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Callaway, Howard G. "Semantic competence and truth-conditional semantics." Erkenntnis 28, no. 1 (January 1988): 3–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00204422.
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Clapp, Lenny. "Indexical Color Predicates: Truth Conditional Semantics vs. Truth Conditional Pragmatics." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42, no. 2 (June 2012): 71–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2012.0009.
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Truth conditional semantics is the project of ‘determining a way of assigning truth conditions to sentences based on A) the extension of their constituents and B) their syntactic mode of combination’ (Rothschild and Segal, 2009). This research program has been subject to objections that take the form of underdetermination arguments, an influential instance of which is presented by Travis: … consider the words ‘The leaf is green,’ speaking of a given leaf, and its condition at a given time, used so as to mean what they do mean in English. How many distinct things might be said in words with all that true of them? Many.… Suppose a Japanese maple leaf, turned brown, was painted green for a decoration. In sorting leaves by colour, one might truly call this one green. In describing leaves to help identify their species, it might, for all the paint, be false to call it that.
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Nickel, Bernhard. "Saying and doing: The role of semantics in the use of generic sentences." Canadian Journal of Linguistics/Revue canadienne de linguistique 57, no. 2 (July 2012): 289–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008413100004783.
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AbstractThis article discusses semantic theories of generic sentences that seek to tie their meaning closely to their use, rather than giving more traditional truth-conditional semantic treatments. It focuses on McConnell-Ginet’s recent work and defends truth-conditional approaches combined with a traditional semantics-pragmatics distinction.
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ASHER, N. "Truth Conditional Discourse Semantics for Parentheticals." Journal of Semantics 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2000): 31–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/17.1.31.
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Horisk, Claire. "THE EXPRESSIVE ROLE OF TRUTH IN TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS." Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 229 (October 2007): 535–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.496.x.
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Napoletano, Toby. "How important are truth-conditions for truth-conditional semantics?" Linguistics and Philosophy 42, no. 6 (April 10, 2019): 541–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-019-09261-y.
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Goldstein, Simon. "Generalized Update Semantics." Mind 128, no. 511 (February 8, 2019): 795–835. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy076.
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Abstract This paper explores the relationship between dynamic and truth conditional semantics for epistemic modals. It provides a generalization of a standard dynamic update semantics for modals. This new semantics derives a Kripke semantics for modals and a standard dynamic semantics for modals as special cases. The semantics allows for new characterizations of a variety of principles in modal logic, including the inconsistency of ‘p and might not p’. Finally, the semantics provides a construction procedure for transforming any truth conditional semantics for modals into a dynamic semantics for modals with similar properties.
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Ogihara, Toshiyuki. "Tense and aspect in truth-conditional semantics." Lingua 117, no. 2 (February 2007): 392–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2005.01.002.
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Horisk, Claire. "The Surprise Argument for Truth-Conditional Semantics." ProtoSociology 21 (2005): 20–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/protosociology2005212.
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Gardiner, Mark Q. "Why Truth Matters for the Study of Religion: A Defense of a Truth-Conditional Semantics." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 30, no. 4-5 (October 10, 2018): 402–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341426.
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AbstractTruth-conditional semantics holds that the meaning of a linguistic expression is a function of the conditions under which it would be true. This seems to require limiting meaningfulness to linguistic phenomena for which the question of truth or falsity is relevant. Criticisms have been raised that there are vast swatches of meaningful language that are simply not truth-related, with religion representing a particularly rich and prevalent source. I argue that if the concept of truth as used in a truth-conditional semantics is understood in ways other than correspondence to fact, there are suitable reformulations of a truth-conditional semantics that may be appropriate for understanding religion. I further argue that these reformulations offer considerable methodological advantages to the scholar of religion.
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Asher, Nicholas. "A default, truth conditional semantics for the progressive." Linguistics and Philosophy 15, no. 5 (October 1992): 463–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00630628.
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AnderBois, Scott. "Sluicing as anaphora to issues." Semantics and Linguistic Theory, no. 20 (April 3, 2015): 451. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v0i20.2574.
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Since Merchant 2001, it has been widely agreed that the licensing condition on Sluicing is at least partly semantic in nature. This paper argues that the relevant semantic condition is one of symmetric entailment over a semantics which includes not only truth-conditional information, but also issues in the sense of Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009. One kind of evidence for the proposal comes from expressions like doubly-negated inde?nites and implicit passive agents which do not license Sluicing despite truth-conditional equivalence to overt inde?nites. In addition to these facts, the paper examines novel data which show that Sluicing is not licensed by even overt inde?nites inside of appositive relative clauses, arguing that these facts (and related facts regarding VP-Ellipsis) follow from the account together with an independently motivated semantics for appositives.
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AnderBois, Scott. "Sluicing as anaphora to issues." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 20 (August 14, 2010): 451. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v20i0.2574.
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Since Merchant 2001, it has been widely agreed that the licensing condition on Sluicing is at least partly semantic in nature. This paper argues that the relevant semantic condition is one of symmetric entailment over a semantics which includes not only truth-conditional information, but also issues in the sense of Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009. One kind of evidence for the proposal comes from expressions like doubly-negated inde?nites and implicit passive agents which do not license Sluicing despite truth-conditional equivalence to overt inde?nites. In addition to these facts, the paper examines novel data which show that Sluicing is not licensed by even overt inde?nites inside of appositive relative clauses, arguing that these facts (and related facts regarding VP-Ellipsis) follow from the account together with an independently motivated semantics for appositives.
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Gardiner, Mark Q. "Truth-Conditions and Religious Language: Introduction." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 30, no. 4-5 (October 10, 2018): 321–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341427.
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AbstractIntroduction to the following set of papers: Lars Albinus, “A grammar of religious ‘truth’—pragmatic considerations on the nature of religious truth”; Terry F. Godlove, “Truth, meaning, and the study of religion”; G. Scott Davis, “Semantics and the study of religion”; Mark Q. Gardiner, “Why truth matters for the study of religion; a defense of a truth-conditional semantics”; Gabriel Levy, “Can fictional superhuman agents have mental states?”.
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Lycan, William G. "Logical constants and the glory of truth-conditional semantics." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 30, no. 3 (June 1989): 390–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093635156.
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Morón Usandivaras, Mariana. "Xosé Rosales Sequeiros: Semantics and Non-Truth-Conditional Meaning." Pragmática Sociocultural / Sociocultural Pragmatics 7, no. 1 (July 26, 2019): 119–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/soprag-2019-0011.
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LEITGEB, HANNES. "A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART A." Review of Symbolic Logic 5, no. 1 (November 17, 2011): 26–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020311000153.
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This is part A of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual ‘if A then B’ to be true even in the presence of relevant ‘A and not B’-worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its probabilistic nature, we show that the semantics and the resulting system of logic may be regarded as a naturalistically vindicated variant of David Lewis’ truth-conditional semantics and logic of counterfactuals. At the same time, the semantics overlaps in various ways with the non-truth-conditional suppositional theory for conditionals that derives from Ernest Adams’ work. We argue that counterfactuals have two kinds of pragmatic meanings and come attached with two types of degrees of acceptability or belief, one being suppositional, the other one being truth based as determined by our probabilistic semantics; these degrees could not always coincide due to a new triviality result for counterfactuals, and they should not be identified in the light of their different interpretation and pragmatic purpose. However, for plain assertability the difference between them does not matter. Hence, if the suppositional theory of counterfactuals is formulated with sufficient care, our truth-conditional theory of counterfactuals is consistent with it. The results of our investigation are used to assess a claim considered by Hawthorne and Hájek, that is, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals are false.
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LEITGEB, HANNES. "A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART B." Review of Symbolic Logic 5, no. 1 (November 17, 2011): 85–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020311000165.
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AbstractThis is part B of a paper in which we defend a semantics for counterfactuals which is probabilistic in the sense that the truth condition for counterfactuals refers to a probability measure. Because of its probabilistic nature, it allows a counterfactual ‘if A then B’ to be true even in the presence of relevant ‘A and not B’-worlds, as long such exceptions are not too widely spread. The semantics is made precise and studied in different versions which are related to each other by representation theorems. Despite its probabilistic nature, we show that the semantics and the resulting system of logic may be regarded as a naturalistically vindicated variant of David Lewis’ truth-conditional semantics and logic of counterfactuals. At the same time, the semantics overlaps in various ways with the non-truth-conditional suppositional theory for conditionals that derives from Ernest Adams’ work. We argue that counterfactuals have two kinds of pragmatic meanings and come attached with two types of degrees of acceptability or belief, one being suppositional, the other one being truth based as determined by our probabilistic semantics; these degrees could not always coincide due to a new triviality result for counterfactuals, and they should not be identified in the light of their different interpretation and pragmatic purpose. However, for plain assertability the difference between them does not matter. Hence, if the suppositional theory of counterfactuals is formulated with sufficient care, our truth-conditional theory of counterfactuals is consistent with it. The results of our investigation are used to assess a claim considered by Hawthorne and Hájek, that is, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals are false.
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COLLIN, FINN, and ANDERS ENGSTRØM. "Metaphor and Truth-conditional Semantics: Meaning as Process and Product." Theoria 67, no. 1 (February 11, 2008): 75–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2001.tb00197.x.
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Del Pinal, Guillermo. "Meaning, modulation, and context: a multidimensional semantics for truth-conditional pragmatics." Linguistics and Philosophy 41, no. 2 (January 17, 2018): 165–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-017-9221-z.
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Goldstein, Simon. "A Theory of Conditional Assertion." Journal of Philosophy 116, no. 6 (2019): 293–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116620.
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According to one tradition, uttering an indicative conditional involves performing a special sort of speech act: a conditional assertion. We introduce a formal framework that models this speech act. Using this framework, we show that any theory of conditional assertion validates several inferences in the logic of conditionals, including the False Antecedent inference (that not A implies if A, then C). Next, we determine the space of truth-conditional semantics for conditionals consistent with conditional assertion. The truth value of any such conditional is settled whenever the antecedent is false, and whenever the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Then, we consider the space of dynamic meanings consistent with the theory of conditional assertion. We develop a new family of dynamic conditional-assertion operators that combine a traditional test operator with an update operation.
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Chatti, Saloua. "The Semantics and Pragmatics of the Conditional in al-Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s Theories." Studia Humana 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0002.
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Abstract In this paper, I examine al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's conceptions of the conditional. I show that there are significant differences between the two frames, despite their closeness. Al-Fārābī distinguishes between an accidental conditional and two “essential” conditionals. The accidental conditional can occur only once and pragmatically involves succession. In the first “essential” conditional, the consequent follows regularly the antecedent; pragmatically it involves likeliness. The second “essential” conditional can be either complete or incomplete. Semantically the former means “if and only if”; pragmatically it means “necessarily if and only if”. The latter is expressed by ‘if, then’ and means entailment; pragmatically, it involves necessity and the inclusion of the antecedent into the consequent. As to Avicenna, he rejects explicitly al-Fārābī’s complete conditional and distinguishes between the luzūm (real implication) and what he calls ittifāq. He quantifies over situations (or times) to express the various conditionals. The two universals AC and EC are expressed by “In all situations, if…, then…”, while the two particulars IC and OC are expressed by “In some situations, if…, then..”. This gives them a modal connotation, and makes the universals close to strict implications. Pragmatically, AC presupposes the truth of the antecedent, but there is no such presupposition in EC, while what is presupposed in both IC and OC is a (possible) conjunction. Despite these differences, in both systems, the conditional is not truth functional, unlike the Stoic conditional.
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Jin, Dawei, and Jun Chen. "Meaning change in Chinese: A numeral phrase construction from adjectives to superlatives to definite descriptions." Linguistics 56, no. 3 (June 26, 2018): 599–651. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ling-2018-0009.
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Abstract This paper analyzes a hitherto unnoticed semantic change process in Chinese, in which lexical (adjectival) materials develop into superlative operators, and subsequently turn into definiteness markers. Our analysis focuses on the semantic factors that underlie this meaning change trajectory. Specifically, we argue that frequent association of gradable adjectives with superlative implication leads to pragmatic strengthening in which the superlative implication conventionally enters the literal meaning. Furthermore, we show that a further change in the extension of the nominal part of superlative phrases leads to a maximality reanalysis that is compatible with the semantics of definite NPs. This paper contributes to the burgeoning field of applying truth-conditional semantics to theories of grammaticalization.
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Sano, Katsuhiko, and Yurie Hara. "Conditional independence and biscuit conditional questions in Dynamic Semantics." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 24 (April 5, 2015): 84. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v24i0.2417.
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<p>Biscuit conditionals such as ‘If you are thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge.’ are felt different from canonical conditionals ‘If it’s raining, the fireworks will be cancelled.’ in that the consequent seems to be entailed regardless of the truth/falsity of the antecedent. Franke (2009) argues that the “feeling of the consequent entailment” in biscuit conditionals is due to the conditional independence between the antecedent and consequent; thus a uniform semantics for canonical and biscuit conditionals can be maintained. A question arises as to whether it is possible to derive the same consequent entailment in the framework of dynamic semantics.<br />Furthermore, there are some instances of biscuit conditional questions such as ‘If I get thirsty, is there anything in the fridge?’ This paper provides a dynamic and non-symmetric version of the independence condition, a d-independence condition which correctly derives the consequent entailment in both declaratives and interrogatives.</p>
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Köhler, Sebastian. "Expressivism, meaning, and all that." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3-4 (2018): 337–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1408278.
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AbstractIt has recently been suggested that meta-normative expressivism is best seen as a meta-semantic, rather than a semantic view. One strong motivation for this is that expressivism becomes, thereby, compatible with truth-conditional semantics. While this approach is promising, however, many of its details are still unexplored. One issue that still needs to be explored in particular, is what accounts of propositional contents are open to meta-semantic expressivists. This paper makes progress on this issue by developing an expressivist-friendly deflationary account of such contents.
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Weiss, Yale. "Semantics for Counterpossibles." Australasian Journal of Logic 14, no. 4 (December 12, 2017): 383. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v14i4.4050.
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The object of this paper is to examine two approaches to giving non-vacuous truth conditions for counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. I first develop modifications of a Lewis-style sphere semantics with impossible worlds. I argue that this approach sanctions intuitively invalid inferences and is supported by philosophically problematic foundations. I then develop modifications of certain ceteris paribus conditional logics with impossible worlds. Tableaux are given for each of these in an appendix and soundness and completeness results are proved. While certain of the latter systems are shown to have similar problems to logics from the first approach, at least one relatively weak system appears to offer an adequate uniform semantics for counterpossibles and counterfactuals.
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Champollion, Lucas, Ivano Ciardelli, and Linmin Zhang. "Breaking de Morgan's law in counterfactual antecedents." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26 (October 15, 2016): 304. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v26i0.3800.
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The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) switch A or switch B is down and (ii) switch A and switch B are not both up make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that (i) and (ii) differ in meaning, which implies that the meaning of a sentential clause cannot be identified with its truth conditions. We show that our data have a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: in a conditional antecedent, (i) introduces two distinct assumptions, while (ii) introduces only one. Independently of the complications stemming from disjunctive antecedents, our results also challenge analyses of counterfactuals in terms of minimal change from the actual state of affairs: we show that such analyses cannot account for our findings, regardless of what changes are considered minimal.
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Bache, Carl. "The semantics of grammatical categories: a dialectical approach." Journal of Linguistics 21, no. 1 (March 1985): 51–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022226700010021.
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In this paper I want to present a practical descriptive approach to the semantics of grammatical categories, especially of the binary type involving two forms only. In doing so, I hope to be able to attract the attention of linguists concerned with the structure of a comprehensive semantic theory of human language. Substitutional relations of a grammatical kind (as opposed to syntactic and lexical relations) are too often neglected in textbooks on modern semantics. For example, in Ruth Kempson's otherwise excellent introduction to semantic theory (Kempson, 1977), there is no mention of the semantics of grammatical categories at all. In my view, not only must such Substitutional relations be accommodated within a total theory of semantics – even on a narrow definition of the discipline – but they may provide important insights into the nature of meaning which will affect some of the current suppositions in semantic theory. In particular I shall attempt to shed light on the role of ‘subjectivity’ – a notion which is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore and which challenges the very common restriction among semanticists of the scope of semantics to just a truth-conditional component.
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van Tiel, Bob, Michael Franke, and Uli Sauerland. "Probabilistic pragmatics explains gradience and focality in natural language quantification." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 9 (February 22, 2021): e2005453118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2005453118.
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An influential view in philosophy and linguistics equates the meaning of a sentence to the conditions under which it is true. But it has been argued that this truth-conditional view is too rigid and that meaning is inherently gradient and revolves around prototypes. Neither of these abstract semantic theories makes direct predictions about quantitative aspects of language use. Hence, we compare these semantic theories empirically by applying probabilistic pragmatic models as a link function connecting linguistic meaning and language use. We consider the use of quantity words (e.g., “some,” “all”), which are fundamental to human language and thought. Data from a large-scale production study suggest that quantity words are understood via prototypes. We formulate and compare computational models based on the two views on linguistic meaning. These models also take into account cognitive factors, such as salience and numerosity representation. Statistical and empirical model comparison show that the truth-conditional model explains the production data just as well as the prototype-based model, when the semantics are complemented by a pragmatic module that encodes probabilistic reasoning about the listener’s uptake.
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Napoletano, Toby. "Why Truth-Conditional Semantics in Generative Linguistics is Still the Better Bet." Erkenntnis 82, no. 3 (August 8, 2016): 673–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9838-2.
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Leclercq, Benoît. "Semantics and pragmatics in Construction Grammar." Belgian Journal of Linguistics, Volume 34 (2020) 34 (December 31, 2020): 225–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bjl.00048.lec.
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Abstract This squib provides a theoretical discussion on the use of the terms semantics and pragmatics in Construction Grammar. In the literature, the difference between semantics and pragmatics is often conceptualized either in terms of conventionality or in terms of truth-conditionality (Huang 2014, 299). It will be shown that, even though constructionists claim that there is no semantics–pragmatics distinction, both these underlying concepts are central to the study of constructions. Therefore, the aim is twofold. First, in keeping with Cappelle (2017), it will be argued that constructionists should make more explicit the distinction between the two types of (encoded) meaning. Second, it will be shown that constructionists need to be more terminologically consistent and agree on how to use the terms semantics and pragmatics. Following Depraetere (2019), I will argue that the terms semantics and pragmatics are most explanatory when defined in truth-conditional terms. In this way, finer-grained understanding of the meaning of constructions can be achieved.
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Godlove, Terry F. "Truth, Meaning, and the Study of Religion." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 30, no. 4-5 (October 10, 2018): 357–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341428.
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Abstract This paper focuses on two contrasting approaches to the theory of linguistic meaning and asks how they color a range of issues of interest to scholars of religion. The so-called truth-conditional approach makes truth basic. It trades on the thought that we sometimes or perhaps often know what someone has said when we know what it would be for what she has said to be true. The other approach pegs meaning to how expressions and sentences are used in communicative situations. Dummett and Davidson are front and center. Davidson is of course in one sense a champion of truth-conditional semantics, but, over the issues I have in view, his case is instructively mixed. This discussion leads us toward an account of linguistic meaning which elevates over truth a family of concepts associated with use, including verification, justification, and pragmatic success.
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Sawada, Osamu. "The meanings of positive polarity minimizers in Japanese: a unified approach." Semantics and Linguistic Theory, no. 20 (April 3, 2015): 599. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v0i20.2577.
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In Japanese there are multiple lexical items for positive polarity minimizers (hereinafter, minimizer PPIs), each of which can differ in meaning/use. For example, while sukoshi ‘lit. a bit/a little’ can only express a quantitative (amount) meaning, chotto ‘lit. a bit/a little’ can express either a quantitative meaning or an ‘expressive’ meaning (i.e. attenuation in degree of the force of a speech act). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the semantics and pragmatics of the Japanese minimizer PPIs chotto and sukoshi and to consider (i) the parallelism/non-parallelism between truth conditional scalar meanings and non-truth conditional scalar meanings, and (ii) what mechanism can explain the cross-linguistic and language internal variation between minimizer PPIs. As for the semantics/pragmatics of minimizers, I will argue that although the meanings of the amount and expressive minimizers are logically and dimensionally different (non-parallelism), they can systematically be captured by positing a single lexical item (parallelism). As for the language internal and cross-linguistic variations, it will be shown that there is a point of variation with respect to whether a particular degree morpheme allows a dimensional shift (i.e. an extension from a semantic scale to a pragmatic scale). Based on the above proposals, this paper will also investigate the pragmatic motivation behind the use of minimizers in an evaluative context.
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Sawada, Osamu. "The meanings of positive polarity minimizers in Japanese: a unified approach." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 20 (August 14, 2010): 599. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v20i0.2577.
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In Japanese there are multiple lexical items for positive polarity minimizers (hereinafter, minimizer PPIs), each of which can differ in meaning/use. For example, while sukoshi ‘lit. a bit/a little’ can only express a quantitative (amount) meaning, chotto ‘lit. a bit/a little’ can express either a quantitative meaning or an ‘expressive’ meaning (i.e. attenuation in degree of the force of a speech act). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the semantics and pragmatics of the Japanese minimizer PPIs chotto and sukoshi and to consider (i) the parallelism/non-parallelism between truth conditional scalar meanings and non-truth conditional scalar meanings, and (ii) what mechanism can explain the cross-linguistic and language internal variation between minimizer PPIs. As for the semantics/pragmatics of minimizers, I will argue that although the meanings of the amount and expressive minimizers are logically and dimensionally different (non-parallelism), they can systematically be captured by positing a single lexical item (parallelism). As for the language internal and cross-linguistic variations, it will be shown that there is a point of variation with respect to whether a particular degree morpheme allows a dimensional shift (i.e. an extension from a semantic scale to a pragmatic scale). Based on the above proposals, this paper will also investigate the pragmatic motivation behind the use of minimizers in an evaluative context.
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Penner, Hans H. "Why does semantics matter to the study of religion?" Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 7, no. 2 (1995): 221–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157006895x00405.
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AbstractBeware of meaning! Meaning is not an entity. It does not refer to anything. This essay is an attempt to describe Donald Davidson's theory of semantics. It took Davidson some time to realize that his truth conditional theory of meaning entailed a radical repudiation of traditional correspondence and coherence theories of meaning. We now have a third theoretical alternative in semantics. In this theory "truth" is left undefined. It is essential that you grasp firmly the fact that truth does not refer, or, "connect-up" anything that makes a sentence true. That is the work of epistemology, or perhaps psycho-neurology. The first theoretical task, therefore, is to describe truth, or meaning, as "convention-T". The second principle, the principle of charity, provides an explanation for testing the theory. The third principle, the principle of holism, provides the theoretical framework for truth-conditions and charity. The theory provides new and powerful refutations of relativism and the notion that semantics must be reduced to the function of the brain, sensations, specific stimuli, and the like. It also provides warrants for denying that religion is "symbolic" of experience of the numinous, the sacred, or other "given" foundations of what might be described as "religious experience". Davidson's theory has important, if not radical, consequences for the study of religion. The essay briefly describes a few of these.
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Pouscoulous, Nausicaa, and Frédéric Goubier. "Virtus sermonis and the semantics-pragmatics distinction." Vivarium 49, no. 1-3 (2011): 214–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853411x590507.
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AbstractLate medieval theories of language and contemporary philosophy of language have been compared on numerous occasions. Here, we would like to compare two debates: that between the nature of Virtus sermonis, on the medieval side—focusing on a statute published in 1340 by the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris and its opponents—and, on the contemporary side, the on-going discussion on the semantics-pragmatics distinction and how the truth-value of an utterance should be established. Both the statute and Gricean pragmatics insist on the importance of taking into account the speaker’s intention and the context in establishing the signification of an utterance. Yet, upon closer examination, a more convincing parallel might be drawn between the statute’s position and current theories in truth-conditional pragmatics. Focusing on a few aspects of the statute that seem to find a counterpart within contemporary pragmatics, we try to show how the issues they give rise to converge, but also diverge.
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Godfrey-Smith, Peter. "Misinformation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 4 (December 1989): 533–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1989.10716781.
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It is well known that informational theories of representation have trouble accounting for error. Informational semantics is a family of theories attempting a naturalistic, unashamedly reductive explanation of the semantic and intentional properties of thought and language. Most simply, the informational approach explains truth-conditional content in terms of causal, nomic, or simply regular correlation between a representation and a state of affairs. The central work is Dretske (1981), and the theory was largely developed at the University of Wisconsin by Fred Dretske, Dennis Stampe, and Berent Enc. Recently, informational semantics has roamed far beyond its Wisconsin home, and built a sizeable collection of followers. Converts include Jerry Fodor (1987), Robert Stalnaker (1984) and, less faithfully, Paul and Patricia Churchland (1983) and Hartry Field (1986). But for some years informational semantics has been hounded by a problem with error – the classic presentation is Fodor (1984) – and no other problem has hounded the theory so persistently.
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Mendonça, Bruno R., and Walter A. Carnielli. "New semantics for urn logics: taming the enduring scandal of deduction." Logical Investigations 26, no. 1 (August 6, 2020): 91–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-1472-2020-26-1-91-109.
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The traditional theory of semantic information, originally proposed by [Bar-Hillel, Carnap, 1953], provides a versatile and pretty plausible conception of what kind of thing semantic information is. It embodies, however, the so-called “scandal of deduction”, a thesis according to which logical truths are informationally empty. The scandal of deduction is prob- lematic because it contradicts the fact that ordinary reasoners often do not know whether or not a given sentence is a logical truth. Hence, it is plausible to say, at least from the epistemological standpoint of those reasoners, that such logical sentences are really inform- ative. In order to improve over traditional theory, we can replace its classical metatheory by the so-called urn logics, non-standard systems of logic (described in detail below) that better describe the epistemological standpoint of ordinary reasoners. Notwithstanding, the applic- ation of such systems to the problem of semantic information faces some challenges: first, we must define truth-conditional semantics for these systems. Secondly, we need to precisely distinguish two systems of urn logic, namely, perfect and imperfect urn logics. Finally, we need to prove characterization theorems for both systems of urn logic. In this paper we offer original (and hopefully, elegant) solutions for all such problems.
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El-Zawawy, Amr M. "A syntactico-semantic approach to the translation of conditionals in two English versions of Sahih Muslim." Babel. Revue internationale de la traduction / International Journal of Translation 62, no. 3 (November 21, 2016): 423–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/babel.62.3.04zaw.
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Conditionals in English can traditionally be viewed according to two different perspectives. One is a simplistic approach based on certain ‘cases’; the other is centered on the truth value of the protasis and apodosis. This argument is based on the semantics of the conditional structures, regardless of the syntax involved. In a similar vein, the complexity of conditionals in Arabic stems from the fact that the syntax of the conditional structure does not necessarily point to the semantics involved. This affinity between the two language systems in terms of conditionality is examined within the context of two English translations of the Arabic religious text Sahih Muslim. The present study adopts an approach that focuses on both syntax and semantics to underline the interplay and/or dissociation of the two in practice. The study reveals that Siddiqui’s versions of translating ‘law’ (and its variant ‘law-la’) and ‘inn’ structures into English are mostly inaccurate, where the syntax-semantics interplay and/or dissociation is not duly observed in practice. Khattab’s versions, however, point to a tendency to start from the entrenched premise of literalism, which is stimulated by adopting the simplistic approach to English conditional structures, being akin to documentary translation where awkwardness is common practice.
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Ogleznev, Vitaly Vasil'evich. "Herbert Hart’s Theory of Definition in the Context of Analytical Legal Philosophy." Russian Journal of Legal Studies 6, no. 2 (June 15, 2019): 165–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rjls18504.
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The article presents Herbert Hart’s theory of definition in the context of modern analytical legal philosophy. Dissatisfaction with the applicability of the traditional method of definition by the genus and differentia to the elucidation of legal concepts led Hart to the development a new method of definition. It is shown that Hart not only modifies the paraphrase of Jeremy Bentham, but also tries to adapt to the analysis of legal concepts the definition in use borrowed from analytical philosophers and logicians. It has been established that the key point of Hart’s method is that instead of defining a separate term, it is necessary to consider a statement, where the utterance plays a characteristic role, and is explained by specifying the conditions under which the entire statement is true. Some difficulties that arise when one uses this definition in the framework of the truth-conditional semantics are considered. In particular, it is shown that Hart uses open sentences of the form “X has a right” in its definition, which differ from closed sentences, primarily because they contain free variables with indefinite range of values. This uncertainty does not allow us to attribute to them the truth-value. The concepts of truth and falsity apply only to statements that are expressed by closed sentences. Thus, Hart’s claim of a special semantic nature of legal concepts and a special epistemological task of definitions in jurisprudence is reflected in his theory of the truth-conditional definition - a kind of contextual definition.
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Berthelin, Signe Rix, and Kaja Borthen. "The semantics and pragmatics of Norwegian sentence-internal jo." Nordic Journal of Linguistics 42, no. 01 (May 2019): 3–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0332586519000052.
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AbstractThe paper proposes a refined analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of the Norwegian non-truth-conditional adverb jo ‘after all, of course’. According to the literature, jo indicates that the proposition is ‘given’ in some sense or other. Based on new empirical investigations, we argue that the Relevance-theoretic notion mutual manifestness (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, Blass 2000) accurately captures the givenness aspect of jo, and we demonstrate through authentic examples what it means for a proposition to be mutually manifest. In addition to mutual manifestness, jo signals that the proposition is a premise for deriving a conclusion. The conclusion often – but not always – opposes someone’s view. We argue that the frequent opposition interpretations are a consequence of the nature of the procedures encoded by jo. In addition to clarifying the semantic and pragmatic properties of jo, the paper sheds light on the Relevance-theoretic notion procedural semantics as well as illustrating its usefulness in the study of pragmatic particles.
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Marques, Teresa. "On an argument of Segal’s against singular object-dependent thoughts." Disputatio 2, no. 21 (November 1, 2006): 19–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2006-0012.
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Abstract This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.
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Harder, Peter. "Linguistic Meaning: Cognition, Interaction and the Real World." Nordic Journal of Linguistics 14, no. 2 (December 1991): 119–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0332586500002420.
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This article deals with the basic issues of the nature of linguistic meaning and the place of semantics in linguistic theory. First, there is a discussion of the implications for semantics of the research paradigm based on formal simulation, concluding that it involves a risk of misrepresenting the place of semantics in linguistics. Second, there is a discussion of the truth-conditional approach, which, although in one important respect it involves a more adequate conception of the role of semantics in language theory, is seen as misrepresenting linguistic meaning in a way that has been pointed out within the cognitive approach to semantics. Third, however, it is argued that the cognitive approach does not sufficiently account for the external anchoring of meaning. Fourth, it is argued that meaning ‘outside the head’ must be understood as basically interactive. A crucial element in the view argued here is the distinction between linguistic, potential meaning, which functions asinstructionsto the addressee, and actual meaning or ‘message’, which the addressee works out as part of the actual process of interpretation. Within such a picture, the importance of both cognition and truth can be accounted for, and both aspects are seen as dependent on the fundamental embeddedness of language in a shared social universe.
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Hanink, Emily Anne, Andrew Koontz-Garboden, and Emmanuel-moselly Makasso. "Property concepts in Basaá and the ontology of gradability across category." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 29 (December 9, 2019): 201. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v29i0.4606.
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Theories of gradability and comparison (e.g., Kamp 1975, Cresswell 1977 and many following) have been developed with data from familiar languages like English with adjectives at their core. In many languages, however, the main predicate in truth-conditionally equivalent constructions -- the property concept (PC) (cf. Dixon 1982) -- is of a different category: that of a nominal, which is predicated through possession cross-linguistically. Francez and Koontz-Garboden (2017) argue for a semantics for such nouns as mereologically and size-ordered sets of abstract portions, a treatment that keeps with their exhibition of mass noun behavior, with possessive predications and comparatives involving these nouns built on such a semantics. A semantics of this kind is not standardly assumed for adjectives and constructions built on them in familiar languages, however, raising the question whether the truth-conditional equivalence of the constructions with nouns in languages that have them and the constructions with adjectives in languages that have them should be model-theoretically represented, a position assumed by Menon and Pancheva (2014), or whether this equivalence should be captured in some other way. Based on data from modification, degree questions, subcomparatives, and equatives in Basaá (Bantu; Cameroon), we show that adjectives and the have+PC noun construction must in fact have a type-theoretically identical semantics.
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Saab, Andrés, and Eleonora Orlando. "Epítetos e insultos de grupo en español: Sobre una ambigüedad y sus implicaciones sintáctico-semánticas." Studies in Hispanic and Lusophone Linguistics 14, no. 1 (May 1, 2021): 161–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/shll-2021-2043.
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Abstract In this paper, we further elaborate on a syntactic ambiguity between slurs and epithets first noticed in Orlando, Eleonora & Andrés Saab. 2020b. A stereotype semantics for syntactically ambiguous slurs. Analytic Philosophy 61(2). 101–129. Here, we discuss in detail the large theoretical implications of such an ambiguity both for the proper analysis of binominal constructions in Spanish (e.g., el idiota de Juan) and for the way in which it is advisable to model the expressive content slurs and certain epithets (those deriving from slurs) have. As for the first aspect, we contend that mainstream approaches in terms of predicate inversion for binominal constructions cannot account for why slurs lose their predicative import when occurring as epithets in binominal environments. In consequence, we propose a new analysis for epithets both in simple occurrences and in binominal constructions. This analysis derives the above-mentioned ambiguity as a type of structural ambiguity, according to which certain slurs can occur in predicative and in non-predicative positions. When they occur as predicates, they have a mixed semantics (McCready, Eric. 2010. Varieties of conventional implicatures. Semantics & Pragmatics 3. 1–57) reflected both in the truth-conditional and the expressive dimensions, but when they occur as epithets, the truth-conditional dimension is lost and only the expressive content survives. As for the second aspect, we defend a stereotype semantics, according to which stereotypes are modeled as Kratzerian modal bases (i.e., set of propositions) in virtue of which stigmatizing theories of human groups are reflected in a parallel, expressive dimension of meaning. This way of modeling some kinds of expressive contents explains how different slurs and epithets manage to communicate different theories about particular human groups, which are the target of derogation.
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HOGEWEG, LOTTE, and AGUSTIN VICENTE. "On the nature of the lexicon: The status of rich lexical meanings." Journal of Linguistics 56, no. 4 (November 2020): 865–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022226720000316.
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Both in linguistics and in psycholinguistics there is some debate about how rich or thin lexico-semantic representations are. Traditionally, in formal semantics but also in philosophy of language as well as in cognitive pragmatics, lexical meanings have been thought to be simple stable denotations or functions. In this paper, we present and discuss a number of interpretational phenomena of which the analysis proposed in the literature makes crucial use of rich meanings. The phenomena in question are cases where the assignment of truth-conditional contents to utterances seems to follow rules that do not operate on simple stable denotations or any other kind of ‘thin’ meanings but where composition takes rich structured representations as input. We also discuss problems for such accounts, which are mostly based on the inability of extant rich meanings accounts to explain many other interpretational phenomena, and we discuss the solutions that have been proposed to solve them. Furthermore, we address the discussion whether the informationally rich meanings are part of semantics, and more specifically part of the lexicon, or whether this information should be ascribed to more general world knowledge.
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Davidson, Ronald M. "Studies indhāraṇīliterature II: Pragmatics ofdhāraṇīs." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 77, no. 1 (February 2014): 5–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0041977x13000943.
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AbstractThis article is one of a series that reassesses thedhāraṇītexts of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The article seeks to examinedhāraṇītexts by using the linguistic tools of pragmatics, especially historical pragmatics, to assist the understanding of their statements. Rather than the meaning of the termdhāraṇīas a subject term, the domain of truth-conditional semantics, this paper examines statements in texts labelleddhāraṇī. Pragmatics examines meaning in context, and the categories of speech acts developed by Searle has been especially helpful in mapping out differences within such texts and the formalization of statements across texts. The grammaticalization of specific speech elements, especially interjections, in the context ofmantra-dhāraṇīs is also discussed.
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Dugas, Edwige. "Form/meaning asymmetry in word formation." Constructions and Frames 10, no. 2 (December 31, 2018): 178–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/cf.00018.dug.
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Abstract The paper deals with the French morphological prefixation pattern [non-N] (non-qualification ‘non-qualification’, non-Italien ‘non-Italian’, and non-ville ‘non-city’). It discusses the form/meaning asymmetry displayed by this pattern and its compositionality. It is shown that the general pattern [non-N] actually corresponds to three distinct subconstructions, i.e. distinct form/meaning pairings. Although pragmatic factors may be seen as presenting a challenge to the compositionality of these constructions, it is argued that [non-N]s must be seen as compositional as long as compositionality is defined not only in terms of truth-conditional semantics, but also of pragmatics.
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Khalaily, Samir. "Syntax of the Palestinian Arabic negation-associated exclusive construction." Linguistics in the Netherlands 37 (October 27, 2020): 103–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/avt.00040.kha.
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Abstract This paper presents an analysis of a Palestinian Arabic negation-associated exclusive construction featuring the contrastive focus marker illa ‘but’, with theoretical implications for the syntax of negation, negative polarity item licensing, and the categorical status of the root in sentential syntax. It analyzes illa-phrases as constituents licensed by a c-commanding sentential negation (Neg), and illa as a grammatical device encoding contrastiveness. A crucial source for the exclusive semantics of the construction comes from a silent bass ‘only’ immediately following illa that constitutes a syntactic ‘shield’ against Neg scope. Rather than taking an in-situ focus-interpretation approach (cf. Rooth 1985, 1992), we argue for two covert movements at the syntax-semantics interface: quantifier raising of illa-phrases to the designated specifier of polarity Phrase followed by Polarity-to-Focus-raising of Neg. This creates the right syntactic configuration for the truth conditional import of both operators and captures the ‘classical’ thought that focus-sensitive exclusive operators like only quantify over propositional alternatives.
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Crisp, Peter. "Imagism's metaphors - a test case." Language and Literature: International Journal of Stylistics 5, no. 2 (May 1996): 79–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096394709600500201.
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Imagism is centered on the image metaphor, and so is a valuable resource for studying this kind of metaphor. Image metaphor raises questions for any theory that sees metaphor as something conceptual. Such theories entail the rejection of truth-conditional semantics and are thus rejected by proponents of truth conditionalism, such as Donald Davidson. Imagism embodies an extreme form of image metaphor that avoids generating any clear propositional entailments. The problem it poses for conceptual theories of metaphor is thus considerable. The solution lies in the concept of the image schema as the basis of propositional reasoning. Image metaphor can be seen as displaying the matrix out of which conceptual metaphor proper itself develops. Image metaphor shows that matrix to be bound up with the nature of aesthetic affect. It thus points the way to a view of poetry that does justice to its aesthetic passion without opposing it in some absolute way to the rationality of logic and science.