Academic literature on the topic 'Trials (Perjury)'

In 1885 and 1886, two trials helped to precipitate a vigorous debate about when criminal proceedings should be closed to the public and when press reports on such cases should be restricted or banned altogether. First, the trial of the artist Gustav Graef for perjury and inappropriate relations with underage models featured sensationalized press reports that provoked a firestorm of public criticism. Soon afterward, press coverage of the trial of a Danish spy, Christian von Sarauw, revealed compromising details about German military planning and outraged government officials. The result was the proposal of a new law to limit public and press access to trials which posed a potential danger either to public decency or national security. Despite vigorous government efforts, this new legislation repeatedly stalled in the German Reichstag, in part because of concerns about protecting legal transparency and freedom of the press. The debates surrounding this law demonstrate the extent (and limits) to which liberal ideals such as legal transparency and freedom of the press had become embedded in Imperial German society and also the substantial power of the German Reichstag to obstruct the will of the government–even in making new laws deemed vital for national security.

Much academic literature explores the reliability of expert evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales. However, almost no attention has been paid to misconduct by experts giving evidence in criminal cases. Whilst rare, its serious impact on the administration of justice and public trust in it means that this area requires analysis. This article explores possible responses to expert witness misconduct occurring in the context of criminal proceedings in England and Wales, noting particularly the differences in responses available, depending firstly upon whether the expert is a registered professional, and secondly whether the expert has stepped outside of their expertise; did not have relevant expertise at all, or was dishonest. Professional disciplinary procedures focus on ‘fitness to practise’, and it is argued that this is sufficient where a registered professional has overstepped their expertise, but has not displayed mala fides. On the contrary, where someone gives evidence purporting to have expertise that they do not, or lies about their conduct as an expert in the case, criminal sanctions are available, appropriate, and should be used. These include contempt of court; perverting the course of justice; fraud by false representation, and perjury.

Abstract In a great variety of cultures oaths, ordeals, or lie detectors are used to adjudicate in trials, even though they do not reliably discern liars from truth tellers. I suggest that these practices owe their cultural success to the triggering of cognitive mechanisms that make them more culturally attractive. Informal oaths would trigger mechanisms related to commitment in communication. Oaths used in judicial contexts, by invoking supernatural punishments, would trigger intuitions of immanent justice, linking misfortunes following an oath with perjury. These intuitions would justify the infliction of costs on oath takers in a way that appears morally justified. Ordeals reflect the same logic. Intuitions about immanent justice link a worse outcome following the ordeal with a guilty verdict. This link justifies the application of the ordeal, and the fixed costs involved (burning, poisoning). Lie detectors also rely on the creation of a link between a specified outcome and a guilty verdict. However, they do not rely on intuitions about immanent justice, but on a variety of intuitions ranging from the plausibly universal to the culturally idiosyncratic. As a result, lie detectors involve lower fixed costs than ordeals, and are less cross-culturally successful than oaths or ordeals.

In the common law world the oath has long provided one way of ensuring that trial witnesses tell the truth. The moral power of the oath supplements the judicial power of perjury laws. But unlike laws forbidding perjury, the oath cannot be used automatically. Through ignorance, belief or conscience a person may be incapable of meaningfully swearing an oath. Over the years there have been many legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements which sought to clarify conditions for the use of the oath and establish alternatives to it. With increasing secularization of society, the traditional ground rules have required modification. Because there has been little serious, theoretical discussion of the nature of the oath, these modifications have often exhibited inadequate understanding of the moral dimensions of the oath. As a result, judicial discussion has reached an impasse. In January, 1988 Bill C-15 became law. It contained yet another attempt to satisfactorily harness the power of the oath to the needs of the judicial system. The interpretation of this new legislation will offer excellent opportunities to eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the oath in Canadian law. This paper will analyze the nature of the oath with special attention to its obligation-generating capacity. The analysis developed here may help provide the understanding necessary for sensible judicial interpretation and reform.

This study is a quantitative analysis designed to compare two groups of factually innocent capital defendants: those who were exonerated and those who were executed. There are a total of 97 cases in the sample, including 81 exonerations and 16 executions. The primary objective of the authors is to identify factors that may predict case outcomes among capital defendants with strong claims of factual innocence. Through the use of a logistic regression model, the following variables were significant predictors of case outcome (exoneration vs. execution): allegations of perjury, multiple types of evidence, prior felony record, type of attorney at trial, and race of the defendant. These results point toward significant problems with the administration of capital punishment deriving primarily from the quality of the case record created at trial.

Sixteen-year-old Acre resident Mustafa Naif, suspected of having sex with another man, stated before the police investigator on June 30, 1943, “I know Mustafa Zaharan and is my friend and mate, I used to love him and he used to love me, and that this man had a sexual intercourse with me twice with my consent and free will, because he loves me and I love him.”1By the time of his trial, approximately a month later, Mustafa Naif must have realized this was the “wrong” story to tell. He recanted his statement and denied knowing Mustafa Zaharan or having anything to do with him. His denial might have been another manifestation of love, as an admission of guilt would have led to his friend's conviction on a sex offense. For his lover's sake, then, Mustafa Naif might have renounced his original romantic version. Indeed, his friend was acquitted as a result of the contradictory statements; however, Mustafa Naif was charged with perjury and was convicted after pleading guilty.

Tant lors de procès en droit criminel que lors de procès en droit administratif, civil ou familial, le mensonge peut contribuer à la mise en place de trames narratives qui embrouillent les faits que les juges devraient connaitre afin d’appliquer adéquatement le droit. De plus, si les juges ne sont pas capables de distinguer le vrai du faux lors des témoignages, la confiance du public indispensable au bon fonctionnement du système de justice pourrait être compromise. Par ailleurs, même si des chercheurs s’intéressent, depuis les années 1960, à la détection du mensonge, en particulier lors d’interrogatoires policiers reproduits en laboratoires, ces expérimentations ignorent plusieurs attributs des systèmes de justice accusatoires (p. ex., les procédures judiciaires, les éléments de preuve incriminante, les déclarations assermentées, les interrogatoires, les contre-interrogatoires et les plaidoiries). Par conséquent, puisque la détection des témoignages mensongers par les juges lors de procès est rarement explorée, les juges des tribunaux municipaux, provinciaux et fédéraux sont pratiquement laissés à eux-mêmes. Dans le cadre de ma thèse, je présente un travail de type descriptif, analytique et explicatif pour observer et mieux comprendre le raisonnement ou, du moins, une partie du raisonnement par lequel des juges, en contexte naturel, en sont venus à déterminer, selon leur point de vue, que des témoins ont menti alors qu’ils témoignaient. Cette recherche vise, entre autres, à bonifier la validité écologique des expérimentations en laboratoire et à s’attaquer plus adéquatement à la problématique des mensonges lors de procès. D’une part, afin d’étudier la détection du mensonge dans le contexte concret où elle a lieu plutôt que dans le cadre d’une représentation expérimentale de cette activité, j’ai fait le choix de me tourner vers des jugements écrits de tribunaux canadiens comme données de recherche, plus spécifiquement, quatre jugements canadiens portant sur une accusation criminelle de parjure résultant d’une déclaration incriminante où les accusés ont été déclarés coupables. D’autre part, afin de décrire, analyser et expliquer de façon minutieuse et approfondie les mécanismes communicationnels sous-jacents aux déclarations de culpabilité pour parjure, j’ai fait le choix de mobiliser une approche contemporaine d’analyse du discours s’inscrivant dans les travaux de l’École de Montréal—l’approche ventriloque de la communication (Cooren, 2013)—dans la mesure où celle-ci permet d’identifier les éléments qui apparaissent comme faisant la différence dans la constitution d’un jugement. Hormis la rareté alarmante des jugements rendus à la suite de procès sur une accusation criminelle de parjure résultant d’un témoignage, les résultats de mes analyses permettent d’observer le rôle substantiel des idées reçues et l’apport considérable des précédents dans le processus décisionnel des juges lors de procès. Comme je le montre dans ma thèse, ces idées reçues peuvent exposer des croyances sur le comportement humain véhiculées ou exprimées, explicitement ou non, par les juges dans leur jugement. Quant aux précédents, ils peuvent avoir l’effet de voiler le rôle substantiel de ces mêmes idées reçues dans le processus décisionnel des juges. De plus, les résultats de mes analyses suggèrent que la détection des témoignages mensongers par les juges lors de procès dépend, entre autres, de nombreux éléments du contexte tels que mis en scène dans le raisonnement des juges et n’a pas grand-chose à voir avec le scénario expérimental typique mis en place pour étudier la détection du mensonge. Finalement, bien qu’ils n’offrent pas de « nouvelle technique » pour distinguer l’honnête justiciable du menteur, les résultats de mes analyses s’inscrivent en continuité avec d’autres travaux de recherche qui démontrent l’utilité a priori limitée des indicateurs comportementaux de mensonge et qui suggèrent que les praticiens du droit, en particulier les juges, devraient être systématiquement formés sur la nature faillible du processus décisionnel lors de procès.
Both in criminal law trials and in administrative, civil or family law trials, deception can lead to the development of narrative patterns that obscure facts that judges should know in order to properly apply the law. In addition, if judges are unable to distinguish truth from falsehood in testimonies, the public trust essential to the proper functioning of the justice system may be compromised. Furthermore, even if researchers have, since the 1960s, been interested in detecting deception, especially during police interrogations conducted in laboratories, these experiments ignore several attributes of adversarial justice systems (e.g., court proceedings, incriminating evidences, sworn statements, examinations, cross-examinations and pleadings). As a result, since the detection of deceptive testimony by judges during trials is hardly ever addressed, judges in municipal, provincial and federal courts are practically left on their own. In my thesis, I present a descriptive, analytical and explanatory work to observe and better understand the reasoning, or at least part of the reasoning, by which judges, in a natural setting, have come to determine, from their perspective, that witnesses have lied while testifying. This research aims, among other things, to improve the ecological validity of laboratory experiments and to address more adequately the problem of deception during trials. On the one hand, in order to study the detection of deception in the actual context in which it takes place rather than in the context of an experimental representation of this activity, I have chosen to turn to written judgments of Canadian courts as research data, more specifically, four Canadian judgments pertaining to a criminal charge of perjury resulting from an incriminating statement in which the accused was found guilty. On the other hand, in order to describe, analyze and explain in a thorough and in-depth manner the underlying communicative mechanisms of perjury convictions, I have chosen to use a contemporary approach to discourse analysis that is part of the work of the Montreal School—the ventriloquist approach to communication (Cooren, 2013)—to the extent that this approach allows to identify the elements that appear to make a difference in the constitution of a judgment. Aside from the alarming scarcity of judgments rendered following trials on a criminal charge of perjury resulting from a testimony, the results of my analyses make it possible to observe the substantial role of popular beliefs and the considerable contribution of precedents in the judges’ decision-making process during trials. As demonstrated in my thesis, these popular beliefs may expose assumptions about human behaviour conveyed or expressed, explicitly or not, by judges in their judgments. As for precedents, they may have the effect of veiling the substantial role of these very beliefs in the judges’ decision-making process. Furthermore, the results of my analyses suggest that the detection of deceptive testimony by judges during trials depends, among other things, on several contextual elements as staged in the judges’ reasoning and has little to do with the typical experimental design set up for studying deception detection. Finally, although they do not offer a “new technique” for distinguishing the honest litigant from the liar, the results of my analyses are consistent with other research that demonstrates the a priori limited usefulness of behavioural indicators of deception and suggests that legal practitioners, particularly judges, should be systematically trained on the fallible nature of the decision-making process during trials.

Abstract The exposure of Alger Hiss as a Communist and a Soviet agent began with a story about Hiss told by his accuser Whittaker Chambers. In 1952 Chambers produced a long, polished version of that story in his memoirs, Witness. He was at that time a celebrity, the star prosecution witness at the 1949 and 1950 perjury trials of Hiss, whom Chambers had accused of being in a Communist cell with him, and passing him stolen government documents, in the 1930s. Chambers admitted to having been a member of the Communist Party of the United States and an under-cover Soviet agent, but stated that he had broken with the Soviets in 1938 and become a rabid anti-Communist.

This chapter traces the history of criminal procedure. The early ‘appeal’ of felony gave way to the indictment, a written presentment approved by a grand jury. Until Georgian times there were few safeguards for the accused other than whatever care was taken by judge and jury. Counsel were rarely involved, except in treason cases; trials were brief; and there were no appeals. The capital punishment imposed on all convicted felons was adjusted in practice by the mechanisms of sanctuary, benefit of clergy, ‘pious perjury’ by jurors, and pardons. Benefit of clergy was originally a privilege of ordained clergy, but the judges contrived to extend it to any man who could read, and Parliament perfected the fiction by extending it to women and the illiterate. Pardons were widely available underlay both the system of transportation and a form of criminal appeal.

In the first case, W and B were police officers who gave evidence at a trial in the Sheriff Court at Linlithgow. When the trial ended, the sheriff, in open court, expressed the opinion that the officers had committed perjury. This statement received wide publicity in the press at the time. Both were charged with perjury and proceedings against them were commenced by way of summary complaint. Before the date of the pleading diet, each of the officers gave notice of a devolution issue and claimed that there had been such delay in bringing proceedings against them as to breach the reasonable time requirement. The House of Lords allowed an appeal by the Crown from the decision of the High Court of Justiciary, confirming the decision of the sheriff to uphold pleas in bar of trial.

Attorney Paul Magnarella filed another petition with the Federal District Court asserting that during O’Neal’s 1970 trial, Jean Young, a key witness for the prosecution, had falsely claimed to have forgotten that she had received numerous payments from the FBI for information. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agent James Moore lied on the witness stand when he said he had not heard of Jean Young receiving FBI payments for information. FBI records established that Jean M. Young had gone by at least seven different surnames, had been arrested three times by Kansas City, Missouri, police, had received a total of fourteen payments from the FBI for information, and had provided information to the FBI on Pete O’Neal. ATF agent Moore testified that he did not know of Young’s paid informant status, even though he later would write that both Young and an FBI agent had told him before the 1970 trial that Young was a paid informant. Magnarella argued that the prosecution was required to reveal to the judge, jury, and defense any evidence that reflects negatively on its witnesses. Failure to do so should result in a new trial.

Lady Mason remained at The Cleeve for something more than a week after that day on which she made her confession, during which time she was fully committed to take her trial at the next assizes at Alston on an indictment for perjury. This...

Abstract Every person who is called to the stand in an American courtroom is required to recite a verse of the American ideal: “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.” It is compact and complete, with a loaded sequence of words: Truth backed by God, told in a courtroom of law where justice prevails and rights are defended. Each concept has to clear the test for a legitimate trial; if any one of the items on the list falls short, there is a mis trial, a perjury, or a breaking of the law.

This chapter discusses Burnett’s only film about police and crime in Los Angeles. Loosely based on actual cases, the film centers on an idealistic young man who becomes the first black officer in a racist sheriff’s department. A black prisoner has recently been killed there, and another black prisoner is being framed for murder. Mistakenly trying to fit into the department, the young man commits perjury during the murder trial. Realizing his error, he joins a female officer in secretly investigating the department’s crimes. The lives of the two are endangered, and the young man eventually loses his career.

Abstract The trial of Thomas Hardy was the longest trial and most expensive trial for high treason that had ever been heard in Britain. The prosecution case was conducted by no less than eight barristers, led by the Attorney-General Sir John Scott and the Solicitor-General Sir John Mitford; the team also included Serjeant James Adai1 who would take over from the exhausted law officers at The lwall’s trial; Edward Law, who had distinguished himself at the trial of Thomas Walker by demanding a special verdict on the basis of perjured evidence; Edward Bearcroft, an old adversary of Erskine’s from the trial of William Shipley in 1783-4--the trial which had given a vital impetus to the successful attempt of Fox and Erskine in 1792 to reform the law on seditious libel; and william Garrow, one of the most aggressive cross-examiners of the age. For the defence, Erskine was seconded by Vicary Gibbs, who con ducted himself with a liberality and composure he abandoned later in his career, when as ‘Vinegar’ Gibbs and Attorney-General he attacked the freedom of the press as zealously as Erskine himself had defended it.