Academic literature on the topic 'Troyes, Treaty of, 1420'

This article studies the peculiarities of the monetary policy of English king Henry V in the territories of the Kingdom of France occupied by him between 1415 and 1422. The purpose of the study is to establish its influence on the state of finance in France and, first of all, on the sharp depreciation of silver money following the defeat. Within the framework of English politics, two stages can be clearly traced: the first one lasted from 1415 to 1420, when monetary policy was indirect in nature, influencing the French economy by the fact of conquest and becoming an additional factor in the aggravation of the domestic political struggle, and the other one lasted from 1420 to 1422 and was connected with the intention of Henry V as regent of the Kingdom of France, to bring the financial system into relative order. The author refers to French and English chronicles, The Diary of a Parisian Citizen, as well as the ordinances of the kings of France, which reflected the peculiarities of the monetary policy, more particularly, changes in the exchange rate and weight of silver coins and attempts to carry out reforms. The study carried out makes it possible to find out that the depreciation of the French silver coin was associated with the beginning of the British conquest of Normandy and the transfer of mints located there. A sharp drop in the money rate occurred after the transfer of Paris into the hands of the Burgundians and the formation in the fall of 1418 of an independent financial administration in the south of France under the control of the dauphin. On the contrary, some stabilisation followed the conclusion of the Treaty of Troyes, and the General States adopted a course towards reforms in December 1420. The author determines the stages of the reform and the reasons for its delay. These include: the lack of control over all the mints of the kingdom, the lack of coin metal and the required number of qualified personnel. Finally, the premature death of Henry V in the summer of 1422 did not allow the completion of the monetary reform.

Histories always deal with the construction of cities, announcements of new eras, and strategies of reformations; human history also shows that the bitter human experience of struggles, disputes and wars involve shifting identities or rivalries over territories. Among Shakespeare’s war plays, The First Part of Henry VI is one of the most significant representations of the war between France and England; the play refers to the Treaty of Troyes, an Anglo- French Treaty in 1420, which recognizes Henry V as heir to the French throne, resulting in internal divisions and tremendous chaos in France. This play by Shakespeare refers to the intrigue, spatial contest, politics of kingship and spatial struggle between England and France. Calais had been an enclave of England in France before Henry V succeeded to the throne; securing Calais, Henry V, the warrior king of England, attempted to build up another enclave at Harfleur. With the Anglo-Burgundian alliance, the Dauphin Charles, and Joan of Arc faced two enemies, England and the Dukedom of Burgundy. England and Burgundy had been allies against France in the Hundred Years’ War since 1415. Burgundy, because of its geographical location, is to play the key role in the tug of war between the two forces. Geopolitics and contesting identities are two intertwining motifs in the First Part of Henry VI. Shakespeare portrays the conquest of France by England and represents diplomatic relations and shifting identities through geography and spatial politics as related to nationhood. This paper by examining the conflicts between France and England, will discuss geopolitics and contesting identities, the territorial disputes as well as spatial politics in an era when boundary politics was in flux.

Les termes du traité de paix entre Charles VI et Henri V qui est ratifié par les deux souverains à Troyes en mai 1420 sont plutôt clairs et paraissent aisément applicables : l’unique héritier de Charles VI, le dauphin Charles, est déshérité; Henri V, par le mariage qui l’unit à la fille du roi de France, Catherine, devient le nouveau successeur légitime de Charles VI et, lorsque celui-ci mourra, règnera sur le France et l’Angleterre sans toutefois unir les deux royaumes; le traité scelle aussi l’alliance entre la Bourgogne, l’Angleterre et la moitié nord de la France dans la guerre contre le parti armagnac que dirigie le dauphin Charles et qui contrôle la moitie sud, le royaume de Bourges. Toutefois, lorsque la cérémonie de la cathédrale Saint-Pierre-et-Saint-Paul de Troyes se termine, la théorie du document se heurte à une réalité bien différente. Alors que le traité prévoit une adhésion totale de la moitié nord de la France à la paix et la disparition politique du parti armagnac du dauphin Charles, c’est tout le contraire qui se produit : des mouvements d’opposition ou de résistance au traité et à l’autorité qu’il confère à Henri V comme héritier et régent de France surgissent de toute part et le parti du dauphin, bien loin de disparaître, tient tête à la « coalition » anglo-franco-bourguignonne. À tout cela vient s’ajouter le décès prématuré, en août 1422, d’Henri V qui, lorsque Charles VI le suit dans la tombe en octobre de la même année, laisse les royaumes de France et d’Angleterre entre les mains d’un roi qui n’a pas encore un an. Tous ces faits semblent bien signifier l’échec de la paix et les responsables chargés de l’appliquer en sont tout à fait conscients. Il n’en demeure pas moins que la décennie qui suit la ratification du traité, malgré tout ce qui s’y oppose, est le théâtre d’une véritable tentative d’application de la paix de Troyes ou, du moins, des articles et des éléments de celui-ci que l’ont peut réellement mettre en pratique.
The terms of the peace ratified by Charles VI and Henry V in Troyes in May 1420 are pretty clear and seem easy to apply : the dauphin Charles, sole heir of king Charles VI, is disinheritaded; Henry V, by wedding the daughter of the king of France, Catherine, becomes the new legitimate heir of Charles VI and, when the latter is to die, will reign over France and England without, however, unifying the two kingdoms; the treaty of Troyes also seals the alliance between Burgundy, England and the northern half of France in the war against the armagnac party of the dauphin Charles which controls the southern part of France, the kingdom of Bourges. Yet, when the peace ceremony of the cathedral of Saint Peter and Saint Paul of Troyes is over, the theory of the treaty comes up against a completely different reality. While the treaty plans a total adherence to the peace from the northern half of France and the politic death of the armagnac party and of the dauphin Charles, what occurs is quite the opposite : aresistance movements to the treaty itself and to the authority that it gives to Henry V as heir and regent of France arise from everywhere and the dauphin’s party, far from disapearing, holds fast against the « coalition » formed by England, France and Burgundy. Last but not least comes the untimely death of Henry V in August 1422 wich, once Charles VI follows him in death in the following October, leaves the kingdoms of Fance and England in the hands of a less than one year hold baby-king. All those facts seem to imply a quick failure of the peace and the people in charge of applying it know it too well. Nevertheless, the ten years following the ratification of the treaty and despite every difficulties against it are the withnesses to a genuine attempt to properly apply the peace of Troyes or, at least, of some of its clauses and elements that really can be putted into practice.

This diploma thesis is exploring the topic of legitimacy and legality of the royal power in the late English and French Middle Ages. Specifically, it answers the question whether Edward IV and Charles VII were legitimate kings for their respective subjects, based on analysis and comparison of selected contemporaneous English and French sources. This thesis presents different points of view on the royal power and the royal office according to the medieval authors. It describes the often ambiguous and contradictory opinions on this issue as well as provides a deeper look at the traditions and customs surrounding it. This analysis is presented against the historical backdrop of prolonged armed conflicts and political changes in both kingdoms. The differences between the legal and political situation of Charles VII and Edward IV suggest a wide range of possible interpretations. This thesis, based on the critical analysis and comparison of the relevant historical sources, advocates the view supporting the legitimacy of both kings, based on their respective genealogical and legal claims as well as on the support granted by their subjects. Keywords: Charles VII, Edward IV, royal power, legitimacy, treaty of Troyes, Wars of the Roses, Hundred years war