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1
Craig, Edward. "David Hume." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004041.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
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Callergård, Robert. "A Treatise of Human Nature - a critical edition - By David Hume." Theoria 74, no. 4 (November 4, 2008): 367–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00030.x.
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Matson, Erik W., and Colin Doran. "The Elevated Imagination: Contemplation and Action in David Hume and Adam Smith." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15, no. 1 (March 2017): 27–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2017.0150.
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In this paper we seek to draw attention to some striking and heretofore unnoticed textual connections between Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments and David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. We find significant textual parallels between the parable of the poor man's son of TMS 4.1 (TMS 4.1.8-4.1.10) and the famous conclusion to Book 1 of Hume's Treatise. These passages are often regarded as especially intense and moving parts of their respective works. We explore the nature and substance of these connections and comment on their larger significance. The nature of the connections suggests that Smith consciously engaged Hume in his work through philosophical conversation. We suggest that these related passages show both Hume and Smith exploring and developing a particular dialectic between contemplation and action in human life. Both move to invert the classical relationship between contemplation and action through what we call the elevated imagination.
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Pereira Campelo, Wendel de Holanda. "Razão, Sentimento e Oscilação Cética no Tratado de David Hume." Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 27, no. 54 (2019): 153–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica2019275425.
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This article offers a reading of David Hume’s skeptical “dangerous dilemma”, comparing it with the thought of authors of the seventeenth century as Descartes, Pascal and Huet with regard to the wavering between our natural sentiment and skeptical doubt. Based on this, we propose a different reading of the relationship between sentiment and reason in the Treatise of Human Nature, often taken only negatively and stressed by the interpreters of Hume’s skepticism.
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Suyudi, M., and Wahyu Hanafi Putra. "Kritik Nalar Kausalitas dan Pengetahuan David Hume." Al-Adabiya: Jurnal Kebudayaan dan Keagamaan 15, no. 02 (November 21, 2020): 201–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.37680/adabiya.v15i02.569.
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This research aims at explaining David Hume’s logical critique of causality and knowledge. As library research, the method used is descriptive-qualitative. Data and data sources were obtained from his important works Why Cause is Always A Need and A Treatise of Human Nature and several secondary literatures on causality. The data was carried out through documentation, started by the researcher documenting Hume's thoughts, especially criticism of the law of causality (cause-effect) and knowledge of both of Hume's primary works. The study results explained that Hume criticized the performance of the law of causality, which explained that the existence of a second essence and after it was an impact or certainty of the first essence. The second essential is the consequence and legitimacy of the first one. According to Hume, it cannot serve empirically as the law of causality occurs because the sequential process is stagnant. Hume's skepticism and doubts over dogmatic and metaphysical matters then affect that all knowledge can only be explored with the five senses and is empirical. All irrational and non-empirical characteristics cannot be attributed to a belief and truth. In conclusion, real truths in knowledge are those that can be investigated empirically.
Keywords: Causality, Hume, Knowledge, The five senses.
Penelitian ini bertujuan menjelaskan kritik nalar kausalitas dan pengetahuan David Hume. Sebagai penelitian pustaka, metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif-kualitatif. Data dan sumber data didapat dari karya-karya Why Cause is Always Necessary dan A Treatise of Human Nature serta literatur-literatur sekunder yang berkaitan dengan tema kausalitas. Teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan dokumentasi, yaitu peneliti mendokumentasikan pemikiran-pemikiran Hume terutama kritik atas hukum kausalitas (sebab-akibat) dan pengetahuan dari kedua karya primer Hume tersebut. Hasil penelitian menjelaskan bahwa Hume melakukan kritik atas kinerja hukum kausalitas yang menjelaskan bahwa adanya esensi kedua dan setelahnya merupakan dampak atau keniscayaan atas esensi pertama. Esensi kedua merupakan akibat dan legitimasi dari esensi pertama. Hal demikian yang menurut Hume tidak dapat dijelaskan secara empiris. Menurutnya, hukum kausalitas itu terjadi karena proses keterurutan secara stagnan. Sikap skeptis dan ragu-ragu Hume atas perihal yang sifatnya dogmatis dan metafisik membawa dampak bahwa segala pengetahuan hanya bisa digali dengan panca inderawi dan bersifat empiris. Semua perihal yang sifatnya irasional dan tidak empiris tidak dapat dinisbatkan pada suatu keyakinan dan kebenaran. Pada akhirnya, kebenaran sejati dalam pengetahuan adalah yang dapat diselidiki secara empiris.
Kata kunci: Hume, Kausalitas, Pengetahuan, Panca Indera
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Marušić, Jennifer Smalligan. "Does Hume Hold a Dispositional Account of Belief?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 2 (June 2010): 155–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2010.0001.
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Philosophical theories about the nature of belief can be roughly classified into two groups: those that treat beliefs as occurrent mental states or episodes and those that treat beliefs as dispositions. David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature seems to contain a classic example of an occurrence theory of belief. Hume defines ‘belief’ as ‘a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression’ (Treatise 1.3.7.5 96). This definition suggests that believing is an occurrent mental state, such as judging, or thinking about something in a particular manner. However, at the same time, a number of Hume's readers claim to find elements in his writings that are suggestive of a dispositional account of belief. Moreover, these elements are sometimes taken as signs of the inadequacy of Hume's account of belief and his dissatisfaction with it. If Hume is not, in fact, wholeheartedly committed to a thoroughgoing occurrence theory of belief, one wonders just who is.
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Schwerin, Alan. "Hume and The Self: A Critical Response." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5, no. 1 (March 2007): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2007.5.1.15.
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In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness.
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Demeter, Tamás. "A Chemistry of Human Nature: Chemical Imagery in Hume’s Treatise." Early Science and Medicine 22, no. 2-3 (June 7, 2017): 208–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15733823-02223p05.
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David Hume’s ‘science of man’ is frequently interpreted as an enterprise inspired in crucial respects by Newton’s Principia. However, a closer look at Hume’s central concepts and methodological commitment suggests that his Treatise of Human Nature is much more congruent with the research traditions that arose in the wake of Newton’s Opticks. In this paper I argue that the label Hume frequently attached to his project, ‘anatomy of the mind,’ is a metaphor that, considered in itself, seems to be expressing a commitment to the study of human nature in analogy with organic living nature. In this vein, Hume’s anatomy relies on conceptual and methodological resources derived from a chemical and physiological perspective on the natural cognitive and affective functioning of human beings. Since the idea of natural functioning provides various options for deriving normative considerations, Hume’s account can be seen as a middle-range theory that connects the discourses of organic nature and normative morality.
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Gelfert, Axel. "Hume on Testimony Revisited." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 13, no. 1 (April 5, 2010): 60–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01301004.
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Among contemporary epistemologists of testimony, David Hume is standardly regarded as a ‘global reductionist’, where global reductionism requires the hearer to have sufficient first-hand knowledge of the facts in order to individually ascertain the reliability of the testimony in question. In the present paper, I argue that, by construing Hume’s reductionism in too individualistic a fashion, the received view of Hume on testimony is inaccurate at best, and misleading at worst. Overall, Hume is much more willing to regard testimonial acceptance as a natural (default) response to testimony than has traditionally been thought. In particular, Hume believes that indirect evidence of human nature and of the social world around us, can take the place of first-hand evidence of the track record of individual speakers or specific classes of testimony. In developing this interpretation of Hume’s views on testimony, the present paper draws on discussions found in the Treatise, the Enquiry, and in Hume’s writings on historical knowledge. In der zeitgenössischen Debatte um den erkenntnistheoretischen Status zeugnisbasiertenWissens wird gern auf David Hume als den Urheber eines „globalen Reduktionismus“ verwiesen, demzufolge der Zeugnisempfänger über ausreichend empirische Belege für die Verlässlichkeit des betreffenden Zeugnisses verfügen muss. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, dass die in der Literatur vorherrschende Meinung ein übertrieben „individualistisches“ Bild von Humes Reduktionismus zeichnet; dadurch wird Humes Position in der gegenwärtigen Debatte ungenau und bisweilen irreführend wiedergegeben. Bei genauerer Betrachtung erweist sich Hume als ausgesprochen aufgeschlossen gegenüber dem Akzeptieren fremden Zeugnisses und sieht darin eine Art Grundmuster im testimonialen Umgang mit anderen. Insbesondere konzediert Hume, dass indirekt erworbenes Wissen um die menschliche Natur und die soziale Welt an die Stelle direkter Belege für die Verlässlichkeit einzelner Zeugen (oder bestimmter Klassen von Berichten) treten kann. Die im vorliegenden Aufsatz entwickelte Neuinterpretation stützt sich auf den Treatise, den Enquiry und auf Humes Schriften zum Problem der historischen Erkenntnis.
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Gill, Michael B. "SHAFTESBURY ON SELFISHNESS AND PARTISANSHIP." Social Philosophy and Policy 37, no. 1 (2020): 55–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052520000047.
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AbstractIn the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume credits “my Lord Shaftesbury” as one of the “philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.” I describe aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that justify the credit Hume gives him. I focus on Shaftesbury’s refutation of psychological egoism, his examination of partiality, and his views on how to promote impartial virtue. I also discuss Shaftesbury’s political commitments, and raise questions about recent interpretations that have taken his Characteristicks to be a polemic, partisan text.
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Prósperi, Germán Osvaldo. "SEIS PERCEPCIONES EN BUSCA DE UN YO: TEATRO Y SUBJETIVIDAD EN DAVID HUME Y LUIGI PIRANDELLO." Praxis Filosófica, no. 44 (April 6, 2017): 59–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i44.4349.
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En este artículo nos proponemos mostrar, por un lado, que resulta factible (y esclarecedor) explicar el capítulo “Of personal identity” del Treatise of Human Nature de David Hume a partir de la obra Sei personaggi in cerca d’autore de Luigi Pirandello, así como esta última obra a partir del texto de Hume; y, por otro lado, que tomando como eje la comparación de la mente con el teatro que propone Hume en dicho capítulo es también posible individuar, según el modo en el que se piensa la relación del pensamiento y la experiencia con el sujeto, dos grandes corrientes en la filosofía moderna: una que podríamos denominar teatro de Autor y otra teatro sin Autor.
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Kail, P. J. E. "The Sceptical Beast in the Beastly Sceptic: Human Nature in Hume." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70 (April 12, 2012): 219–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246112000112.
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David Hume's most brilliant and ambitious work is entitled A Treatise of Human Nature, and it, together with his other writings, has left an indelible mark on philosophical conceptions of human nature. So it is not merely the title of Hume's work that makes discussion of it an appropriate inclusion to this volume, but the fact of its sheer influence. However, its pattern of influence – including, of course, the formulations of ideas consciously antithetical Hume's own – is an immensely complex one, subtle and incredibly difficult to decode. In all probability ‘Hume's’ presence in contemporary thinking of human nature is to likened to the end product of a historiographical game of Chinese whispers, whereby ‘Hume's’ view on x and y is now inflected with interpretations his work – or, more accurately, selected parts of it – that are in turn filtered by thinkers and traditions with different focuses and interest from Hume's own. I am not equipped even to begin to trace this line of influence, a lack compounded by my relative ignorance of the present state of the debate on human nature. Nevetheless various ‘humean’ doctrines still orient debate (even if they aren't labelled as such) and I guess these claims include the idea that causation is a matter of instantiating a universal regularity, that normativity can understood causally, that motivation is a matter of belief plus some independently intelligibly ‘attitude’, that a self is best conceived as a collection of independent states that (somehow) combine to yield a self and so on.
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Hill, James. "The Role of Instinct in David Hume's Conception of Human Reason." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18, no. 3 (September 2020): 273–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0277.
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This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume's understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is ‘nothing but’ an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual power of intuitive and demonstrative reason that is not itself an instinct. At first sight it may look as if this intellectual reason, that is capable of grasping ‘relations of ideas’, is not even grounded in instinct but is a thoroughly non-natural element in human nature. On closer analysis, however, it is shown that intellectual reason, in its apprehension of ‘abstract’ and general relations, is dependent on language – the use of ‘terms’ – and that language itself is grounded in instinctive associations of ideas. Thus, Hume's overall view is that even the intellect is an outgrowth of instinct and his conception of human nature is, therefore, shown to be fully naturalistic. Yet this naturalism can still make room for the ‘exceptionalism’ of human mathematical thought, which has no counterpart in the animal kingdom where language is lacking.
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JOSEPH T. EKONG, REV FR, and O.P. "Hume's Critique of Locke’s Variant Of "Social Contract Theory”: A Ratiocinative Assessment." International Journal of Scientific and Management Research 05, no. 07 (2022): 98–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.37502/ijsmr.2022.5709.
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David Hume (1711-1776) has long been considered a severe denunciator of 'social contract theory', and this interpretation has implicitly premised a perspective that lays heavy weight on the importance of social contract in the history of political thought. This work presents Hume's critique of the Lockean version of the social contract, and identifies the issues responsible for such criticism. In Book 3 of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature (henceforth T), Hume displays his systematic criticism of social contract theory. Hume did not consider social contract theory as an important trend in the history of political thought. One of his points was that 'social contract theory' was quite new, strange and 'heterodoxical' in politics. This work offers an appraisal of Hume’s stance on the Lockean variant of “Social Contract Theory” and proposes a more judicious textual reading of his contributions in this regard.
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Atkinson, David, and Jeanne Peijnenburg. "“Till at last there remain nothing”." Synthese 197, no. 8 (July 24, 2018): 3305–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1883-8.
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Abstract In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something that reduces to nothing, but it is something other than what, according to many, Hume had in mind. Thus two views emerge of what exactly it is that reduces. We surmise that Hume failed to distinguish the two, because he lacked the formal means to differentiate between a rendering of his argument that is in accordance with the probability calculus, and one that is not.
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Bonicco, Céline. "Une critique d'explication par les causes finales: l'anticontractualisme de Hume. Une histoire naturelle du politique." Dialogue 46, no. 4 (2007): 637–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300002158.
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ABSTRACTThis article proposes to show how David Hume's critique of contractualism is the political consequence of his analysis of causality. Hume rejects contractualism mainly for methodological reasons: explanations based on final causes are never satisfying. Therefore, contractualism applies to the political sphere the argument from design presented in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. The genesis of politics unfolded in A Treatise of Human Nature must be seen as a particular application of the only pertinent way of explaining phenomena, i.e., natural history, in which sympathy immanently configures and reconfigures society. The final cause must be replaced by the efficient cause. Hume's political theory—either positive or negative—and epistemology cannot be dissociated.
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Kılıç, Emrullah. "David Hume Düşüncesinde Duygu-Düşünce İlişkisinin İnsan Doğasında Temellendirilmesi." Tetkik, no. 2 (September 30, 2022): 429–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.55709/tetkikdergisi.2022.2.45.
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17. yüzyıl pek çok alanda olduğu gibi bilim ve felsefe açısından da önemli değişim ve dönüşümlere sebep olmuştur. Bu bağlamda Orta çağ düşüncesindeki Tanrı merkezli hâkim anlayışın yerini insan ve insan doğası bilimi almıştır. Aydınlanma dönemini karakterize eden söz konusu bu durum ile varoluşla ilgili tüm hususlar neden-etki ilişkisine bağlanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda David Hume’da mevcut rasyonalistlerden farklı olarak insan eylemlerinin başlatıcı nedeni olarak insan doğası bilimini tüm bilimlerin odağına yerleştirmiştir. Bu çalışma, İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme (A Treatise of Human Nature) ve İnsanın Anlama Yetisi Üzerine Bir Soruşturma (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) isimli eserlerinden yola çıkarak Hume’un insan doğası/bilimine dayalı duygu-düşünce ilişkisini zihnin işlevi ve deneyim çerçevesinde ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Deneysel yargılardan hareket eden Hume’un bu düşüncesi geleceğin geçmişle uyumlu olacağı varsayımına dayanır. Tüm felsefi yaklaşımının özünü insan bilimi ya da insan doğasına dayandıran Hume’un bu tutumu, daha sonra ardıllarını da büyük oranda etkileyecek olan deneyime yüksek bir otorite vermesinin sonucu olarak okunabilir. Düşünceleri, nesnel akıl yerine insan doğasından hareketle üretmeye çalışan Hume söz konusu eleştirel tutumuyla bilim ve ahlakı da duygulara bağlayarak felsefe tarihinde önemli bir yere sahip olmuştur. İnsanı merkeze alan Hume, insan doğasının araştırılmasına yönelmiş hatta bu doğrultuda matematik, doğa felsefesi ve doğal dini bile insana bağlamıştır. Geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek hakkında daha öngörülebilir bilgilerin elde edilmesini insan doğası bilimine bağlayan Hume’un düşünceleri iki temel varsayım üzerine kurulur: Birincisi, insanda sabit, değişmeyen, tek yönlü bir doğa bulunur; ikincisi ise, şayet bir insan doğası bilimi inşa edilecekse içerik ve yöntem olarak deneyime dayanmalıdır. Zaten Hume, felsefesinin gayesini de “bu zamana kadar izlenen oyalayıcı ve usandırıcı yöntemleri terk etmek”, “sınırdaki bir kaleyi ya da köyü ele geçirmek yerine doğrudan başkente”, yani “bilimlerin merkezine, bir zamanlar hepsinden üstün olan insan doğasının ta kendisine” yürümek şeklinde ifade eder. Kendisinden önceki felsefi öğretileri sonuçsuz tartışmalar olarak niteleyen Hume’a göre insan doğasına yönelip, insanın anlama yetisinin potansiyeli ve gücünü keşfetmek gerekmektedir. Nedensellik ilişkisinin sınırları ve kaynağını insan zihni ve alışkanlıklar üzerinden temellendiren Hume’un yaklaşımının etkileri hala günümüzde de devam eden hakikat tartışmalarını derinden etkilemiştir. * Bu makale, 2. Türkiye Sosyal Bilimler Sempozyumu’nda sözlü olarak sunulan ancak tam metni yayımlanmayan “David Hume Düşüncesinde Duygu-Düşünce İlişkisinin İnsan Doğasında Temellendirilmesi” adlı tebliğin içeriği geliştirilerek ve kısmen değiştirilerek üretilmiş hâlidir.
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Baier, Annette C. "Natural Virtues, Natural Vices." Social Philosophy and Policy 8, no. 1 (1990): 24–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003721.
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David Hume has been invoked by those who want to found morality on human nature as well as by their critics. He is credited with showing us the fallacy of moving from premises about what is the case to conclusions about what ought to be the case; and yet, just a few pages after the famous is-ought remarks in A Treatise of Human Nature, he embarks on his equally famous derivation of the obligations of justice from facts about the cooperative schemes accepted in human communities. Is he ambivalent on the relationship between facts about human nature and human evaluations? Does he contradict himself – and, if so, which part of his whole position is most valuable?Between the famous is-ought passage and the famous account of convention and the obligations arising from established cooperative schemes once they are morally endorsed, Hume discusses the various meanings of the term “natural.” “Shou'd it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these principles [upon which all our notions of morals are founded] in nature or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal.” (T. 473–74) The natural can be opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, or the artificial. It is the last contrast that Hume wants, for his contrast between the “artificial” culturally variant, convention-dependent obligations of justice and the more invariant “natural virtues,” and what he says about that contrast in this preparation for his account of the “artificial” virtues, makes it clear why he can later refer to justice as “natural” and to the general content of the rules of justice – that is, of basic human conventions of cooperation – as “Laws of Nature” (T. 484).
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Borza, Natalia. "Animating Sympathetic Feelings. An Analysis of the Nature of Sympathy in the Accounts of David Hume’s Treatise." Conatus 4, no. 1 (October 31, 2019): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.18851.
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Sympathy is a powerful principle in human nature, which can change our passions, sentiments and ways of thinking. For the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, sympathy is a working mechanism accountable for a wide range of communication: the ways of interacting with the others’ affections, emotions, sentiments, inclinations, ways of thinking and even opinions. The present paper intends to find a systematic reading of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739) from the point of view of what the mechanism of sympathetic communication implies in terms of strengthening our action of understanding, of being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of others. Hume’s description of the sympathetic mechanism appears to suggest that sympathetic passions come upon us purely by natural means in a passive manner, without the active use of any of our faculties. Consequently, scholarly attention is drawn to the mechanistic character of the sympathetic process; its automatic nature is emphasized to such an extent that some experts even find it to be completely void of any reflective process. The current study investigates to what extent the sympathetic process can actively be modified and in what manner sympathetic feelings can be generated as described in Hume’s system of emotions. The paper identifies at which points the otherwise mechanically and passively operating process of sympathetic feelings is open to be modified by actively altering or strengthening certain skeletal points of the mechanism. I argue that the alterations can be initiated by the person who receives the sympathetic feelings and also by the person whose passions are transmitted, moreover even by a third party. In a seemingly mechanic model, there is room for altering or at least amplifying one’s sympathetic feelings.
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Schliesser, Eric. "David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition. Edited by, David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. (Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume.) 2 volumes. xvi + 1,090 pp., apps., bibl., indexes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. $199 (cloth)." Isis 100, no. 2 (June 2009): 442–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/605276.
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Austin, Linda M. "SELF AGAINST CHILDHOOD: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALICE MEYNELL TO A PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY OF MEMORY." Victorian Literature and Culture 34, no. 1 (March 2006): 249–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s106015030605114x.
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THE IDEA OF THE SELFin its various constructions–political, economic, psychological–has always been shadowed by an English tradition of skepticism about the persistence of a conscious and stable identity. Voiced most disconcertingly by David Hume in his section, “Of personal identity” fromA Treatise of Human Nature(1739–40; I.iv.vi), this attitude was significantly advanced during the second half of the nineteenth century by a group of physiological psychologists who argued for the corporeal basis of mental functions, including memory. Henry Maudsley and George Henry Lewes, among others, challenged the metaphysical notion of a mind and drew instead from controversial and often suppressed theories of neuroscience to describe the physiological operation of memory. These theories, which located impressions and sensations in the brain or spinal chord, produced a form of identity that could endure alterations of consciousness. They offered, in addition, a new understanding of an adult's physical connection to the personal past.
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Mankin, Robert. "Can Jealousy be Reduced to a Science? Politics and Economics in Hume's Essays." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 27, no. 1 (March 2005): 59–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557570500031570.
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Today we tend to read David Hume's Essays, Moral, Political and Literary in the 1777 edition, a two-part collection dating essentially from the early 1740s and then again from the early 1750s, as revised continually by the author until his death in the year of the American Declaration of Independence. Although this is better than reading the essays in anthologies, even the best text that we have ever had (the Liberty Fund's) is a compendious final version rather than a critical edition, one that would lead us not only into what the essays are but also what they were about. Hume's revisions and afterthoughts are, for the most part, duly noted, but never put into perspective; and his intentions at the outset are underplayed or simply ignored (Hume 1777). Yet it would be a great help to have more clarity on this desire for changes, for it is remarkable in Hume's career. When, very shortly after publication in 1738, he came to feel reservations about the Treatise of Human Nature, he simply scrapped it and wrote new versions of his philosophy. With the Essays, in contrast, he was more tempted than with any other work published in his lifetime, and more chronically tempted, to revise and adapt his thoughts and then resubmit them to the public. With these labors he was not saving or preparing them for posterity so much as constantly adjusting them to the present as he understood it. This is the kind of evidence that might be cited for a recent claim that the Essays are “contemporary history” (Pocock 1999, vol. ii., p.177ff.).
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VANDERSCHRAAF, PETER. "WAR OR PEACE?: A DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF ANARCHY." Economics and Philosophy 22, no. 2 (July 2006): 243–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267106000897.
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I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic analysis of anarchy, I maintain that typically in anarchy some moderate individuals will most desire mutual cooperation while other dominators will most desire to exploit others' cooperation. I argue that once one allows for different types of individuals in anarchy, any a priori analysis of anarchy requires unrealistic assumptions regarding the agents' common knowledge of their situation. However, this move also suggests a dynamical analysis of anarchy, one that assumes no common knowledge. In the Variable Anticipation threshold model developed here, individuals modify their behavior as they learn from repeated interactions. I present specific instances of this model where the individuals in anarchy converge to different equilibria corresponding to either peace or war, depending on the initial conditions. I show that individuals are liable to converge to Hobbes' war of all against all even if only a small percentage of are dominators. The presence of only a few “nasty” individuals gradually drives all, including those inclined to be “nicer”, to imitate the “nasty” conduct of these few. This dynamic analysis suggests that the Hobbesian war in anarchy is indeed inevitable in most realistic circumstances.You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carry'd to commit acts of injustice as well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature)
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JOST, JACOB SIDER. "HUME'S FOUR PHILOSOPHERS: RECASTING THE TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE." Modern Intellectual History 6, no. 1 (April 2009): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244308001923.
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Disappointed by the indifferent reception of his 1739 Treatise of Human Nature, particularly in view of his commitment to vividness and convincingness as epistemological criteria, Hume recast crucial arguments from his Treatise in “The Epicurean,” “The Stoic,” “The Platonist,” and “The Sceptic,” four pieces from his 1741–2 Essays Moral and Political. Locating these texts within both the dialogue and essay genres, I demonstrate how Hume continues the project of the Treatise by showing, rather than telling, his views: he blends rhetoric and reasoned argument to show that they are in many cases indistinguishable; he depicts his speakers' conclusions as consequences of their personalities to show his skepticism about human freedom; and he concludes, in a moment strongly reminiscent of the famous end of Book I of the Treatise, by showing the limits of philosophy itself.
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Sugden, Robert. "David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature." Topoi 27, no. 1-2 (July 2008): 153–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9034-3.
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McCormick, Miriam. "A Change in Manner: Hume's Scepticism in the Treatise and the first Enquiry." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29, no. 3 (September 1999): 431–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10717520.
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The year before his death, Hume asked his publisher to affix an advertisement to all existing and future editions of his works. In this advertisement, Hume disavows the Treatise and directs all criticism to his later work. Hume himself is relatively clear as to why he preferred this later work. In his autobiography, when discussing the poor public reception given his Treatise, Hume says, ‘I had always entertained a Notion, that my want of Success in publishing the Treatise of human nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter; and that I had been guilty of a very usual Indiscretion, in going to the Press too early.’ In a letter to Gilbert Elliot, written in 1751, Hume says that ‘The philosophical Principles are the same in both’ the Treatise and the first Enquiry.
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Matson, Erik W. "Reason and Political Economy in Hume." Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 12, no. 1 (July 24, 2019): 26–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v12i1.333.
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This paper examines some connections between Hume’s epistemology in his Treatise of Human Nature and his political economy. I make three claims: (1) First, I argue that it is the development of Hume’s account of the faculty of reason in Book I of the Treatise that leads him to emphasize social science—including political economy—and the humanities over more abstract modes of intellectual inquiry. (2) Second, I argue that Hume’s conception of reason has implications for his methodology in political economy. His perception of human reason leads him to deploy a method of qualified generalization that emphasizes the by-and-large nature of theoretical statements. (3) Third, when it comes to policy matters, the method of qualified generalization in theory cashes out in terms of practical maxims. I suggest that two central maxims in Hume’s political economy derive from his views of the usefulness of economic liberty and the coordinating nature of the status quo.
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Van Holthoon, F. L. "Adam Smith and David Hume: with Sympathy." Utilitas 5, no. 1 (May 1993): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800005525.
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Why did Hume drop sympathy as a key concept of his moral philosophy, and why—on the other hand—did Smith make it into the ‘didactic principle’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments? These questions confront us with the basic issue of ethical theory concerning human nature. My point in dealing with these questions is to show what views of human nature their respective choices involved. And my procedure will be to take a close look at the revisions they made to their ethical theories to bring out the contrasting aspects of their views of human nature.
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Blinov, Evgeniy N. "Deciphering Hume." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 1 (2020): 202–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057115.
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The present article analyzes an ambitious attempt to revisit and reevaluate Hume’s metaphysical project in the early 21th century, proposed by Vadim Vasilyev. His claim is to demonstrate that the problems raised by the author of Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are far from being completely resolved and could provide us some valuable hints into the problems of contemporary analytical metaphysics. Against a widespread consensus that the evolution in Hume’s had been insignificant, Vasilyev maintains that his philosophical project underwent crucial transformations. He provides evidence of a gradual shift from a radical empiricism to a moderate rationalism by re-examining some classical problems of Hume’s studies and providing a critical analysis of the problems of causality and personal identity. This review provides some arguments for and against Vasilyev’s claims.
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CROWE, BENJAMIN D. "Religion and the ‘sensitive branch’ of human nature." Religious Studies 46, no. 2 (February 5, 2010): 251–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250999031x.
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AbstractWhile the theses that (1) human beings are primarily passional creatures and that (2) religion is fundamentally a product of our sensible nature are both closely linked to David Hume, Hume's contemporary Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1782), also defended them and explored their implications. Importantly, Kames does not draw the same sceptical conclusions as does Hume. Employing a sophisticated account of the rationality of what he calls the ‘sensitive branch’ of human nature, Kames argues that religion plays a central role in the development and perfection of human life.
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Campbell, Joe. "Critical Notice: Paul Russell’s The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (OUP 2008)." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, no. 1 (2015): 127–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1024027.
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In The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (2008), Paul Russell makes a strong case for the claim that “The primary aim of Hume’s series of skeptical arguments, as developed and distributed throughout the Treatise, is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of Christian philosophy and theology with a view toward redirecting our philosophical investigations to areas of ‘common life, ’ with the particular aim of advancing ‘the science of man’”; (2008, 290). Understanding Hume in this way, according to Russell, sheds light on the “ultimate riddle”; of the Treatise: “is it possible to reconcile Hume’s (extreme) skeptical principles and conclusions with his aim to advance the ‘science of man’”; (2008, 3)? Or does Hume’s skepticism undermine his “secular, scientific account of the foundations of moral life in human nature”; (290)? Russell’s controversial thesis is that “the irreligious nature of Hume’s fundamental intentions in the Treatise”; is essential to solving the riddle (11). Russell makes a compelling case for Hume’s irreligion as well as his atheism. Contrary to this interpretation I argue that Hume is an irreligious theist and not an atheist.
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Stunkel, Kenneth R. "Early Reactions to David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature." European Legacy 11, no. 3 (June 2006): 323–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770600668399.
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Singer, Ira. "Hume's Extreme Skepticism in Treatise I IV 7." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 4 (December 1995): 595–622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717428.
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Hume finds himself in an appalling state during Treatise I iv 7 (the conclusion of Book I). He is almost bereft of beliefs; he believes, for a short time, only that he cannot believe anything else. But, being an assiduous student of human nature, Hume makes this extreme skeptical crisis into material for naturalistic study. He carefully reports how extreme skepticism comes about, what it is like, and how it passes. So I iv 7 has two aspects: involved personal experience of a skeptical crisis, and detached naturalistic reflection on that crisis. Interpreting the text correctly requires taking both these aspects seriously.An old interpretive tradition ignores or downplays Hume's detached naturalistic reflections in I iv 7, and focuses only on his involved personal experience of skepticism. Oddly enough, interpretations in this tradition tend to treat Hume's experience dismissively and derisively.
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Chappell, T. D. J. "Reason, Passion, and Action: the Third Condition of the Voluntary." Philosophy 70, no. 273 (July 1995): 453–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100065633.
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1. ‘Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office, but to serve and obey them.’ (Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (THN) 2.3.3) Unfortunately, Hume uses ‘reason’ to mean ‘discovery of truth or falsehood‘ (THN 3.1.1) as well as discovery of logical relations. So suppose we avoid, as Hume I think does not, prejudging the question of how many ingredients are requisite for action, by separating these two claims out:A. Reason (= logical powers) is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.B. Reason (= belief(s)) is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.
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Kornegay, R. Jo. "Hume on the Ordinary Distinction Between Objective and Subjective Impressions." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 2 (June 1993): 241–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1993.10717319.
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Hume begins ‘Of scepticism with regard to the senses,’ Section 2 of the Treatise, Book I, Part iv with the claim that it is otiose to ask whether or not there are bodies since belief in their existence is unavoidable. The appropriate question is rather ‘What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?’ (§2, 187-8; his emphasis). For Hume, belief is lively conception. Hence, he is also undertaking to answer the logically prior question: What causes induce us to form the concept of body? Hume wants to explain the ordinary notion of, and belief in, external objects as part of his science of human nature.
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Stefanovic, Igor. "Hume’s understanding of causal explanation." Theoria, Beograd 58, no. 3 (2015): 121–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1503123s.
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This article deals with actuality of Hume?s positive thesis about causality, specifically in modern science. According to Dauer, Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature does not deal with scientific theory which allows us, in modern times, to come to the truth, and then necessity. Also, he claims that observation alone, without theory is useless, which is the reason why we need science to predict future events. I intend to show that all three claims are incorrect, and to show an intimate connection of causality and our intuitions.
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Davidovic, Aleksandra. "Hume’s understanding of the relationship between scepticism and philosophy." Theoria, Beograd 61, no. 3 (2018): 93–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1803093d.
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In this article I explore how Hume?s views on the relationship between scepticism and philosophy developed and matured throughout his philosophical career. Hume?s first work, A Treatise of Human Nature, leaves open the question of why would anyone pursue philosophy in light of the discovery that sceptical arguments are irrefutable. What I aim to show is that, although Hume?s attitude to scepticism and his own sceptical position remain essentially unchanged over the years, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, along with a couple of his minor writings, contain interesting changes, additions and improvements to his thinking about the way scepticism can inform our philosophical enquiries. Only in his last work Hume unambiguously claims that scepticism does have a positive and lasting influence on our philosophising, and this influence consists in intelectual modesty and subject-matter limitations whithin philosophical investigations.
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Hakkarainen, Jani. "Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10, no. 2 (September 2012): 143–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2012.0035.
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In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real (distinct and continued) entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various ways to avoid this problem do not work. Accordingly, this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism.
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Watts, Gabriel. "Reading Hume on the passions." Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1, no. 34 (2021): 73–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa2134073w.
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This paper provides a reception history of Book Two of the Treatise-Of the passions-as well as an attempt to reconcile Hume's ambitions to systematicity in Book Two with the distracted and distracting nature of the text. We currently have, I think, a good sense of the philosophical importance of Book Two within Hume's science of human nature. Yet we have not made much progress on understanding Book Two on its own terms, and especially why Book Two so often seems on the verge of falling into an explanatory heap. I aim to rectify this situation by giving a reading of Book Two that makes sense of the philosophical importance of Hume's system of the passions, yet also explains why he encounters so many difficulties in setting out his system; such that he is often forced to stretch his explanations to the very edge of the credible. I contend that Hume's system of the passions is best viewed as an unstable explanatory compound, one that progressively dissolves as Hume's explanatory intentions become increasingly ambitious.
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O'Rourke, Sean Patrick. "Hugh Blair's Observations upon a Pamphlet (1755): Introduction and Text." Journal for the History of Rhetoric 14, no. 2 (July 1, 2011): 220–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jhistrhetoric.14.2.0220.
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ABSTRACT This article provides a critical edition and brief introduction to a polemical pamphlet of Hugh Blair published anonymously under the title Observations upon a Pamphlet, Intitled, An Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments contained in the Writings of Sopho, and David Hume, Esq; &c. (1755). The work participates in a contemporary controversy concerning human nature and religion. Within the controversy Henry Home, Lord Kames, and David Hume had been attacked for their views on free will, not least in a tract by conservative churchman John Bonar. Blair's pamphlet defends Kames and Hume and provides a rare look at Blair's rhetorical practice apart from his extant sermons.
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Watts, Gabriel. "Marching on the Capital: Hume's Experimental Science of Man as a Conquest for Occupied Territory." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18, no. 3 (September 2020): 233–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0275.
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In this paper I set out what I call a ‘conquest’ conception of Hume's experimental science of man. It is notable, I claim, that Hume regards what he calls the ‘capital’ of the sciences – ‘the science of MAN’ – as occupied territory, and that he views his ‘direct’ method of approach upon the science of human nature as a ‘conquest’. I expand upon such statements by leveraging the comparison that Hume draws between experimental moral philosophy and the experimental tradition in natural philosophy inaugurated by Francis Bacon. Overall, I suggest that Hume's decision to ground his science of human nature upon experience and observation is as much about overthrowing the epistemic authority of speculative dogmas as it is about establishing a secure foundation for his system of the sciences, and I contend that Hume's application of his hypotheses to animals is central to this conception of his philosophical project in the Treatise.
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Hales, Steven D. "Certainty and Phenomenal States." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (March 1994): 57–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1994.10717359.
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The sort of knowledge we have with regard to the nature and kind of our own phenomenal states has enjoyed considerable prestige in the history of philosophy. Hume claims that ‘The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions’ (A Treatise of Human Nature, I 4.2). In the New Essays (II 27.238), Leibniz remarks that ‘if the immediate inner experience is not certain, we cannot be sure of any truth of fact.’
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Demeter, Tamás. "Towards a Humean epistemic ideal: Contested alternatives and the ideology of modern science." Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1, no. 34 (2021): 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa2134007d.
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I suggest that it is fruitful to read Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding as a concise exposition of an epistemic ideal whose complex philosophical background is laid down in A Treatise of Human Nature. Accordingly, the Treatise offers a theory of cognitive and affective capacities, which serves in the Enquiry as the foundation for a critique of chimerical epistemic ideals, and the development of an alternative ideal. Taking the "mental geography" of the Treatise as his starting point, this is the project Hume pursues in the Enquiry. The epistemic ideal Hume spells out in the Enquiry is an alternative to competing ideals: the Aristotelian, the Cartesian, and the Newtonian, and can be read as an exposition of the epistemic ideal of modern science. Although the spell of the Aristotelian and the Cartesian ideals had been in decline for several decades by the 1740s, they had not fully lost their grip on the philosophical imagination. Yet, it was the Newtonian epistemic ideal that became dominant in Scotland and Britain by then, guiding inquiry in moral and natural philosophy, as well as in medical theory. Hume offers a critique of these ideals. He shows that Aristotelian and Cartesian epistemic aspirations rest on mistaken views on human cognitive capacities. And albeit the Newtonian ideal is not prone to this mistake by Hume's standards, its epistemic expectations extend far beyond the limits of those capacities. Hume's epistemic ideal can be read as a correction, limitation and refinement of the Newtonian ideal: it sets epistemic aims and propagates methods for the production of fallible, limited and potentially useful knowledge that falls short of the great epistemic expectations of Newton and many Newtonians - but it conforms to what we expect from modern science.
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Gerwin, Martin. "Causality and Agency: A Refutation of Hume." Dialogue 26, no. 1 (1987): 3–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300042268.
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In Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume examines the idea of necessary connection, which, he observes, forms an indispensable part of our idea of cause and effect. He concludes:The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey'd by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, by deriv'd from some internal impression, or impression of reflexion. There is no internal impression which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider'd as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union.
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Merrill, Thomas. "Hume's Socratism." Review of Politics 77, no. 1 (2015): 23–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670514000825.
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AbstractHume's famous “Conclusion” to Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature has been an enduring source of interest and controversy to scholars, with some going so far as to argue that the Treatise is inconsistent. Yet in the opening pages of the book Hume makes an odd, rarely noticed allusion to Socrates that helps explain the “Conclusion.” This article argues that the “Conclusion” is Hume's version of calling philosophy down from the heavens, establishing it in the cities, and compelling to inquire into morality and human affairs. Recognizing Hume's Socratic allusion focuses our attention on the centrality of moral and political topics to his mature thought and sheds light on the character of his skepticism. Far from being a confession of despair, Hume's skeptical crisis is an argument for a new conception of philosophy that takes self-knowledge as the indispensable condition of philosophizing about anything.
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Galvagni, Enrico. "Hume on Pride, Vanity and Society." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18, no. 2 (June 2020): 157–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0265.
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Pride is a fundamental element in Hume's description of human nature. An important part of the secondary literature on Hume is devoted to this passion. However, no one, as far as I am aware, takes seriously the fact that pride often appears in pairs with vanity. In Book 2 of the Treatise, pride is defined as the passion one feels when society recognizes his connection to a ‘cause’, composed by a ‘subject’ and a (positive) ‘quality’. Conversely, no definition of vanity is provided. Despite Hume's fluctuating vocabulary, I hold that a conceptual difference between pride and vanity exists. To support this claim, I analyse the common features of these two passions, showing that both pride and vanity (a) are indirect passions, (b) are self-regarding passions, and (c) have the same structure. Supported by textual evidence, I then claim that vanity is a desire of reputation, a desire to feel pride, when pride is not (yet) in place, because its cause is only imaginary and not real. Nonetheless, I underscore that, at times, ‘vanity’ means simply pride and call for greater attention on this ongoing oscillation. In conclusion, I explore the implications of this account of vanity for social interactions in Hume's philosophy, which illustrates its intrinsic ambivalence.
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Vasilyev, Vadim V. "David Hume’s Epistemology and Its Contemporary Importance." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 1 (2020): 166–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057113.
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The paper is about some epistemological ideas of David Hume. At first, I give a review of his most influential epistemological conceptions: his exposition of the problem of induction in the context of his investigation of the nature of empirical reasonings, his analysis of epistemic status of the principle of causation, and his skeptical arguments concerning existence of external world and demonstrative knowledge. Then I discuss those Hume’s epistemological ideas which, as I believe, are usually not rightly understood in literature about Hume’s philosophy. They are connected to his theory of probabilistic reasonings. It is quite common to contrast his theory with approach of Thomas Bayes, but I try to show that in reality Hume’s theory is in perfect agreement with the Bayes’ theorem. In order to do this I interpret a topic of probability of our belief in testimonies of miracles, which Hume discusses, in terms of Bayes’ theorem: P(miracle/testimony) = P(testimony/miracle) x P(miracle) // P(testimony). According to this interpretation a probability of veracity of testimony of a miracle diminishes with diminishing of probability of miracles and diminishes when probability of testimonies increases. That’s very Hume’s position. At the end of the paper I discuss Hume’s insights on non-rational aspects of human cognition, which had anticipated some recent developments in cognitive psychology. In this context I also consider a possibility of justification of our principles of empirical cognition in Hume’s epistemology. I argue that Hume gave a kind of justification of them after all in terms of final causes, and quite legitimate.
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Nurkic, Petar. "Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 3 (2021): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2103091n.
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Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.
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Wennerlind, C. "The Link between David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature and His Fiduciary Theory of Money." History of Political Economy 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 139–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-33-1-139.
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Flew, Antony. "Hume's Philosophy of Religion." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 129–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004070.
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I shall be dealing with not only Sections X and XI but also Part II of Section VIII and Part III of Section XII. Of all this material we have, anywhere in the originally anonymous and later emphatically disowned Treatise of Human Nature, Hume's first book, nothing more than at most hints. But in a surviving letter, written while he was still working on the manuscript of that Treatise, Hume wrote: ‘I am at present castrating my work, that is, cutting off its nobler parts; that is, endeavouring it shall give as little offence as possible, before which I would not pretend to put it in the Doctor's hands’. Enclosed with this letter were some ‘Reasonings concerning Miracles’, which must have anticipated what became Section X of our Enquiry. Presumably there were other excised anticipations also. The ‘Doctor’ mentioned was a Doctor of Theology, Joseph Butler, soon to be appointed Bishop of Durham; an office open in that period only to believing Christians.