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Books on the topic 'Truthmaker'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 26 July 2025

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1

d'Aix-Marseille), Conference "Truths and truthmakers: Vingt ans après" (2004 Université. Metaphysics and truthmakers. Ontos, 2007.

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Monnoyer, Jean-Maurice, ed. Metaphysics and Truthmakers. DE GRUYTER, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110326918.

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Conference "Truths and truthmakers: Vingt ans après" (2004 Université d'Aix-Provence). Metaphysics and truthmakers. Ontos, 2007.

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4

Helen, Beebee, and Dodd Julian, eds. Truthmakers: The contemporary debate. Clarendon Press, 2005.

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5

Faroldi, Federico L. G., and Frederik Van De Putte, eds. Kit Fine on Truthmakers, Relevance, and Non-classical Logic. Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29415-0.

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6

Truthmaker. ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited, 2022.

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7

Reisig, Michael. Truthmaker. Clear Creek Press, 2012.

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8

Jago, Mark. Truthmaker Maximalism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0004.

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If the theory of truth as truthmaking is to be plausible, then all truths must have a truthmaker. This is truthmaker maximalism. It is a difficult idea to defend (§3.1), and existing arguments for it are not sufficiently strong (§3.2). I’ll offer a more powerful argument, showing that the maximalist’s opponent is committed to a maximalist ontology (§3.4, §3.6). I consider some objections to the argument in §3.5.

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9

Tennant, Neil. Truthmakers and Consequence. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198777892.003.0008.

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We compare Tarski’s notion of logical consequence (preservation of truth) with that of Prawitz (transformability of warrants for assertion). The latter is our point of departure for a definition of consequence in terms of the transformability of truthmakers (verifications) relative to all models. A sentence’s Tarskian truth-in-M coincides with its having an M-relative truthmaker. An M-relative truthmaker serves as a winning strategy or game plan for player T in the ‘material game’ played on that sentence against the background of the model M. We enter conjectures about soundness and completene

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10

Cameron, Ross P. Truthmakers. Edited by Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.013.13.

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Truthmaker theory says that what is true depends on what exists. This chapter spells out this thesis, its implications, and why we should believe it. It looks at the connection between truth-making and the in virtue of relation. It looks at reasons to accept or reject truthmaker maximalism—the claim that absolutely every truth has a truthmaker—and truthmaker necessitarianism—the claim that if A makes p true then it is impossible for A to exist without p being true. It asks what views on essentialism are compatible with truthmaker theory. Three reasons for accepting the view are discussed. The

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11

Jago, Mark. Truthmaking and Grounding. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0007.

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In previous chapters, I’ve argued that all truths have a truthmaker, and I’ve developed an ontological account of what those truthmakers are. They’re states of affairs, and they include negative and other logically complex entities. Now it’s time to turn our focus to the truthmaking relation itself. What kind of relation is it? What are its logical properties? Can it be defined, or otherwise understood, in more conceptually basic terms? What is its relation to the general concepts of grounding and metaphysical determination? These are the questions I’ll try to answer in this chapter.

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12

Tennant, Neil. Transmission of Truthmakers. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198777892.003.0009.

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We begin by introducing the formal genus ‘conditional M-relative construct’, of which M-relative truthmakers and falsitymakers, and core proofs, are species. Fortunately they can stand in symbiotic relations, even though they cannot hybridize. We aim to generalize the earlier method we used in order to prove Cut-Elimination, so that the inputs P for the binary operation [P,P′] can be truthmakers (whereas P′ remains a core proof); and so that the reduct itself, when it is finally determined by recursive application of all the transformations called for, is a truthmaker for the conclusion of P′.

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13

Moltmann, Friederike. Objects and Attitudes. Oxford University PressNew York, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878481.001.0001.

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Abstract This book develops a new approach to the semantics of sentences based on a novel ontology of attitudinal and modal objects, or more generally satisfiable objects. On that view, roughly, (embedded and independent) sentences serve as predicates of attitudinal objects (entities like claims, beliefs, decisions, requests, and promises), of modal objects (entities like needs, obligations, permissions), and of locutionary and phatic objects of different kinds. The view overcomes various conceptual and empirical problems for propositions, abstract objects standardly taken to be the referents

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14

Tennant, Neil. A Logical Theory of Truth-Makers and Falsity-Makers. Edited by Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.013.16.

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We explicate the different ways that a first-order sentence can be true (resp., false) in a model M, as formal objects, called (M-relative) truth-makers (resp., falsity-makers). M-relative truth-makers and falsity-makers are co-inductively definable, by appeal to the “atomic facts” in M, and to certain rules of verification and of falsification, collectively called rules of evaluation. Each logical operator has a rule of verification, much like an introduction rule; and a rule of falsification, much like an elimination rule. Applications of the rules (∀) and (∃) involve infinite furcation when

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15

Estes, David. Truthmarked. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.

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16

Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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17

Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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18

Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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19

Monnoyer, Jean-Maurice. Metaphysics and Truthmakers. De Gruyter, Inc., 2007.

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20

Monnoyer, Jean-Maurice. Metaphysics and Truthmakers. De Gruyter, Inc., 2007.

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21

Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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22

Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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23

Monnoyer, Jean-Maurice. Metaphysics and Truthmakers. De Gruyter, Inc., 2007.

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24

Monnoyer, Jean-Maurice. Metaphysics and Truthmakers. de Gruyter GmbH, Walter, 2013.

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25

Beebee, Helen, and Julian Dodd. Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005.

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26

Beebee, Helen, and Julian Dodd. Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press, 2005.

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27

Griffith, Aaron M. Truth and Social Reality. Oxford University PressOxford, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198948469.001.0001.

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Abstract Truth and Social Reality: A Metaphysical Inquiry presents a new theory of social truth and social construction. The book weds truthmaker theory with recent work in social ontology, arguing that social truths are true in virtue of socially constructed portions of the world. It focuses on the construction of human social kinds like gender, race, class, and disability. The book offers novel accounts of social construction (one in terms of truthmaking), realism, social kind pluralism, social context, the context dependency of social truth, and social vagueness. Overall, Truth and Social R

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28

Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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29

Metaphysicy and Truthmakers (Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis). Ontos Verlag, 2007.

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30

Armstrong, D. M. Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Cambridge University Press, 2004.

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31

(Editor), Helen Beebee, and Julian Dodd (Editor), eds. Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford University Press, USA, 2005.

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32

Putte, Frederik Van De. Kit Fine on Truthmakers, Relevance, and Non-Classical Logic. Springer International Publishing AG, 2023.

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33

Jago, Mark. States of Affairs. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0005.

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We’ve reached the view that states of affairs exist and act as truthmakers for the corresponding propositions. But what are states of affairs, metaphysically speaking? I’ll begin to answer this question in this chapter, focusing on the metaphysical nature of positive, logically simple states of affairs, such as that Bertie is snuffling. I’ll discuss three approaches (§4.1, §4.2, and §4.3), and argue that all are viable options (§4.4).

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34

Jago, Mark. Arguments for Truthmaking. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0003.

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The theory of truth I’m proposing analyses truth in terms of truthmaking. But why think that truths need to be made true by entities in the world? That’s a key question in this project. There are no quick, easy arguments in favour of truthmaking (§2.2 and §2.3). My strategy will be to argue that properties and relations exist (§2.4), and from there, to argue in favour of states of affairs (§2.5). Once we’ve got these in our ontology, it’s but a short step to argue that they are truthmakers for the corresponding propositions (§2.6).

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35

Jago, Mark. The Nature of Propositions. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0009.

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What kind of entity are truths? I shall argue that they are propositions (§8.1). To understand what propositions are, we must investigate their nature. Given what I’ve said previously about truth and grounding, a characterisation of their nature is easy to give (§8.2). But finding a theory of what propositions are which respects that nature is much harder. I’ll argue that existing theories of propositions cannot account for their nature (§§8.2–8.4). A better account is to analyse propositions in terms of their possible truthmakers (§8.5). I investigate whether this is metaphysically tenable (§

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36

Maley, Corey J., and Gualtiero Piccinini. A Unified Mechanistic Account of Teleological Functions for Psychology and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685509.003.0011.

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Functions play an important explanatory role in both psychology and neuroscience. Any effort to integrate psychology and neuroscience must provide an account of functions and how they explain in psychology and neuroscience. Yet the ontological foundations for function attributions and functional explanation remain unsettled. In this chapter, we contribute to an integrated science of cognition and behavior by offering a unified account of the teleological functions of multi-level mechanisms. The account applies to both biological traits and artifacts. Teleological functions are stable causal co

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37

Morris, Kevin. Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758600.003.0007.

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This chapter discusses and evaluates the role of truthmaking in articulating an unproblematic concept of emergence—specifically, the proposal that emergent properties should be characterized as those that, while “ontologically dependent”, are yet needed as truthmakers. It argues that while emergence so understood appears to avoid several well-known concerns about emergence and emergent properties, including those that stem from the alleged “brute determination” of emergent properties, this result is secured through the weak notion of dependence that it employs. The appeal to truthmaking, in co

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38

Williams, Donald C. The Bugbear of Fate. Edited by A. R. J. Fisher. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198810384.003.0013.

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This chapter begins with a critique of David Lewis’s ontology of concrete possible worlds. One argument that has been given in support of such an ontology is that possible worlds are needed to uphold our best analysis of counterfactuals. In response to this argument it is objected that we do not need to postulate possible worlds as truthmakers for counterfactuals. It is further argued that Lewis’s ontology of concrete possible worlds leads to set-theoretic-like paradoxes, and that it fails to explain our motivation to eradicate evil in our world. Nelson Pike’s argument that if God exists our a

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39

Mumford, Stephen. Absence and Nothing. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198831532.001.0001.

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Nothing is not. Yet it seems that we invoke absences and nothings often in our philosophical explanations. Negative metaphysics is on the rise. It has been claimed that absences can be causes, there are negative properties, absences can be perceived, there are negative facts, and we can refer to and speak about nothing. Parmenides long ago ruled against such things. Here we consider how much of Parmenides’ view can survive. A soft Parmenidean methodology is adopted in which we aim to reject all supposed negative entities but are prepared to accept them, reluctantly, if they are indispensable a

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40

Jago, Mark. What Truth Is. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.001.0001.

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What Truth Is presents and defends a novel theory of what truth is, in terms of the metaphysical notion of truthmaking. This is the relation which holds between a truth and some entity in the world, in virtue of which that truth is true. By coming to an understanding of this relation, I argue, we gain better insight into the metaphysics of truth. The first part of the book discusses the property being true, and how we should understand it in terms of truthmaking. The second part focuses on truthmakers, the worldly entities which make various kinds of truths true, and how they do so. I argue fo

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