Academic literature on the topic 'Umkhonto we sizwe'

The struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa gave rise to many heroes, whose symbol was Chris Hani, an underground fighter, a participant in the fighting in Zimbabwe, the chief of staff of the People's Army of the African National Congress — “Umkhonto we Sizwe” (MK), who was killed by a Polish emigrant on April 10 1993. But she also gave birth to traitors, or as they are now preferred to be called, collaborators. The article discusses their complicity with the apartheid regime, starting with state witnesses and ending with “askari”, as Africans who served in the colonial forces were called in East Africa, and in South Africa and Namibia — fighters of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, who went over to the side of the racist regime.

Abstract Why did leaders of the Congress movement in South Africa abandon their exclusive reliance on non-violent means in the struggle against apartheid, form an armed unit (Umkhonto we Sizwe), and launch a campaign of spectacular sabotage bombings of symbols of apartheid in 1961? None of the earlier violent struggles from which Congress leaders drew inspiration, and none of the contemporaneous insurgencies against white minority rule elsewhere in southern Africa, involved a similar distinct, preliminary and extended phase of non-lethal symbolic sabotage. Following the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, Congress leaders feared the social and political consequences of increased popular enthusiasm for using violence. Nelson Mandela, Joe Slovo, and the other founders of Umkhonto we Sizwe did not launch their sabotage campaign because they believed it would prompt a change of heart among white South Africans, nor because they believed urban sabotage bombings were a necessary prelude to the launch of rural guerrilla warfare. Rather, the sabotage campaign was a spectacular placeholder, a stopgap intended to advertise the Congress movement's abandonment of exclusive non-violence and thus to discourage opponents of apartheid, both inside and outside South Africa, from supporting rival groups or initiating ‘uncontrolled violent action themselves.

Although a great deal has been written over the past two decades on the armed struggle in South Africa and the role that the African National congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP)have played in it, virtually nothing of academic value has been written on the main vehicle of the struggle, namely Umkhonto we Sizwe or 'MK' as it is more commonly known. Besides the research undertaken by Edward Feit in the 1960's and the account left to us by Bruno Mtolo on the formation and activities of Umkhonto in Natal prior to the Rivonia events, most of the material that has been written on the subject of Umkhonto makes no meaningful contribution to the history and activities of the organisation. As a result a serious vacuum has been left in the history of the liberation movement but particularly the armed struggle in South Africa. There was therefore an urgent need for a systematic and detailed study of Umkhonto and the specific role it played in the liberation struggle since 1961. Identifying the need for this study vas however the easy part. Writing it on the other hand presented numerous complex problems, part of which was brought about by the lack of suitable source material, and the fact that the organisation vas proscribed by law. The problem was further compounded by the fact that although Umkhonto was created to be independent (initially at least) of the ANC and to fulfill a function that the ANC could not do in the 1960's, the two organisations became so closely associated with one another and with the SACP that most of the time it is very difficult if not nearly impossible, to always draw a clear distinction between the three of them. Of course the problem has not been made easier by the Press which, for the sake of simplicity and expediency, have chosen to equate the ANC and Umkhonto with one another. Virtually none of the newspapers which have reported on the armed struggle over the years have taken the trouble to draw any meaningful distinction between the organisation and activities of the ANC on the one hand and Umkhonto on the other. While it is true that the two organisations have very close ties and there is a strong degree of overlapping between both members and leaders, this research will show that the two organisations are nonetheless different from one another and have organisational structures and functions that support this. The main difference between the two organisations has always been the fact that while Umkhonto was specifically created as the military component of the ANC-SACP alliance, the ANC on the other hand has remained the main political instrument of the liberation movement. As such, members of the ANC were not supposed to undertake any direct military missions against apartheid targets in South Africa. At best they fulfilled a supportive role such as the distribution of propaganda, the provision of transport, the supply of weapons and the creation of weapons caches etc., to support Umkhonto's cadres in the field. The members of the ANC thus concerned themselves primarily with political and diplomatic work in the armed struggle. By the middle of the 1980's however, the relationship between the ANC and Umkhonto began to change when the political and military functions of the two organisations were brought together under the control of the newly created political-military-council (PMC)following the collapse of the ANC and Umkhonto's organizational structures in the frontline states of Mozambique and Swaziland, as a result of the South African government's persistant counter-insurgency operations. The new organisational structure that was set up by the beginning of 1983 to replace the defunct Regional Command and was sanctioned by the ANC and the SACP and accepted at the former's National Consultative Conference at Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985. This new direction in the armed struggle was further reflected in the decision to introduce compulsory military training for all members of the combined liberation movement. In theory thus, after 1985, all members of the ANC and the SACP were subjected to military training in Umkhonto's training camps in Angola and elsewhere. This move further helped to blur the lines between the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto. Much of this will become clear in the course of this thesis. Where possible, interpretations will be attached to the facts to highlight certain developments in the armed struggle. Unfortunately, the facts pertaining to Umkhonto is not always volumous or conclusive enough to make statements that will withstand the test of time. The aim of this study is to examine the history of Umkhonto from its origins in 1961 to the end of 1988 when as a result of the New York Accord between South Africa, Cuba and Angola the ANC and Umkhonto were forced to remove all their military bases and personnel from Angola with immediate effect. Although this particular move severely crippled the ability of Umkhonto to continue with its armed struggle it vas not the only factor influencing its performance and status by the end of 1988. A host of other factors such as poor organisation, weak leadership, dissention, dissatisfaction with the role of the SACP in the liberation movement, and lack of sufficient funds among others also contributed to its weakened position by the end of the 1980's. These and other factors effecting the position and performance of Umkhonto are extensively dealt with in the second half of this study. Although increased cooperation between the military and political segments of the liberation movement became an important element in the armed struggle after 1985, the leadership of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto were not always in agreement on important issues. This became increasingly apparent towards the end of the 1980's when the combined effect of the South African government's counter-insurgency operations and the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were beginning to have a direct affect on the position and future of the liberation alliance led by the ANC and the SACP. Although the ANC, like most political organisations, always had a fair share of dissention in its ranks the formation of Umkhonto in 1961, the destruction of the organisation's underground structures inside South Africa by the mid-1960'S and the growing hegemony of the SACP over both the ANC and Umkhonto's leadership since, have produced some serious dissention in the ranks of the liberation movement. The first came in 1975 with the expulsion of the African National Congress African nationalist faction from the ranks of the ANC. The second came with the isolation of the Okhela organisation which was reported to have been a predominantly white anti-communist organisation inside the ANC. The third attack was on the leadership of the liberation movement was averted with the expulsion of the dissident Marxist group known as the “Marxist Tendency within the ANC” in the early 1980's. Although the ANC and the SACP have always denied that the influence of these attacks on its combined leadership were in anyway serious, this study has shown that these developments in association with other developments had indeed a deep effect on the effectiveness of Umkhonto and the outcome of the armed struggle. The latter is particularly evident in the decision by Chris Hani, who was Chief of Staff of Umkhonto and his protégé, Steve Tshwete, to challenge the ANC's National Executive committee in 1981 to allow them to execute the decision taken at the Kabwe conference to extend Umkhonto's attacks to include white civilian targets inside South Africa. Although the ANC had accepted such action in principle at its Kabwe conference in 1985, it remained reluctant to fully implement it out of fear that such action could tarnish its image internationally and loose its much needed international support, particularly among the nations and people of Western Europe. Such considerations seemingly did not carry much support with Marxist radicals and militants such as Hani and others who preferred a military to a political or negotiated settlement in South Africa. With the support of the central Committee of the SACP (or rather. key elements of it) behind them, Hani and Tshwete issued a directive to all Umkhonto commanders in 1987 to extent their attacks to white civilian targets. The fact that the ANC did nothing to stop the directive or to counter Hani's actions is clear indication of the position that the military hardliners had come to occupy in the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto by the latter part of the 1980's. Unfortunately for Hani and his followers, the signing of the New York Accord at the end of 1988 came as a severe setback to their plans and left them with a cause that was becoming increasingly difficult to execute successfully. This research will show that as a result of these developments and the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union particularly with regards to Soviet Third World policy, the military hardliners in the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto were increasingly forced to take a backseat to the views and activities of more moderate leaders such as Thabo Mbeki, who was the ANC's Chief of Foreign Affairs. In view of the above this study will show that the SACP since the early 1970'S has taken steadily control of the ANC and the liberation struggle in South Africa and that by the end of the 1980'S Umkhonto was more a fief of the SACP and its Central Committee than of the ANC and its National Executive Committee, which had a clear majority of communist members by 1988. Although some major developments have taken place since the signing of the New York Accord in December 1988, such as the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto and the release of many political prisoners, these events and developments falls outside the scope of this study and are dealt with in the postscript.
Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2009.
Historical and Heritage Studies
unrestricted

Thesis (M.A. in International Security and Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2000.
Thesis advisor(s): Paul Stockton, Letitia Lawson. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was a military organization dominated by black Africans. Although it is not generally associated with Indian South Africans, who form a minority in the country, there were Indian MK members. This thesis explores the way in which Indian MK members reconciled aspects of their ethnic identity with their membership of MK. It explores the experiences of two generations of members: those born between 1929 and 1944 and those born between 1960 and 1969. In particular it looks at whether they experienced tensions between their ethnic and political identities. It explores what set these Indian South Africans apart from the rest of the Indian South African community that did not join MK. It also looks at what significant differences there were between different generations of Indian MK members. The research results show that the first generation MK members believe that their MK activities were „the highest form of passive resistance‟. An explanation for this way of referring to their activities could be that this was a way of reconciling tensions between their ethnic and political identities. The first generation was also very critical of the Indian SA community. This could be because they still feel part of this community despite having a strong political consciousness that is different from most of the community. It was found that some of the features that set Indian MK members apart from other Indian South Africans were that they were not raised in very religious households and occupied a fairly low rather than „middle man‟ economic position. In addition, members of the first generation of MK members were raised in comparatively multi-racial areas. Both generations made the decision to join MK because of Indian role models. There were some marked differences between the two generations of MK veterans. Most notably, the younger did not see their activities as in line with passive resistance and they also displayed more ambivalence about their ethnic identities.

Magister Artium - MA (History)
Nokuthula Simelane, born near Bethal in Mpumalanga, joined the ANC's armed-wing uMKhonto we Sizwe (MK) as a courier while studying at the University of Swaziland in the early 1980s. In 1983 she set out on a mission to South Africa on the pretext of purchasing clothing for her up-coming graduation. Simelane was however abducted, and has since not been heard from nor has her body been found. Her disappearance was one of those examined by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa. These are some facts about Simelane. This thesis seeks to explore how Simelane's biographies manifest themselves across multiple genres and in so doing determine their similarities and differences, with a view to understanding the difficulties of producing the biography of a missing person. The genres of biography I examine relation to Simelane are: the TRC's Amnesty Committee (AC) hearings, the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) hearing, their transcripts and the TRC reports; a documentary film called Betrayal directed by Mark Kaplan; and a statue of Simelane located in Bethal sculpted by Ruhan Janse van Vuuren.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: South Africa consists of a vast, culturally diverse population, entrenched in customary tribal influences which are essentially based on stringent patriarchal directives. These spilt over into other societal spheres, one of which is the media, which is part of an existing male hegemonic society. The rationale for this study is essentially to determine the role played by the media in their representation of women, before and shortly after the liberation of South Africa. This study will establish whether the voices of women were represented, or not, in the media, in the period shortly after the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and affiliated organisations in 1990. By interviewing and recording the oral histories of a few female ANC Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) soldiers, the need is evident to, through this oral tradition process, give a voice to these voiceless women. The theoretical foundations for this study is firstly based on “womanism”. Womanism was born from the shortcomings of feminism (a largely Western concept) that was unable to address the issues unique to the situation of black women. A second theoretical point of departure is the Social Responsibility Theory, a media theory that could, based on research done for this study, play a profound role to the benefit of women. The methodological investigation is based on a mixed method research approach where Content Analysis (CA) and Grounded Theory (GT) are triangulated with the literature review. The GT processes gave a voice to some unknown female MK soldiers by conducting interviews based on in-depth interview questions. The CA process led to the conclusion that the voices of women who contributed to the struggle were largely ignored by the media. The researcher found that given the contributions and sacrifices women have made in democratising South Africa, acknowledgement of these efforts are sorely lacking, especially in the media. This study therefore seeks to contribute to the lost and repressed voices of women, and to redress a history of omission to a history of commission.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Suid-Afrika beskik oor 'n kultureel diverse bevolking met tradisionele stam-invloede wat essensieel gebaseer is op streng patriargale riglyne. Dit het oorgespoel na ander sosiale kontekste, waarvan een die media is, en wat deel uitmaak van 'n bestaande manlike hegemoniese gemeenskap. Die rasionaal vir hierdie studie was om vas te stel watter rol die media gespeel het in die representasie van vroue kort ná die eerste stappe tot 'n bevryde Suid-Afrika. Hierdie studie wou vasstel of die stemme van vroue verteenwoordig was, of nie, in die media, in die tydperk kort ná die ontbanning van die African National Congress (ANC) en ander geaffilieerde organisasies in 1990. Die veronderstelling is dat vrouestemme nie in die media waarneembaar was nie, en dat die situasie teengewerk kan word deur die toepassing van mondelinge geskiedenis. In hierdie geval is die verhale van 'n paar vroulike Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)-soldate geboekstaaf om sodoende deur die mondelinge geskiedenistradisie 'n stem te gee aan stemlose vroue. Die teoretiese grondslag vir hierdie studie is eerstens gebaseer op “Womanism”. Dié teorie het ontstaan weens die tekortkominge van Feminisme (grootliks ‟n Westerse konsep), wat nie in staat was om die kwessies wat uniek is aan die situasie van swart vroue aan te spreek nie. 'n Tweede teoretiese vertrekpunt is die Sosiale Verantwoordelikheidsteorie. Gebaseer op die navorsing vir hierdie studie, kan dit 'n groter rol in die media in die belang van vroue speel. Die metodologie is gebaseer op 'n gemengde metode-navorsingsbenadering waar Inhoudsanalise en Grounded Theory (GT) trianguleer met die literatuurstudie. Die GT-proses gee 'n stem aan 'n paar onbekende vroulike MK-soldate deur onderhoudvoering wat op in-diepte onderhoudvrae gebaseer is. Die inhoudsanalise proses het bevind dat vroue wat bygedra het tot die Vryheidstryd grootliks deur die media geïgnoreer is. Gegewe die bydraes en opofferings wat vroue gemaak het in die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika, ontbreek erkenning van hul pogings in ons geskiedskrywing, en beslis so in die media. Hierdie studie was 'n poging om by te dra tot die omkeer van hierdie situasie, naamlik om 'n “geskiedenis van uitsluiting” te herstel na 'n “geskiedenis van insluiting”.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a postcolonial analysis of Third World foreign policy, looking at an atypical case of state relations with national liberation movements. It is also an empirical contribution to an area of recent South African history through interrogating Cuba’s foreign policy towards South Africa’s liberation movements from 1959 until 1994. My starting point has been that meagre scholarship exists within the field of International Relations on this important area of South African history and on Cuban foreign policy. Mainstream scholars have largely overlooked relations between the Cuban state and civil society and liberation movements such as the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and Umkhonto we Sizwe. By interrogating an ignored area of Third World foreign policy, this thesis furthermore aims to probe into the field of International Relations and analyses of foreign policy. Applying the methodology of a postcolonial theoretical critique, I highlight the ontological assumptions within the field that make theorising foreign policy from states and societies in the Third World peripheral within IR, as well as render states and civil society in the Third World as objects rather than subjects of the theoretical endeavour. The conceptualisation of the Cold War as a mere Superpower affair, with states in the Third World as mere sites of conflict between the Superpowers and divorced from the causal dynamics of the conflict, exemplifies the ontological assumptions that exist within the field of International Relations theory. I use the case study of Cuba’s foreign policy towards South African liberation movements in carrying out a qualitative analysis of the available literature and well as conducting interviews with senior participants of South Africa’s various liberation movements. A broad reconstruction of relations between 1959 and 1994, as well as post-1994, reveals extensive relations between Cuba and South African liberation movements involving the Cuban state and civil society. The findings of my research include an overview of relations between Cuba and various liberation movements at the political and military level, as well as the role of Cuban civil society in areas such as education and strengthening the role of women in the liberation struggle. Respondents reveal that relations between the two spheres are not uni-directional, but in fact reveal a complex interaction in which the agency of South Africa’s liberation movements in determining the content of relations is central. In conceptualising foreign policy using a postcolonial theoretical framework, I look not only at the Cuban state but also at the role of civil society in Cuba in constructing and carrying out foreign policy towards South African liberation movements. This theoretical framework rejects a strict dichotomy between the foreign and the domestic by looking at social forces within the state as well as the role of ideology in the making foreign policy domestically. Lastly, the extensive relations between Cuba and South African liberation movements that my research reveals points to possibilities for further theoretical investigations within the field of International Relations from a postcolonial theoretical critique.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is ‘n post-koloniale analise van Derde Wêreld buitelandse beleid, dit kyk na die atipiese geval van staats verhoudinge met nasionale vryheidsbewegings. Dit is ook ‘n empiriese bydrae tot ‘n area in onlangse Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis deurdat dit Kuba se buitelandse beleid teenoor Suid- Afrikaanse vryheidsbewegings tussen 1959 tot 1994 ondervra. My beginpunt is dat daar skamele vakkundigheid tans bestaan binne die studieveld Internasionale Betrekkinge met betrekking tot hierdie belangrike area van Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis en Kubaanse buitelandse beleid. Hoofstroom deskundiges hanteer tot ‘n groot mate die verhoudinge tussen staat en burgerlike samelewing van Kuba met vryheidsbewegings soos die African National Congress, die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party, die Congress of South African Trade Unions en Umkhonto we Sizwe met min aandag. Deur hierdie geïgnoreerde area binne Derde Wêreld buitelandse beleid te ondervra, is dit ook ‘n verdere oogmerk van hierdie tesis om die vakgebied van Internasionale Betrekkinge en die gepaardgaande analises van buitelandse beleid te ondersoek. Deur die toepassing van die metodologie van post-koloniale kritiek, beklemtoon ek die ontologiese aannames binne die vakgebied van Internasionale Betrekkinge wat die teoretisering van buitelandse beleid van state en samelewings in die Derde Wêreld marginaliseer, asook om hierdie state en burgerlike samelewings in die Derde Wêreld tot objekte in plaas van subjekte van ‘n teoretiese onderneming te reduseer. Die konseptualiseering van die Koue Oorlog as bloot ‘n supermag aangeleentheid, met state in die Derde Wêreld as blote ligging vir konflikte tussen die supermagte asook terselfdertyd vervreemd van die oorsaaklike dynamiek van die konflik, beliggaam die ontologiese aannames wat binne die vakgebied van Internasionale Betrekkinge bestaan. Ek maak gebruik van Kuba se buitelandse beleid teenoor Suid-Afrkaanse vryheidsbewegings as gevallestudie om ‘n kwalitatiewe analise te maak op die bestaande literatuur asook om onderhoude te hê met senior deelnemers in Suid Afrika se verskeie vryheidsbewegings. ‘n Uitgebreide rekonstruksie van verhoudinge tussen 1959 en 1994, sowel as post-1994, openbaar diepgaande verhoudinge tussen Kuba en Suid-Afrikaanse vryheidsbewegings wat die Kubaanse staat en burgerlike samelewing behels. Die bevindinge in my navorsing sluit in ‘n oorsig van verhoudinge tussen Kuba en verskeie vryheidsbewegings op politiekeen militêre vlak asook die rol van Kubaanse burgerlike samelewing in areas soos opvoeding en die verstewiging van die rol van vroue in die vryheidstryd. Respondente openbaar dat verhoudinge tussen die twee sfere nie in een rigting geloop het nie, maar dat dit eintlik ‘n komplekse interaksie openbaar in wie die agentskap van die Suid-Afrikaanse vryheidsbewegings om die inhoud van die verhoudinge te bepaal ‘n sentrale deel speel. Deur buitelandse beleid te konseptualiseer deur gebruik te maak van ‘n v post-koloniale raamwerk kyk ek nie net bloot na die Kubaanse staat nie, maar ook na die rol van die Kubaanse burgerlike samelewing in die konstruksie en uitvoering van buitelandse beleid teenoor Suid- Afrikaanse vryheidsbewegings. Hierdie teoretiese raamwerk verwerp ‘n eng tweeledigheid tussen die buitelandse en binnelandse deur te kyk na die sosiale magte binne die staat sowel as die rol van ideologie in die binnelandse skepping van buitelandse beleid. Ten slote, die diepgaande verhoudinge tussen Kuba en Suid-Afrikaanse vryheidsbewegings wat my navorsing openbaar dui in die rigting van moontlike verdere teoretiese ondersoeke binne die vakgebied van Internasionale Betrekkinge vanaf ‘n perspektief van post-koloniale kritiek.

After its banning in 1961 the ANC, together with the South African Communist Party, adopted the armed struggle. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was formed and had its debut in December of the same year. When the MK command was arrested at Rivonia outside Johannesburg most of the remaining members went into exile. The banning of the ANC forced the members not just to go underground but also to go into exile and their first haven was the newly independent Tanzania. The 1960's witnessed the flight into exile of most members of the organisation. In Tanzania, members of the ANC and MK came into contact with members of other liberation movements, including the liberation movements [Tom Portuguese Africa. As the 1960's progressed MK was responsible for training recruits in various African countries, most notably in Tanzania and Zambia. In 1967 they launched their first major campaign, together with the Zimbabwe People's Union (ZAPU), into southern Rhodesia in an effort to reach South Africa. The campaign failed and several members were put in prison in Bechuanaland. On their release some of the cadres, amongst them Chris Hani, voiced criticism of the leadership. This criticism was expressed just as the leaders of the organisation gathered for their first major conference in exile, the Morogoro conference in Tanzania At Morogoro the emphasis on armed struggle was affirmed, and it was agreed that the other pillar supporting the struggle would be international relations. After the Morogoro conference MK continued to train recruits in Zambia and Tanzania, but the situation was increasingly difficult as internal problems in these countries led to the expulsion of several liberation movements. In 1974 a new wave of South Africans went into exile, and at the same time the liberation war in Portuguese Africa entered its last phase. When Angola became independent the ANC began negotiating with the new government about the possible establishment of new training facilities for MK in Angola. When the students of Soweto went into revolt, reacting against the introduction of Afrikaans as the main language in their schools, the ANC, the MK command and their rivals the PAC were taken aback. The first wave of new recruits was flown to Tanzania before they were re-routed to Luanda In Angola they were sent to the southern parts of the country, to Benguela and later to Nova Katengue. By 1979 nine camps had been established in Angola: there was a transit camp outside Luanda, and camps at Benguela, Nova Katengue, Gabela, Fazenda, Quibaxe, Pango, Camp 32 (Quatro) and Funda The main camp was Nova Katengue. The camp got the nickname of University of the South because of the emphasis there on ideological, political and academic courses. But one episode of attempted food poisoning and later the bombing by the South African Air Force focused attention on the need for internal security in the camps, and a Security Department took shape in the region. After the bombing which left Nova Katengue flattened to the ground, MK left their southern camps; a series of meetings took place in Luanda which resulted in a revised strategy outlined in "the Green Book". In 1979 MK participated in a second campaign together with ZAPU; as the attempt to reach South Africa was once again unsuccessful most of the participants found themselves back in the Angolan camps. This failure, together with the degrading conditions in which the cadres were living, fuelled a spiral of discontent in the camps. The food was sparse and the sanitary conditions were bad. A feeling of stagnation spread among the cadres, who were disillusioned at the bleak prospect of infiltrating back into South Africa. In the beginning of the 1980's the roads between Luanda and the eastern camps around Malanje, Caculama and Camalundi became unsafe as the South African-backed UNITA guerrillas increased their attacks. MK forces were deployed around the town of Cacuso to guard the railway line and secure the safety of the road, and this deployment aggravated the dissatisfaction of the cadres. At the end of 1983 some members of the security department beat a sick cadre to death. This triggered off a mutiny in some of the camps. The leadership defused this, the first in a series of mutinies. In 1984 a second mutiny took place in Viana The mutineers elected a Committee of Ten to forward a set of demands to the leadership. But the leadership was not ready to listen and the Angolan presidential guard quelled the mutiny. When a third mutiny erupted in Pango three months later no demands were made and no committee was elected, but the Pango mutiny was more violent. After the disturbances at Viana but before the Pango mutiny, a commission had been sent out from Lusaka to find the reasons for the uprising. The commission found that the main reasons were the deteriorating living conditions, the lack of proper health services and the deployment on the eastern front. Later reports came to similar conclusions regarding the reasons for the mutiny. However, the reports differ regarding the degree of punishment used in the region after the mutinies. The Committee of Ten was imprisoned after the mutinies. However preparations were made to meet their main demand, which had been for the calling of a national consultative conference and in 1985 the Kabwe conference took place in Zambia. Some restructuring of the organisation and army took place and the much criticised Security Department was made accountable to the leadership. Life in the Angolan camps continued much as before but efforts were made to provide some vocational training and better health services. The deployment on the eastern front came to an end, but soon MK came under attack on the roads between Luanda and their northern camps. The attacks intensified as other forces in Angola gathered around the south central town of Cuito Cuanavale, and eventually the siege of Cuito Cuanavale forced the South African regime to the negotiating table. After the siege the Namibia Agreement was signed. One of the terms of the agreement was that MK had to leave Angola and search for new havens, and in 1989 and 1990 most of the cadres were flown to Uganda.
Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

Former Minister for the Intelligence Services in South Africa, Ronnie Kasrils, writes about the challenges faced by the African National Congress (ANC) during the transition to peaceful political activism. He explains the ruptures he faced personally as one of the founders of the military wing of the ANC (Umkhonto we Sizwe – MK, or Spear of the Nation), and as a former deputy minister of defence in South Africa, following the end of apartheid and the transition to democracy. The chapter focuses on the establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961, its transformation and demobilisation in 1994, and the challenges of the amalgamation of the previous adversarial military forces into a new South African National Defence Force up to 1999. The chapter also outlies some of the reforms in both the military and the intelligence establishments.

Abstract Nelson Mandela left South Africa in 1962. During his time abroad, he solicited pledges of military training from Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Morocco. The chapter discusses Mandela's arrest following his return home later that year. The chapter also discusses the rise and fall of Poqo in 1962–3, while the struggle between the State and the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in the aftermath of Mandela's arrest is also considered. MK's High Command developed Operation Mayibuye, a blueprint for guerrilla warfare, but its leaders were apprehended in a raid on their underground headquarters at Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia in July 1963. Other dissident groups rolled up in 1963-4 were the Yu Chi Chan Club, and the NCL, which renamed itself the African Resistance Movement.

Abstract This chapter discusses the State of Emergency that followed the Sharpeville Massacre, during which the ANC and PAC were banned, and a revolt in rural Pondoland was crushed by the state. In a referendum, South Africa's Prime Minister, H.F. Verwoerd, obtained white approval to establish a republic, but in the teeth of the hostility of other Commonwealth members, South Africa had to withdraw from that club. Nelson Mandela went underground, organized an abortive strike against the republic, and after that failed, set about obtaining support from his political comrades for an armed struggle. The chapter ends in December 1961 when Umkhonto we Sizwe (of which Mandela was the founding commander), and Poqo, which was an offshoot of the PAC, began military operations. They were joined by a third underground militia, the National Committee of Liberation (NCL).