Academic literature on the topic 'Treaty of Versailles (1919 June 28)'

Abstract: This article examines the idea of the Treaty of Versailles as a readily quantifiable corpus of provisions as set down in a readily identifiable document that was signed at the Palace of Versailles on 28 June 1919. It does so by recalling the pre-history to that peace that stretches as far back as US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918, for the German Government accepted these Fourteen Points as well as subsequent pronouncements of President Wilson as the basis for the peace that ended the Great War. Through a close engagement with diplomatic correspondence from October and November 1918, the article considers how impressions came to form that a ‘contract’ had been made with the enemy (John Maynard Keynes) by the time of the Armistice of Compiègne of November 1918—an apparent ‘charter for our future activity’ (Harold Nicolson) or a localized lex pacificatoria for its time. The article explores the amenability of each of the Fourteen Points to international normativity and, in its final section, it provides a broader account of how this set of positions shaped Germany’s official response to the draft treaty (‘Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace’) that was released in May 1919.

Signed on 28 June 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles, this peace treaty established a new political order in Europe. Poland gained the Poznań lands, excluding Wschowa, Babimost, Międzyrzecz and Skwierzyna, and a larger part of the Royal Prussia (a total of 45 463 km2 and a little over three million inhabitants). Determining Polish borders was a process largely affected by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, who was reluctant in his attitude towards Poland. He opposed any solution that would increase the role of France in Europe. The final shape of the borders was to be a task of the Allied and Associated Powers. After a heated debate, the Legislative Sejm of Poland ratified a peace treaty with Germany on 31 July 1919. It took effect on 10 January 1920. The peace treaty also arranged a plebiscite in parts of Eastern and Western Prussia, which was to determine the Polish or German affiliation of Warmia, Masuria and Powiśle. Only after that event the Boundary Commission began its delimitation works. The results of the plebiscite were unfavourable for Poland as it gained only small territories. The commission in the field focused on establishing the borders in the light of the peace treaty, so along the former German-Russian border until the Vistula river and then along it up to the Free City of Danzig.

The Treaty of Versailles was signed after several months of deliberations at a peace conference convened to Paris after the end of World War I on 28 June 1919 in Paris by Germany and the Entente countries. It entered into force on 10 January 1920, i.e., on the day of its ratification. Delegations of 27 winning countries participated in the peace conference in Paris. The treaty completely changed the map of Europe and the prevailing political order. Many small countries found their place on the map, including the Republic of Poland re-emerging on the maps of Europe, although in smaller territorial ownership than before the Partition of Poland. The Polish delegation, including among others: Ignacy Jan Paderewski and Roman Dmowski, tried their best to restore the Poles to their lands. Lands which, as a result of the Partition, came under the rule of three powers, namely: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. However, the peace conference in Paris showed much reluctance on the part of the Big Five, which decided about the fate of post-war Europe towards Poland. Expectations of the Poles that their case would be supported by friendly British, American, or French politicians turned out to be deceptive. Especially the French, who seemed very favourable to Poland, at the peace conference completely obeyed the will of the British, who even intended to prevent the Poles in their quest to restore the pre-partition Polish borders. The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who turned out to expose his unfavourable attitude towards the Polish cause, was so uncompromising in his position that no arguments invoked by the Polish delegation appealed to him.

AbstractIn January 1919, the Bürgertum of the Bavarian town of Hof voted overwhelmingly for the left-liberal German Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP). But the following summer, in the Reichstag elections of June 1920, the Democrats sustained significant losses against the right-wing nationalist Bavarian Middle Party (Bayerische Mittelpartei, BMP). This article explores the rise and fall of the DDP in Hof by showing that a pro-republican politics initially proved popular among the local Bürgertum, until its credibility was undermined and ultimately destroyed by a series of devastating crises: the Bavarian Räterepublik of April 1919, the publication of the Versailles Treaty a month later, and the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary convulsions triggered by the Kapp Putsch in March 1920. This article concludes that political violence and a burgeoning confrontation between bürgerliche and socialist milieus were the key factors in explaining the eclipse of left-liberalism in Hof during the first years of the Weimar Republic.

Romania’s foreign policy during the first decades of the 20th century was not accidental or spontaneous. It was implemented by the leadership of the Kingdom as part of a targeted program for the creation of “Greater Romania.” The foreign policy of Bucharest during the World War and formation of the Versailles system of international relations can be considered as indicative in terms of achieving national interests to gain the regional leader status in the Balkans. The article analyses the struggle around the “Bessarabian question” at the Paris Peace Conference during 1919–1920. This period became decisive for the Romanian Kingdom in the question of the recognition by the international community of its exclusive right to annex Bessarabia. The purposeful work of the Romanian politicians I. Bratianu, A. Vaida-Voevoda, A. Averescu and others in solving the “Bessarabian question” has undoubtedly yielded positive results for Romania. On October 28, 1920, the Paris, or Bessarabian, protocol was signed in Paris to legally recognize the annexation of Bessarabia to the kingdom. Thus, the long and the exhausting struggle of the Romanian diplomacy ended with the victory of Bucharest on the one hand, while on the other, this fateful document was never ratified by the individual participants, which automatically made it legally “incomplete” international act.

1918 թ. փետրվարի 10-ից Կովկասյան ճակատում հաջողությամբ ծավալված թուրքական հարձակումը հանգեցրեց 1918 թ. մարտի 3-ին կնքված Բրեստ-Լիտովսկի պայմանագրին։ Օսմանյան կայսրությունը շարունակեց առաջխաղացումն Անդրկովկասում և 1918 թ. հունիսի 4-ին Վրաստանի, Ադրբեջանի և Հայաստանի հանրապետություններին պարտադրեց շատ ավելի ծանր Բաթումի պայմանագիրը, որտեղ հայտարարվեց Նախջիևանը թուրքական բանակով բռնանվաճելու մասին։ Թեև հայ ազգային հերոս, գեներալ-մայոր Անդրանիկ Օզանյանը մերժեց Բաթումի պայմանագիրը և 1918 թ. հունիսի 7-ից մինչև հուլիսի 20-ը կատաղի կռիվներ մղեց թուրքերի դեմ, բայց նրա Հայկական առանձին հարվածող զորամասին չհաջողվեց Պարսկաստանում միանալ բրիտանական զորքերին կամ թուրքերից փրկել Նախիջևանի հայությանը։ Զորամասը 1918 թ. հուլիսի 23-ից մինչև նոյեմբերի 28-ը Զանգեզուրում էր և կարողացավ այս երկրամասը փրկել օսմանյան ներխուժումից ու կոտորածից։ Տեղի մահմեդական բնակչությունը Նախջիևանում փորձ արեց 1918 թ. մարտին անկախություն հռչակել: 1919 թ. հունվարի 17-ին, թուրքական հսկողության ներքո, Շարուր-Նախիջևան-Սուրմալուում ստեղծվեց «Արասդայանի հանրապետությունը»։ Քանի որ «Արաքսի հանրապետությունը» չափազանց թույլ էր, այն փոխարինվեց մարիոնետային այլ՝ թուրքական սահմաններում հայտարարված ինքնավար միավորով։ Успешное турецкое наступление на Кавказском фронте 10 февраля 1918 г. привело к Брест-Литовскому договору от 3 марта 1918 г. Османская империя не придерживалась пунктов этого документа, продолжая свое наступление в Закавказье. 4 июня 1918 г. с новообразованными независимыми республиками Грузии, Азербайджана и Армении был заключен более тяжелый – Батумский договор. Его текст гласил об аннексии Нахиджевана турецкими войсками. Хотя и армянский национальный герой, генерал-майор А. Озанян обоснованно отверг Батумский договор и с 7 июня до 20 июля 1918 г. развернул боевые действия против турок, но его Армянский особый ударный отряд не смог объединиться с британскими войсками в Персии и спасти нахиджеванских армян от турок. В марте 1918 г. местное мусульманское население Нахиджевана попыталось установить независимость. Затем в Шаруре-Нахиджеване-Сурмалу была создана марионеточная «Арасдаянская республика» под турецким контролем. Поскольку «Аракская республика» была слишком слабой, она была заменена другой марионеточной, уже автономной единицей в турецких границах. The successful Turkish advance on the Caucasus Front from February 10, 1918, re-sulted in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918. The Ottoman Empire did not respect this document, continued its advance into the Transcaucasia and concluded on June 4, 1918, much more heavy Treaty of Batum with newly-independent republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. Its text announced annexation of Nakhijevan by the Tur-kish forces. Their invasion had been fulfilled by the 36th, 11th and 33rd Divisions on July 10-19, 1918. Though the Armenian national hero and General Major A. Ozanian reasonably rejected the Treaty of Batum and waged his fights from June 7 till July 20, 1918, his Arme-nian Special Striking Detachment could not unite with the British troops in Persia or save the Nakhijevan Armenians from the Turks. On July 14, 1918 he subordinated this district to Soviet Russia, but without any support from the Red Army. His Armenian Special Striking Detachment of 1.400-3.000 men had to evacuate with 35.000 Western and local refu-gees. His further stay in Zangezur on July 23 – November 28, 1918, gave better results and saved the district from the Ottoman invasion and massacre. The local Muslim population first attempted its independence on March 7-25, 1918. Then it proclaimed in Sharur-Nakhijevan-Surmalu a puppet "Republic of Arazdayan" under the Turkish control on De-cember 5, 1918 – January 17, 1919. Since the "Republic of Araxes" could not stand Arme-nian demands, it was replaced by another puppet, now autonomous unit in the frontiers of Turkey, troops of which evacuated from Goghtan on November 25, 1918, and from the whole Nakhijevan on January 26, 1919. During this period the Republic of Armenia ap-pointed its commissar of the district on November 27, 1918, and established a Military Go-vernorship under General Major G. Shelkovnikian on January 14, 1919. On the insistence of British, it was replaces on January 26 by their own Military Governorship; so on Febru-ary 3, an agreement with the Republic of Armenia was signed and on February 10, 1919, the Armenian army was called back to the northern borders of the district.

The Final Act of Congress of Vienna was signed on June 9, 1815. More accurately, because of Napoleon's escape and the consequent battle of Waterloo, the Vienna settlement was completed with the signature of the second Treaty of Paris on November 20s 1815. There is thus no doubt that last year marks the 170th anniversary of the settlement. There is equally no doubt that in many ways 1815 has come to seem very remote. There are no great historical arguments in progress about it, nor does it seem to attract any great interest from the students of international relations, unless their attention is actually drawn to it. So it may be as well to remember that the Vienna settlement has generated much more substantial debate at other times. Very soon after its making, it began to be said that the settlement represented a failed attempt to control, at worst, or suppress, at best, the two doctrines that were to be the political foundation of the 19th century: liberalism and nationalism. By the end of the century this attitude had intensified. In any case, the immense social and political changes which were moulding the modern state structure were beginning to create a new kind of international environment in which the ‘unspoken’ as well as deliberate assumptions of 1815 were less relevant. Approved or not, in practical terms, the settlement remained as a basis for the conduct of international politics until 1914, and thus was the obvious point of departure for discussion about the new settlement which would have to be made when the First World War ended. It is not surprising therefore to find that part of the British preparation for the Paris Peace Conference, which were made by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, was a study of the Congress of Vienna by C. K. Webster. It is a somewhat routine piece, and his treatment of the subject was much better based and wider ranging in his monumental study of British foreign policy under Lord Castlereagh. It contained, however, one conclusion which may have had an important effect on the way in which the 1919 settlement was arrived at. Webster said that it had been an error on the part of the allies to have permitted the French to be present at Vienna because of the successful attempt by Talleyrand to insert France into the discussions of the other great powers. It has of course been subsequently felt that one of the cardinal respects in which Vienna was more, sensible than Versailles was precisely in that the French were included and became in effect joint guarantors of the agreement. Whether anything fundamental would have been different had the same been done for the Weimar republic is open to question, but there can be no doubt that the circumstances at the time and afterwards would have been greatly easier had the agenda of post-war international politics not had to include the status of Germany as a first item.

The article discusses regulatory efforts of states to protect the rights of national minorities. The focus is on the role of the League of Nations and the treaties on minorities concluded with Poland (1919), Czechoslovakia (1919), the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian state (1919), Romania (1919) and Greece (1920), as well as the peace treaties that formed the basis of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations in Europe in 1919– 1922 (the 1919 Peace Treaty between the Allied and United Powers and Germany, the 1919 Saint-Germain Peace Treaty, the 1919 Neisk Peace Treaty, the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, the 1920 Sevres Peace Treaty). The contribution of the Permanent Court of International Justice to the protection of minority rights is noted (the case of minority rights in Upper Silesia, the case of minority schools in Albania, the case of eviction of German minorities in Poland).

What would happen if the Germans refused to sign the treaty? The Allies were not prepared to resume the war or to handle the possibility of a German government collapse. “To bed, sick of life” describes the doubts and fears of the Allies and the German response to the proposed Treaty of Versailles. The request of German foreign minister Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau for amendments was rejected and he returned to Berlin without any agreement. The German cabinet resigned on June 20, 1919 rather than vote in favor of accepting the treaty, but Provisional president Friedrich Ebert persuaded the National Assembly to approve it, despite the unfavorable terms, and the treaty was officially signed in Paris on June 28.

‘Diplomatic origins of the Great War and Versailles’ looks at the diplomatic origins of the Great War and its aftermath Versailles, which carried away five empires and an entire generation of young men. Based on Europe’s rival alliances and age-old ambitions, the Great Powers found themselves engulfed in war that began with the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo, 28 June 1914. A case can be made that the Treaty of Versailles, with its emphasis on German war guilt and reparations, achieved the exact opposite of what the diplomats set out to do, inexorably, tragically, laying the groundwork for the next, more horrible world war.

Abstract For all its agony of carnage and destruction, the Great War of 1914-18 settled little. In time, it would come to be seen as but the opening chapter in the twentieth century’s own Thirty-Year War, a conflict that endured thirty-one years, to be exact, from 1914 to 1945, and at the price of some sixty million lives forever transformed the world. To be sure, the First World War had shattered the Austro-Hungarian empire and left Germany defeated. But the treaty signed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on June 28, 1919, neither extinguished the ambitions that had ignited the war nor quieted the anxieties it had spawned. Victors and vanquished agreed only that the conflict had been a dreadful catastrophe, a blood-spilling, man-killing, nation-eating nightmare of unprecedented horror. All were determined to avoid its reoccurrence. More precisely, each nation was determined to avoid the repetition of its own role in it.