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Books on the topic 'Transaction costs theory'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Skogh, Göran. A transaction costs theory of insurance. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1986.

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2

Mher, Safarian, and SpringerLink (Online service), eds. Markets with Transaction Costs: Mathematical Theory. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.

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3

Qi ye xing zhi jie shi: Jie yue jiao yi fei yong yu li yong she hui sheng chan li. Shanghai Shi: Shanghai cai jing da xue chu ban she, 2001.

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4

Williamson, Oliver E. Perspectives on the economics of organization. Lund: Institute of Economic Research, Lund University, 1989.

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5

Transaction cost economics and beyond: Towards a new economics of the firm. London: Routledge, 1994.

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6

An entrepreneurial theory of the firm. London: Routledge, 2000.

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7

The economics of business culture: Game theory, transaction costs, and economic performance. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

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8

Casson, Mark. The economics of business culture: Game theory, transaction costs, and economic performance. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

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9

Williamson, Oliver E. The transaction cost economics project: The theory and practice of the governance of contractual relations. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013.

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10

Yamin, M. Institutions and the theory of the transnational corporations: The irrelevance of transaction costs. Manchester: Manchester School of Management, 1991.

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11

J, Ferguson Glenys, ed. Industrial economics: Issues and perspectives. 2nd ed. Washington Square, New York, N.Y: New York University Press, 1994.

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12

Ferguson, Paul R. Industrial economics: Issues and perspectives. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education, 1988.

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13

Murshed, Syed Mansoob. Transaction cost politics, institutions for commitment and rent seeking. Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2001.

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14

Sewerin, Uwe. Transaktionskosten und Marktevolution: Die Relevanz von Transaktionskosten und Transaktions-Ansatz für dynamisch-evolutorische Wettbewerbstheorien. Bayreuth: Verlag P.C.O., 1993.

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15

Ronald Coase' Transaktionskosten-Ansatz. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000.

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16

Mandewirth, Sven Oliver. Transaktionskosten von Handelskooperationen: Ein Effizienzkriterium für Verbundgruppen und Franchise-Systeme. Heidelberg: Physica, 1997.

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17

Attanasio, Orazio P. intertemporal consumption choices, transaction costs and limited participation to financial markets: Reconciling data and theory. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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18

The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

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19

Bossone, Biagio. Financial infrastructure, group interests, and capital accumulation: Theory, evidence, and policy. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, Office of the Executive Director, 2003.

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20

Baldwin, Richard E. Re-interpreting the failure of foreign exchange market efficiency tests: Small transaction costs, big hysteresis bands. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.

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21

Dolzhenko, Ruslan. Economic grounds for the development of new forms of labor relations. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/977548.

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The monograph examines the key new forms of labor relations (outsourcing, crowdsourcing, and insourcing, freelancing), which by their nature and content have positive qualities for the subjects of labor. The methodological basis of research are the theory of neo-institutional Economics and the theory of transaction costs. The considered approach to the introduction of new practices in the system of labor relations of the organization with consideration of needs of subjects of labour to reduce transaction costs may serve as a guideline to determine promising areas of transformation of labor relations in the innovation economy. For specialists in the Economics and sociology of labour, as well as all those interested in questions of introduction and use of innovation in the workplace.
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22

Lyons, Bruce R. Contracts and specific investment: An empirical test of transaction cost theory. Norwich: School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, 1992.

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23

Watthanawithūkūn, Somlakrat. The theory of transactions costs: An application to the case of water pollution control in Mae Klong, Thailand. Bangkok: Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, 1985.

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24

Jo, Sei-youn. A study of strategic alliance structuring in the perspectives of transaction cost economics and resource-based theory. [s.l.]: typescript, 1998.

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25

Sang-Huem-Park, Andy. On the agility theory of virtual organisation: A review of theories and a transaction cost examination of cases. Manchester: UMIST, 2003.

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26

Kabanov, Yuri, and Mher Safarian. Markets with Transaction Costs: Mathematical Theory. Springer, 2012.

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27

The Economics of Transaction Costs: Theory, Methods and Applications. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

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28

E, Williamson Oliver, and Masten Scott E. 1955-, eds. Transaction cost economics. Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1995.

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29

The Casual Structure of Long-Term Supply Relationships: An Emperical Test of a Generalized Transaction Cost Theory. Springer, 2000.

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30

The Causal Structure of Long-Term Supply Relationships: An Empirical Test of a Generalized Transaction Cost Theory. Springer, 2011.

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31

(Editor), Glenys J. Ferguson, ed. Industrial Economics. 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan, 1994.

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32

Industrial Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, 1988.

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33

Ferguson, Paul R. Industrial Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, 1988.

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34

The Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Performance (Clarendon Paperbacks). Oxford University Press, USA, 1994.

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35

Chiu, Herng-Chia. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND NURSING HOMES: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING TRANSACTION COSTS (VERTICAL INTEGRATION). 1995.

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36

Oliver Williamsons Organisationsökonomik. Mohr, 2001.

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37

Williamson, Oliver E. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press, USA, 1999.

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38

Singer, Abraham A. The Chicago School’s Theory of the Corporation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190698348.003.0006.

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This chapter analyses the Chicago school theory of the corporation, which reduces the corporation to a set of purely market processes, a nexus of contracts. The chapter begins by offering a conceptual clarification of what the Chicago school is, and how it builds on a strand of Ronald Coase’s thought different from the theory of transaction costs. It then discusses the important components of its theory of the corporation: profit-maximization ethics; agency theory; property rights theory; and the economic theory of corporate law. The chapter concludes with a rehearsal of how the Chicago school answers the questions posed in the first chapter.
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39

1949-, Groenewegen John, ed. Dynamics of the firm: Strategies of pricing and organisation. Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar, 1993.

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40

Groenewegen, John. Dynamics of the Firm: Strategies of Pricing and Organisation. Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.

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41

Adelstein, Richard. Exchange and Efficiency. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190694272.003.0003.

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This chapter articulates the Coase Theorem, which describes how voluntary exchange works when it works perfectly, and considers its implications for both efficient and equitable allocation when conditions are perfect and when they’re not. Distinctions between utility, wealth, and value are developed in relation to the problem of distributional fairness, and transaction costs are introduced as impediments to voluntary exchange, and thus to efficient allocation in markets. Posner extends Coase’s logic to a corollary, that when transaction costs are high, efficiency can only be achieved if rights are granted initially to their highest-valuing owner, and proposes a provocative theory of the judicial role in light of the rule of law and the inevitable subjectivity of justice. This is tested in two cases: a hypothetical case where transaction costs are high, and a real one, involving rights to a significant moment in American history in which they’re low.
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42

Hennart, Jean‐François. Theories of the Multinational Enterprise. Edited by Alan M. Rugman. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234257.003.0005.

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This article provides a critical survey of some of the theories that have sought to explain why multinational enterprises (MNEs) exist, with special emphasis on the transaction costs/internalization approach. While scholars have quibbled over the definition of an MNE (and whether it ought to manufacture in at least two countries to qualify for that title), this article defines it as a private institution that organizes, through employment contracts, interdependencies between individuals located in more than one country. Hence a domestic manufacturer who contracts at arm's length with local distributors abroad is not an MNE, but a domestic department store with its own overseas buying offices, but no foreign manufacturing, is. The first section briefly discusses early capital flow and industrial organization theories before turning to transaction costs/internalization theories, the now dominant theories of the MNE. It focuses on the author's own brand of the theory, developing first the basic foundations, then applying them to the MNE.
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43

Brandsma, Gijs Jan, and Jens Blom-Hansen. Theorizing Delegation and Control Regimes in the EU. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198767909.003.0002.

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This chapter presents the book’s theoretical argument. Building on the delegation literature and principal-agent theory, it argues that legislative principals delegate to reduce transaction costs. However, they delegate with hesitance because they fear that delegated powers may be used for unintended purposes. This dilemma between efficiency and control is partly resolved by installing monitoring mechanisms. However, since control implies influence on future decisions to be made by the agent, the principals are likely to disagree on their exact design. There is therefore a ‘multiple principals’ problem in the design and use of control regimes. In the post-Lisbon EU, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament may choose between the delegated acts and the implementing acts control regime. Since these two regimes provide them with different control positions, they are likely to disagree on their use. This fundamental conflict is the key to understanding post-Lisbon institutional contestation of delegation.
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44

Glenn, Carroll, and Teece David J, eds. Firms, markets, and hierarchies: The transaction cost economics perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

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45

Salter, Frank. The Biosocial Study of Ethnicity. Edited by Rosemary L. Hopcroft. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190299323.013.36.

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This chapter reviews behavioral biological analyses of ethnic solidarity and conflict. The universality of ethnic behavior, including frequent altruism, points to evolutionary origins. This chapter reviews the history of research into ethnicity by ethologists, sociobiologists, and evolutionary psychologists. The biosocial approach is unique in tracing causality back to adaptations, including brain functions and the evolutionary processes that selected them. One such selection process is cultural group strategies in which rules and beliefs adopted by a group help it replace others. The most influential biosocial theory states that ethnic solidarity is nepotism extended to the population. Ethnic nepotism theory and other insights have been fruitful in suggesting research directions. These include ethnic group dominance, superorganism theory applied to ethnic middleman groups, the idea that ethnic trust boosts economic competitiveness by reducing transaction costs, and the finding that ethnocultural diversity increases social conflict. Other research concerns national character.
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46

Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective. Oxford University Press, USA, 1998.

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47

Singer, Abraham A. Ronald Coase and the Difference between Markets and Firms. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190698348.003.0004.

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This chapter reviews the development of transaction cost economics and unpacks its theory of the firm. The chapter begins with the marginal revolution in economics and how it altered the way economists understood the corporation. It then reviews the work of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, explaining how they provided a novel account of firms. Transaction cost economics emphasizes how firms use hierarchy and bureaucracy to overcome problems of opportunism and asset-specific investment to coordinate some types of economic activity more efficiently than markets can. The transaction cost account of the corporation’s productivity component is shown in tabular form in comparison with its historical forerunners reviewed in the previous chapter.
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48

Martin, Hunter. Part XIV Final Reflections and Looking Ahead, 37 Recollections of Past Events and Reflections on Future Trends. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198783206.003.0038.

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This chapter presents the author’s recollections of his personal experiences involving the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and, more generally, the world of arbitration. He describes how he became a member of the Institute in the mid 1960s. He discusses the taking of evidence by arbitral tribunals, saying that the issue remains important because most commercial disputes are decided by arbitral tribunals based on material facts, rather than on an erudite analysis of the transaction agreement, or a microscopic evaluation of the provisions of the applicable national law. He also believes that arbitral tribunals must do their best to ensure that the costs incurred by the parties are reasonable. The Institute has the duty to educate its members and students on the importance of cost control, and to use their discretionary powers to allocate the costs of legal representation (and other costs) in their awards in a way that discourages excessive expenditure by the eventual winning party.
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49

Kreps, David M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691202754.001.0001.

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This book is a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and “user-friendly.” The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory — one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth, followed by exploration of information economics. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
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50

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, and Gerrit DeGeest. Carrots vs. Sticks. Edited by Francesco Parisi. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684267.013.41.

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This article draws a general picture of the differences between the metaphors of carrots and sticks. It discusses incentive effects (in principle, a $100 carrot creates the same incentives as a $100 stick, but there are exceptions); transaction costs (carrots are paid upon compliance, sticks upon violation, therefore sticks have lower transaction costs if the majority complies); risks (probabilistic carrots create risks for compliers, probabilistic sticks for violators); wealth and budget constraints (the maximum carrot depends on the principal's wealth, the maximum stick on the agent's wealth, but sticks can have a multiplication effect); distributive effects (carrots may overcompensate, sticks may undercompensate; individualizing sanctions changes the distributive effect of carrots but not of sticks); activity level effects caused by these distributive effects; the principal's incentives to behave opportunistically; and the agent's incentives to self-report. The article also discusses special types (precompensated, annullable, combined, intra-group financed, reversible, strict liability carrots and sticks) and two extensions (political risks, behavioural effects).
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