To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Truth as aletheia.
Journal articles on the topic 'Truth as aletheia'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Truth as aletheia.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Guzun, Mădălina. "Aletheia : la vérité des traductions philosophiques en tant que traduction de la vérité. À la rencontre de Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricœur et Antoine Berman." Labyrinth 21, no. 2 (March 3, 2020): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.25180/lj.v21i2.192.
Full textAbstract:
Aletheia: The Truth of Philosophical Translation as a Translation of Thruth.An Encounter of Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricœur and Antoine BermanThe article analyzes the specificity of philosophical translations insofar as they generate a new meaning and present themselves as originals that must be retranslated. This goes against Ricœur’s conception of translation as a creation of comparable terms. We will show that philosophical translation consists in the creation of an incomparable term, which cannot be measured in terms of equivalence, adequacy or fidelity. All these terms correspond to a notion of truth understood as adequacy, therefore we operate a deconstruction of aletheia, the Greek concept for “truth”, in order to show that what we hold today to be the truth of translation has been the result of a translation. Through Heidegger’s reading of aletheia and through Berman’s account of the terms that name translation in Europe, we reinterpret the Roman philosophical translations as examples of traductio and we show, in the end, that by retranslating aletheia, the rules for the practice of translation change, allowing the latter to be guided by an ethical approach towards the otherness rather than by righteous fidelity and adequacy.
2
Anvar Bunyatova, Shams. "Analysis of The Category of Truth - “Aletheia” in Plato’s Epistemology." SCIENTIFIC WORK 59, no. 10 (November 6, 2020): 36–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/2663-4619/59/36-40.
Full textAbstract:
The article reflects the explanation of the concept of the truth by Plato, referring to his allegory "the Cave" and the analogy "the Divided Line" as well as to the dialogues. At the same time, the concept of the truth is being analyzed in the context of episteme and doxa and, accordingly, the hierarchical idea of knowledge, formed by the philosopher, is being investigated. The world of ideas, which forms the basis of Plato's philosophy, is assessed as a world where there is the truth and the unity, the true is separated from its shadow. In addition to the above, Plato's ways of achieving the metaphysical truth are being discussed. The article emphasizes that Plato was the first representative of the oldest theory in history, the theory of correspondence of the truth. Key words: Plato, aletheia, episteme, doxa, idea, knowledge, the divided line
3
Christians, Clifford G. "Jacques Ellul and truth as aletheia: A response." Explorations in Media Ecology 15, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 275–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/eme.15.3-4.275_1.
Full text
4
Duong, Dung Ngoc. "Logic, truth, and metaphysics: from Leibniz to Heidegger." Science and Technology Development Journal 18, no. 4 (December 30, 2015): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdj.v18i4.953.
Full textAbstract:
This essay explores the ontological foundations of logic and truth from Heidegger’s philosophical perspective. It focuses, in particulat, on Heidegger’s interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of judgment. This case study aims at looking back at the history of philosophy from Heidegger’s position on truth understood as unconcealment or disclosure (aletheia).
5
Sokołowska, Katarzyna. "Marlow’s Gaze in Lord Jim by Joseph Conrad: Between Light and Shadows." Studia Anglica Posnaniensia 54, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 199–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/stap-2019-0010.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn Lord Jim Marlow functions not only as a narrator who spins the yarn about the morally problematic case of the young sailor, but also as an interpreter who struggles to register impressions as faithfully as possible thus translating the visual into the discursive. Marlow’s double function establishes the novel as a text about the search to understand and to acquire reliable knowledge about Jim and his dilemma. Levin’s distinction of the two styles of vision, the assertoric gaze and the aletheic gaze, offers a neat conceptualization for Marlow’s visual practices which affect his interpretation of Jim. Levin defines the assertoric gaze as a fixed stare which involves the hegemony of a single standpoint, whereas the aletheic gaze, decentred and subversive, cherishes ambiguity and tends to roam about to accommodate multiple points of view. Levin relates this distinction to the two concepts of truth that Heidegger examines in his critique of the metaphysics of presence: truth as proposition, correspondence, or correctness and truth as aletheia or unconcealment as well as the two types of discourse, the hermeneutical discourse of poetizing and the discourse of statements. If Plato and Descartes defined truth and knowledge in terms of a total visibility, Heidegger insists that the path to truth involves confronting shadows and recognizing that they are necessary for the disclosure of being. Within this philosophical framework it is possible to reassess both Marlow’s failure to form an unequivocal explanation of Jim and his growing epistemological scepticism as a departure from the correspondence theory of truth. The encounter with Jim brings Marlow to interrogate his own strategies of grasping the truth and subverts the focus on light as its visual equivalent.
6
Gajda-Krynicka, Janina. "The Propedeutic of the Theory of Judgment in Ancient Philosophy from the Sophists to Plato’s Theaetetus." Folia Philosophica 42, no. 2 (December 30, 2019): 21–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/fp.8513.
Full textAbstract:
In the ancient epistemology, precisely stated definition of judgment (axioma) appears only in the 3rd century B.C. It was formulated by Chrysippus of Soli, the founder of the Stoic logic. However, on the other hand, the analysis of the extant utterances in which the knowledge had been objectified since the first Greek thinkers, allows us to state that the evolution of the theory of judgment was a long process. In this development, Greek epistemology had to deal with a number of problems connected with the object of the judgment –– knowledge, with the form of its objectification –– predication, and also with the predicates of the true and false judgment –– categories of “truth” (aletheia) and “falsehood” (pseudos). The first definition of the false judgement (logos pseudes) and the true judgment (logos alethes) can be found only in the late dialogue of Plato, Sophist, which delivers precisely established terminology of the theorem. Yet, such a definition could be formulated only when Greek epistemology re-defined the scope of the meaning of the key terms-concepts, aletheia and pseudos. The term-concept aletheia was identified with the term-concept being, functioning in the ontological-axiological sphere. On the other hand, pseudos did not mean false in the sense of negating the truth, but something, which is different than truth, is its imperfect copy. Thus, the pre-Platonic philosophy has not yet formulated the terminology in which predication of something inconsistent with the actual state of being, with the truth, could be verbalized. Often to express such a form of predication, a phrase “to utter things, which are not” was used. The other problem was connected with –– characteristic ofthe Greek language –– dual function of the verb to be/einai, which included both existential and truthful function. Accordingly, every utterance, in which the predicate was the verb einai or its derivates, was ex definitione a true predication –– “it spoke beings (things, which are).” In such a situation, there was noneed in epistemology to precisely define judgment as such, and to state the conditions which the true judgment hadto meet. The problem is definitely solved by Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus, in which the philosopher defines the object of the judgment, which is knowledge (however, its object is not stated yet) and introduces the project of verification of the utterances/opinion, thanks to which an opinion ––doxa can reach the status of judgment ––logos. An opinion needs to be verified with the dialectical procedures.
7
O'Donnell, John. "Truth as Love: The Understanding of Truth According to Hans Urs von Balthasar." Pacifica: Australasian Theological Studies 1, no. 2 (June 1988): 189–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1030570x8800100205.
Full textAbstract:
The key to Balthasar's logic is his understanding of truth as aletheia or unconcealedness. Theologically, the event of truth happens when the Word becomes flesh. Only a methodology from above can account for the leap which is implied in Jesus' affirmation: I am the truth. The unveiling of the truth in the Christ-event, and its presence in the Church through the Holy Spirit shows that the ultimate meaning of truth is love, the love of the three persons of the Trinity revealed in the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Thus Balthasar argues that the only Christian logic is the logic of love, not verified by reason, but grasped through doing the truth in love.
8
Purcell, Sebastian. "Hermeneutics and Truth: From Alētheia to Attestation." Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 4, no. 1 (January 29, 2013): 140–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/errs.2013.156.
Full textAbstract:
This essay aims to correct a prevalent misconception about Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, which understands it to support a conception of human understanding as finite as Heidegger did, but in a more “conceptuallyconservative” way. The result is that Ricoeur’s work is viewed as incapable of addressing the most pressingproblems in contemporary Continental metaphysics. In response, it is argued that Ricoeur is in fact the firstto develop an infinite hermeneutics, which departs significantly from Heideggerian finitude. This positionis demonstrated by tracing the itinerary from Heidegger’s account of aletheia to Ricoeur’s account ofattestation. The conclusion, then, not only clears Ricoeur of the stated charges, but also presents a moreviable path for the future of hermeneutics.
9
Warfield, Bradley. "Play as Polemos." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 48 (2014): 21–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle2014483.
Full textAbstract:
Much has been written about Heidegger's various influences on Gadamer's thinking, especially as the latter culminates in Truth and Method. Scholars often point to the way Heidegger's notions of “thrownness” and “historicity” in Being and Time (BT) influence Gadamer's insistence on the centrality of tradition for hermeneutical understanding, and his notions of the “fusion of horizons” (horizontverschmelzung) and the “hermeneutic circle.”1 But scholars have appeared to overlook, or at least underestimate, the influence some of Heidegger's other notions have exerted on Gadamer's thought. In this paper I want to address crucial aspects of this neglect; I shall explore the relation between Heidegger's notion, as he explains it in Introduction to Metaphysics (IM), of truth as unconcealment (aletheia), and compare it to Gadamer's notion, as he describes it in Truth and Method, of truth as emergent, in play (Spiel), from the event (Ereignis) of conversation and of the work of art.
10
Rojas Martínez, Javier. "La constitución del sujeto en la Odisea de Homero. Odiseo profano: la aletheia, el lenguaje y el êthos." Revista Lumen Gentium 2, no. 2 (December 15, 2018): 44–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.52525/lg.v2n2a4.
Full textAbstract:
El presente artículo pretende realizar un análisis de la constitución del sujeto en el poema épico la Odisea de Homero. El argumento central explora la posibilidad de la constitución del sujeto humano a partir del espacio abierto, no codificado y no reglado en el que se desarrolla la obra, y que permite la articulación de tres momentos específicos, tres encuentros que llevan al héroe a poner en escena el coraje de su decisión ética, con tres elementos necesarios para la constitución de la subjetividad, a saber, la aletheia (la verdad), el lenguaje y el êthos.
Abstract
This paper attempts an analysis of the consti- tution of the subject in the epic poem the Odyssey. The central argument explores the possibility of the constitution of the human subject from the not regulated, uncoded open space in which the poem takes place, which allows the articulation of three time points, three meetings to lead the hero to put in scene the courage of their ethical decision, with three elements necessary for the constitution of subjectivity, namely the aletheia (truth), language and êthos.
11
Knight, Thomas E. "The Use of Aletheia for the "Truth of Unreason": Plato, the Septuagint, and Philo." American Journal of Philology 114, no. 4 (1993): 581. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/295427.
Full text
12
Potter, Brent. "Eudaimonia, Faith (Pistis), and Truth (Aletheia): Greek Roots and the Construction of Personal Meaning." Journal of Constructivist Psychology 30, no. 1 (February 17, 2016): 57–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10720537.2015.1119090.
Full text
13
Ha, Youngsam. "The beginning of the Eastern truth: The cultural elucidation of the truth 真 zhen." Journal of Chinese Writing Systems 3, no. 1 (March 2019): 45–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2513850218814406.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyzes the etymology of the Chinese character 真 zheēn and researches what truth was, and how truth appeared, to the ancient Chinese people. The concept of truth in mainstream Western philosophy is examined first, and I compare it with the Chinese notion of truth through the etymology of the Chinese character 真 zheēn. Truth was not recognized by the dichotomy of ‘truth versus falsity’ in ancient China; nor did ancient Chinese people logically argue the correspondence of what was said and the state of affairs; nor did the truth have to be represented in accurate language. I argue that it was not after Shuowen Jiezi (说文解字) in the Han period when the Chinese character 真 zheēn, which means ‘truth’, first appeared; rather it appeared long before this in the bronze inscriptions of the Western Zhou period. Moreover, it appeared in the form of 贞 zheēn in the oracle bone era in the 13th century BC. In addition, 贞 zheēn in the period of the oracle bone era, the original form of 真 zheēn, composed of 卜 buˇ and 鼎 dǐng (changed into 贝 bèi later) describes the embodiment of the gods’ will through divination. This is no different from aletheia, meaning ‘truth’ in Greek – that is, unconcealment ( unverborgenheit) revealing something concealed ( letheia). Therefore, the view that 真 zheēn and the meaning of truth first appeared after the Han Dynasty and that the concept of truth in China is different from that of the West should be rediscussed from different angles, and the denigration of the East based on this recognition leaves room for reconsideration.
14
Charles, Freeland. "The Origin of the Work of Art." MANUSYA 4, no. 2 (2001): 40–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26659077-00402004.
Full textAbstract:
The following was presented at the Fourth Collegium in the Humanities held at Thammasat University on January 4 and 5, 2001. The paper is intended as an introduction to Heidegger’s important essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art". In the course of the paper, I discuss the following themes:Heidegger’s questioning of the concept of truth in terms of Aletheia, the self disclosing and concealing of Being, as the setting for a radical revaluation of techne, (the Greek word for art, as a practical, productive knowledge (Wissen)), in which techne will now be conceived as not only a way of kno wing that stands alongside theoria, but even more, as a decisive site for the disclosure of Being. The actuality of art, its "thingly" character, will not be seen as a static object, therefore, but as energeia, activity or "being-at-work". Techne will be thought as event, an event of Being, the site for the happening of Truth (Aletheia) This culminates in Heidegger’s delimitation, or definition, of art as the site or place (topos, Orter; in the German word Heidegger uses) of truth’s setting-itself-to- work. This is art’s "activity", its "actuality". Finally, the significance of this is.in the way it opens a new questioning of the European experience of nihilism as the "death of God", or withdrawal of gods, and the related triumph of knowledge in the form of scientific technicity, the calculative thinking of a techne that demands, challenges, provokes, and sets up Being as an object and conceives of earth , for example, as a "natural resource" to be exploited. The work of art, as the techne in which "truth (Aletheia) sets itself to work", what Heidegger might call "great art", is then to be seen as a possible way of overcoming (Verwindung) of nihilism and of questioning the essence of technology and calculative thinking. Through a questioning of the origin of the work of art, philosophical thinking will go beyond a mere "aesthetics" toward the more fundamental questioning of the "end of metaphysics". Through a return to an archaic Greek world opened in and by the temple, and through a thinking of all that is still yet to be thought, or that is still held in reserve in that experience, Heidegger seeks the possibility of a new beginning for the European, especially the Germanic, historical destiny. No doubt the revaluation of techne, not only in terms of the work of art, but in terms of the political and the founding of a nation and the opening of the destiny of a people, which is Heidegger’s way of thinking the actuality of the work of techne, are all crucial and deeply related themes. But, due to limitations of time and space in this paper, both the links of thi s with Heidegger’s meditations on the poetry of Holderlin, and the political dimensions of this work and Heidegger’s relation to National socialism during the 1930s, are not considered.
15
McNeill, William. "The Naivety of Philosophy." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 42 (2008): 5–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle2008421.
Full textAbstract:
The present paper remains modest in its scope: It seeks only to undertake some exploratory and preparatory investigations with a view to addressing a more difficult and far-reaching question. The issue, in brief, is the following: In the 1920s, Heidegger engages in an incisive and comprehensive critique of techn!, which I shall render here as “production” or “productive comportment,” arguing that it furnishes the foundation and horizon for Greek ontology, and by extension for the entire Western philosophical tradition, a horizon that is problematically reductive because the ontology it gives rise to understands the Being of beings in general in terms of independent presence-at-hand, the appropriate mode of access to which is theoretical apprehension. Not only philosophy and ontology, but science and its outgrowth, modern technicity—itself a monstrous transformation of techn!—would be an almost inexorable consequence of this fateful Greek beginning. The project of a “destructuring of the history of ontology” announced in Being and Time would seek to retrieve and to open up an entirely other dimension of Being, a dimension foreclosed by the Greek beginning and yet awaiting us precisely as the unthought of that beginning and the tradition to which it gave rise. The destructuring would take as its guiding thread an understanding of the Being of Dasein—designating the being that we ourselves in each case are—as radically temporal, never simply present-at-hand, and essentially inaccessible to theoretical apprehension. Yet the critical resource for this analytic of the Being of Dasein was, for the early Heidegger, itself provided by Greek philosophy: It was Aristotle’s insight into the Being of the human being as praxis, and its authentic mode of self-disclosure, phron!sis, that led Heidegger to see the radically different kind of temporality pertaining to human existence, by contrast with the theoretically ascertained time of nature as something present-at-hand, and provided a key insight into the essence of “truth” (aletheia) as unconcealment. Aristotle’s insight into this more primordial sense of aletheia or “truth” as the knowing self-disclosure of our radically temporal Being-in-the-world as praxis, as opposed to truth conceived as a property of logos, judgment, or theoretical knowledge, was a forgotten thread of Greek philosophy that could shed light upon the limits and foundations of the theoretical tradition that dominates the subsequent history of ontology.
16
Gorichanaz, Tim. "Information and experience, a dialogue." Journal of Documentation 73, no. 3 (May 8, 2017): 500–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jd-09-2016-0114.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose Scholars in information science have recently become interested in “information experience,” but it remains largely unclear why this research is important and how it fits within the broader disciplinary structure of information science. The purpose of this paper is to clarify this issue. Design/methodology/approach The discussion unfolds in the form of a philosophical dialogue between the Epistemologist, who represents the traditional and majority epistemological viewpoint of information science, and the Aestheticist, representing the emerging paradigm of experiential information inquiry. Findings A framework emerges that recognizes dual conceptualizations of truth (veritas and aletheia) and consequently information and knowledge (gnostic and pathic). The epistemic aim of understanding is revealed as the common ground between epistemology and aesthetics. Originality/value The value of studying human experiences of information is grounded in work spanning philosophy, psychology and a number of social science methodologies, and it is contextualized within information science generally. Moreover, the dialogic format of this paper presents an opportunity for disciplinary self-reflection and offers a touch of heart to the field.
17
Hayes, Josh Michael. "From Oikeiosis to Ereignis: Heidegger and the Fate of Stoicism." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 52 (2018): 96–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20185216.
Full textAbstract:
This paper proceeds by investigating three ‘topoi’ or sites within Heidegger’s texts where the presence of Stoicism most fundamentally articulates itself as critical to his understanding of the truth of being (aletheia) and its historical destining as Ereignis. We will begin with the “Letter on Humanism” (1947), the most comprehensive “public’ statement of his later thought-by first considering how Ereignis-often translated as the event or event of appropriation to indicate the historical destining of being-might be said to be consonant with the Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis-the appropriation or familiarization with oneself echoed by both Chrysippus and Hierocles. In doing so, we will attempt to trace Heidegger’s interpretation of oikeiosis back into the origins of his fundamental ontology by turning to the genesis of care/cura (Sorge) in Sein und Zeit (1927)-specifically the Roman myth of Hyginus that bears its name-before concluding with an early lecture course, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion (1920-1921) where his engagement with the Pauline tradition reveals oikeiosis to be a hidden enigma in his thinking about the meaning of being and its historical destining.
18
Amorim, Wellington Lima, and José Roberto Carvalho da Silva. "O fim da filosofia na modernidade com o surgimento da hermenêutica heideggeriana/The end of philosophy in modernity with the rise of heideggerian hermeneutics." Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 4, no. 7 (October 24, 2013): 113. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/pensando.v4i7.1366.
Full textAbstract:
Para Heidegger, a filosofia até então fora metafísica e enquanto tal chega a seu acabamento na era tecnológica, ou seja, a modernidade atinge seu auge com a inauguração da autonomia das ciências particulares pela linguagem cibernética. O filósofo chama a atenção para um pensamento capaz de pensar além da metafisica e da essência da técnica (gestell) que tem dominado a compreensão do habitar humano no mundo. Redescobrir um pensar que não seja nem metafísico nem técnico é o que Heidegger chama de a tarefa do pensamento. Vejamos que tanto a metafísica quanto a técnica estão acentuadas em um mesmo fundamento, consequentemente em uma mesma noção de verdade, a verdade enquanto concordância, enunciativa e enquanto ente. Nesta concepção de verdade também a filosofia habita enquanto metafísica, por isso na tarefa do pensamento a filosofia deve superar-se e buscar uma nova compreensão para o que é verdadeiro, deve ir às origens do pensamento grego e resgatar o significado de alétheia, desvelamento. Pensar é desvelar o que está velado. A tarefa do pensamento passa a ser encaminhada à hermenêutica, não por mera arbitrariedade, mas sim pela própria necessidade de se pensar originariamente. Só a hermenêutica pode ainda pensar o que é digno de ser pensado, o que ainda não foi alcançado pelo pensamento metafísico e pelo enquadramento técnico que move a habitação do homem no mundo, pois é a abertura que possibilita todo apresentar-se, essa abertura é a clareira do Ser.Abstract: For Heidegger philosophy had been hitherto metaphysics and it reaches its finishing process in the technological era, i.e., modernity reaches its peak with the unveiling of the autonomy of the special sciences through cyber language. The philosopher draws attention to a thought able of thinking beyond metaphysics and the essence of the technique (Gestell) that has dominated the understanding of human dwelling in the world. Rediscover a thinking that is neither metaphysical nor technique is what Heidegger calls the task of thought. Considering that both metaphysics and technique are pronounced in the same basis, thus in the same notion of truth, the truth as agreement, expository and as beings. In this conception of truth philosophy inhabits as metaphysical as well as. For this reason, in the task of thought, philosophy should surpass itself and seek a new understanding for what is true, it shall go to the origins of Greek thought and redeem the meaning of aletheia, unveiling. Thinking is to unveil what is veiled. The task of thought becomes forwarded to hermeneutics, not for mere arbitrariness, rather for the need of thinking originally. Only hermeneutics might still think what is worthy of being thought, what has not yet been reached by metaphysical thought and by the technical framework that moves the habitation of man in the world, then it is the opening that allows all “coming forwards”, this opening is the clearing of Being. Keywords: Philosophy. Metaphysics. Technique. Hermeneutics. Modernity.
19
Torrance, T. F. "Phusikos Kai Theologikos Logos, St Paul and Athenagoras at Athens." Scottish Journal of Theology 41, no. 1 (February 1988): 11–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930600031252.
Full textAbstract:
In the early Christian treatise Peri tes anastaseos ton nekron, written in the last quarter of the second century, Athenagoras of Athens drew a distinction between two kinds of theological discourse or argument (logos), ‘on behalf of the truth’ (huper tes aletheias) and ‘concerning the truth’ (peri tes aletheias), in which he clearly had in mind St Paul's missionary address to the Athenians on Mars' Hill. Owing to its nature discourse concerning the truth is of primary importance for it provides necessary knowledge of the actual subject-matter, while discourse on behalf of the truth is of secondary importance for it does not establish the truth but is useful in opening the way for it by removing the undergrowth of false and hostile opinion. It is in this light that Athenagoras' two extant works are to be appreciated, Presbeia ton Christianon which is admittedly of an apologetic nature, and Peri tes anastaseos ton nekron in which he offered a reasoned account of the truth of the resurrection.
20
Ferrari, Filippo, and Sebastiano Moruzzi. "Ecumenical alethic pluralism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 3 (May 2019): 368–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1493880.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractEcumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP) is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as it involves a reconfiguration of the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists.
21
Westerkamp, Dirk. "Alethischer Pragmatismus." Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 2014, no. 2 (2014): 295–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000106681.
Full textAbstract:
»Alethic Pragmatism« is the seemingly complicated term for a rather trivial philosophical enterprise. Coined in allusion to Alston’s »alethic realism,« alethic pragmatism calls attention not only to the propositional but also to the procedural aspects of truth. Reaching back to the Peircean and Jamesian origins of pragmatism’s tradition, this paper deciphers different acts of verification, validation and truth-making. Special attention is devoted to alethic pragmatism’s concept of facticity and validity (or validation, Geltung). It is argued that one possible sense of bringing about truth could lie in the various performative linguistic, and scriptural acts determined to make propositions valid within a given system of beliefs or propositions.
22
Wrenn. "ALETHIC PLURALISM AND TRUTH-ATTRIBUTIONS." American Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2020): 311. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/48584449.
Full text
23
Froehlich, Thomas. "Some Thoughts Evoked by Peter Lor, Bradley Wiles, and Johannes Britz, “Re-thinking Information Ethics: Truth, Conspiracy Theories, and Librarians in the COVID-19 Era,” in LIBRI, March 2021." Libri 71, no. 3 (August 30, 2021): 219–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/libri-2021-0061.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The paper offers some thoughts prompted by the research paper published by Peter Lor, Bradley Wiles, and Johannes Britz, “Re-Thinking Information Ethics: Truth, Conspiracy Theories, and Librarians in the COVID-19 Era,” in LIBRI, March 2021. It highlights two significant contributions, an analysis of the misinformation in the COVID-19 pandemic and the notion of alethic rights, the right of truth of patrons based on the work of D’Agostini. This reflection then situates the COVID-19 misinformation campaign within the broader disinformation ecology within which it exists. While it agrees that alethic rights are an important ethical framework, it wonders whether it practically advances work beyond that libraries and librarians are already doing, e.g., in collection decisions, approaches to reference questions, or library programming. It looks at the debate between John Swan and Noel Peattie on the inclusion of books representing outright lies in the collection (e.g., Holocaust denial). It then contrasts a right to information and authorities propagating and validating that information with a right to misinformation and authorities for propagating and validating that misinformation that exists within disinformation ecologies. The problem of truth, its authorities and its context appears to be more complicated than an appeal to alethic truths: for example, liberals and conservatives differ on the meaning of a rational consensus on contentious political matters, such as climate change. Given the dire consequences of misinformation on democracies and public health, an appeal to professional neutrality is woefully inadequate. There must be proactive resistance, if not outright repudiation.
24
Zuidervaart, Lambert. "Holistic Alethic Pluralism: A Reformational Research Program." Philosophia Reformata 81, no. 2 (October 4, 2016): 156–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/23528230-08102002.
Full textAbstract:
This essay lays out a reformational research program on the idea of truth. First it describes challenges to the idea of truth in contemporary philosophy and gives reasons why a robust conception of truth is needed. Next it presents two overriding concerns – ontological and axiological – that such a conception should address. In addressing these concerns, a contemporary reformational approach will take up three sets of issues: relations between propositional truth and the discursive justification of truth claims; distinctions and connections between propositional and nonpropositional truth; and the sorts of cultural practices and social institutions within which truth occurs. My detailed response to these issues, as sketched in the last section of the essay, is to propose a holistic, normative, and structurally pluralist conception of truth, one that I call holistic alethic pluralism. Propositional truth is important but not all-important, and reformational philosophy needs to show why that is so.
25
Clark, Janine Natalya. "Emotional Legacies, Transitional Justice and Alethic Truth." Journal of International Criminal Justice 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 141–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqaa011.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Transitional justice processes seek to address the legacy of past human rights abuses. This article focuses on the emotional dimensions of legacy. It argues that war crimes and human rights abuses leave important emotional legacies that have not received sufficient attention within transitional justice theory or practice, and underscores that any process of ‘dealing with the past’ is necessarily incomplete if powerful emotions connected to that past are overlooked. Drawing on the author’s fieldwork in the Bosnian village of Ahmići, the article aims to demonstrate that the neglect of emotional legacies — which it links to the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence — represents a missed opportunity to explore how the meta emotions that people share constitute potential new bases for building reconciliation in post-conflict societies such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Reflecting more broadly on the relationship between truth and reconciliation, it emphasizes the utility of alethic truth as a concept that accommodates and draws attention to common emotions — and thus points to unexplored dimensions of the relationship between truth and reconciliation.
26
Cook, Roy T. "ALETHIC PLURALISM, GENERIC TRUTH AND MIXED CONJUNCTIONS." Philosophical Quarterly 61, no. 244 (June 14, 2011): 624–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.706.x.
Full text
27
Drouillard, Jill. "(Re)productive Tensions: Aletheiac Revealing in Morisot’s “Cradle” and “Wet Nurse”." Heidegger Circle Proceedings 53 (2019): 25–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle2019533.
Full textAbstract:
Martin Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art moves beyond an aesthetic reading of the artwork that focuses on questions of judgment towards a hermeneutical understanding of art as a realm where truth happens. Such a truth presents itself as an aletheiac unfolding of the strife between Earth and World, a tension revelatory of our historical situation. To better understand this truth, Heidegger turns to a painting of Van Gogh’s shoes, providing an account of the artwork that moves beyond the “thingly” character of the shoes to its “equipmental being”. That he attributes Van Gogh’s shoes to a peasant woman is telling in that her being female points to a gendered relation between woman and Earth. However, in only focusing on the equipmental being of her shoes and her labor in the fields, a historical truth about the tension between her labor of reproduction and production, a strain inherent in the Earth/World dynamic becomes eclipsed. This tension is felt as a reckoning of, not only one’s finitude, but of one’s natality. Heidegger looks to Van Gogh’s shoes and analyzes how toils in the field set up a world; however, as Gaston Bachelard notes, “Before he is ‘cast into the world,’ as claimed by certain hasty metaphysicians, man is laid in the cradle of the house.2” To explore our natal origin that begins in the cradle and stretches along to our death, this paper presents a hermeneutical reading of two works of art, Berthe Morisot’s “Cradle” and “Wet Nurse”, suggesting that in seeking an origin of the work of art and the tension that resides there, an understanding of reproduction (and its relation to production) should complement Heidegger’s treatment of the artwork.
28
Lynch, M. P. "Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth." Synthese 145, no. 1 (May 2005): 29–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2.
Full text
29
Newhard, Jay. "Plain truth and the incoherence of alethic functionalism." Synthese 194, no. 5 (January 13, 2016): 1591–611. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-1006-8.
Full text
30
Newhard, Jay. "Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and the Nature of Truth." Acta Analytica 29, no. 3 (November 30, 2013): 349–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0214-4.
Full text
31
Zalabardo, José L. "Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth." Disputatio 8, no. 43 (November 1, 2016): 147–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0009.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false.
32
Dell'Utri, Massimo. "Alethic Deflationism and Normativity: A Critique." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 63, no. 1 (April 23, 2018): 292. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2018.1.29278.
Full textAbstract:
The paper starts by highlighting that virtually nobody would object to claims such as “to regard an assertion or a belief or a thought as true or false is to regard it as being right or wrong”—a claim that shows that truth is intrinsically normative. It is well known that alethic deflationists deny this. Paul Horwich, for instance, maintains that nothing shows that TRUTH is a normative concept in the way that OUGHT is. By relying on a distinction among dimensions of normativity I will try to pinpoint the weakness of Horwich’s argument in the fact that he works with a strong, uncalled-for, interpretation of normativity, whereas a weaker interpretation is more than enough. However, the impression might persist that a different understanding of the normativity of truth on the part of deflationists could eventually show the compatibility between alethic deflationism and normativity. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to contend that this is a wrong impression. Accordingly, it is stated that the normativity exerted by truth is ascribable in the final analysis to the world, and the provocative claim is defended that alethic deflationism lacks the conceptual resources to account for the relation between language and the world.***Deflacionismo Alético e Normatividade: Uma Crítica***O artigo começa destacando que praticamente ninguém se opõe a reivindicações como "considerar uma afirmação, uma crença ou um pensamento como verdadeiro ou falso é considerá-lo como correto ou errado" - uma afirmação que mostra que a verdade é intrinsecamente normativa. Sabe-se que os deflacionistas aléticos negam isso. Paul Horwich, por exemplo, sustenta que nada mostra que a verdade é um conceito normativo da maneira que deveria ser. Ao confiar em uma distinção entre as dimensões da normatividade, tentarei identificar a fraqueza do argumento de Horwich no fato de que ele trabalha com uma interpretação de normatividade forte, desnecessária, quando uma interpretação mais fraca seria mais do que suficiente. No entanto, a impressão pode persistir de que uma compreensão diferente da normatividade da verdade por parte dos deflacionistas poderia eventualmente mostrar a compatibilidade entre o deflacionismo e a normatividade alética. A parte restante do artigo dedica-se a afirmar que esta é uma impressão errada. Por conseguinte, afirma-se que a normatividade exercida pela verdade é imputável, em última análise, ao mundo, e a reivindicação provocativa é defendida de que o deflacionismo alético não possui os recursos conceituais para explicar a relação entre a linguagem e o mundo.
33
Fritz, Peter Joseph. "Karl Rahner’s Theological Logic, Phenomenology, and Anticipation." Theological Studies 80, no. 1 (February 27, 2019): 57–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040563918819815.
Full textAbstract:
This article provides an update on the logic undergirding Karl Rahner’s theology of mystery through a dialogue between Rahner and Jean-Luc Marion. It focuses on Rahner’s account of truth in Aquinas and Marion’s Gifford Lectures on revelation. Marion’s distinction between “alethic” (modern-epistemological) and “apocalyptic” (phenomenological-Christian) logics elucidates anew Rahner’s commitment to mystery as deep, abiding truth. Also addressed is Marion’s Balthasarian concern about Rahner and “anticipation,” expressed as criticism of the “anonymous Christian.” The article aims to encourage future, robust theological reflection on truth, an always timely endeavor.
34
PEDERSEN, NIKOLAJ JANG LEE LINDING, and DOUGLAS EDWARDS. "TRUTH AS ONE(S) AND MANY: ON LYNCH'S ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM1." Analytic Philosophy 52, no. 3 (September 2011): 213–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2153-960x.2011.00529.x.
Full text
35
Valiavitcharska, Vessela. "Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias' Encomium of Helen." Rhetorica 24, no. 2 (2006): 147–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rh.2006.24.2.147.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This paper argues against the tendency to interpret Gorgias' view of logos as a techne of persuasion which relies on opinion (doxa) and rests on deception either deliberately or incidentally in order to function. Rather, Gorgias appears to be making a connection between truthful speech (alethes logos) and correct speech (orthos logos). Gorgias' insistence on correctness of speech surfaces not only in the Encomium of Helen, but also in the Funeral Oration fragment and in Agathon's parody of Gorgianic rhetoric in Plato's Symposium. Correct speech goes beyond the effectiveness of language and into the domain of ethical correctness and responsibility.
36
d’Agostini, Franca. "Alethic Rights: Preliminaries of an Inquiry into the Power of Truth." Social Epistemology 35, no. 5 (May 16, 2021): 515–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1919236.
Full text
37
Marchese, Elena, and Jorge Baquerizo. "De incertidumbre no se muere. Un desafío no resuelto sobre verdad y conocimiento = Uncertainty does not kill. An open challenge about truth and knowledge." EUNOMÍA. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, no. 17 (September 27, 2019): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2019.4990.
Full textAbstract:
Resumen: La idea de certeza absoluta, típica del primer realismo alético, ha encontrado en la ley un hábitat ideal en el que se ha enraizado profundamente. La insostenibilidad epistemológica de esta noción, y el daño que ha causado a la reflexión jurídica, han sido denunciados de manera clara: tanto por Luigi Ferrajoli, como por la dogmática iusfilosófica que ha seguido sus ideas (los llamados «teóricos del hecho»). En este trabajo intento, por una parte, analizar la labor de estos teóricos, aportando elementos de reflexión sobre el tema de la verdad y del conocimiento judicial; por otra parte, también intento mostrar que la «rehabilitación» del realismo alético, en el ámbito jurídico, subsiste todavía como un problema abierto y lleno de interés para la reflexión filosófica. Palabras clave: verdad, conocimiento procesal, teóricos del hecho, Ferrajoli, realismo y antirealismo alético.Abstract: The idea of absolute certainty -typical of the first alethic realism- found an ideal habitat in Law and it rooted deeply into it. The epistemological unsustainability of this notion and the harms it caused to the legal debate were denounced clearly by Luigi Ferrajoli and the following scholars (i.e. the «fact-theorists»). This paper is aimed, on the one hand, at assessing the work of these jurists and provide food for thought on the topics of truth and procedural knowledge; on the other hand, it tries to show that the problem of the «rehabilitation» of alethic realism in the legal field still remains open and full of interest for the philosophical reflection. Keywords: truth, judicial knowledge, fact-theorists, Ferrajoli, alethic realism and anti-realism.
38
Ferrari, Moruzzi, and Pedersen. "INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE “ALETHIC PLURALISM AND THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH”." American Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2020): 309. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/48584448.
Full text
39
Wilson, Amanda. "Shame, guilt and Martha Nussbaum’s immaturing process: alethic truth and human flourishing." Journal of Critical Realism 19, no. 4 (August 7, 2020): 380–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2020.1802190.
Full text
40
Ball, Brian. "Alethic Pluralism and the Role of Reference in the Metaphysics of Truth." Southern Journal of Philosophy 55, no. 1 (March 2017): 116–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12208.
Full text
41
Klenner, Niels, and Tilmann Köppe. "On the alethic and moral status of political storytelling." Frontiers of Narrative Studies 7, no. 1 (July 1, 2021): 44–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/fns-2021-0003.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The article reconstructs the theory of political storytelling as outlined by political strategist Mark McKinnon. Stories that conform to this theory feature a suspense structure, and as such they invoke hope and fear in recipients, thereby instilling pro- or contra-attitudes. This is potentially problematic in four respects: Political storytelling (1) can be used to induce attitude-change without a rational foundation, thereby infringing on the receiver’s right to epistemic self-determination; (2) political storytelling may involve a misrepresentation of the teller’s communicative intentions, thereby disclosing the truth about them in a way that is potentially harmful to society; (3) by expressing rather than stating crucial elements of his or her “message,” the political storyteller may immunize him- or herself from critique and mask the true content of the message; (4) by attempting to influence recipients’ preferences, the political storyteller does not conform to some fundamental principle of representative democracy.
42
LANCASTER-THOMAS, ASHA. "Truth, consequences, and the Evil-god challenge: a response to Anastasia Scrutton." Religious Studies 56, no. 3 (October 16, 2018): 447–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000690.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn her 2016 article in Religious Studies, Anastasia Scrutton attempts to undermine Stephen Law's Evil-god challenge by arguing that belief in a good god is more justified than belief in an evil god, despite the alethic similarity of the two hypotheses. Drawing on the epistemological theory of pragmatic encroachment, Scrutton claims that is it more reasonable to believe in a benevolent deity than a malevolent one because belief in the latter (i) is detrimental to one's well-being and (ii) has worse moral consequences, whereas belief in the former (i) is good for one's well-being and (ii) has better moral consequences. In this article, I critically respond to Scrutton's argument by proposing that even if belief in a good god results in better consequences than belief in an evil god does, pragmatic encroachment does not undermine the Evil-god challenge. I further argue that pragmatic encroachment potentially undermines itself in this instance.
43
Campbell, James R. "Mythicist Foundations of State Terror." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 33, no. 1 (2019): 11–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ijap201988120.
Full textAbstract:
This essay examines the traumas inflicted by acts of false-flag state terrorism on 11 September 2001, and their concealment by exploitation of mythicist falsifications that are endemic to our culture—while also paying particular attention to parallels between the staging of explosive demolitions for the WTC Towers and gutting of the Reichstag by Nazi incendiaries in 1933. The study culminates in a depiction—based on heuristic distinctions between natural, gnomic, alethic, and personal wills—of how we become vulnerable to mythicist falsifications, and how truth-telling facilitates recovery of our moral integrity after the twin traumas of betrayal by acts of state terror, and complicity with that betrayal, have deeply compromised it.
44
Florio, Antonio. "The Notion of 'Being Informative' & the Praxiological-Information Perspective on Language." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 7, no. 2 (November 6, 2009): 214–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v7i2.117.
Full textAbstract:
After a concise introduction on the analysis of truth and meaning in philosophy of language two notions of information are grasped by the analysis of Situation Semantics and Situation Theory. The first is that of correlation, the second that of constraint; the latter is reducible to the former. More than that, the phenomenon of ";alethic nature of information"; is highlighted and the notion of ";being informative"; is pointed out. The difference between a meaning-oriented and an informational-oriented perspective of language is marked. Messages are recognized as being the atomic constituents of the informational perspective of language; the architecture of language is shown; and a praxiological-information perspective on the study of language is outlined.
45
Florio, Antonio. "The Notion of 'Being Informative' & the Praxiological-Information Perspective on Language." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 7, no. 2 (November 6, 2009): 214–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/vol7iss2pp214-227.
Full textAbstract:
After a concise introduction on the analysis of truth and meaning in philosophy of language two notions of information are grasped by the analysis of Situation Semantics and Situation Theory. The first is that of correlation, the second that of constraint; the latter is reducible to the former. More than that, the phenomenon of ";alethic nature of information"; is highlighted and the notion of ";being informative"; is pointed out. The difference between a meaning-oriented and an informational-oriented perspective of language is marked. Messages are recognized as being the atomic constituents of the informational perspective of language; the architecture of language is shown; and a praxiological-information perspective on the study of language is outlined.
46
Hodes, Harold T. "Where do sets come from?" Journal of Symbolic Logic 56, no. 1 (March 1991): 150–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274911.
Full textAbstract:
Many philosophers take set-theoretic discourse to be about objects of a special sort, namely sets; correlatively, they regard truth in such discourse as quite like truth in discourse about nonmathematical objects. There is a thin “disquotational” way of construing this construal; but that may candy-coat a philosophically substantive semantic theory: the Mathematical-Object theory of the basis for the distribution of truth and falsehood to sentences containing set-theoretic expressions. This theory asserts that truth and falsity for sentences containing set-theoretic expressions are grounded in semantic facts (about the relation between language and the world) of the sort modelled by the usual model-theoretic semantics for an uninterpreted formal first-order language. For example, it would maintain that ‘{ } ∈ {{ }}” is true in virtue of the set-theoretic fact that the empty set is a member of its singleton, and the semantic facts that ‘{ }’ designates the empty set,‘{{ }}’ designates its singleton, and ‘∈’ applies to an ordered pair of objects iff that pair's first component is a member of its second component.Now this theory may come so naturally as to seem trivial. My purpose here is to loosen its grip by “modelling” an alternative account of the alethic underpinnings of set-theoretic discourse. According to the Alternative theory, the point of having set-theoretic expressions (‘set’ and ‘∈’ will do) in a language is not to permit its speakers to talk about some special objects under a special relation; rather it is to clothe a higher-order language in lower-order garments.
47
Edwards, M. J. "Aidōs in Plotinus: Enneads II.9.10." Classical Quarterly 39, no. 1 (May 1989): 228–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000983880004060x.
Full textAbstract:
At one point in his treatise against the ‘Gnostics’ Plotinus treats his adversaries as men of flesh and blood, not merely as proponents of false books and false beliefs:For I feel a certain shame (aidōs tis echei) with regard to some of my friends (philoi), who, having chanced upon this doctrine before the beginning of our friendship, have continued to adhere to it for reasons that I cannot understand. Not that they themselves show any compunction in saying what they say: they may believe what they say to be true (alethe), but perhaps they rather wish others to be persuaded of the truth of their own opinions. (Enneads II.9.10.3ff.)
48
Aijaz, Imran. "Traditional Islamic Exclusivism - A Critique." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, no. 2 (June 21, 2014): 185–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i2.186.
Full textAbstract:
In this paper, I give an account and critique of what I call ‘Traditional Islamic Exclusivism’ – a specific Islamic interpretation of religious exclusivism. This Islamic version of religious exclusivism rests on exclusivist attitudes towards truth, epistemic justification and salvation. After giving an account of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism by explaining its theological roots in the Qur’an and ahadith (reports of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad), I proceed to critique it. I do so by arguing that Islamic epistemic exclusivism, which forms the main core of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism, is implausible. This criticism subsequently opens up further lines of criticism and discussion of both salvific and alethic exclusivism in an Islamic context. I conclude with some remarks about the implications and significance of my criticisms of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism.
49
Lor, Peter, Bradley Wiles, and Johannes Britz. "Re-thinking Information Ethics: Truth, Conspiracy Theories, and Librarians in the COVID-19 Era." Libri 71, no. 1 (February 2, 2021): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/libri-2020-0158.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic is an international public health crisis without precedent in the last century. The novelty and rapid spread of the virus have added a new urgency to the availability and distribution of reliable information to help curb its fatal potential. As seasoned and trusted purveyors of reliable public information, librarians have attempted to respond to the “infodemic” of fake news, disinformation, and propaganda with a variety of strategies, but the COVID-19 pandemic presents a unique challenge because of the deadly stakes involved. The seriousness of the current situation requires that librarians and associated professionals re-evaluate the ethical basis of their approach to information provision to counter the growing prominence of conspiracy theories in the public sphere and official decision making. This paper analyzes the conspiracy mindset and specific COVID-19 conspiracy theories in discussing how libraries might address the problems of truth and untruth in ethically sound ways. As a contribution to the re-evaluation we propose, the paper presents an ethical framework based on alethic rights—or rights to truth—as conceived by Italian philosopher Franca D’Agostini and how these might inform professional approaches that support personal safety, open knowledge, and social justice.
50
Hannikainen, Ivar. "Might-counterfactuals and the principle of conditional excluded middle." Disputatio 4, no. 30 (May 1, 2011): 127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0003.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Owing to the problem of inescapable clashes, epistemic accounts of might-counterfactuals have recently gained traction. In a different vein, the might argument against conditional excluded middle has rendered the latter a contentious principle to incorporate into a logic for conditionals. The aim of this paper is to rescue both ontic mightcounterfactuals and conditional excluded middle from these disparate debates and show them to be compatible. I argue that the antecedent of a might-counterfactual is semantically underdetermined with respect to the counterfactual worlds it selects for evaluation. This explains how might-counterfactuals select multiple counterfactual worlds as they apparently do and why their utterance confers a weaker alethic commitment on the speaker than does that of a would-counterfactual, as well as provides an ontic solution to inescapable clashes. I briefly sketch how the semantic underdetermination and truth conditions of mightcounterfactuals are regulated by conversational context.