Academic literature on the topic 'Truth Default Theory'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Truth Default Theory.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Journal articles on the topic "Truth Default Theory"
1
Levine, Timothy R. "Truth-Default Theory (TDT)." Journal of Language and Social Psychology 33, no. 4 (2014): 378–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x14535916.
Full text
2
Zimmerman, Tara, Millicent Njeri, Malak Khader, and Jeff Allen. "Default to truth in information behavior: a proposed framework for understanding vulnerability to deceptive information." Information and Learning Sciences 123, no. 1/2 (2022): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ils-08-2021-0067.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose This study aims to recognize the challenge of identifying deceptive information and provides a framework for thinking about how we as humans negotiate the current media environment filled with misinformation and disinformation. Design/methodology/approach This study reviews the influence of Wilson’s (2016) General Theory of Information Behavior (IB) in the field of information science (IS) before introducing Levine’s Truth-Default Theory (TDT) as a method of deception detection. By aligning Levine’s findings with published scholarship on IB, this study illustrates the fundamental similarities between TDT and existing research in IS. Findings This study introduces a modification of Wilson’s work which incorporates truth-default, translating terms to apply this theory to the broader area of IB rather than Levine’s original face-to-face deception detection. Originality/value False information, particularly online, continues to be an increasing problem for both individuals and society, yet existing IB models cannot not account for the necessary step of determining the truth or falsehood of consumed information. It is critical to integrate this crucial decision point in this study’s IB models (e.g. Wilson’s model) to acknowledge the human tendency to default to truth and thus providing a basis for studying the twin phenomena of misinformation and disinformation from an IS perspective. Moreover, this updated model for IB contributes the Truth Default Framework for studying how people approach the daunting task of determining truth, reliability and validity in the immense number of news items, social media posts and other sources of information they encounter daily. By understanding and recognizing our human default to truth/trust, we can start to understand more about our vulnerability to misinformation and disinformation and be more prepared to guard against it.
3
Clementson, David E. "Truth Bias and Partisan Bias in Political Deception Detection." Journal of Language and Social Psychology 37, no. 4 (2017): 407–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x17744004.
Full textAbstract:
This study tests the effects of political partisanship on voters’ perception and detection of deception. Based on social identity theory, in-group members should consider their politician’s message truthful while the opposing out-group would consider the message deceptive. Truth-default theory predicts that a salient in-group would be susceptible to deception from their in-group politician. In an experiment, partisan voters in the United States ( N = 618) watched a news interview in which a politician was labeled Democratic or Republican. The politician either answered all the questions or deceptively evaded a question. Results indicated that the truth bias largely prevailed. Voters were more likely to be accurate in their detection when the politician answered and did not dodge. Truth-default theory appears robust in a political setting, as truth bias holds (as opposed to deception bias). Accuracy in detection also depends on group affiliation. In-groups are accurate when their politician answers, and inaccurate when he dodges. Out-groups are more accurate than in-groups when a politician dodges, but still exhibit truth bias.
4
Frápolli, María José. "You and Me Baby Ain't Nothing but Mammals. Subject Naturalism and Default Positions." Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica 1, no. 1 (2014): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/a.rif.20141970.
Full textAbstract:
Resumen Este artículo discute el problema de la localización, tal como Price lo ha definido. En el se distinguen diferentes versiones de naturalismo y se defiende el naturalismo del sujeto. Se asume que el sistema de conceptos humano se ha desarrollado en interacción con el medio natural y social. Por esta razón no podemos evitar ser realistas y representacionalistas por defecto. Las afirmaciones básicas del realismo, el representatcionalismo y la teoría de la verdad como correspondencia son difícilmente rechazables, y esto explica el aire de artificiosidad que acompaña a las posiciones anti-realistas. Sin embargo las posiciones por defecto no apoyan en absoluto a sus versiones filosóficamente desarrolladas. Estas son incompatibles con una visión naturalista sobre la realidad, el significado y la verdad. Palabras clave: Correspondentismo por defecto, naturalismo, naturalismo del sujeto, realismo por defecto, representacionalismo por defecto, teoría de la verdad como correspondencia, teoría prooracional de la verdad, verdad aristotélica Abstract This paper deals with Price’s placement problem. In it, different versions of naturalism are distinguished and subject naturalism is defended. It is assumed that human conceptual system has evolved as a result of humans relations with the natural and social surroundings. For this reason, we cannot but be realist and representationalist by default. The basis claims of realism, representationalism, and correspondence are hardly deniable, and this explains the artificiality scent that usually accompanies anti-realist positions. Nevertheless, the natural default positions do not lend any support to their philosophically implemented versions, metaphysical realism, semantic representationalism and full-blood correspondence. These approaches to reality, meaning and truth are incompatible with a sound naturalist stand on these issues. Keywords: Aristotelian truth, correspondence theory of truth, default realism, default representationalism, default correspondentism, naturalism, prosentential theory of truth, subject naturalism.
5
Sosa, Ernest. "Skepticism and Default Assumptions." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45 (2021): 291–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/msp2021111521.
Full textAbstract:
A telic virtue-theoretic approach to gnoseology (to the theory of knowledge) is developed. Two new concepts are introduced: the concept of default assumptions, and the concept of secure knowledge full well. A default assumption for a given domain of human performance is an assumption that agents in that domain can make with no negligence or recklessness as they perform in the domain. Knowledge full well is judgment or representation (alethic affirmation, whether judgmental or just telically, functionally representational) that attains success (truth) aptly, and whose aptness is also attained aptly. However, secure knowledge full well requires in addition that not easily might the thinker have lacked the pertinent SSS profiles that account for the aptness and full aptness of their success. The aim of the paper is to explain how those two new concepts help explain the pertinent epistemic data concerning varieties of knowledge and epistemically rational belief. These concepts enable a virtue epistemology that more fully attains that explanatory objective.
6
Marley, Carol. "Truth values and truth-commitment in interdiscursive dating ads." Language and Literature: International Journal of Stylistics 17, no. 2 (2008): 137–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963947007088224.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, I explore issues of commitment to truth in dating ads that use apparently impossible categorizations to project identities for ad writers and their desired others. The article begins with a brief overview of relevant aspects of Text World Theory (especially Gavins's work on dating ads), Sinclair's model of fictional worlds and Routledge and Chapman's account of truth-commitment in discourse, and proposes the need for a framework that allows for a partial suspension of commitment to truth. I then draw on the work of Ivanič and Weldon on identity in writing, in order to develop an account that offers a discourse- and genre-based discussion of how the intertextual metaphors in such ads are interpreted in relation to truth values. I suggest the default stance is that of positive commitment to literal truth and that, when this is not possible, a fall-back mode of negative commitment to metaphorical truth is preferred over an interpretation in which questions of truth are truly suspended. Finally, I consider a related category, of apparently negative dating ad identities, in order to suggest a functional motivation for the inclusion of elements that cannot be interpreted in truth-committed mode.
7
Timothy R. Levine. "Mysteries and Myths in Human Deception and Deception Detection: Insights from Truth-Default Theory." Ewha Journal of Social Sciences 33, no. 2 (2017): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.16935/ejss.2017.33.2.001.
Full text
8
Clementson, David E. "Why Won’t You Answer the Question? Mass-Mediated Deception Detection After Journalists’ Accusations of Politicians’ Evasion." Journal of Communication 69, no. 6 (2019): 674–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz036.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Journalists often accuse politicians of dodging questions. Truth-default theory (TDT) predicts that when journalists serve as de facto deception detectors, the audience will process the messaging through a cognitive sequence that lowers the perceived trustworthiness of the politician. Conversely, the public’s perception of the media as being generally hostile and biased in their reporting could make a journalist’s allegation of evasion enhance the politician’s credibility. We constructed political TV interviews in which a journalist falsely accused a politician of evasiveness. Consistent with serial multiple mediation as proposed by TDT, in Study 1 (N = 210 U.S. voters) a journalist’s allegation triggered suspicion, which increased perceived dodging, resulting in voters distrusting the politician. Absent a journalist’s allegation, however, people remained in their truth-default state toward the politician. Study 2 (N = 429) replicated the Study 1 results, and conditional process modeling revealed that the effect was moderated by rumination.
9
Chai, Xiao Long, Gui Wu Hu, and Ai Xiang Chen. "Semantics Integral Operator Fuzzy Logic." Applied Mechanics and Materials 263-266 (December 2012): 3382–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.263-266.3382.
Full textAbstract:
A new Operator Fuzzy logic in the theory of semantics integral has been defined. In the way of combining syntax and semantics of the formulas, this logic which named SIOFL can give an index to the truth degree of a proposition formula. It can give the quantum measure of default information with the obtained knowledge. With the character of non-monotonic, the logic system is suitable for approximate reasoning when some information is lacked.
10
Ryckman, Thomas. "What does History Matter to Philosophy of Physics?" Journal of the Philosophy of History 5, no. 3 (2011): 496–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226311x599925.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Naturalized metaphysics remains a default presupposition of much contemporary philosophy of physics. As metaphysics is supposed to be about the general structure of reality, so a naturalized metaphysics draws upon our best physical theories: Assuming the truth of such a theory, it attempts to answer the “foundational question par excellence”, “how could the world possibly be the way this theory says it is?” It is argued that attention to historical detail in the development and formulation of physical theories serves as an ever-relevant hygienic corrective to the “sentiment of rationality” underlying the naturalistic impulse to read ontology off of physics.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Truth Default Theory"
1
Clementson, David E. "Deception Detection in Politics: Partisan Processing through the Lens of Truth-Default Theory." The Ohio State University, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1492029358496203.
Full text
2
Malmgren, Daniel. "Police officers’ and police students’ beliefs about deception in the framework of the Truth-Default Theory." Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Fakulteten för hälsovetenskap, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-22085.
Full textAbstract:
The ability to detect deception is of critical value in criminal and investigative contexts. This study has investigated beliefs about deception detection held by police officers (N = 63) and police students (N = 130). The results show that there are inconsistencies when comparing the beliefs to empirical research findings. One example is the belief that liars avert their gaze. The results are discussed and contrasted with the Truth-Default Theory. Instead of a focus on cues that are probabilisticallyassociated with deception, the Truth-Default Theory focuses on contextualized communication content. The theory recognizes that people are truth biased. Truth-Default Theory proposes that reliance on cues pushes the accuracy of deception detection to the level of chance.
Books on the topic "Truth Default Theory"
1
Levine, Timothy R. Duped: Truth-Default Theory and the Social Science of Lying and Deception. University of Alabama Press, 2019.
Find full text
2
Duped: Truth-Default Theory and the Social Science of Lying and Deception. University of Alabama Press, 2019.
Find full text
3
Edwards, Douglas. Deflationism Revealed. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758693.003.0004.
Full textAbstract:
Deflationism threatens the metaphysics of truth in two ways. Firstly, by offering an austere view of truth, it is a view that, if correct, renders the majority of metaphysical issues with respect to truth obsolete. Secondly, it has inspired a certain methodological approach to the study of truth, sometimes referred to as ‘methodological deflationism’. The idea here is that, since deflationism is the most neutral and innocuous of all truth theories, it ought to enjoy the position of the ‘default’ theory of truth, with the onus being on other theories of truth to demonstrate why deflationism is wrong prior to taking up their more substantial metaphysical projects. This chapter responds to both of these threats. The main focus will be deflationism about truth itself, and to reveal the true nature and commitments of the view. Once these are exposed, methodological deflationism is addressed.
4
Jaszczolt, Kasia M. Pragmatic indexicals. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0013.
Full textAbstract:
In this chapter Kasia M. Jaszczolt offers a pragmatic, contextualist account of the meaning of devices used for first-person reference that makes use of the post-Gricean idea of top-down modification of truth-conditional content. On this view, the indexical/non-indexical distinction becomes blurred because expressions on each side of the dichotomy can have indexical as well as non-indexical functions. She demonstrates how indexicality can be ‘pragmaticized’, and how the resulting ‘functional indexicals’ can be represented in her radical contextualist theory of Default Semantics.
5
Harman, Gilbert. Toward Resolving the Liar Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0005.
Full textAbstract:
This chapter asks whether there is a notion of truth that applies to nonindexical sentences of English and, if there is, how that is to be explained. After showing that the liar paradox casts doubt on an attempt at capturing the meaning of ‘true’, the chapter proposes a novel notion that does seem to apply to nonindexical sentences of English—that of what the author calls default implication. Using this notion of default implication, the chapter recasts the initial attempt at capturing the meaning of ‘true’ and shows that this is not plagued by the consequences of the liar paradox.
Book chapters on the topic "Truth Default Theory"
1
Levine, Timothy R. "Truth-Default Theory." In Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication, 3rd ed. Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003195511-35.
Full text
2
Miedema, Frank. "Science for, in and with Society: Pragmatism by Default." In Open Science: the Very Idea. Springer Netherlands, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2115-6_4.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractTo rethink the relation between science and society and its current problems authoritative scholars in the US and Europe, but also around the globe, have since 1980 implicitly and increasingly explicitly gone back to the ideas of American pragmatism. Pragmatism as conceived by its founders Peirce, James and Dewey is known for its distinct philosophy/sociology of science and political theory. They argued that philosophy should not focus on theoretical esoteric problems with hair-splitting abstract debates of no interest to scientists because unrelated to their practice and problems in the real world. In a realistic philosophy of science, they did not accept foundationalism, dismissed the myth of given eternal principles, the unique ‘scientific method’, absolute truths or let alone a unifying theory. They saw science as a plural, thoroughly social activity that has to be directed to real world problems and subsequent interventions and action. ‘Truth’ in their sense was related to the potential and possible impact of the proposition when turned in to action. Knowledge claims were regarded per definition a product of the community of inquirers, fallible and through continuous testing in action were to be improved. Until 1950, this was the most influential intellectual movement in the USA, but with very little impact in Europe. Because of the dominance of the analytic positivistic approach to the philosophy of science, after 1950 it lost it standing. After the demise of analytical philosophy, in the 1980s of the previous century, there was a resurgence of pragmatism led by several so-called new or neo-pragmatists. Influential philosophers like Hillary Putnam and Philip Kitcher coming from the tradition of analytic philosophy have written about their gradual conversion to pragmatism, for which in the early days they were frowned upon by their esteemed colleagues. This new pragmatist movement gained traction first in the US, in particular through works of Bernstein, Toulmin, Rorty, Putnam and Hacking, but also gained influence in Europe, early on though the works of Apel, Habermas and later Latour.
3
Webb, Charlie. "Duties and Damages." In Oxford Studies in Private Law Theory: Volume I. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851356.003.0001.
Full textAbstract:
This essay looks at the relationship between primary and secondary duties. If I breach a duty I owe to you, the law’s standard response is that I must pay you damages for such losses as I thereby cause. Some have thought that we understand what duties we owe only by looking to the sanctions the law imposes in the event of “default”: if all the law will compel me to do is to pay you damages, this is the sum of my duty to you. But the truth is that the content of these sanctions tells us little to nothing about these duties; the question of how I should conduct myself in my dealings with you is simply different to the question of what action the law should take if I do not do as I should. So, just as our legal duties cannot be read off from the law’s sanctions, so we should not think that the law falls short when it fails to compel performance, or such performance as remains possible, of our duties. But while looking to the content of my duty does not tell us how the law should respond to its breach, the considerations which ground that initial duty may shed light on this question. How much light? In the final sections, I offer some reasons for doubting whether the basis of our secondary duties is always, or even commonly, to be found in the considerations which ground the relevant primary duty.
4
Brown, Nathan. "Badiou After Meillassoux: The Politics of the Problem of Induction." In Rationalist Empiricism. Fordham University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823290000.003.0010.
Full textAbstract:
Chapter 8 reads Quentin Meillassoux’s revival of the problem of induction back into the work of his mentor, Alain Badiou. I argue that Badiou’s theory of the event and of truth procedures can be understood in terms of the aporetic relation of the past to the future theorized by Hume’s famous critique of the grounds of inductive judgment. While Hume overcomes his sceptical doubts through a pragmatic theory of habit (rather than a theory of rationally or empirically grounded knowledge of cause and effect), Badiou’s theory of the subject depends upon a capacity to act within the default of habit: in situations where the genesis of habits in the past is inadequate to the construction of the future in the present. Exemplifying this approach to political action through the political sequence of Occupy Oakland (2011–2012), the chapter develops an account of the political relay between theory and practice.
5
Clarke, Michael. "Looking for Unity in a Dictionary Entry." In Liddell and Scott. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810803.003.0014.
Full textAbstract:
The lexicographer’s engagement with a word is fundamentally a search for unity: a search for the essential idea that holds together a group of things (referents, concepts, senses, etc) that may not be straightforwardly united in the modern mother tongue that provides our metalanguage and our default assumptions. This chapter approaches the problem with the help of perspectives from prototype theory, one of the richest areas in the relatively young discipline of cognitive linguistics. Typically, work in this field is presented as a contribution to the understanding of meaning as such, of the workings of the mental lexicon as an aspect of the human language faculty. The use of prototype theory here will be more limited, avoiding any claims to truth-value and treating it as a sounding-board for new possibilities in modelling and describing the behaviour of words.
6
Hong, Sun-ha. "Introduction." In Technologies of Speculation. NYU Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479860234.003.0001.
Full textAbstract:
Technologies of datafication pursue the familiar modern promise of better knowledge—and, in doing so, reshape what counts as knowledge in their own image. The fantasy of raw data, objective truth, and predictive control licenses a new array of fabrications: approximations are solidified into facts; algorithmic biases, endowed with neutrality; and uncertainties, upgraded into predictions. Big data and smart machines are technologies of speculation that are establishing new societal defaults for what counts as truth.
7
Fish, Stanley. "Don’t Let Anyone Else Do Your Job." In Save the World on Your Own Time. Oxford University Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195369021.003.0009.
Full textAbstract:
Of course, there’s no shortage of people who will step in to do your job if you default on it. The corporate world looks to the university for its workforce. Parents want the university to pick up the baton they may have dropped. Students demand that the university support the political cause of the moment. Conservatives believe that the university should refurbish and preserve the traditions of the past. Liberals and progressives would like to see those same traditions dismantled and replaced by what they take to be better ones. Alumni wonder why the athletics teams aren’t winning more. Politicians and trustees wonder why the professors aren’t teaching more. Whether it is state legislators who want a say in hiring and course content, or donors who want to tell colleges how to spend the funds they provide, or parents who are disturbed when Dick and Jane bring home books about cross-dressing and gender change, or corporations that want new departments opened and others closed, or activist faculty who urge the administration to declare a position on the war in Iraq, there is no end of interests intent on deflecting the university from its search for truth and setting it on another path. Each of these lobbies has its point, but it is not the university’s point, which is, as I have said over and over again, to produce and disseminate (through teaching and publication) academic knowledge and to train those who will take up that task in the future. But can the university defend the autonomy it claims (or should claim) from public pressures? Is that claim even coherent? Mark Taylor would say no. In a key sentence in the final chapter of his book The Moment of Complexity (2001), Taylor declares that “the university is not autonomous but is a thoroughly parasitic institution, which continually depends on the generosity of the host so many academics claim to reject.” He continues: “The critical activities of the humanities, arts, and sciences are only possible if they are supported by the very economic interests their criticism so often calls into question.”