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Alagic, Azra. "Not like my mother : truth and the author in creative nonfiction." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2009. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/26446/1/Azra_Alagic_Exegesis.pdf.
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This exegesis examines how a writer can effectively negotiate the relationship between author, character, fact and truth, in a work of Creative Nonfiction. It was found that individual truths, in a work of Creative Nonfiction, are not necessarily universal truths due to individual, cultural, historical and religious circumstances. What was also identified, through the examination of published Creative Nonfiction, is a necessity to ensure there are clear demarcation lines between authorial truth and fiction. The Creative Nonfiction works examined, which established this framework for the reader, ensured an ethical relationship between author and audience. These strategies and frameworks were then applied to my own Creative Nonfiction.
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Alagic, Azra. "Not like my mother : truth and the author in creative nonfiction." Queensland University of Technology, 2009. http://eprints.qut.edu.au/26446/.
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This exegesis examines how a writer can effectively negotiate the relationship between author, character, fact and truth, in a work of Creative Nonfiction. It was found that individual truths, in a work of Creative Nonfiction, are not necessarily universal truths due to individual, cultural, historical and religious circumstances. What was also identified, through the examination of published Creative Nonfiction, is a necessity to ensure there are clear demarcation lines between authorial truth and fiction. The Creative Nonfiction works examined, which established this framework for the reader, ensured an ethical relationship between author and audience. These strategies and frameworks were then applied to my own Creative Nonfiction.
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Carroll, Jacob. "Authors of truth writers, liars, and spies in Our man In Havana /." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/3668.
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O'Farrell, Kevin. "Joyce after Nietzsche : irony and the will to truth." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3de0686a-b70f-433c-ae20-9de7d554b08e.
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This thesis explores and evaluates the work of James Joyce using the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche. It does so not only by examining Joyce's knowledge of Nietzsche's writings, but also through demonstrating how effectively they can illuminate Joyce's themes and techniques, and aid in a general reconceptualisation of his literary project. My analysis draws on several of Nietzsche's key concepts - perspectivism, ressentiment, the will to power - and applies them to Joyce's work. The main idea I use however is the will to truth. I argue that Joyce's primary concern as an artist was the depiction of what he saw as the truth of contemporary existence, in Dublin and more generally. This aim determines his technē, the origin and form of his work of art. Various manifestations of irony, a key element of Joyce's technique, help illustrate the importance of this will to truth. This understanding of his work eliminates the false division between form and content and through an emphasis on Joyce's artistry and philosophy, rather than the historical context in which he wrote (that is, on the author rather than the man), allows for a truly critical assessment. The five chapters that follow my introduction are chronologically ordered. They examine the early works, Dubliners, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, and especially Ulysses, in considerable detail and from various angles. Though careful to respect the individuality of each, my analyses find a common thread of realism uniting the three major works of prose fiction; beginning with the French naturalism of the short stories, moving on to a new development of perspectival irony and a unique mode of allegory in his first novel, and ending in what Joyce called 'the new realism' of his epic. My study then explains how and why realism is problematised in the later chapters of Ulysses as the will to truth comes to question itself. The thesis concludes with an assessment of Finnegans Wake, considering how it marks a radical departure from Joyce's earlier practice, and why I regard it a failure.
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Rodrigues, Juliano Barreto. "A VERDADE DOS AUTOS VERSUS A VERDADE REAL NA JUSTIÇA CRIMINAL." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Goiás, 2013. http://localhost:8080/tede/handle/tede/2672.
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Previous issue date: 2013-06-28<br>This paper presents the differences between the truth of the facts and truth that remains in the written records of the criminal process after the production of evidence indicating that one is not identical to another. The fact that writing is an end refiguring contaminated by numerous interpretations of actors, a reductionist historiographic discourse that denies the acts outside the standards and ignores the complexity of a criminal act. It also studies the juridical reason, based on the topical-rhetorical and prudential judgments, showing its fragility, justifying numerous judicial errors. With a focus on disciplinary Discourse Analysis, also uses concepts and theories of Historiography, Psychology, Linguistics and Publicity to treat under new angle, already much discussed topic of the strictly legal point of view. With this diverse perspective, demonstrates the countless acting interfering in the formation of versions ranging registered in the records, emphasis how can (the interfering) distance them (the records) of the real truth. Engages primarily of justice derived from the truth that it capable of producing in the process and will be, as proof, always more or less different from the facts as exactly occurred. Proved this part, we analyze the degree of acceptance of this model by jurisdictional.<br>O texto apresenta as diferenças entre a verdade dos fatos e a verdade que resta escrita nos autos do processo criminal após a persecução penal, indicando que esta não corresponde fielmente àquela, sendo uma refiguração, contaminada por interpretações de inúmeros atores, um discurso historiográfico reducionista que nega os discursos discrepantes e a complexidade do fato criminoso. Estuda a razão jurídica, lastreada na tópica-retórica e no juízo prudencial, demonstrando sua fragilidade, justificadora de inúmeros erros judiciários. Com foco disciplinar na Análise do Discurso, coteja também conceitos e teorias da Historiografia, da Psicologia, da Linguística e da Publicidade para tratar, sob ângulo novo, tema já muito discutido do ponto de vista estritamente jurídico. Com esta óptica diversa, demonstra os incontáveis interferentes que atuam na formação das versões que vão registradas nos autos, destacando o quanto podem (os interferentes) afastá-los (os autos) da verdade real. Trata, essencialmente, da justiça obtida a partir da verdade que se consegue produzir no processo e que será, conforme comprova, sempre mais ou menos diferente dos fatos como exatamente ocorridos. Provada esta parte, é analisado o grau de aceitação deste modelo pelos jurisdicionados.
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Jesus, Maria Gorete Marques de. "\'O que está no mundo não está nos autos\': a construção da verdade jurídica nos processos criminais de tráfico de drogas." Universidade de São Paulo, 2016. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8132/tde-03112016-162557/.
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O que torna possível que narrativas policiais sobre flagrantes de tráfico de drogas sejam recepcionadas como verdade pelos operadores do direito, sobretudo juízes? Qual verdade jurídica é construída quando a testemunha consiste no próprio policial que efetuou o flagrante? Para responder a essas questões, o estudo apresenta análises dos autos e processos judiciais, de entrevistas com policiais e operadores do direito e dos registros de campo de audiências de custódia, e de instrução e julgamento acompanhadas por observação direta. A variedade de fontes de dados exigiu o uso de multimétodos, tendo como ponto central a análise de fluxo do sistema de justiça criminal. Constatou-se que a verdade policial, descrita nos autos, resulta de um processo de seleção daquilo que os policiais do flagrante vão considerar adequado tornar oficial. Para descreverem essas prisões, os policiais dispõem de expressões, linguagens e categorias, utilizadas em suas narrativas. Esse vocabulário policial justifica a abordagem e a prisão, e passa a fazer parte do campo do direito, incorporado em manifestações e decisões judiciais. Mas o que torna isto possível? Inicialmente, parecia que a questão da fé pública era a justificativa central para a acolhida da verdade policial. Contudo, descobriu-se que um repertório de crenças oferece o suporte de veracidade às narrativas policiais: a crença na função policial, acredita-se no agente por representar uma instituição do estado; crença no saber policial, acredita-se que os agentes apresentam suas técnicas, habilidades e estratégias para efetuarem as prisões; crença na conduta do policial, acredita-se que policiais atuam de acordo com a legalidade; crença de que o acusado vai mentir, acredita-se que os acusados têm o direito de mentir para se defenderem; crença de que existe uma relação entre criminalidade e perfil socioeconômico; crença de que os juízes têm o papel de defender a sociedade e a prisão representa um meio de dar visibilidade a isto. A crença é apresentada por promotores e juízes como necessária para o próprio funcionamento do sistema de justiça. A crença dispensa o conhecer, não se questiona a forma como as informações foram produzidas e adquiridas pelos policiais. Práticas de violência, tortura ou ameaça não são averiguadas. Como não consideram verdadeiras as narrativas das pessoas presas, sobretudo aquelas acusadas por tráfico de drogas, expressões como violência policial, extorsão, flagrante forjado não aparecem nas deliberações de promotores e juízes. A crença é central para o exercício do poder de prender e punir dos juízes. A verdade policial é uma verdade que vale para o direito, possui uma utilidade necessária para o funcionamento do sistema, para que os juízes exerçam seu poder de punir, sendo o elemento central para a constituição da verdade jurídica.<br>What makes it possible for police narratives about drug trafficking flagrants to be received as truth by jurists and civil servants, especially judges? What kind of legal truth is built when the witness is the officer himself who made the flagrant? In order to answer these questions, this study presents analyses of court proceedings, interviews with police officers, judges, prosecutors and defenders, field notes and direct observation of hearings of custody, instruction and judgment. The variety of data sources required the use of multimethod, with the central point the criminal justice system flow analysis. It was found that the police truth is the result of a selection process of what the police officer will consider appropriate to register and make official. In order to describe these arrests, the policemen make use of expressions, categories and language patterns to narrate their actions. This police vocabulary justifies the approach and imprisonment, and it becomes part of the law field. But what makes this possible? Initially, the issue of public faith seemed central to explain the acceptance of the police truth. However, we discovered that a repertoire of beliefs offers the support for police narratives: the belief in the police as part of the state, people believe in the policemen because he or she represents an institution of the state; belief in the police knowledge, it is believed the agents present their techniques, skills and strategies in order to make arrests; belief in the conduct of the police, it is believed that police officers work within the law; belief that the accused will lie to defend him or herself; belief that there is a relationship between crime and socio-economic profile; belief that judges have the role of defending society and the imprisonment is a way to give visibility to this. Beliefs such as these are present in the discourses of prosecutors and judges as being central to the proper functioning of the justice system. Believing dismisses knowing, there is no questioning on how the information is produced and acquired by police. Practices of violence, torture and threats are not investigated. As prosecutors and judges do not consider true the narratives of people arrested, especially those charged with drug trafficking, expressions such as police violence, extortion, forged flagrant do not appear in the deliberations of prosecutors and judges. Beliefs are central to the exercise of the power to arrest and punish of judges. The police truth is a truth that has a necessary value for the operation of the legal system. In order for judges to exercise their power to punish, a police truth is the central element for the establishment of a legal truth.
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Prado, Daniel Nicory do. "No mundo dos autos: uma teoria da narrativa judicial." Faculdade de Direito, 2018. http://repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/25031.
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DANIEL NICORY DO PRADO.pdf: 1026729 bytes, checksum: 76688c9b2086ace57e533faf769e73cc (MD5)<br>O presente trabalho teve o objetivo de discutir a constituição do universo e a definição dos critérios de verdade da narrativa judicial. Adotando como marcos teórico filosofia aristotélica e as decorrentes reflexões sobre tempo e narrativa de Paul Ricouer e sobre ação comunicativa de Jürgen Habermas, iniciou-se uma revisão das teorias da ação, de base teleológica, da filosofia, as suas consequências para a construção da teoria do fato na ciência jurídica, e a passagem da ação à narração por meio da teoria dos atos de fala. Chegando à questão da narrativa, analisaram-se, a partir de Paul Ricouer, suas principais modalidades, a narrativa histórica e a ficção, sendo que a primeira apresenta uma pretensão de correspondência, verificada pelas provas fornecidas pelo historiador, e a segunda uma pretensão de credibilidade, verificada pela coerência narrativa. À primeira vista, a narrativa judicial seria enquadrada como forma de narrativa histórica, em face da evidente relação entre verdade-correspondência e justiça. No entanto, existem vários indicadores no sistema e na prática jurídica de que nem sempre se alcança a correspondência, mesmo quando não se trata de um problema de insuficiência cognitiva, mas de proibição jurídica de acesso aos elementos disponíveis. Isto é justificado, em parte, porque o processo judicial teria outros valores a preservar além da verdade, mas poderia também ser dito o contrário, que, nesses casos, de renúncia à correspondência, outro tipo de pretensão de validade (como a correção normativa ou o consenso) prevalece sobre a busca da correspondência. Portanto, pode-se concluir que a narrativa judicial é ficcional, mas, como a correspondência não pode ser completamente abandonada, trata-se de ficção baseada em fatos reais. A estrutura da narrativa judicial é binária, dividida em história do processo, narrada no modo mimético alto, dentro da qual se revela gradualmente a história do conflito, narrada nos modos mimético baixo ou irônico, em que o desfecho da primeira é simultaneamente o da segunda. Quanto ao narrador, a pluralidade de pontos de vista narrativos é a principal característica, e decorre do próprio sistema (princípio do contraditório) destinando-se a gerar uma incerteza provisória quanto à verdade, a ser superada com a decisão definitiva. O reconhecimento de que cada processo judicial é um pequeno universo ficcional tem por consequência a adoção da coerência, e não da correspondência, como critério de verdPoade. Por ser ficção baseada em fatos reais, a correspondência não é completamente abandonada, já que a coerência pode ser enganosa. A coerência externa pode gerar equívocos quando remete a uma narrativa familiar, no âmbito da tradição, mas que não reflete corretamente o caso em discussão; a coerência interna pode gerar equívocos quando há falso consenso entre as partes, ou não oposição deliberada de uma delas; quando uma narrativa é coerente por um critério e incoerente por outro, a correção do equívoco deve partir da verificação desta divergência até a decisão por um dos critérios; se uma narrativa é duplamente coerente, mas falsa, ou duplamente incoerente, mas verdadeira, os recursos narrativos disponíveis são insuficientes para a correção do problema.<br>This work intended to discuss how the universe of judicial narrative is constructed and which are its criteria of truth. Adopting Aristotle’s philosophy, and its further developments of the relations between time and narrative, by Paul Ricouer, and of communicative action, by Jürgen Habermas, as the main theoretical framework, it starts reviewing the teleological concept of action, its many philosophical theories, their consequences to the construction of fact as a legal concept, and then its further passage to the narrative theory using the theory of speech acts as a theoretical transition. Regarding narrative theory, Paul Ricouer’s work was used to distinguish the main narrative forms (historical and fictional), according to whom the first has a correspondence claim, verified by the evidence provided by the historian, while the second has a credibility claim, verified by its narrative coherence. At first, it seems evident that judicial narrative should be a form of historical narrative, because of the undeniable relationship between truth (as correspondence) and justice. Despite that, there are many indications, in legal practice, that correspondence is not always reached, not only because of a cognitive defect, but also because of a legal prohibition to access and evaluate the available data. It is justified, in part, by the thought that the Judicial System has other goals, besides truth-finding, but that can be phrased in a different way: when it is a case of abandonment of correspondence, other types of validity-claims (like normative correction or consensus) prevail over its search. So, it can be said that judicial narrative is fictional, but, since correspondence can’t be completely abandoned, it is fiction based on true facts. Judicial narrative’s structure is binary, divided in the trial story, told in the high mimetic mode, in which the conflict story, told in the low mimetic or the ironic mode, is gradually revealed, and the ending of the first is also the ending of the second. Regarding the narrators, the plurality of points of view is the most important aspect, which is a consequence of the system itself and destined to generate a provisional uncertainty about the truth, that the final decision will overcome. Recognizing each case file as a fictional universe means that coherence, and not correspondence, has to be adopted as the criterion of truth. On the other hand, since it is a true facts based fiction, correspondence can’t be completely abandoned, because coherence can be misleading. External coherence can be misleading when it evokes a familiar narrative, ingrained in the tradition, but that doesn’t reflect correctly the particular case. Internal coherence can be misleading when there is a false consensus between the parties, or a false confession by one of them; when a narrative is coherent by one measure and incoherent by another, the correction can come from a verification of this divergence and a decision for one of the criteria, but if a narrative is doubly coherent, but false, or doubly incoherent, but true, the narrative resources are insufficient to correct the problem.
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Huguley, Piper Gian. "Why Tell the Truth When a Lie Will Do?: Re-Creations and Resistance in the Self-Authored Life Writing of Five American Women Fiction Writers." unrestricted, 2006. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04252006-174728/.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006.<br>Title from title screen. Audrey Goodman, committee chair; Thomas L. McHaney, Elizabeth West, committee members. Electronic text (253 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed May15, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (243-253).
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Trebaul, Dewi. "Sens, référence, idéographie : études sur et autour de Frege." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015AIXM3115.
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Notre travail de thèse aborde la question suivante : quel est le thème de l'idéographie frégéenne ? Nous y répondons en questionnant l'emploi de la terminologie modèle-théorique ordinairement employée. Notre méthode consiste en un examen détaillé des Grundgesetze, ainsi qu'en une approche comparative avec les œuvres de deux objecteurs contemporains de Frege, le Tractatus-logico philosophicus de Wittgenstein et les Fondements de la géométrie de Hilbert. Pour déterminer ce dont traite l'idéographie, il faut envisager la manière dont sont rendues signifiantes les expressions qu'elle contient. En vue de répondre à cette question, un examen du statut des notions de sens et de référence est accompli, au niveau épistémique, correspondant à la compréhension par un locuteur, ainsi qu'au niveau théorique, concernant leur place précise dans le compte-rendu des démonstrations en langage idéographique. Les notions de sens et de référence sont expliquées par des éclaircissements : leur introduction est déjà leur mise en œuvre. Nous privilégions une lecture interne de ces notions. Au centre de notre travail se trouve le défi formaliste : peut-on conjuguer l'idéal d'une corrélation bi-univoque entre signes et sens et l'exigence d'une pluralité de signes de même sens, nécessaire aux définitions ? Nous montrons que la distinction entre sens et référence conserve un rôle opératoire dans l'idéographie, qu'elle illustre la fécondité démonstrative du système, ce qui a peu été souligné jusqu'à présent dans les études frégéennes. Ainsi il est possible de défendre Frege face à ce défi en soutenant que la diversité des sens, même corrélée à la diversité des signes, ne lui est pas réductible<br>Our doctoral thesis addresses the following question : what is the theme of the fregean conceptual script? We answer it in questioning the model-theoretical framework currently used. Our method consists in a close study of the fregean texts, especially the Grundgesetze, and in a comparative approach with the works of two contemporary critics of Frege, the Tractatus logico-philosophicus by Wittgenstein and the Foundations of geometry by Hilbert. To determine what the fregean conceptual script is about, we have to consider how the expressions it contains are made significant. For that purpose, a close examination of the notions of sense and reference is carried out, at the epistemic level, that corresponds to the understanding by a speaker, and at the theoretic level, that concerns the role it plays in the account of proofs in the conceptual script. Frege explains the notions of sense and reference through elucidations: their introduction is already part of their use. We favour an internal reading of these notions.Crucial in our work is what we reconstruct as a formalist challenge addressed to Frege: is it possible to combine the ideal of a one-one correlation between signs and senses with the demand of a plurality of signs with the same sense, necessary for the purpose of definitions? We show that the distinction between sense and reference retains an operative role in the conceptual script, that it highlights the fecundity of the system, which has seldom been underlined in the fregean studies. Thus we argue that Frege can face that formalist challenge, because the plurality of senses, even when it is correlated with the plurality of signs, cannot be reduced to it
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Soulard, Tossah Christine. "De l'individuation à la philosophie politique : autour de Jan Patočka." Thesis, Sorbonne université, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SORUL038.
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Autour de la genèse de l’histoire tchèque, un grand moment de philosophie politique est advenu durant la première moitié du XX° siècle : un État tchécoslovaque peut affirmer son existence, et cela est l’aboutissement d’une confrontation sans concession avec un destin indéfiniment tourmenté, celui d’une longue marche pour s’émanciper de la tutelle de l’Empire austro-hongrois ; persécutions religieuses suivies d’une guerre de trente ans et enfin une expérience intime de l’exil, qui est une brisure de son être. Enfin, le XIX° siècle a ouvert des négociations pour obtenir un statut respectueux des Tchèques avec le parlement autrichien.Cette ouverture a été acquise par un peuple toujours sur la brèche selon Hannah Arendt. La philosophe tchèque lui donne le nom de crise ou Krisis. Il s’éprouve dans son être comme un rapport d’être, scission en son être qui est toujours un questionnement sur soi et sur le monde et aspiration à la perfection et au soin de l’âme. C’est une expérience à haut risque du regard sur la vérité du monde pour l’énonciation d’un sens et d’un jugement, Jan Patocka retrouve là « la solidarité des ébranlés » pour une « vie dans la vérité ». Nous regarderons d’abord et principalement les grandes figures de pensée qui ont fait l’avènement de L’État tchécoslovaque ; ce sont leurs philosophes qui sollicitent sans fin cette pulsion de vie expérience de sa révolte, et principalement Jan Patocka. Ils débordent le convenu, bouscule l’ordre figé pour dévoiler un instant de vérité pour une donation de sens. Ensuite, nous verrons comment les philosophes rois de ce pays, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk et Vaclav Havel sont des guides précieux pour le peuple tchèque en ces années de plomb. Leurs maîtres de philosophie ne sont jamais très loin<br>With the genesis of the Czech history, during the first half of the twentieth century, a great moment of political philosophy is born: a Czechoslovakian State can declare its existence as a result of an uncompromising conflict with an extremely tormented lot. The long walk to emancipation from the Austro-Hungarian empire and the religious persecutions were followed by a thirty-year-long war and eventually ended in a private experience of exile resulting in personal breakdown. Finally, negotiations with the Austrian parliament started in the ninetieth century so the Czech could gain a status of respect. This awareness was gained by a people constantly on the move according to Hannah Arendt. The Czech philosopher called it crisis or Krisis. It can be felt within your own being, just like a [relationship of being], a scission within your being always questioning about one self and the world as well as searching for perfection and spiritual well-being. Considering the truth of the world in order to outline a meaning and a judgment is a high-risk experience. Jan Patocka traces there "the solidarity of the shaken" for a "life in truth".We will first look into the main eminent thinkers that have made the Czechoslovakian State come to life, thanks to its philosophers, mainly Jan Patocka, who after a life of protests, endlessly felt an urge for existence. They trespassed the rules, disrupted the rigid order to unveil a moment of truth and give it a meaning. We will then see how philosopher-kings of this country, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Vaclav Havel became precious guides to the Czech people during the country’s dark years. Their philosophy mentors are never too far
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Whyte, Jamie Thomas. "Truth." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.359698.
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Shimizu, Yudai. "La technique et l'Être chez Michel Foucault." Thesis, Lille 3, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019LIL3H013.
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Ce travail a pour but d’éclairer comment Foucault a élaboré sa critique de l’homme comme figure centrale du savoir moderne : problématique qu’il a reprise à la ligne de pensée antihumaniste qui s’est répandue dans la France d’après-guerre. Pour ce faire, il a tenté de concevoir une nouvelle forme de savoir qui n’est réductible au savoir moderne centré sur l’homme comme doublet empirico-transcendantal. Quel est alors sa conception de ce nouveau savoir à venir ? Dans notre thèse, nous tâcherons de montrer que ce nouveau savoir consiste dans le « jeu de la technique ». Alors que ces deux notions n’ont pas forcément l’objet des recherches précédentes ni encore des textes du philosophe lui-même, la réflexion autour de ces notions peut se repérer, selon nous, de ses premiers ouvrages jusqu’au ses derniers cours au Collège de France en passant par ses livres dédiés à la « technologie politique du corps ». À travers nos recherches, nous préciserons une part que, chez Foucault, la technique consiste dans la production impersonnelle des formes dans la positivité du langage et du corps ; de ce point de vue, n’étant plus basée sur le sujet ni l’objet, la technique donne lieu plutôt à diverses fonctions du sujet et de l’objet. Nous défendrons d’autre part que, pour Foucault, l’être est considéré comme jeu de vérités ou la stratégie de la vérité, qui se déroule dans la dimension du positif plutôt que d’être situé dans l’ordre du fondamental. À travers l’analyse de tous ses ouvrages et certains de ses cours au Collège de France, notre thèse a pour objectif de démontrer que c’est à l’appui de sa réflexion sur ce « jeu de la technique » que Foucault a pu développer ses études critiques vis-à-vis de l’homme. Pour ce faire, notre thèse avancera en cinq étapes : 1. expliquer comment Foucault a esquissé l’apparition de l’homme au seuil de l’âge moderne ; 2. expliciter sa propre notion de ce nouveau savoir à l’appui de son analyse des techniques du langage ; 3. mettre en relief le rapport entre la positivité de la technique et la stratégie de la vérité qui lui impose un ordre, voire une certaine technologie de sujet et d’objet ; 4. élucider le rapport entre la technologie de soi et le rapport à soi ; 5. rendre compte de la problématisation qui, prenant pour cible privilégié la parrêsia, sert à critiquer le jeu actuel de vérité où la subjectivité et l’objectivité s’articulent d’une manière contingente et, de ce fait, transformable<br>This work is aimed at clearing how Foucault elaborated his critique of the man as central figure in the modern episteme: problem which he had taken from the anti-humanist thinking widely spread in the France after the World War II. In doing so, the philosopher invented a new form of knowledge that couldn’t be reduced to the modern knowledge centered on the man as a “doublet empirico-transcendantal”. Then, what is it that this new form of knowledge? In our thesis, we try to show that, for Foucault, this new knowledge consisted of the ‘play of technic (jeu de la technique)’. Though the two concepts – play and technic – aren’t subject of previous research, nor of the philosopher’s own texts, the thought on them can be found, according to us, from his first work to his last Cours au Collège de France, inculding his work on the power and the ‘political technology of the body’. Through our research, we clarify, on the one hand, that the technic in a foucauldian sens means the ‘impersonal production of forms in the positivity of language and body’; from this point of view, it isn’t based neither on the subject nor object, but it does produce various forms of subject and object. On the other hand, we defend that the concept of ‘Being (Être)’ is considered by him as a ‘play of truth’ or the ‘strategy of truth’ which take place in the order of the ‘positive’, not in that of the ‘fundamental’. Throughout our analysis of all his works – from beginning to end –, the purpose of our thesis is to demonstrate that it is on the basis of his reflection upon this play of technics that he was able to develop his critique of the modern episteme as well as the man. To do so, our thesis will advance in the following five steps: 1. to explain how Foucault described the appearance of the man at the threshold of modern age; 2. to define his concept of knowledge in the support of his early texts on the play of language ; 3. to show the relation between positivity of the technic and strategy of the truth in the light of his works on the power and the political technology of body ; 4. to clarify the connection between the technic of the self (technique de soi) and the technology of the self (technologie de soi); 5. to explain the problematization which, in discussing the notion of ‘parehsia’
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Grgorinic, Natalija. "Recounting the Author." Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1333512288.
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Bogdanovska, Jasna. "Dossier : truth /." Online version of thesis, 2007. https://ritdml.rit.edu/dspace/handle/1850/3845.
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Yu, Andy. "Fragmented truth." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e7dfbf9c-c608-4c8c-8d7c-ee81579f4825.
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This thesis comprises three main chapters-each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate 'true' either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic and semantics that shows how they can answer central conceptual and logical challenges for their view. In Chapter 2, I motivate and develop a modal account of propositions on the basis of an iterative conception of propositions, where the modality is logico-mathematical. The modal account of propositions takes the conception to motivate an inherently potential hierarchy of propositions. I show that the account helps provide satisfying solutions to the intensional paradoxes of Russell-Myhill, Kaplan, and Prior. In Chapter 3, I propose that 'true' is polysemous. I suggest that 'true' is initially polysemous between correspondence truth and disquotational truth, and further polysemous between the meanings corresponding to the subconcepts of the concept truth generated by the indefinite extensibility of that concept. I show that the proposal provides satisfying solutions to the semantic paradoxes.
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Jovanelli, Megan London. "Truth Letters." Fogler Library, University of Maine, 2006. http://www.library.umaine.edu/theses/pdf/JovanelliML2006.pdf.
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Christensen, Ryan. "Minimal truth /." May be available electronically:, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU1MTUmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=12498.
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Smit, Johannes Petrus. "The truth about value and the value of truth." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/53692.
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Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis an attempt is made to sketch the outlines of a cognitive theory of ethics,
i.e. a theory in which ethical statements are a subset of descriptive statements. It is
argued that the good is a quale, and that this quale roughly corresponds to what is
often referred to as "pleasure". If this conceptualisation of the good is correct, then the
resulting ethical theory is a cognitive, egoist version of ethical hedonism. The thesis
proceeds by relating this conceptualisation of the good to economic phenomena. An
investigation is then made of the conditions under which the following of a boundedly
rational rule is preferable to calculating which one of the possible options available to
the actor to follow. It is argued that one such rule is that "truth" should serve as a
norm of inquiry. Next the issue of "altruism" is considered. It is argued that our
intuitions regarding what egoist action should be are radically untrustworthy.
Considerations from evolutionary biology and game theory make it clear that an
egoist actor might well be best advised to perform a number of actions that would
normally be termed altruistic. The next topic concerns the relation between fact and
value. Arguments that claim to undermine the distinction between fact and value are
argued to be fallacious. It is also argued that the correct view of the relation between
fact and value can help to clarify some of the problems surrounding the
conceptualisation of "objectivity". The thesis ends by considering the gains that arise
from adopting the position argued for.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word 'n poging aangewend om 'n kognitiwe teorie van etiek, m.a.w 'n
teorie waarbinne etiese stellings 'n subspesie van deskriptiewe stellings is, daar te stel.
Daar word geargumenteer dar "die goeie" 'n quale is, en dat hierdie quale rofweg
dieselfde objek is as wat dikwels na verwys word as plesier. Indien hierdie siening
van "die goeie" korrek is, dan impliseer dit die moontlikheid van 'n kognitiewe,
egoïstiese weergawe van etiese hedonisme. Die tesis poog eerstens om die verhouding
tussen hierdie siening van "die goeie" en ekonomise fenomene te verduidelik. Daarna
word ondersoek ingestel na die kondisies waaronder die volg van 'n begrensde
rasionele reël 'n beter opsie vir 'n akteur is as om an al die moontlike opsies te kyk en
die beste te kies. Daar word geargumenteer dat die idee dat die "waarheid" die doel
van ondersoek moet wees een so 'n reël is. Volgende word daar gekyk na die kwessie
van altruïsme. Daar word geargumenteer dat ons intuïsies insake die aard van
egoïstiese optrede radikaalonbetroubaar is. Sekere kwessies in evolusionêre biologie
en spelteorie laat dit blyk dat 'n egoïstiese akteur waarskynlik verskeie oënskynlik
"altruïstiese" aksies behoort uit te voer. Die volgende kwessie wat bespreek word is
die verhouding tussen feite en waardes. Daar word geargumenteer dat pogings om
hierdie onderskeid te ondermyn nie suksesvol is nie. Daar word verder geargumenteer
dat die korrekte siening insake hierdie verhouding sekere probleme insake die
verstaan van "obkjektiwiteit" kan ophelder. Die tesis eindig deur die voordele wat uit
spruit uit die aanvaarding van die posisie wat hier voor geargumenteer word.<br>National research Foundation (NRF)
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Gwilliam, Janet Elizabeth. "The truth, whole truth, and nothing but the truth, censorship, sexuality, and the politics of expertise." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/MQ59379.pdf.
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Kennedy, Niall. "Deleuze and the author." Thesis, Kingston University, 2016. http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/38644/.
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This thesis argues that Gilles Deleuze, as philosopher, reader, and critic, recognised the central importance of a defined authorial subjectivity, closely associated with a philosophical or intellectual project, and that his analyses of philosophy, literature, visual art and cinema were shaped and determined by his recognition of that authority. In this respect, my reading challenges those critics who find in the work of Deleuze an assault on ‘author-centric’ interpretations of texts, and more generally on the concept of a unified self, and which uphold experimentation on the part of the reader or critic rather than interpretation. I argue that Deleuze has a coherent and meaningful conception of an author as a consciousness which persists through time, learns, plans and makes projects, differentiates itself from the work of other authors, is inspired and creative, takes positions in relation to the inheritance of artistic and philosophical traditions, and which is capable of entering into collaboration with others. Through close reading of Deleuze’s texts, I demonstrate that he consistently relies on the authorial function to impose unity and coherence on the distinctive - and often remarkable - body of work of an individual theorist or practitioner. I argue that the historical, political and social situation of an author is of great importance to the analysis of a text. Finally, unlike Roland Barthes or other critics invested in the ‘death’ or displacement of the author, I argue that Deleuze considers the competing interpretations of a text advanced by the reader or spectator to be of little or no importance.
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Bullman, Lee. "Nothing but the truth? : truth, true-crime, genre and 'Blowback'." Thesis, University of Huddersfield, 2016. http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/34159/.
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Blowback, my biography of the international drug smuggler Michael Forwell, has, since its publication, been marketed within two commercially and culturally recognised categories, namely true crime and biography. In a commercial sense these titles act as signifiers of content, communicating in broad strokes what the reader can expect from the work, where it might lie within their own view of the cultural landscape and therefore whether or not they find engagement with the work appealing. In a practical sense (i.e. from the point of view of the practitioner, the writer), these categorisations bring with them expectations of both form and content, which influence the work produced within that category to varying degrees, either by their inclusion or their absence. I intend to look at these generic and cultural expectations in relation to my own book Blowback, as well as true crime’s most consistently popular, influential and lauded texts, Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood and Vincent Bugliosi and Curt Gentry’s Helter Skelter, in order to examine the extent to which these expectations shape the work. I will also engage with the work of relevant theorists, including Christian Metz, Steve Neale and Mark Seltzer. I also intend to provide context for both my own creative practice prior to writing Blowback and the extent to which the fiction I wrote went on to influence the ‘true’ crime described within the book. Any study of true crime must wrestle with the genre’s relationship with truth, a relationship I will contextualise via a history of the genre which examines its long, complex and symbiotic relationship with fiction. The true crime shelves are where we store our monsters, and I aim to investigate how those monsters’ brushes with true crime (and with fiction) alter our relationship with them. Interesting notions of truth exist within the study of biography too, and I will look at these where they apply to my portrayal of Michael and his world and where I, the writer of somebody else’s story, might be located within that world.
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Parker, Sara Lynn. "Seeking truth the development of an international truth commission norm /." Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file, 309 p, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1662993371&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=8331&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Delaware, 2008.<br>Principal faculty advisors: Julio F. Carrión and Matthew Hoffmann, Dept. of Political Science & International Relations. Includes bibliographical references.
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Franzén, Torkel. "Provability and truth." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 1987. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-81520.
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Hughes, Judith University of Ballarat. "Thread of truth." University of Ballarat, 2005. http://archimedes.ballarat.edu.au:8080/vital/access/HandleResolver/1959.17/12766.
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"It is thought that phobias are caused by a fear of the unknown and can be overcome by self-help learning resulting in better understanding. Observation and scientific investigation have been used to create a body of artwork for the purpose of helping to desensitize people who suffer from arachnophobia. Field trip collections, photography, printmaking and installations have been used to capture, explore and create visual artworks that have been designed to highlight fact-based features of spiders and their webs."<br>Master of Arts (Visual Arts)
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Wright, Cory D. "Truth and cognition." Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2007. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3259624.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2007.<br>Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 21, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 273-290).
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Schindler, Thomas. "Type-free truth." Diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2015. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-183351.
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This book is a contribution to the flourishing field of formal and philosophical work on truth and the semantic paradoxes. Our aim is to present several theories of truth, to investigate some of their model-theoretic, recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and to evaluate their philosophical significance.
In Part I we first outline some motivations for studying formal theories of truth, fix some terminology, provide some background on Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth, and then discuss the prospects of classical type-free truth. In Chapter 4 we discuss some minimal adequacy conditions on a satisfactory theory of truth based on the function that the truth predicate is intended to fulfil on the deflationist account. We cast doubt on the adequacy of some non-classical theories of truth and argue in favor of classical theories of truth.
Part II is devoted to grounded truth. In chapter 5 we introduce a game-theoretic semantics for Kripke’s theory of truth. Strategies in these games can be interpreted as reference-graphs (or dependency-graphs) of the sentences in question. Using that framework, we give a graph-theoretic analysis of the Kripke-paradoxical sentences. In chapter 6 we provide simultaneous axiomatizations of groundedness and truth, and analyze the proof-theoretic strength of the resulting theories. These range from conservative extensions of Peano arithmetic to theories that have the full strength of the impredicative system ID1.
Part III investigates the relationship between truth and set-theoretic comprehen- sion. In chapter 7 we canonically associate extensions of the truth predicate with Henkin-models of second-order arithmetic. This relationship will be employed to determine the recursion-theoretic complexity of several theories of grounded truth and to show the consistency of the latter with principles of generalized induction. In chapter 8 it is shown that the sets definable over the standard model of the Tarskian hierarchy are exactly the hyperarithmetical sets. Finally, we try to apply a certain solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes to the case of truth, namely Quine’s idea of stratification. This will yield classical disquotational theories that interpret full second-order arithmetic without set parameters, Z2- (chapter 9). We also indicate a method to recover the parameters.
An appendix provides some background on ordinal notations, recursion theory and graph theory.
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Virdi, Arhat Singh. "What is truth?" Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2010. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/252/.
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I defend the correspondence theory of truth, according to which a statement’s truth consists in a relation of correspondence with extralinguistic fact. There are well-known objections to this view, which I consider and rebut, and also important rival accounts, principal among which are so-called deflationist theories and epistemic theories. Epistemic theories relate the concept of truth to our state of knowledge, but fail, I argue, to respect the crucial distinction between a criterion of truth and the meaning of truth: the view that one cannot do semantics, or metaphysics, without addressing epistemic issues is rejected by this work. Against epistemic theories, I illustrate how truth is independent of epistemic considerations. Deflationism is the more popular of the rival accounts and has gained considerable momentum over the past two decades. It is therefore dealt with in greater detail by this work. Deflationist theories exploit the paradigmatic ‘“Snow is white” is true iff snow is white’ biconditional to argue for an insubstantialist account, according to which truth is conservative with respect to non-semantical facts. On this view, truth’s raison d’être is merely to perform the useful expressive function of generalising over possibly infinite sets of assertions. Against deflationist theories, I claim that the work done by Jeffrey Ketland and Stewart Shapiro conclusively demonstrates how truth is informationally additive over non-semantic facts, while deflationism itself is also an excessively impoverishing theory, inadequate to the tasks it purports to accomplish. This work also defends the thesis that Alfred Tarski’s well-known theory of truth is an authentic correspondence theory. To say this is to say that the clauses of a Tarskian truth-definition can be interpreted in terms of a relation of correspondence that holds between true sentences and the states of affairs they describe. I provide a precise account of what the correspondence in question consists in, claiming that true sentences are homomorphic images of facts, i.e. a true sentence represents, in a form-preserving manner, the truth-making facts in it. This gives precise expression to Wittgenstein’s thesis that true sentences picture the world.
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Nickel, Bernhard Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Truth in explanation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33711.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2005.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-163).<br>My thesis consists of three papers on truth and explanations in science. Broadly, the question I ask is semantic. Should the best account of certain bits of our scientific practice focus on the concept of truth? More specifically, should the crucial distinctions between good and bad aspects of that practice be drawn in terms of truth? My thesis consists of three case studies: ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences, appeals to idealizations in the application of theories, and the analysis of explanations quite generally, exemplified in the asymmetry of explanation. In each case, prominent philosophers have argued that a proper treatment does not focus on truth. In each case, I argue that truth should play a central role. And in each case, the issue turns, at least in part, on the connection between the scientific practice in question and explanations.<br>by Bernhard Nickel.<br>Ph.D.
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Martin, Gwen A. ""Thinking the truth"." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1990. http://www.tren.com.
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Braun, Faye J. "Truth in menu." Online version, 1999. http://www.uwstout.edu/lib/thesis/1999/1999braunf.pdf.
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Kelly, Jeremy J. "Truth and judgment." [Tampa, Fla] : University of South Florida, 2009. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0002956.
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Underwood, Lori J. "Kant on truth /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p9951130.
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Hughes, Judith. "Thread of truth." Thesis, University of Ballarat, 2005. http://researchonline.federation.edu.au/vital/access/HandleResolver/1959.17/65780.
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"It is thought that phobias are caused by a fear of the unknown and can be overcome by self-help learning resulting in better understanding. Observation and scientific investigation have been used to create a body of artwork for the purpose of helping to desensitize people who suffer from arachnophobia. Field trip collections, photography, printmaking and installations have been used to capture, explore and create visual artworks that have been designed to highlight fact-based features of spiders and their webs."<br>Master of Arts (Visual Arts)
34
Hughes, Judith. "Thread of truth." University of Ballarat, 2005. http://archimedes.ballarat.edu.au:8080/vital/access/HandleResolver/1959.17/14601.
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"It is thought that phobias are caused by a fear of the unknown and can be overcome by self-help learning resulting in better understanding. Observation and scientific investigation have been used to create a body of artwork for the purpose of helping to desensitize people who suffer from arachnophobia. Field trip collections, photography, printmaking and installations have been used to capture, explore and create visual artworks that have been designed to highlight fact-based features of spiders and their webs."<br>Master of Arts (Visual Arts)
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Vice, President Research Office of the. "A Convenient Truth." Office of the Vice President Research, The University of British Columbia, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/9512.
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Lee, Siyeon. "The author on the stage : Fielding's self-awareness as author and problems of authority." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20627.
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This thesis advances a new perspective on Henry Fielding's self-awareness as author, as it appears in his writings of various genres from <I>The Author's Farce </I>to <I>The Covent-Garden Journal. </I>The principal argument is that Fielding's problematic self-awareness as author and idea of literary authority evolved through a series of ambivalent relationships with literary and political authorities of his age. At each stage of his career, Fielding found himself in tensioned relations to the Scriblerians, particularly Pope 'the great Poet', Robert Walpole 'the Great Man', and the great or 'High People' at large, including his own patrons. The 'Trade of Authoring' seemed at best a dubious alternative to attain financial (and moral) independence, and Fielding considered himself denied the aesthetic and moral authority to write serious satire by public readership, the new patrons of commercialised letters. Instead of the Fielding we are familiar with, that is, the authoritative Augustan satirist and master of comic fiction, Fielding as appears in the present thesis is essentially 'an author of a farce', by his own self-demeaning denomination, who sees in himself a 'humble servant' to either the great patrons or the paying audience, with only some Drawcansirian mock-authority at best. Chapter I offers analyses of <I>The Author's Farce, </I>a dramatisation of Fielding the novice playwright's ambivalence towards the great in letters and politics, and of his anti-Walpole plays in 1736-37, each in the format of a rehearsal by the 'Author', through whom Fielding converts his self-awareness as author without authority into an opposition formula to veto Walpole's political authority. Chapter II continues to discuss Fielding's peculiar infusion of his authorial concern into the anti-Walpole satire in <I>The Champion </I>and <I>Jonathan Wild. </I>
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SA, MANZALI DE. "FROM TRUTH AS EXISTENCIAL DISCLOSURE TO THE POETIC HAPPENING OF TRUTH." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2010. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=16886@1.
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COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR<br>Na sua conferência A origem da obra de Arte, de 1936, Martin Heidegger
leva a discussão sobre a arte, até então restrita ao domínio da estética, para o
campo ontológico, na sua definição da obra de arte como o pôr-se-em-obra da
verdade. Nesta dissertação intento esclarecer esta peculiar expressão, tomando
como fio condutor as mudanças do sentido de verdade que acompanharam o
motivo central na filosofia de Heidegger, a questão do ser, desde Ser e tempo até o
seu encontro com a arte nesta conferência. Heidegger, em seu empenho contra a
entranhada tradição da verdade como verdade eterna, noção esta que mostrou ser
comandada pela lógica da adequação, parte da noção de verdade histórica por ele
definida nos anos 1930, para chegar ao mais original sentido da verdade de
ocultamento e desvelamento da alétheia, que, ao se essencializar, acontece
poeticamente na obra de arte, instaurando a verdade de um novo ser ao abrir
horizontes históricos-destinais. Mostrarei por fim, como a techné, neste momento
compreendida por Heidegger como original [ursprünglich], é por ele então
pensada na abertura instaurada pela obra de arte associadamente à essencialização
da técnica moderna em seu desabrigar dos entes como recurso disponível de uma
vigência estabilizada.<br>In his conference The Origin of the Work of Art, of 1936, Martin
Heidegger takes the discussion about art, then restricted to the domain of the
aesthetics, to the ontological field, when defining the work of art as the settingitself-
to-work of the truth. In this dissertation I aim to clarify this peculiar
expression, taking as a thread changes in the meaning of truth that followed the
central motif in the philosophy of Heidegger, the question of being, since Being
and Time until his encounter with art in this conference. Heidegger, in his
persistence against the ingrained tradition of truth as perpetual truth, notion
pointed by him as being commanded by a logic of adequacy, takes the notion of
historical truth defined by him in the1930s, to find the most original truth of
veiling and disclosure of the alétheia, that in its essencialization happens
poetically as a work of art, establishing the truth of a new being in its opening of
historical-destinals horizons. At last, I will show how Techné, understood by
Heidegger then as original [Ursprünglich], is presented by him as the clearing of
an open by the work of art in association with the essentialization of modern
technique in its unshelter of beings as available resource of a stabilized sway.
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Misak, Cheryl. "Truth and the end of inquiry : a Peircean account of truth." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.315834.
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Salie, Shazia. "The representations of Sojourner Truth in The Narrative of Sojourner Truth." University of the Western Cape, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/7311.
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Magister Artium - MA<br>I read representations of Sojourner Truth in her Spiritual Narrative, The Narrative of Sojourner Truth with a focus on the portrayal of her unconventional character, through a close analysis of language, structure, photographs and narrative voice. Truth’s editor Olive Gilbert’s raises questions about whether the daguerreotype offers a more accurate form of representation than text. I explore the similarities and differences between visual and written portraits in representations of Truth as a unique figure. I question critical readings of Sojourner Truth’s dress in photographs as conservative, reading instead for a combination of conservative and subversive elements. I suggest that her interest in aesthetic forms such as dress and décor is symbolic of her yearning for home, her heritage, her agency, and unique taste. Her many references to her family indicate that she was more than just an empowered figure, but also one who still grieved. I read Truth’s description of domestic space as representing ambivalently, both her sense of loss, and her attempts to acquire agency. I consider how Truth attempts to recreate a sense of family and belonging through fragments of memory. In my reading of how she questions and extends conventional notions of family and community, I explore how she adapts and includes song, and quotations from the Bible in her sermons, by drawing on elements of African folktale and music. Most critics focus on Truth’s strong voice as an activist, there is little attention to the significance of spiritual solitude for her reimagining of community. I suggest that Truth offers alternative ideas of community as fluid rather than as fixed in one place. I explore how her ideas challenge the notion of nation as exclusive. I consider the genre of The Narrative by analyzing Olive Gilbert’s role as editor and writer. I propose that her role in The Narrative is a more complex one than suggested by critics, as it challenges conventional concepts of autobiography creating a conversation between two voices and lives.
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Bulcaen, Chris. "The dialogue of an author:." Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-96426.
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In Swahili Forum III Elena Bertoncini-Zubkova (1996) discussed some of the political criticisms, expressed in the form of literary motifs and imagery, that emerged in the works of the Tanzanian Swahili writer Euphrase Kezilahabi since 1978 onwards. She situates this emergent critique in the new political discoursive context where critical reviews of the Ujamaa policy could now be publicly voiced since President Nyerere himself admitted the failure of Ujamaa in his delivery Azimio la Arusha baada ya Miaka Kumi (The Arusha Declaration Ten Years Later, 1977). According to Bertoncini this admission `clear[ed] the way for critical literary works` of which Kezilahabi satirical play Kaputula la Marx (Marx`s Shorts, 1978) and his short story Mayai- Waziri wa maradhi (Eggs- Minister of Sickness, 1978) were among the first.
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Moran, Joseph Patrick. "The American author as celebrity." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.283106.
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Berger, Karol. "The Text and Its Author." Bärenreiter Verlag, 1998. https://slub.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A36799.
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Govender, Dyalan. "The Author Figured in Film." Thesis, University of Sydney, 2009. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/23107.
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For all the critical attention paid to the author in literary theory and criticism, there has been no study of the film medium’s fascination with authors and authorship. Every year, Hollywood produces numerous films about poets, playwrights, novelists, and screenwriters. This thesis explores the narrative and cinematic potential of the author. In broad terms, it is an exercise in genre criticism, establishing the defining characteristics of films characterising authors. It is also a very specific type of genre criticism, taking a cognitivist approach that defines the author as a set of historically and socially established expectations and characteristics against which the characters in these films are measured. After establishing the phenomenological parameters and critical value of the cognitivist approach in Chapter 1,1 then take up Andrew Bennett’s outline of the author as a cultural concept, discussing its utility in dealing with films figuring authors and authorship. Chapters 3 to 8 explore a selection of the sub-genres of films containing authors, starting with characterisations of the author as a detective, then moving to films using and depicting writer’s.block, horrific characterisations of the author, characterisations of female authors, the biopic, and films characterising screenwriters in Hollywood. The work concludes with an analysis of Charlie Kaufman and Spike Jonze’s Adaptation (2002), whose broad exploration of authorship traverses more of these sub-genres than any other film, offering an opportunity to bring together the findings of Chapters 1 to 8. I focus on English language, feature length, narrative films released between 1927 and 2007. Rather than taking a chronological approach and tracing the history of the medium’s treatment of the author, I select films from various periods, identifying in them the defining characteristics of the genre. But more than this, the genre and its characteristics represent the persistent interpretive function of the author in face of the critical trend away from biographically based interpretation towards textual and semiotic analysis.
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Gariazzo, Matías. "Between use sensitive and assessment sensitive truth : a criticism of truth relativism." Thesis, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2016. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/6382/.
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This thesis compares truth relativism with non-indexical contextualism. These views are compared both as general approaches to account for the use of a linguistic expression in declarative sentences and as proposals about particular expressions such as personal taste, aesthetic and moral predicates, epistemic modals, knowledge ascriptions and future contingents. Four aims are set forth: (i) to show that truth relativism must be understood as an account of the assessment sensitivity of our ordinary monadic truth notion, (ii) to single out a problem this view faces to make sense of its non-monadic truth notion and identify the best strategy to solve it, (iii) to argue that, with the exception of future contingents, this strategy cannot be applied to the cases for which truth relativist accounts have been proposed, and (iv) to argue for non-indexical contextualist treatments of these cases. The thesis has two parts; (i) and (ii) are addressed in the first one, while (iii) and (iv) are addressed in the second one. In addressing (iv), we only question the evidence adduced for truth relativism that non-indexical contextualism is committed to reject. As it happens, this is the evidence that is necessary to challenge in order to accommodate the problem mentioned in point (ii).
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Rossi, Lorenzo. "Truth, paradoxes, and partiality : a study on semantic theories of naïve truth." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:026f12c0-8a1a-4094-8ee9-3b7405021870.
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This work is an investigation into the notion of truth. More specifically, this thesis deals with how to account for the main features of truth, with the interaction between truth and fundamental linguistic elements such as connectives and quantifiers, and with the analysis and the solution of truth-theoretic paradoxes. In the introductory Chapter 1, I describe and justify the approach to truth I adopt here, giving some general coordinates to contextualize my work. In Part I, I examine some theories of truth that fall under the chosen approach. In Chapter 2, I discuss a famous theory of truth developed by Saul Kripke. Some difficulties of Kripke's theory led several authors, notably Hartry Field, to emphasize the importance of a well-behaved conditional connective in conjunction with a Kripkean treatment of truth. I articulate this idea in a research agenda, which I call Field's program, giving some conditions for its realizability. In Chapter 3, I analyze the main theory of truth proposed by Field to equip Kripke's theory with a well-behaved conditional, and I give a novel analysis of its shortcomings. Field's theory is remarkably successful but is technically and intuitively very complex, and it is unclear whether Field's conditional is a plausible candidate for a philosophically useful conditional. Moreover, Field's treatment of "determinate truth" and his handling of many kinds of paradoxes is not fully satisfactory. In Part II, I develop some new theories that capture the main aspects of the notion of truth and, at the same time, give a philosophically interesting meaning to connectives and quantifiers - in particular, they yield a strong and conceptually significant conditional. The theory proposed in Chapter 4 extends the inductive methods employed in Kripke's theory, showing how to adapt them to non-monotonic connectives as well. There, I also develop and defend a new, theoretically fruitful notion of gappiness. The theory proposed in Chapter 5 (and discussed further in Chapter 6), instead, employs some graph-theoretic intuitions and tools to provide a new model-theoretic construction. The resulting theory, I argue, provides a nice framework to account for the interaction between truth, connectives, and quantifiers, and it is flexible enough to be applicable to several interpretations of the logical vocabulary. Some new technical results are established with this theory as well, concerning the interplay between every Lukasiewicz semantics and some interpretations of the truth predicate, and concerning the handling of determinate truth. Finally, the theory developed in Chapter 5 provides articulate and telling solutions to truth-theoretical paradoxes.
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Gifford, Michael Lee. "Exploring Realism and Truth." Thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10620352.
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<p> This dissertation explores some important interconnections between the notions of Realism and Truth. Recently in analytic philosophy, there has been growing resistance to the idea that we might productively approach the realism issue via a consideration of the nature of truth. Michael Devitt, in particular, has argued forcefully and at length that realism is a metaphysical issue which ought to be settled before the semantical issue concerning the sorts of truth conditions our sentences may have. One goal of this dissertation is to establish that the realism issue may be fruitfully addressed through a study of language rather than metaphysics proper. The bulk of the dissertation is devoted to a careful study of one particular semantic approach to the realism question: That of Michael Dummett's.</p><p> The first chapter focuses on the dogmatic views of Michael Devitt. Devitt claims that we ought to "put metaphysics first," that is, answer metaphysical questions before semantical and epistemological questions. He also believes that we ought to put metaphysics first in the sense that our metaphysical conclusions should be given a certain kind of immunity from revision in light of what we may conclude in semantics and epistemology. Hence, Devitt argues, it would be a mistake to settle on an anti-realist conclusion based on the determination that our sentences have anti-realist (epistemic) truth conditions. I argue in the first chapter that Devitt's approach lacks sufficient motivation and furthermore requires us to take on a number of unsavory philosophical commitments.</p><p> Those who prefer a metaphysical, as opposed to semantic, approach to the realism issue are under special pressure to explain what exactly the nature of mind-independence is. This is because the metaphysical approach to the realism issue says that the question of realism comes down to the question whether what exists does so mind-independently. The second chapter of my dissertation is devoted to an analysis of the notion of mind-independence. I criticize some common statements of realism in terms of mind-independence and attempt to offer a better version of the view. One major issue of common statements of realism in terms of mind-independence is that they leave it a mystery how we might be realists about minds. I overcome this problem by framing mind-independence in terms of what I call our <i>directed cognitive practices</i>. </p><p> The third chapter consists of a detailed study of the anti-realist views of Michael Dummett. Dummett happens to be an anti-realist, but his approach to the realism issue is consistent with realism. For Dummett, the realism question comes down to the question as to what sorts of truth conditions our sentences have. His realist claims that our sentences have truth conditions in such a way that they could be true or false despite our inability to ever come to know whether they were true or false. Dummett's anti-realist claims that our sentences could never have such truth conditions, and instead have truth conditions such that we must be capable, at least in principle, of coming to know the sentences' truth values. I criticize various interpretations of Dummett and respond to some common objections. Understanding Dummett's philosophy requires understanding what he means by the term 'undecidable', since he takes the realism dispute to be a dispute as to whether "undecidable" sentences have determinate truth values. I argue that the best way to understand the notion of undecidability in the context of Dummett's philosophy is as the lack of an effective decision procedure, that is, the lack of a procedure which is guaranteed to deliver an answer as to whether the sentence is true or false in a finite amount of time.</p><p> The fourth chapter focuses on the question as to whether a Dummettian anti-realist is under any special pressure to reject classical logic in favor of an intuitionistic logic. I conclude that the Dummettian, who endorses a semantics in terms of proof-conditions rather than truth-conditions, must reject classical logic and instead endorse the logic of the intuitionists. The chapter is largely devoted to criticizing other attempts to discern in Dummett any particular argument for the conclusion that his anti-realist must reject classical logic.</p><p>
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Asay, Jamin Roberts John. "Truth in constructive empiricism." Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,912.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007.<br>Title from electronic title page (viewed Dec. 18, 2007). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy." Discipline: History; Department/School: History.
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Horton, Michael Brady. "INFLATIONARY TRUTH-THEORETIC SEMANTICS." UKnowledge, 2012. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/1.
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I argue that satisfaction and reference—and therefore, truth—are multiply realizable properties. I advocate a novel approach motivated by a commitment to the robustness and fruitfulness of truth-theoretic approaches to natural language semantics.
DEFLATIONISM: Philosophers keen on deflating the metaphysical pretensions of truth theories claim that we need not appeal to a substantive truth-property. Recently, however, some philosophers have sought to combine deflationism about truth with the view that our concept of truth or the truth-predicate can play an important role in natural language semantics.
TRUTH-THEORETIC SEMANTICS: The goal of a formal semantic theory of a natural language is to provide both the semantic values of that language’s lexically primitive items as well as the semantically significant modes of combining those basic elements into meaningful and more complex expressions. Most approaches have in common a commitment to finite stateability and compositionality as well as a commitment to something like Davidson’s “Convention T.”
PLURALISM: Pluralists about truth argue that different areas of discourse have different truth-properties. Can pluralism successfully be combined with a commitment to truth-theoretic semantics?
OPEN SEMANTIC FUNCTIONALISM: The pluralist approaches to truth are unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. The only option, I argue, is to regard truth as multiply-realizable. Specifically, we should view the set of truth’s realizers as possessing non-actual members—as being “open.” Truth is defined in the usual way in terms of reference and satisfaction, but these latter two relations are to be understood as multiply realizable but open. The property of truth can be specified using the Ramsey/Lewis method. My final view—Open Semantic Functionalism—respects compositionality and finite stateability, avoids triviality, handles plurality, and fits with robust, explanatorily significant natural language semantic theories.
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Antonova, Antonia Ivo. "Finding Truth in Literature." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/992.
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This thesis uses Amy Kind’s defense of epistemic relevance in imagination to examine how and when true beliefs imparted in literary imaginings are justified as knowledge. I will show that readers’ literary imaginings must pass a test of epistemic relevance, as well as be paired with a strong affirming emotional response in order to justify the truth behind the beliefs they impart. I believe the justificatory affective response is a kind of non-propositional emotional imagining, distinct from the type of literary imaginings that initially imparted the beliefs. Due to this thesis’ focus on the justificatory power of literary imaginings related to emotion, my work shows how literature can provide new knowledge to the philosophical realms of ethics and emotion. Literary implications in other types of philosophical inquiry still remain unexplored.
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Fuller, M. B. "Truth, value, and justification." Thesis, University of Manchester, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.370948.
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