Academic literature on the topic 'United Nations (UN)'

This thesis examines compliance with international human rights law in United Nations (UN) operations. It focuses on the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance, and on the assumption of administrative powers by the UN both de Jure (international administrations of territory) and de facto (refugee camps). It is argued that in these operations the UN has the functional capacity to have a direct impact on individuals and on the enjoyment of their fundamental rights. In part using case studies (the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, the UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, and refugee camps in Kenya), it is shown that acts in violation of human rights have indeed been committed in the course of these operations. Although the UN is not itself a party to human rights treaties, various arguments are made to justify the applicability of international human rights law to the UN, and to its specialised programmes and agencies. Mechanisms - political, administrative, judicial and semi-judicial - for ensuring the accountability of the UN for violations of human rights are examined. However, existing mechanisms are largely inadequate. They neither offer remedies to the victims of the violations, nor impose sanctions on the perpetrators; their ability to modify future institutional conduct is also limited.

As a mode of intervention in which the UN assumed direct authority over disrupted states, transitional administrations represent unique examples of ambitious state-building projects. This thesis investigates the apparent failure of transitional administrations to establish the rule of law in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. It identifies nine explanatory factors which are tested against each case study. In addition, it seeks to enhance conceptual understandings of the UN???s state-building agenda and to add to empirical studies regarding attempts by external actors to establish the rule of law in disrupted states. Three findings emerge. First, in each case, UN transitional administrations failed in each of the following ways: to make the best use of their mandate; to establish effective state justice institutions; to build local commitment to the rule of law as a value system; to promote social relationships supportive of the rule of law; to ensure sufficient state capacity post-intervention; to maintain adequate levels of security; to address the existence of informal justice structures; to deal with the legacies of the past; and to ensure an adequate level of mission performance. Of these, establishing effective state justice institutions, building local commitment and addressing informal justice structures proved most crucial. Second, the state-based ???enforcement??? approach adopted by transitional administrations proved ineffective. Enacting laws and establishing coercive state structures such as judicial, police and prison services were critical to, but could not be equated with the rule of law. This approach did not account sufficiently for the importance of entrenched informal justice institutions, of the voluntary consent of local actors, or of appropriate institutional design choices. As a result, it did not offer real solutions to real problems faced by local actors. Finally, the UN failed to consider fully how to create an enabling ???space??? in which internal processes of change could occur, to engage appropriately with local actors, to overcome the tyrannies of truncated deployment, or to address these issues at the ???front-end??? of the mission. This ???entry without strategy??? approach to state-building seriously undermined the UN???s ability to establish the rule of law, as the self-declared touchstone of its state-building agenda.

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The aim of this study is to evaluate the United Nations (UN) role in the resolution, management and termination of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with specific reference to the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The aim emanates from the basic research question: To what extent did the deployment of MONUC contribute to the termination of internal conflict in the DRC and create conditions conducive for the holding of democratic elections? The research problem generated four subsidiary questions: Was the intention of the drafters of the Lusaka Agreement for the UN converted into a viable peacekeeping mission, especially in the early phases of the mission? Did MONUC receive adequate resources to fulfil its task, commensurate with the size and complexity of the operational theatre and its mandate? Why was a development such as the deployment of Interim Emergency Multi National Force (IEMF) in Ituri (2003) necessary, given the fact that MONUC was deployed? Were the expectations regarding MONUC involvement in the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement and repatriation (DDRRR) programme and the domestic disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR) programme realistic? Therefore four sub-problems were addressed, namely the issue of the mission mandate; the resourcing of the mission relative to the mandate and the operational theatre; the external augmentation of the mission; and the MONUC role in DDRRR and DDR. Following a definition of the concept internal conflict and a discussion of the factors contributing to internal conflict, the theory of peacekeeping was described to determine a framework for the evaluation of the UN peace mission in the DRC, based on the recommendations of the 2000 Brahimi Report. Emphasis was placed on the mandate, force levels and composition, and operational capability. A historic overview contextualised the complex conflict situation in the DRC that the UN was required to help ameliorate. MONUC made a contribution to the termination of internal conflict in the DRC by managing the conflict in a fashion that permitted democratic elections to be held. This was achieved despite the fact that the actual deployment of MONUC (in terms of its functioning, especially regarding DDRRR) did not meet the requirements for a UN force as envisaged by the signatories of the 1999 Lusaka Agreement. The expectations of the signatories regarding DDRRR were not realistic, but the UN response in terms of the mandate and allocation of resources also fell far below what was required to establish a credible UN peace mission. The graduated approach ensured a reactive MONUC posture in the field, but the reticence to provide adequate resources in response to political and operational developments necessitated the external augmentation of the mission on two occasions. While this development brought a new facet of ‘co-deployment’ in UN peacekeeping operations to he fore, it also served to highlight the MONUC deficiencies in terms of its ‘responsibility to protect’ civilians under threat of violence. MONUC was mandated from its inception to discharge this responsibility, without receiving the necessary resources to enable the conduct of operations to protect civilians. This inability resulted in the mission lacking credibility amongst the population of the DRC. Copyright<br>Dissertation (MSS)--University of Pretoria, 2010.<br>Political Sciences<br>MSS<br>Unrestricted