Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Treatise of human nature (Hume, David)'

O presente trabalho procura mostrar que para Hume poder fazer as distinções que ele pretende fazer no início do Tratado da Natureza Humana, entre impressões e idéias e entre idéias da imaginação e idéias da memória, Hume precisa ter recurso a elementos que não são dados empiricamente, como a crença em um mundo externo, atitudes em relação a percepções (crença) e propensões da mente. No entanto, argumentamos que estes não são nem pressupostos irrefletidos de Hume, nem medidas de contenção usadas quando problemas começam a aparecer, mas que constituem elementos imprescindíveis de sua filosofia, amplamente trabalhados por ele, e sem os quais a compreensão de sua filosofia ficaria severamente prejudicada.
The present work tries to show that, for Hume to be able to make the distinctions he intends to make at the beginning of A Treatise of Human Nature, between impressions and ideas, and between ideas of imagination and ideas of memory, Hume needs to make use of elements which are not given empirically, such as belief in an external world, attitudes towards perceptions (belief), and propensities of the mind. However, we argue that they are neither unexamined presuppositions made by Hume, nor accessory measures used to solve problems as they begin to show up in his philosophy; rather, they are necessary elements of his philosophy, thoroughly worked by him, and without which the understanding of Hume’s philosophy would become very limited.

O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação.
The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

Esta dissertação pretende mostrar que a tese de Hume de que nós estamos inevitavelmente determinados a crer na existência de objetos externos tem a circunscrição de seu significado condicionada à identificação e à resolução de uma inconsistência presente na teoria humeana da crença inevitável em objetos externos. Essa inconsistência se expressa pela incompatibilidade entre a tese de que (P1) nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos e a tese de que (P2) não podemos conceber objetos externos. Essas teses são incompatíveis se se considera que, para Hume, (P4) não podemos crer em algo que não podemos conceber. Esse problema só emerge se se supõe um uso unívoco da expressão "objeto externo" por parte de Hume em (P1) e (P2), e se se supõe que (P4) é o caso para Hume, o que se mostra ser um ponto de partida razoável. Os resultados indicam que as duas interpretações gerais do significado da tese de que nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos, o naturalismo cético e o realismo cético, chegam a conclusões insatisfatórias porque ignoram esse problema. Por fim, conclui que não há, de fato, uma inconsistência na teoria humeana da crença em objetos externos porque não é o caso que não possamos ter uma concepção de objetos externos para Hume. Essa concepção se origina de um sentimento ou instinto original da mente.
This paper aims to show that Hume's claim that we are unavoidably determined to believe in the existence of external objects has the delimitation of our meaning conditioned to the identification and resolution of an inconsistency present in Hume's theory of the unavoidable belief in external objects. This inconsistency expresses itself by the incompatibility between the claim that (P1) we unavoidably believe in external objects and the claim that (P2) we can't conceive external objects. These claims are incompatible if we recognize that Hume claims as well that (P4) we can't believe in something that we can't conceive. This problem arises only if we suppose that Hume univocally uses the expression "external object" in (P1) and (P2), and if we suppose that (P4) is the case, a reasonable starting point. The results indicate that both general views of the meaning of the claim that we unavoidably believe in external objects, the skeptical naturalism and the skeptical realism, arrives at unsatisfactory outcomes because they ignore that problem. Finally, concludes that there's not, actually, an inconsistency in Hume's theory of belief in external objects because it's not the case that we can't conceive external objects. This conception of external existences arises out of a sentiment or natural instinct of the mind.

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa.
This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.

This thesis explores the status of a specific subset of absent characters within twentieth century American drama. By borrowing the term “proximate cause” from tort law and illuminating its intricacies through David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, this thesis re-appropriates proximate cause for literary studies. Rather than focus on characters whose existence remains the subject of critical debate, this set of absent characters presumably exists but never appear onstage. Despite their non-appearance onstage, however, these absent characters nonetheless have a profound effect upon the action that occurs during their respective plays. Highlighting the various ways in which these characters serve as the proximate cause for the onstage action of a given play will expand the realm of drama and literary studies in myriad ways.

This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc.
Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."

This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume'
s philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo
s &ldquo
science of man&rdquo
attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo
s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo
being-human&rdquo
, the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo
s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.

FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico
Este trabalho pretende apresentar a filosofia moral de David Hume a partir da associaÃÃo entre razÃo e sentimento, a formarem um composto inseparÃvel na aÃÃo e na distinÃÃo morais. Para tanto, considero sua teoria no domÃnio mental e no social. O filÃsofo acreditava que a artificialidade das instituiÃÃes nÃo implicava a negaÃÃo da natureza, mas sua extensÃo. Assim, virtudes e vÃcios sÃo reconhecidos pelos seres humanos enquanto aÃÃes que, respectivamente, lhes agradam e desagradam. Isto porque compartilhamos uma mesma natureza que nos capacita discernirmos a utilidade das condutas para nossa sobrevivÃncia de acordo com as circunstÃncias de tempo e espaÃo. Recusa-se, entÃo, um objetivismo metafÃsico e uma autoridade religiosa como fundamento da moralidade. Hume entendia seu projeto como um complemento da RevoluÃÃo CientÃfica do sÃculo XVII, ao estender o uso do mÃtodo experimental no campo da moralidade.
This work is intended to show that David Hume‟s moral philosophy associated reason to feeling, both in mental and social domains, like an inseparable compound in moral action and distinction. He believed that the artificiality of institutions did not implicate the negation of nature, but its extension. Thus, virtues and vices are recognized by humans as actions which respectively please and unplease them. This is because we share a nature in common that enables us to discern the utility of behavior for our survival according to the circumstances of time and space. Then, it means a refusal of the methaphysical objectivism and the religious authority as the foundation of morality. Hume understood his project as a complement to the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, extending the use of experimental method in the field of morality.

本論の目的は、「知覚」的世界の実相の解明を通じて、『人間本性論』におけるヒュームの哲学の基本的枠組みを闡明するところにある。本論文は、印象と観念の差異としての「生気」を因果的力能と捉える解釈を軸とし、次のように展開する。最初に、関係的知覚の構造と、因果の観念の知覚的起源を究明する。それに基づいて、「生気」にかんする因果的解釈を明確化する。最後に、この解釈に依拠して、観念の表象性および真理についての自然主義的な説明を試みる。
The purpose of this dissertation is to make explicit the basic framework of Hume's philosophy, by clarifying the nature of Humean 'perceptions' upon which his arguments in Treatise are founded. I begin with the hypothesis that the liveliness of perceptions, to which Hume refers to differentiate impressions and beliefs from ideas, is a kind of causal power to produce certain effects. I firstly investigate Hume's view on the perceptions of relations and on the perceptual origin of causal ideas. I then articulate the causal interpretation of liveliness. Finally I pursue its consequences, reconstructing Hume's conception of ideas as representations from a naturalistic point of view about truth and inquiry.
博士(哲学)
Doctor of Philosophy
同志社大学
Doshisha University

A strong version of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM) that includes two theses is defended here. First, desire is necessary for action, and no mental states are necessary for action other than a desire and an appropriate means-end belief. Second, desires can be changed as the conclusion of reasoning only if a desire is among the premises of the reasoning. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force cannot accept HTM, even as a contingent truth, since HTM implies that no beliefs have intrinsic motivational force. Many of them argue that there are cases where HTM fails to explain how we deliberate. The response is to develop a novel account of desire and show that HTM provides superior explanations even in their cases. On this account, desire necessarily motivates action when combined with an appropriate means-end belief. Desire necessarily causes pleasure when our subjective probability of satisfaction increases or when we vividly imagine satisfaction, and likewise causes displeasure when the subjective probability of satisfaction decreases or when we vividly imagine dissatisfaction. It is contingently true that desire directs attention towards things one associates with its object, is made more violent by vivid sensory or imaginative representations of its object, comes in the two flavors of positive desire and aversion, and satisfies the second principle above. This account of desire helps HTM provides superior explanations of deliberation even in the cases that its opponents offer as counterexamples. In response to Darwall’s proposed counterexample to the second principle and some 20th century writers discussing the feeling of obligation, it is shown that Humeans can provide superior explanations of agents’ emotions in their cases. In Searle’s case of akrasia, Scanlon’s case of bracketing, and Schueler’s case of deliberation, it is shown that Humeans can build the structures of deliberation more simply than their opponents can. Against Korsgaard, it is argued that agents cannot choose the aims for which they act.
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The 'prevalence of the calm passions over the violent' is Hume's general formula for both virtue and happiness. I argue in this dissertation that Hume's detailed account of the causes and effects of the relative calmness and strength of motivating passions in Treatise 2.3 is a main goal of Hume's project in the Treatise, Books I and II, and the reason why he published them together in 1739 as a "compleat chain of reasoning by themselves." However, despite widespread recognition of the general importance of this doctrine to Hume's 'science of man', no adequate attempt has been made to investigate those sections of Treatise 2.3 which bear directly on a deeper understanding of the causes of this 'prevalence of the calm passions'. Such attention is particularly warranted because, as I argue, these sections of the Treatise constitute Hume's attempt at an 'anatomy' of deliberation which accounts for the principles of human nature by which we successfully regulate our conduct and remain constant in pursuit of our long-term greater good. However, these sections also give rise to interpretative challenges that threaten the coherence of this central doctrine. Accordingly, my aim in this dissertation is to analyze Hume's anatomy of deliberation and of the prevalence of calm passions in Treatise 2.3 and to work through the interpretative difficulties it poses. I present a novel resolution of these interpretative problems which calls attention to the importance both of Hume's Treatise, Book I account of causal belief and of his neglected account of the influence of the passions on the imagination and understanding for his theory of motivation. I demonstrate that it is only when we attend to these key features of Hume's account of human nature that we can appreciate the coherent Humean theory of prudential motivation that emerges from Treatise 2.3.

PhDr. Tomáš Kunca The Humanist Virtuoso: Beginnings, Idea and Illustration of Hume's experimental philosophical anthropology in Treatise of Human Nature UK FHS, Praha 2013 Thesis introduces a concept of "The Humanist Virtuoso" as distinctive feature reflecting Hume's effort to introduce an idea of experimental philosophical anthropology based on study of human nature and manifested in his A Treatise of Human Nature. Concept is justified by three steps, through analysis of the beginnings of Hume's philosophy, explication of his "science of man" idea in Treatise and illustration of this idea in action, as appears in analysis of passions (Book 2). The beginnings of Hume's way to experimental philosophical anthropology are explained thorough interpretation of historical facts connected with his early study at College of Edinburgh. First meetings with culture of science ( both British Christian tradition of experimental philosophy and Newtonian mathematical philosophy) are considered as particularly important. Detailed analysis of pre-Treatise letters (the Letter to Physician and to Michael Ramsey) is provided to make explicit the beginnings of his "science of man" idea, turn to study of human nature. Castration of Treatise is observed and discussed via analysis of his letter to Home (1737). The second...

本論の目的は、「知覚」的世界の実相の解明を通じて、『人間本性論』におけるヒュームの哲学の基本的枠組みを闡明するところにある。本論文は、印象と観念の差異としての「生気」を因果的力能と捉える解釈を軸とし、次のように展開する。最初に、関係的知覚の構造と、因果の観念の知覚的起源を究明する。それに基づいて、「生気」にかんする因果的解釈を明確化する。最後に、この解釈に依拠して、観念の表象性および真理についての自然主義的な説明を試みる。
The purpose of this dissertation is to make explicit the basic framework of Hume's philosophy, by clarifying the nature of Humean 'perceptions' upon which his arguments in Treatise are founded. I begin with the hypothesis that the liveliness of perceptions, to which Hume refers to differentiate impressions and beliefs from ideas, is a kind of causal power to produce certain effects. I firstly investigate Hume's view on the perceptions of relations and on the perceptual origin of causal ideas. I then articulate the causal interpretation of liveliness. Finally I pursue its consequences, reconstructing Hume's conception of ideas as representations from a naturalistic point of view about truth and inquiry.
博士(哲学)
Doctor of Philosophy
同志社大学
Doshisha University