourse in Israel is taking a somewhat surprising turn in its vacillation between individualism and collectivism. While mainstream public opinion in the 1980s and 1990s pointed to the failures of common- and public-property regimes, elected officials, entrepreneurs, and consumers are nowadays singing the praises of commons and communities. The re-romanticizing of commons and community is driven by a number of explicit and implicit motives, which also underscore, however, the limits of a full-fledged return to common-property regimes. This article highlights three instances of the reemergence of the commons- and community-discourse across the Israeli landscape. First, while the old-style “cooperative kibbutz” suffered a substantial decline in past decades, the evolution of a new type of midlevel communitarianism in the “renewing kibbutz” has led to a growing demand to join the ranks of such kibbutzim. Second is the development of urban shared office-space compounds such as WeWork, and the next phase of urban commons: co-living buildings. Third, the emergence of “community villages” on state-owned lands, located mostly in Israel’s peripheral areas, has been praised by governmental agencies and residents alike as restoring a key role for community for middle-class families. But this advocacy may also be driven by exclusionary social and political motives, as applicants may be turned down based on open-ended criteria, such as “incompatibility with social life in the community” or incongruity with its “social-cultural texture.” These case studies serve as a basis for offering new theoretical tools for thinking about the commons, fifty years after The Tragedy of the Commons presented their apparent failures. A fresh theory of commons and community could highlight how the revived discourse attests to the need to design a new set of balances between the perils of commons and anticommons, between values of anonymity and familiarity, and between governance by hierarchy and egalitarian rules.

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28

Parisi, Francesco, Norbert Schulz, and Ben Depoorter. "Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons." European Journal of Law and Economics 17, no. 2 (March 2004): 175–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:ejle.0000014575.00312.15.

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29

Buchanan, James M., and Yong J. Yoon. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons." Journal of Law and Economics 43, no. 1 (April 2000): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467445.

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30

Kosnik, Lea. "The anticommons and the environment." Journal of Environmental Management 101 (June 2012): 206–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.01.016.

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31

Katz, Larissa. "Red Tape and Gridlock." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 23, no. 1 (January 2010): 99–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900004835.

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This paper concerns the role of property theory in explaining why so many people around the world control their assets informally, without recourse to the state. According to one influential view, owners and their assets are driven to the informal sector because of deficiencies in the form of ownership on offer in the formal sphere. Where too many people have the power to veto the optimal use of a resource, we have a form of ownership, an anticommons, that is deficient. But this account of informality proceeds from an overly capacious theory of ownership. On this view, an owner’s position is incomplete if she lacks the requisite inputs for a project that represents the optimal use of an object. Further, a person counts as an “owner,” albeit one locked in an anticommons, merely if she has the power to block the ends that others are able to achieve with an object. I argue that this view of ownership leaves us unable to see that owners are in a radically different position vis-à-vis other owners with the same authority over an object than they are vis-à-vis the state or other non-owners who may be in a position to block an owner’s valuable ends. The integrity of the concept of the anticommons is undermined if we define it in terms of veto-power over the ends for which a resource is optimally suited.In this paper, I situate the concept of the anticommons within a larger theory of ownership as agenda-setting authority. Seen this way, what is important about an anticommons is its effect on an owner’s means rather than her ends. Whereas owners of private property are never guaranteed the ability to achieve their ends, owners in an anticommons are not even guaranteed the ability to exercise their very means, their agenda-setting authority. From this revised and much narrower concept of the anticommons, what follows is that talk of “gridlock” in the formal sphere makes sense just as a normative argument about the best distribution of ownership and regulatory authority rather than a conceptual argument rooted in the idea of ownership.

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32

Yoon, Yong J. "An Analogy: Symmetric Tragedies and Calculus of Consent." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 29, no. 1 (April 1, 2011): 25–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569211x15665367493607.

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Abstract Any thoughtful reader would recognize the similarity between the anticommons [BUCHANAN - YOON, 2000] and the decision making costs in The Calculus of Consent [BUCHANAN - TULLOCK, 1962]. In both cases, the veto power of participants generates inefficient or costly outcomes. This analogy may suggest that there is an internal logic between the two literatures. The analogy, however, stops here and the internal logic cannot be generalized. The Calculus of Consent is concerned with a selection of a collective decision making rule from behind a veil of uncertainty in a constitutional convention, while anticommons considers individual decision making over alternatives under already defined existing rules. Yet, it can be instructive to clarify the differences. External costs and decision making costs in calculus are compared to commons and anticommons problems by introducing different property regimes.

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33

Schlueter, Achim. "Small-scale European forestry, an anticommons?" International Journal of the Commons 2, no. 2 (July 1, 2008): 248. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ijc.42.

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34

Yoon, Yong J. "Buchanan on increasing returns and anticommons." Constitutional Political Economy 28, no. 3 (February 6, 2017): 270–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10602-017-9236-z.

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35

Bellantuono, Giuseppe. "The regulatory anticommons of green infrastructures." European Journal of Law and Economics 37, no. 2 (February 3, 2012): 325–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-012-9298-3.

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36

Parisi, Francesco, Norbert Schulz, and Ben Depoorter. "Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons." International Review of Law and Economics 25, no. 4 (December 2005): 578–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2005.12.003.

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37

Gabriel, Marian Cosmin. "Education in the Anticommons: Evidence from Romania." Central European Journal of Public Policy 12, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 32–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/cejpp-2018-0003.

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Abstract The process of administrative decentralization of the education system in Romania proceeded in chaotic steps. It was done under the pressure, on one hand, of the EU integration requirements and, on the other hand, of the local administrations who wanted more control over how their money were used in the schools and of the parents committees that wanted to have a say in the local schools. The road was scattered with new reform legislations coming with every change in government composition and ministers. The result was a combination of local autonomy and central control that had the potential to produce confusion and conflict. The multiple and complex blend of divided responsibilities and powers turned out in the process of setting up the new form or entry grade in the Romanian primary education cycle in a rational strategic play scholarly designated as anticommons. Each separated actor tries to obtain a maximizing share of the cooperatively generated benefit for a minimum possible cost. The interactions are modeled as a Game of Chicken where, because actors calculate separately, each selects a higher price/lower quantity position than is optimal, resulting in a lower net payoff both individually and collectively.

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38

Van Essen, Matt. "Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public-Expenditure Theory." Southern Economic Journal 80, no. 2 (October 2013): 523–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2012.147.

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39

Contreras, Jorge L. "The anticommons at 20: Concerns for research continue." Science 361, no. 6400 (July 26, 2018): 335–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aat4684.

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40

Dhont, Kristof, Alain Van Hiel, and David De Cremer. "Externalities Awareness in Anticommons Dilemmas Decreases Defective Behavior." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 25, no. 3 (January 24, 2011): 228–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.718.

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41

Hemphill, Thomas A. "Gene Patents, The Anticommons, and the Biotechnology Industry." Research-Technology Management 53, no. 5 (September 2010): 11–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08956308.2010.11657645.

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42

Euben, J. Peter. "The Tragedy of Tragedy." International Relations 21, no. 1 (March 2007): 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117807073765.

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43

Sun, Chia-Hung, and Chorng-Jian Liu. "The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies." Journal of Economics 122, no. 1 (March 9, 2017): 29–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0534-8.

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44

McCarter, Matthew W., Shirli Kopelman, Thomas Turk, and Candace Ybarra. "How Anticommons Resources Emerge through Territorial Conflict in Organizations." Academy of Management Proceedings 2012, no. 1 (July 2012): 18189. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2012.71.

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45

Simcoe, Timothy. "Governing the Anticommons: Institutional Design for Standard-Setting Organizations." Innovation Policy and the Economy 14 (January 2014): 99–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/674022.

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46

Alvisi, Matteo, and Emanuela Carbonara. "IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTES FOR PERFECT COMPLEMENTS: SOLVING THE ANTICOMMONS PROBLEM." Bulletin of Economic Research 65, no. 3 (October 5, 2011): 256–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00407.x.

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47

Heller, M. A. "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research." Science 280, no. 5364 (May 1, 1998): 698–701. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.280.5364.698.

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48

Currie, G. "Tragedy." Analysis 70, no. 4 (September 9, 2010): 632–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq076.

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Murray, Penelope. "Tragedy." Classical Review 49, no. 1 (April 1999): 4–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cr/49.1.4.

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Yezzi, David. "Tragedy." Hopkins Review 10, no. 3 (2017): 336–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/thr.2017.0074.

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