Academic literature on the topic 'United Nations. General Assembly 1960-1961)'

Jerusalem is a special entity under the administrative power of United Nations according to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, where Jerusalem does not fall under the sovereignty of any state. Jerusalem Embassy Act is the public law of United States which recognized Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel by establishing a diplomatic mission in the city.This paper concludes that Jerusalem Embassy Act is illegitimate according to international law. It turns its back to international obligation under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 and UN resolutions.Thus, the Jerusalem Embassy Act has to be pulled back by the US parliament in order to maintain international peace and security, bearing in mind the ongoing dispute between Palestine and Israel.

In 1977 the World Health Organization recommended that every country throughout the world should have a national plan for child mental health. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has been another important stimulus for child mental health policies and services in many countries. Adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989 and instituted as international law in 1990, the Convention is an agreement on the basic protections that should be accorded to children. Adopted in 1961, the European Social Charter is the major European treaty that secures children's rights. In 1996 the Charter was revised and expanded to include a list of core obligations of the contracting parties relating to the recognition of social, legal and economic rights for children and young persons.

The United Nations established after the Second World War by the winner countries was a key institution which formed the conceptual basis for international development possessed all necessary instruments and knowledge for its implementation in concrete countries. The paper explores a role of two main UN bodies - General Assembly (UN GA) and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in forming and pushing international development from the Organization establishment and till adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. To implement this research task the authors apply content-analysis and comparative historical analysis methods. A special database of the UN GA and ECOSOC documents dated 1946-2000 devoted to the development issues was made as well. The authors come to a conclusion that at the initial stage (1946-1959) both the UN GA and ECOSOC handled the similar tasks aimed at creating a new system of development institutions. After the adoption in 1961 the first Development Decade by the UN and till 2000 a process of division of powers of two bodies started. During this period a share of program documents in the GA discourse increased that laid a foundation for adoption by the global community the MDGs in 2000, operational and organizational issues were absorbed by the ECOSOC. The UN General Assembly was an important platform for the international dialogue on development which made it possible for the global community to adopt the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the 21st century. The UN GA acted as a catalyzing power for inclusion of new development issues in the agenda and creations of instruments and mechanisms for their implementation. The ECOSOC played a technical and coordinating role in a process of elaborating the international development agenda.

On the occasion of the 130th anniversary of the birth of Academician V. M.Koretsky his activity at the United Nations is highlighted, which covers the period 1946–1970 in its structures of the codification and progressive development of international law. These are bodies like the General Assembly, the Committee on Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, the International Law Commission, the Human Rights Commission and its Editorial committee for the preparation of the draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His participation in a number of international conferences held within the UN and also his work as a Judge of the UN International Court of Justice (1961–1970) are shown. The life path of the Scholar and the role in the creation of the Institute of State and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which rightly bears his name, are traced. The comparison of the largest in the history of international relations codification and progressive development of international law, which carried out in conditions of raising legal awareness of the peoples in connection with the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations, with the current period of instability in international relations threatening the peoples of World War III is made. The current state of international relations is characterized by the decline of authority of international law and the erosion of the international legal order established by the UN Charter as a consequence of the crisis of the liberal economy and related globalization of international relations

ABSTRACT At the beginning of the industrial atomic age, launched by President Dwight Eisenhower's speech on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (“Atoms for Peace”, addressed to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 8 December 1953), and after the birth of the first atomic agencies in France (Commissariat a l'Énergie Atomique, 1945) and the United States (the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1946), the Comitato Nazionale per le Ricerche Nucleari (National Committee for Nuclear Research–CNRN) was also established in Italy (1952). The new institution, in 1960 became a self-governing organization with a modified name, Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare (National Committee for Nuclear Energy–CNEN). Its mission was to promote and develop Italian research in nuclear science and technology. Mining and mineral exploration were among the early activities that the National Committee undertook beginning in 1954, when the Divisione Geomineraria (Geology and Mining Division) was established. A regional-scale geochemical and geophysical prospecting survey for U-Th bearing ores involved different Italian regions both in northern and in southern Italy. Geological surveys, for instance, were systematically carried out in the Alps beginning in 1954. They were run by three main teams of geologists. The paper aims to analyze the key factors that contributed to fostering the emergence of a new field of research about uranium and nuclear geology in Italy during the years immediately after WWII.

On February 25, 2019, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965. The judges held by a majority of 13:1 that the process of decolonisation of Mauritius is incomplete, owing to the separation of the Chagos Archipelago shortly before Mauritian independence, that the United Kingdom should end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, and that all Member States of the United Nations should cooperate to complete the decolonisation of Mauritius. The (partial) decolonisation of Mauritius in 1968 and the treatment of the Chagos islanders (Chagossians) have important parallels with the purported decolonisation of Greenland in 1952–54. In both cases, the consultative body of the colonised people was neither fully independent nor representative of all the people concerned. No real choice was given to either body; rather the colonial power offered only the continuation of the status quo or professed self-determination on terms defined by the colonial power itself. Furthermore, the process of decolonisation was inherently linked to the forcible transfer of people in order to make way for a United States military facility. Nevertheless, there are some relevant differences. First of all, Greenland was purportedly decolonised in 1953, some seven years before the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UNGA Res. 1514(XV) 1960). Second, the UN General Assembly accepted the Danish government’s representations regarding the full decolonisation of Greenland (UNGA Res. 849 (1954), in contrast to their position regarding Mauritius that decolonisation was and remains incomplete, owing to the separation of the Chagos Archipelago (UNGA Res(XX) 1965). Third, though the Chagossians have been recognised as indigenous at the UN, the British government has continually denied this status and (mis)characterises them as a transient people, while Denmark has accepted the status of the Greenlanders as both an indigenous people and a colonial people, entitled to self-determination. This article examines the implications for the judgment for the Greenland case as well as broader questions of self-determination of peoples. It concludes that the colonial boundaries continue to govern in decolonisation cases, with the consequence that the Greenlanders are likely to be held to be a single people; that the erga omnes character of the right to self-determination means that all States must cooperate to facilitate Greenlanders’ choices for their future; and that there remain significant procedural hurdles that prevent colonial and indigenous peoples having their voices heard, even in the matters that concern them most of all.

This article uses the history of partition to assess when self-determination became a rule of customary international law prohibiting partition as a method of decolonization. In so doing it revisits the partitions of Indochina, Korea, India, Palestine, Cyprus, South Africa, and South West Africa, and explains that UN practice underwent a transformation when the UN General Assembly opposed the United Kingdom’s partition proposals for Cyprus in 1958. Two years later, the UN General Assembly condemned any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country in Resolution 1514 (1960). The illegality of partition under customary international law was raised during the second phase of the South West Africa Cases (1960–1966) in respect of South Africa’s homelands policy, but the International Court of Justice (ICJ) infamously did not address the merits of those cases. The illegality of partition was also raised in the arbitration between the United Kingdom and Mauritius over the establishment of the British Indian Ocean Territory in 1965. Like the ICJ in the South West Africa Cases, the Arbitral Tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction to address the legality of the British excision of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, even though the legality of the excision was argued at length between counsels for Mauritius and the United Kingdom in their oral pleadings and written statements. However, in their joint dissenting opinion, Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum and Judge James Kateka expressed their opinion that self-determination had developed before 1965, and that consequently the partition was unlawful. This paper agrees that selfdetermination prohibited the partition of Mauritius to establish the British Indian Ocean Territory, a new colony, in 1965 although self-determination probably did not emerge as a rule of customary international law until the adoption of the human rights covenants in 1966, after the excision of the Chagos Archipelago in 1965, but before the passage of the Mauritius Independence Act in 1968.

Ali Mazrui was born in 1933 in Mombasa, Kenya. Sent to England in 1955 for his secondary school education, he remained there until he earned hisB.A. (1960, politics and philosophy) with distinction from the University of Manchester. He received his M.A. (1961, government and politics) and Ph.D. (1966, philosophy) from Columbia and Oxford universities, respectively. In Africa, he taught political science at Uganda’s Makerere University College (1963-73), and then returned to the United States to teach at the University of Michigan (1974-91) and New York’s Binghamton University (1991-2014). An avatar of controversy, Mazrui was also legendary for the fertility of his mind. Nelson Mandela viewed him as “an outstanding educationist” 1 and Kofi Annan, former secretary-general of the United Nations, referred to him as “Africa’s gift to the world.”2 Salim Ahmed Salim, former secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity and prime minister of Tanzania wrote: Ali Mazrui provided [many of us] with the illuminating light to understand the reality we have been confronting. He armed us with the tools of engagement and inspired us with his eloquence, clarity of ideas while all the time maintaining the highest degree of humility, respect for fellow human beings, and an unflagging commitment to justice.

Ali Mazrui was born in 1933 in Mombasa, Kenya. Sent to England in 1955 for his secondary school education, he remained there until he earned hisB.A. (1960, politics and philosophy) with distinction from the University of Manchester. He received his M.A. (1961, government and politics) and Ph.D. (1966, philosophy) from Columbia and Oxford universities, respectively. In Africa, he taught political science at Uganda’s Makerere University College (1963-73), and then returned to the United States to teach at the University of Michigan (1974-91) and New York’s Binghamton University (1991-2014). An avatar of controversy, Mazrui was also legendary for the fertility of his mind. Nelson Mandela viewed him as “an outstanding educationist” 1 and Kofi Annan, former secretary-general of the United Nations, referred to him as “Africa’s gift to the world.”2 Salim Ahmed Salim, former secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity and prime minister of Tanzania wrote: Ali Mazrui provided [many of us] with the illuminating light to understand the reality we have been confronting. He armed us with the tools of engagement and inspired us with his eloquence, clarity of ideas while all the time maintaining the highest degree of humility, respect for fellow human beings, and an unflagging commitment to justice.

Constant demand for new naval and commercial vessels has created special conditions for the Government-owned Soviet shipbuilding industry, which practically has not been affected by the world shipbuilding crisis. On the other hand, such chronic diseases of the centralized economy as lack of incentive, material shortage and poor workmanship cause specific problems for ship construction. Being technically and financially unable to rapidly improve the overall technology level and performance of the entire industry, the Soviets concentrate their efforts on certain important areas and have achieved significant results, especially in welding and cutting titanium and aluminum alloys, modular production methods, standardization, etc. All productivity improvement efforts are supported by an army of highly educated engineers and scientists at shipyards, in multiple scientific, research and design institutions. Discussion Edwin J. Petersen, Todd Pacific Shipyards Three years ago I addressed the Ship Production Symposium as chairman of the Ship Production Committee and outlined some major factors which had contributed to the U.S. shipbuilding industry's remarkable achievements in building and maintaining the world's largest naval and merchant fleets during the five-year period starting just before World War II. The factors were as follows:There was a national commitment to get the job done. The shipbuilding industry was recognized as a needed national resource. There was a dependable workload. Standardization was extensively and effectively utilized. Shipbuilding work was effectively organized. Although these lessons appear to have been lost by our Government since World War II, the paper indicates that the Soviet Union has picked up these principles and has applied them very well to its current shipbuilding program. The paper also gives testimony to the observation that the Soviet Government recognizes the strategic and economic importance of a strong merchant fleet as well as a powerful naval fleet. In reviewing the paper, I found great similarity between the Soviet shipbuilding productivity improvement efforts and our own efforts or goals under the National Shipbuilding Research Program in the following areas:welding technology, flexible automation (robotics), application of group technology, standardization, facilities development, and education and training. In some areas, the Soviet Union appears to be well ahead of the United States in improving the shipbuilding process. Most noteworthy among these is the stable long-and medium-range planning that is possible by virtue of the use and adherence to the "Table of Vessel Classes." It will be obvious to most who hear and read these comments what a vast and significant improvement in shipbuilding costs and schedules could be achieved with a relatively dependable 15year master ship procurement plan for the U.S. naval and merchant fleets. Another area where the Soviet Union appears to lead the United States is in the integration of ship component suppliers into the shipbuilding process. This has been recognized as a vital step by the National Shipbuilding Research Program, but so far we have not made significant progress. A necessary prerequisite for this "supplier integration" is extensive standardization of ship components, yet another area in which the Soviets have achieved significantly greater progress than we have. Additional areas of Soviet advantage are the presence of a multilevel research and development infrastructure well supported by highly educated scientists, engineering and technical personnel; and better integration of formally educated engineering and technical personnel into the ship production process. In his conclusion, the author lists a number of problems facing the Soviet economy that adversely affect shipbuilding productivity. Perhaps behind this listing we can delve out some potential U.S. shipbuilding advantages. First, production systems in U.S. shipyards (with the possible exception of naval shipyards) are probably more flexible and adjustable to meet new circumstances as a consequence of not being constrained by a burdensome centralized bureaucracy, as is the case with Soviet shipyards. Next, such initiatives as the Ship Production Committee's "Human Resources Innovation" projects stand a better chance of achieving product-oriented "production team" relationship among labor, management, and technical personnel than the more rigid Soviet system, especially in view of the ability of U.S. shipyard management to offer meaningful financial incentives without the kind of bureaucratic constraints imposed in the Soviet system. Finally, the current U.S. Navy/shipbuilding industry cooperative effort to develop a common engineering database should lead to a highly integrated and disciplined ship design, construction, operation, and maintenance system for naval ships (and subsequently for commercial ships) that will ultimately restore the U.S. shipbuilding process to a leadership position in the world marketplace (additional references [16] and [17]).On that tentatively positive note, it seems fitting to close this discussion with a question: Is the author aware of any similar Soviet effort to develop an integrated computer-aided design, production and logistics support system? The author is to be congratulated on an excellent, comprehensive insight into the Soviet shipbuilding process and productivity improvement efforts that should give us all adequate cause not to be complacent in our own efforts. Peter M. Palermo, Naval Sea Systems Command The author presents an interesting paper that unfortunately leaves this reader with a number of unanswered questions. The paper is a paradox. It depicts a system consisting of a highly educated work force, advanced fabrication processes including the use of standardized hull modules, sophisticated materials and welding processes, and yet in the author's words they suffer from "low productivity, poor product quality, . . . and the rigid production systems which resists the introduction of new ideas." Is it possible that incentive, motivation, and morale play an equally significant role in achieving quality and producibility advances? Can the author discuss underlying reasons for quality problems in particular—or can we assume that the learning curves of Figs. 5 and Fig. 6 are representative of quality improvement curves? It has been my general impression that quality will improve with application of high-tech fabrication procedures, enclosed fabrication ways, availability of highly educated welding engineers on the building ways, and that productivity would improve with the implementation of modular or zone outfitting techniques coupled with the quality improvements. Can the author give his impressions of the impact of these innovations in the U.S. shipbuilding industry vis-a-vis the Soviet industry? Many of the welding processes cited in the paper are also familiar to the free world, with certain notable exceptions concerning application in Navy shipbuilding. For example, (1) electroslag welding is generally confined to single-pass welding of heavy plates; application to thinner plates—l1/4 in. and less when certified—would permit its use in more applications than heretofore. (2) Electron beam welding is generally restricted to high-technology machinery parts; vacuum chamber size restricts its use for larger components (thus it must be assumed that the Soviets have solved the vacuum chamber problem or have much larger chambers). (3) Likewise, laser welding has had limited use in U.S. shipbuilding. An interesting theme that runs throughout the paper, but is not explicitly addressed, is the quality of Soviet ship fitting. The use of high-tech welding processes and the mention of "remote controlled tooling for welding and X-ray testing the butt, and for following painting" imply significant ship fitting capabilities for fitting and positioning. This is particularly true if modules are built in one facility, outfitted and assembled elsewhere depending on the type of ship required. Any comments concerning Soviet ship fitting capabilities would be appreciated. The discussion on modular construction seems to indicate that the Soviets have a "standard hull module" that is used for different types of vessels, and if the use of these hull modules permit increasing hull length without changes to the fore and aft ends, it can be assumed that they are based on a standard structural design. That being the case, the midship structure will be overdesigned for many applications and optimally designed for very few. Recognizing that the initial additional cost for such a piece of hull structure is relatively minimal, it cannot be forgotten that the lifecycle costs for transporting unnecessary hull weight around can have significant fuel cost impacts. If I perceived the modular construction approach correctly, then I am truly intrigued concerning the methods for handling the distributive systems. In particular, during conversion when the ship is lengthened, how are the electrical, fluid, communications, and other distributive systems broken down, reassembled and tested? "Quick connect couplings" for these type systems at the module breaks is one particular area where economies can be achieved when zone construction methods become the order of the day in U.S. Navy ships. The author's comments in this regard would be most welcome. The design process as presented is somewhat different than U.S. Navy practice. In U.S. practice, Preliminary and Contract design are developed by the Navy. Detail design, the development of the working drawings, is conducted by the lead shipbuilder. While the detail design drawings can be used by follow shipbuilders, flexibility is permitted to facilitate unique shipbuilding or outfitting procedures. Even the contract drawings supplied by the Navy can be modified— upon Navy approval—to permit application of unique shipbuilder capabilities. The large number of college-trained personnel entering the Soviet shipbuilding and allied fields annually is mind-boggling. According to the author's estimation, a minimum of about 6500 college graduates—5000 of which have M.S. degrees—enter these fields each year. It would be most interesting to see a breakdown of these figures—in particular, how many naval architects and welding engineers are included in these figures? These are disciplines with relatively few personnel entering the Navy design and shipbuilding field today. For example, in 1985 in all U.S. colleges and universities, there were only 928 graduates (B.S., M.S. and Ph.D.) in marine, naval architecture and ocean engineering and only 1872 graduates in materials and metallurgy. The number of these graduates that entered the U.S. shipbuilding field is unknown. Again, the author is to be congratulated for providing a very thought-provoking paper. Frank J. Long, Win/Win Strategies This paper serves not only as a chronicle of some of the productivity improvement efforts in Soviet shipbuilding but also as an important reminder of the fruits of those efforts. While most Americans have an appreciation of the strengths of the Russian Navy, this paper serves to bring into clearer focus the Russians' entire maritime might in its naval, commercial, and fishing fleets. Indeed, no other nation on earth has a greater maritime capability. It is generally acknowledged that the Soviet Navy is the largest in the world. When considering the fact that the commercial and fishing fleets are, in many military respects, arms of the naval fleet, we can more fully appreciate how awesome Soviet maritime power truly is. The expansion of its maritime capabilities is simply another but highly significant aspect of Soviet worldwide ambitions. The development and updating of "Setka Typov Su dov" (Table of Vessel Classes), which the author describes is a classic example of the Soviet planning process. As the author states, "A mighty fishing and commercial fleet was built in accordance with a 'Setka' which was originally developed in the 1960's. And an even more impressive example is the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy." In my opinion it is not mere coincidence that the Russians embarked on this course in the 1960's. That was the beginning of the coldest of cold war periods—Francis Gary Power's U-2 plane was downed by the Russians on May 1, 1960; the mid-May 1960 Four Power Geneva Summit was a bust; the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961 and, in 1962, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States maritime embargo capability in that crisis undoubtedly influenced the Soviet's planning process. It is a natural and normal function of a state-controlled economy with its state-controlled industries to act to bring about the controlled productivity improvement developments in exactly the key areas discussed in the author's paper. As the author states, "All innovations at Soviet shipyards have originated at two main sources:domestic development andadaptation of new ideas introduced by leading foreign yards, or most likely a combination of both. Soviet shipbuilders are very fast learners; moreover, their own experience is quite substantial." The Ship Production Committee of SNAME has organized its panels to conduct research in many of these same areas for productivity improvement purposes. For example, addressing the areas of technology and equipment are Panels SP-1 and 3, Shipbuilding Facilities and Environmental Effects, and Panel SP-7, Shipbuilding Welding. Shipbuilding methods are the province of SP-2; outfitting and production aids and engineering and scientific support are the province of SP-4, Design Production Integration. As I read through the descriptions of the processes that led to the productivity improvements, I was hoping to learn more about the organizational structure of Soviet shipyards, the managerial hierarchy and how work is organized by function or by craft in the shipyard. (I would assume that for all intents and purposes, all Russian yards are organized in the same way.) American shipyard management is wedded to the notion that American shipbuilding suffers immeasurably from a productivity standpoint because of limitations on management's ability to assign workers across craft lines. It is unlikely that this limitation exists in Soviet shipyards. If it does not, how is the unfettered right of assignment optimized? What are the tangible, measurable results? I believe it would have been helpful, also, for the author to have dedicated some of the paper to one of the most important factors in improvement in the labor-intensive shipbuilding industry—the shipyard worker. There are several references to worker problems—absenteeism, labor shortage, poor workmanship, and labor discipline. The reader is left with the impression that the Russians believe that either those are unsolvable problems or have a priority ranking significantly inferior to the organizational, technical, and design efforts discussed. As a case in point, the author devotes a complete section to engineering education and professional training but makes no mention of education or training programs for blue-collar workers. It would seem that a paper on productivity improvement efforts in Soviet shipbuilding would address this most important element. My guess is that the Russians have considerable such efforts underway and it would be beneficial for us to learn of them.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att analysera Dag Hammarskjölds medlande och diplomatiska agerande under Kongokrisen 1960-1961. Uppsatsen är grundad i Thomas Princens teori om intermediärt medlande med taktiker och tekniker som metodologiska verktyg. Studiens resultat visar att Hammarskjöld aktivt medlade med en tydlig preferens för Léopoldville faktionen samt att han undvek att tydligt tillgodose FN:s rådgivande kommitté med information om en diplomatisk policy som han själv skapade. Denna bild skiljer sig från den tidigare forskningen som främst har idealiserat Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjölds diplomati var även karakteriserat av en ambivalent relation till medlarrollen där han vid tillfällen snarare var en disputant än en medlare. Genom analysen av Hammarskjölds medlande under Kongokrisen har forskningen om generalsekreterarens diplomatiska agerande utökats.