Academic literature on the topic 'United States. Army. Organized Reserve Corps'

If statesmanship can be characterized as a bed rock of principles, a strong moral compass, a vision, and an ability to articulate and effect that vision, then the fortitude, tenacity, imperturbability, and resilience of William Crawford Gorgas cannot be overestimated. As Chief Sanitary Officer in Cuba and as Chief Medical Officer in Panama, he actualized strategies to eradicate the vectors of yellow fever and malaria. His superiors initially pigeonholed his requisitions, refused to provide him with any authority, and clamored for his dismissal. Nevertheless, with dogged persistence he created a coalition of the willing, who eventually implemented those reforms. As Surgeon General in the United States Army, he organized and expanded the Active Duty and Medical Reserve Corps in anticipation of World War I. Skilled university affiliated surgeons and personnel from throughout North America, manned base hospitals in Europe. Those lessons impacted upon subsequent military and civilian surgical care—organizationally, logistically, and clinically. He was universally recognized for his bonhomie, savoir-faire, modesty, discretion, decorum, courtesy, and graciousness. To those attributes must be added his devotion to duty, discipline, integrity, and authenticity, which characterized his leadership and statesmanship. Those attributes are most worthy of emulation and perpetuation by clinicians, academicians, educators, and investigators.

Abstract Introduction U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advanced Camp (AC) is a 29-day training that assesses military skills and leadership potential in college students training to become Commissioned Officers (i.e. Cadets). Military trainings are widely known to disrupt normative sleep. Additionally, operational sleep disruption is linked to performance decrements. This study examined the ability for objective and subjective sleep during ROTC AC to predict Cadet performance. Methods One hundred and fifty-nine ROTC Cadets (age 22.06±2.49 years; 76.1% male) wore an actiwatch device continuously for 29 days during AC. Paper surveys administered at the end of AC captured subjective sleep metrics during the training. ROTC instructors evaluated Cadet performance and provided scores of overall class rank and summary performance. Multiple and ordinal linear regressions assessed the predicative utility of subjective (sleep duration [SD]; Global score [Global] from the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index) and objective (Total Sleep Time [TST]; Sleep Efficiency [SE]; Sleep Latency Onset [SOL]; Wake After Sleep Onset [WASO] from actigraphy) sleep on performance. Results The interaction of SD and Global, when controlling for age and gender, significantly predicted increased Cadet rank, F(4,153) = 3.09, p = 0.018. Models testing the prediction of SD and Global on summary performance score were non-significant. Further, regressing of both Cadet rank and summary performance individually on objective sleep metrics, when controlling for age and gender, resulted in non-significant findings. Conclusion Subjective and objective sleep showed no significant individual predictive utility on performance. However, the combined subjective model significantly predicted that Cadets who slept worse (lower SD; higher Global) during AC received a lower rank at the end of the training. These findings suggest there may be a unique combined predictive utility of subjective sleep on performance when compared to the predictive power of individual variables. Therefore, subjective sleep may be better for predicting operational performance than objective sleep. Future analyses will refine these models and examine how performance on individual AC events may be influenced by sleep. Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC). Support (if any):

Abstract Introduction In military service members, high risk-taking behavior (RTB; e.g., looking to start a fight, reckless driving) leads to injury, judicial reprimand, and removal from military service. Consequently, reducing RTB has become a priority of the United States (U.S.) Army, and identifying modifiable antecedents of RTB has become critical. In non-military populations, in-lab studies have shown sleep restriction/deprivation leads to risky decision-making. We assessed whether sleep duration/quality and RTB are related in U.S. Army soldiers in operationally-relevant settings. Methods Sleep and RTB questionnaire data were collected in 4 unique samples: U.S. Army soldiers from an Armored Brigade Combat Team, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Cadets, Special Operations infantrymen, and elite mountain warfare instructors. We aggregated data to conduct a mega-analysis, which is a combined analysis of original raw data. We assessed whether RTB (assessed with an in-house measure of soldier-specific RTB) was correlated with nightly sleep hours (n=2175), Insomnia Severity Index (n=1076), and Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index scores (n=503). Next, using a linear regression, we assessed whether sleep duration was a predictor of RTB while controlling for relevant demographic factors (age, gender, marital status, combat experience, years of education, rank, years of service; n=1198). Results Higher RTB was correlated with lower sleep duration (r=-.23,p<.001), more insomnia symptoms (r=.29,p<.001), and poorer sleep quality (r=.20,p<.001). In the full model, lower age (B=-.02,p=.03) and higher combat experience (B=.05,p=.006) predicted higher RTB. Sleep duration remained a significant (and the strongest) predictor of RTB (B=-.18,p<.001). Conclusion Military leaders should work to build in more sleep opportunities and remove environmental sleep disruptors during training and deployment operations. Leaders should also monitor soldier behavior after military operations that require sleep loss in order to reduce RTB, and, consequently, increase the readiness of the force. Support This work was supported by the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP). The opinions and assertions contained herein are the private views of the authors and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views of the US Army or of the US Department of Defense. This abstract has been approved for public release with unlimited distribution.

Context Historical research on pathology and laboratory medicine services in World War I has been limited. In the Spanish American War, these efforts were primarily focused on tropical diseases. World War I problems that could be addressed by pathology and laboratory medicine were strikingly different because of the new field of clinical pathology. Geographic differences, changing war tactics, and trench warfare created new issues. Objectives To describe the scope of pathology and laboratory medicine services in World War I and the value these services brought to the war effort. Methods Available primary and secondary sources related to American Expeditionary Forces' laboratory services were analyzed and contrasted with the British and German approaches. Results The United States entered the war in April 1917. Colonel Joseph Siler, MD, a career medical officer, was the director, and Colonel Louis B. Wilson, MD, head of pathology at the Mayo Clinic, was appointed assistant director of the US Army Medical Corps Division of Laboratories and Infectious Disease, based in Dijon, France. During the next year, they organized 300 efficient laboratories to support the American Expeditionary Forces. Autopsies were performed to better understand treatment of battlefield injuries, effects of chemical warfare agents, and the influenza pandemic; autopsies also generated teaching specimens for the US Army Medical Museum. Bacteriology services focused on communicable diseases. Laboratory testing for social diseases was very aggressive. Significant advances in blood transfusion techniques, which allowed brief blood storage, occurred during the war but were not primarily overseen by laboratory services. Conclusions Both Siler and Wilson received Distinguished Service Medals. Wilson's vision for military pathology services helped transform American civilian laboratory services in the 1920s.

Abstract Introduction U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Cadets are college students training to be Army Officers. During a month-long capstone course (Advanced Camp), Cadets are rated on their leadership ability. Little work has been done to determine predictors of leadership ability at Advanced Camp. This study examined the effect of poor sleep and mood disorders -- two prevalent factors among college students -- on leadership ability. Methods Metrics on leadership, sleep quality, anxiety, and depression, were assessed in 159 ROTC Cadets (22.06±2.49 years; 23.90%female) at Days 1 (Baseline), 14 (Mid), and 29 (Post) of Advanced Camp. Leadership ratings were determined by ROTC Instructors over the course of Advanced Camp (1–5 score; higher score indicates poorer leadership). Predictors were the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7, and Patient Health Questionnaire-9. The relationships between the predictors and leadership scores were tested using linear regression. The interaction between mood disorders and sleep quality on leadership was tested using SPSS Process (Model 1). Results Poorer sleep quality at the Post time point (reflecting the prior 2 weeks of sleep) predicted poorer leadership (B=.05,p=.03), while sleep quality from Baseline (B=.03,p=.14) and Mid (B=.01,p=.67) did not. Higher anxiety and depression scores from all time points predicted poorer leadership (p-values<.03). There was an interaction: higher anxiety and high depression predicted poorer leadership only in the context of poor sleep quality (not good or average sleep quality) [anxiety: R2=.04,F(1,159)=6.04,p=.02; interaction: R2=.03,F(1,155)=5.30,p=.02]. Conclusion The current study identified a relationship between sleep quality and leadership ratings in ROTC cadets. This relationship was moderated by anxiety and depression. ROTC instructors should encourage ROTC Cadets to take advantage of sleep opportunities at Advanced Camp in order to maximize leadership potential. Support Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program (MOMRP) of the United States Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC). Disclaimer: The opinions and assertions contained herein are the private views of the authors and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views of the US Army or of the US

Abstract Introduction U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advanced Camp (AC) is a month-long capstone course that evaluates Cadet leadership. Although the relationship between sleep and objective performance is well established, less is known about how sleep may impact self-perception of performance, especially in the military context. This study examined the impact of habitual sleep on self-expected and objective AC performance. Methods 577 Cadets (age 22.22 ± 2.74; 74.36% male) completed the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) at baseline to measure subjective sleep quality (Global; higher scores indicate poorer sleep quality) and total sleep time (TST) in the month before training. Self-expected AC performance was captured by asking Cadets to estimate what their final performance score would be and objective performance was determined from summary scores from Instructors. Performance discrepancy was calculated as the difference between Cadet’s expected and objective scores. Regression models assessed the predictive utility of habitual TST and Global on performance. Results Ordinal regressions showed that as Global increased, expected AC score also decreased with an OR of .684 (95% CI, -.694 to -.064), Wald χ2(1) = 5.56, p = .018. Further, Global independently predicted performance discrepancies, where the odds of a difference existing between a Cadet’s self-expected and their objective performance was .895 less likely for those with increasing Global (p = .028). Together TST and Global predicted discrepancy magnitude between Cadet self-expected and objective performance, F(2, 349) = 2.99, p = .05, with Global as a independent predictor p < .05. Independent findings related to TST were varied and warrant further testing. Conclusion Cadets with poorer sleep quality prior to AC self-expected to perform worse and had discrepancies between their self-expected and objective performance when compared to those with higher sleep quality. TST enhanced the predictive power of Global when predicting magnitude of performance discrepancy. Therefore future research examining Global, while accounting for TST, is warranted to better understand how sleep may influence self-expectations of military performance. Support (if any) Support for this study came from the Military Operational Medicine Research Program of the United States Army Medical search and Development Command.

Human history has witnessed varied surveillance and counter-surveillance activities from time immemorial. Human beings could not surveille others effectively and accurately without the technology of their era. Technology is a tool that can empower both people and governments. The outcomes are different based on the users’ intentions and aims. 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu noted that ‘If you know both yourself and your enemy, you can win numerous (literally, "a hundred") battles without jeopardy’. His words still ring true. To be a good surveiller and counter-surveiller it is essential to know both sides, and in order to be good at these activities access to technology is vital. There is no doubt that knowledge is power, and without technology to access the information, it is impossible to be powerful. As we become more expert at technology, we will learn what makes surveillance and counter-surveillance more effective, and will be more powerful.“Surveillance” is one of the most important aspects of living in the convergent media environment. This essay illustrates government surveillance and counter-surveillance during the Iranian Green Movement (2009) on social and mobile media. The Green Movement refers to a non-violent movement that arose after the disputed presidential election on June 2009. After that Iran was facing its most serious political crisis since the 1979 revolution. Claims of vote fraud triggered massive street protests. Many took to the streets with “Green” signs, chanting slogans such as ‘the government lied’, and ‘where is my vote?’ There is no doubt that social and mobile media has played an important role in Iran’s contemporary politics. According to Internet World Stats (IWS) Internet users in 2009 account for approximately 48.5 per cent of the population of Iran. In 2009, Iran had 30.2 million mobile phone users (Freedom House), and 72 cellular subscriptions for every 100 people (World Bank). Today, while Iran has the 19th-largest population in the world, its blogosphere holds the third spot in terms of number of users, just behind the United States and China (Beth Elson et al.). In this essay the use of social and mobile media (technology) is not debated, but the extent of this use, and who, why and how it is used, is clearly scrutinised.Visibility and Surveillance There have been different kinds of surveillance for a very long time. However, all types of surveillance are based on the notion of “visibility”. Previous studies show that visibility is not a new term (Foucault Discipline). The new things in the new era, are its scale, scope and complicated ways to watch others without being watched, which are not limited to a specific time, space and group, and are completely different from previous instruments for watching (Andrejevic). As Meikle and Young (146) have mentioned ‘networked digital media bring with them a new kind of visibility’, based on different kinds of technology. Internet surveillance has important implications in politics to control, protect, and influence (Marx Ethics; Castells; Fuchs Critique). Surveillance has been improved during its long history, and evolved from very simple spying and watching to complicated methods of “iSpy” (Andrejevic). To understand the importance of visibility and its relationship with surveillance, it is essential to study visibility in conjunction with the notion of “panopticon” and its contradictory functions. Foucault uses Bentham's notion of panopticon that carries within itself visibility and transparency to control others. “Gaze” is a central term in Bentham’s view. ‘Bentham thinks of a visibility organised entirely around a dominating, overseeing gaze’ (Foucault Eye). Moreover, Thomson (Visibility 11) notes that we are living in the age of ‘normalizing the power of the gaze’ and it is clear that the influential gaze is based on powerful means to see others.Lyon (Surveillance 2) explains that ‘surveillance is any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purpose of influencing or managing those whose data have been granted…’. He mentions that today the most important means of surveillance reside in computer power which allows collected data to be sorted, matched, retrieved, processed, marketed and circulated.Nowadays, the Internet has become ubiquitous in many parts of the world. So, the changes in people’s interactions have influenced their lives. Fuchs (Introduction 15) argues that ‘information technology enables surveillance at a distance…in real time over networks at high transmission speed’. Therefore, visibility touches different aspects of people’s lives and living in a “glasshouse” has caused a lot of fear and anxiety about privacy.Iran’s Green Movement is one of many cases for studying surveillance and counter-surveillance technologies in social and mobile media. Government Surveillance on Social and Mobile Media in Iran, 2009 In 2009 the Iranian government controlled technology that allowed them to monitor, track, and limit access to the Internet, social media and mobiles communication, which has resulted in the surveillance of Green Movement’s activists. The Iranian government had improved its technical capabilities to monitor the people’s behavior on the Internet long before the 2009 election. The election led to an increase in online surveillance. Using social media the Iranian government became even more powerful than it was before the election. Social media was a significant factor in strengthening the government’s power. In the months after the election the virtual atmosphere became considerably more repressive. The intensified filtering of the Internet and implementation of more advanced surveillance systems strengthened the government’s position after the election. The Open Net Initiative revealed that the Internet censorship system in Iran is one of the most comprehensive and sophisticated censorship systems in the world. It emphasized that ‘Advances in domestic technical capacity have contributed to the implementation of a centralized filtering strategy and a reduced reliance on Western technologies’.On the other hand, the authorities attempted to block all access to political blogs (Jaras), either through cyber-security methods or through threats (Tusa). The Centre for Investigating Organized Cyber Crimes, which was founded in 2007 partly ‘to investigate and confront social and economic offenses on the Internet’ (Cyber Police), became increasingly important over the course of 2009 as the government combated the opposition’s online activities (Beth Elson et al. 16). Training of "senior Internet lieutenants" to confront Iran's "virtual enemies online" was another attempt that the Intelligence minister announced following the protests (Iran Media Program).In 2009 the Iranian government enacted the Computer Crime Law (Jaras). According to this law the Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Websites is legally empowered to identify sites that carry forbidden content and report that information to TCI and other major ISPs for blocking (Freedom House). In the late fall of 2009, the government started sending threatening and warning text messages to protesters about their presence in the protests (BBC). Attacking, blocking, hacking and hijacking of the domain names of some opposition websites such as Jaras and Kaleme besides a number of non-Iranian sites such as Twitter were among the other attempts of the Iranian Cyber Army (Jaras).It is also said that the police and security forces arrested dissidents identified through photos and videos posted on the social media that many imagined had empowered them. Furthermore, the online photos of the active protesters were posted on different websites, asking people to identify them (Valizadeh).In late June 2009 the Iranian government was intentionally permitting Internet traffic to and from social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter so that it could use a sophisticated practice called Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to collect information about users. It was reportedly also applying the same technology to monitor mobile phone communications (Beth Elson et al. 15).On the other hand, to cut communication between Iranians inside and outside the country, Iran slowed down the Internet dramatically (Jaras). Iran also blocked access to Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia, Twitter and many blogs before, during and after the protests. Moreover, in 2009, text message services were shut down for over 40 days, and mobile phone subscribers could not send or receive text messages regardless of their mobile carriers. Subsequently it was disrupted on a temporary basis immediately before and during key protests days.It was later discovered that the Nokia Siemens Network provided the government with surveillance technologies (Wagner; Iran Media Program). The Iranian government built a complicated system that enabled it to monitor, track and intercept what was said on mobile phones. Nokia Siemens Network confirmed it supplied Iran with the technology needed to monitor, control, and read local telephone calls [...] The product allowed authorities to monitor any communications across a network, including voice calls, text messaging, instant messages, and web traffic (Cellan-Jones). Media sources also reported that two Chinese companies, Huawei and ZTE, provided surveillance technologies to the government. The Nic Payamak and Saman Payamak websites, that provide mass text messaging services, also reported that operator Hamrah Aval commonly blocked texts with words such as meeting, location, rally, gathering, election and parliament (Iran Media Program). Visibility and Counter-Surveillance The panopticon is not limited to the watchers. Similarly, new kinds of panopticon and visibility are not confined to government surveillance. Foucault points out that ‘the seeing machine was once a sort of dark room into which individuals spied; it has become a transparent building in which the exercise of power may be supervised by society as a whole’ (Discipline 207). What is important is Foucault's recognition that transparency, not only of those who are being observed but also of those who are observing, is central to the notion of the panopticon (Allen) and ‘any member of society will have the right to come and see with his own eyes how schools, hospitals, factories, and prisons function’ (Foucault, Discipline 207). Counter-surveillance is the process of detecting and mitigating hostile surveillance (Burton). Therefore, while the Internet is a surveillance instrument that enables governments to watch people, it also improves the capacity to counter-surveille, and draws public attention to governments’ injustice. As Castells (185) notes the Internet could be used by citizens to watch their government as an instrument of control, information, participation, and even decision-making, from the bottom up.With regards to the role of citizens in counter-surveillance we can draw on Jay Rosen’s view of Internet users as ‘the people formerly known as the audience’. In counter-surveillance it can be said that passive citizens (formerly the audience) have turned into active citizens. And this change was becoming impossible without mobile and social media platforms. These new techniques and technologies have empowered people and given them the opportunity to have new identities. When Thompson wrote ‘the exercise of power in modern societies remains in many ways shrouded in secrecy and hidden from the public gaze’ (Media 125), perhaps he could not imagine that one day people can gaze at the politicians, security forces and the police through the use of the Internet and mobile devices.Furthermore, while access to mobile media allows people to hold authorities accountable for their uses and abuses of power (Breen 183), social media can be used as a means of representation, organization of collective action, mobilization, and drawing attention to police brutality and reasons for political action (Gerbaudo).There is no doubt that having creativity and using alternative platforms are important aspects in counter-surveillance. For example, images of Lt. Pike “Pepper Spray Cop” from the University of California became the symbol of the senselessness of police brutality during the Occupy Movement (Shaw). Iranians’ Counter-Surveillance on Social and Mobile Media, 2009 Iran’s Green movement (2009) triggered a lot of discussions about the role of technology in social movements. In this regard, there are two notable attitudes about the role of technology: techno-optimistic (Shriky and Castells) and techno-pessimistic (Morozov and Gladwell) views should be taken into account. While techno-optimists overrated the role of social media, techno-pessimists underestimated its role. However, there is no doubt that technology has played a great role as a counter-surveillance tool amongst Iranian people in Iran’s contemporary politics.Apart from the academic discussions between techno-optimists and techno-pessimists, there have been numerous debates about the role of new technologies in Iran during the Green Movement. This subject has received interest from different corners of the world, including Western countries, Iranian authorities, opposition groups, and also some NGOs. However, its role as a means of counter-surveillance has not received adequate attention.As the tools of counter-surveillance are more or less the tools of surveillance, protesters learned from the government to use the same techniques to challenge authority on social media.Establishing new websites (such as JARAS, RASA, Kalemeh, and Iran green voice) or strengthening some previous ones (such as Saham, Emrooz, Norooz), also activating different platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube accounts to broadcast the voice of the Iranian Green Movement and neutralize the government’s propaganda were the most important ways to empower supporters of Iran’s Green Movement in counter-surveillance.‘Reporters Without Borders issued a statement, saying that ‘the new media, and particularly social networks, have given populations collaborative tools with which they can change the social order’. It is also mentioned that despite efforts by the Iranian government to prevent any reporting of the protests and due to considerable pressure placed on foreign journalists inside Iran, social media played a significant role in sending the messages and images of the movement to the outside world (Axworthy). However, at that moment, many thought that Twitter performed a liberating role for Iranian dissenters. For example, Western media heralded the Green Movement in Iran as a “Twitter revolution” fuelled by information and communication technologies (ICTs) and social media tools (Carrieri et al. 4). “The Revolution Will Be Twittered” was the first in a series of blog posts published by Andrew Sullivan a few hours after the news of the protests was released.According to the researcher’s observation the numbers of Twitter users inside Iran who tweeted was very limited in 2009 and social media was most useful in the dissemination of information, especially from those inside Iran to outsiders. Mobile phones were mostly influential as an instrument firstly used for producing contents (images and videos) and secondly for the organisation of protests. There were many photos and videos that were filmed by very simple mobile cell phones, uploaded by ordinary people onto YouTube and other platforms. The links were shared many times on Twitter and Facebook and released by mainstream media. The most frequently circulated story from the Iranian protests was a video of Neda Agha-Sultan. Her final moments were captured by some bystanders with mobile phone cameras and rapidly spread across the global media and the Internet. It showed that the camera-phone had provided citizens with a powerful means, allowing for the creation and instant sharing of persuasive personalised eyewitness records with mobile and globalised target populations (Anden-Papadopoulos).Protesters used another technique, DDOS (distributed denial of service attacks), for political protest in cyber space. Anonymous people used DDOS to overload a website with fake requests, making it unavailable for users and disrupting the sites set as targets (McMillan) in effect, shutting down the site. DDOS is an important counter-surveillance activity by grassroots activists or hackers. It was a cyber protest that knocked the main Iranian governmental websites off-line and caused crowdsourcing and false trafficking. Amongst them were Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's supreme leader’s websites and those which belong to or are close to the government or security forces, including news agencies (Fars, IRNA, Press TV…), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Police, and the Ministry of the Interior.Moreover, as authorities uploaded the pictures of protesters onto different platforms to find and arrest them, in some cities people started to put the pictures, phone numbers and addresses of members of security forces and plain clothes police officers who attacked them during the protests and asked people to identify and report the others. They also wanted people to send information about suspects who infringed human rights. Conclusion To sum up, visibility, surveillance and counter-surveillance are not new phenomena. What is new is the technology, which increased their complexity. As Foucault (Discipline 200) mentioned ‘visibility is a trap’, so being visible would be the weakness of those who are being surveilled in the power struggle. In the convergent era, in order to be more powerful, both surveillance and counter-surveillance activities aim for more visibility. Although both attempt to use the same means (technology) to trap the other side, the differences are in their subjects, objects, goals and results.While in surveillance, visibility of the many by the few is mostly for the purpose of control and influence in undemocratic ways, in counter-surveillance, the visibility of the few by the many is mostly through democratic ways to secure more accountability and transparency from the governments.As mentioned in the case of Iran’s Green Movement, the scale and scope of visibility are different in surveillance and counter-surveillance. The importance of what Shaw wrote about Sydney occupy counter-surveillance, applies to other places, such as Iran. She has stressed that ‘protesters and police engaged in a dance of technology and surveillance with one another. Both had access to technology, but there were uncertainties about the extent of technology and its proficient use…’In Iran (2009), both sides (government and activists) used technology and benefited from digital networked platforms, but their levels of access and domains of influence were different, which was because the sources of power, information and wealth were divided asymmetrically between them. Creativity was important for both sides to make others more visible, and make themselves invisible. Also, sharing information to make the other side visible played an important role in these two areas. References Alen, David. “The Trouble with Transparency: The Challenge of Doing Journalism Ethics in a Surveillance Society.” Journalism Studies 9.3 (2008): 323-40. 8 Dec. 2013 ‹http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616700801997224#.UqRFSuIZsqN›. Anden-Papadopoulos, Kari. “Citizen Camera-Witnessing: Embodied Political Dissent in the Age of ‘Mediated Mass Self-Communication.’” New Media & Society 16.5 (2014). 753-69. 9 Aug. 2014 ‹http://nms.sagepub.com/content/16/5/753.full.pdf+html›. Andrejevic, Mark. iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era. Lawrence, Kan: UP of Kansas, 2007. Axworthy, Micheal. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. London: Penguin Books, 2014. Bentham, Jeremy. Panopticon Postscript. London: T. Payne, 1791. Beth Elson, Sara, Douglas Yeung, Parisa Roshan, S.R. Bohandy, and Alireza Nader. Using Social Media to Gauge Iranian Public Opinion and Mood after the 2009 Election. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012. 1 Aug. 2014 ‹http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1161.pdf›. Breen, Marcus. Uprising: The Internet’s Unintended Consequences. Champaign, Ill: Common Ground Pub, 2011. Burton, Fred. “The Secrets of Counter-Surveillance.” Stratfor Global Intelligence. 2007. 19 April 2015 ‹https://www.stratfor.com/secrets_countersurveillance›. Carrieri, Matthew, Ali Karimzadeh Bangi, Saad Omar Khan, and Saffron Suud. After the Green Movement Internet Controls in Iran, 2009-2012. OpenNet Initiative, 2013. 17 Dec. 2013 ‹https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/iranreport.pdf›. Castells, Manuel. The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society. Oxford: Oxford UP: 2001. Cellan-Jones, Rory. “Hi-Tech Helps Iranian Monitoring.” BBC, 2009. 26 July 2014 ‹http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/8112550.stm›. “Cyber Crimes’ List.” Iran: Cyber Police, 2009. 17 July 2014 ‹http://www.cyberpolice.ir/page/2551›. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977. Foucault, Michel. “The Eye of Power.” 1980. 12 Dec. 2013 ‹https://nbrokaw.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/the-eye-of-power.doc›. Freedom House. “Special Report: Iran.” 2009. 14 June 2014 ‹http://www.sssup.it/UploadDocs/4661_8_A_Special_Report_Iran_Feedom_House_01.pdf›. Fuchs, Christian. “Introduction.” Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media. Ed. Christian Fuchs. London: Routledge, 2012. 1-28. Fuchs, Christian. “Critique of the Political Economy of Web 2.0 Surveillance.” Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media. Ed. Christian Fuchs. London: Routledge, 2012. 30-70. Gerbaudo, Paolo. Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism. London: Pluto, 2012. “Internet: Iran’s New Imaginary Enemy.” Jaras Mar. 2009. 28 June 2014 ‹http://www.rahesabz.net/print/12143›.Iran Media Program. “Text Messaging as Iran's New Filtering Frontier.” 2013. 25 July 2014 ‹http://www.iranmediaresearch.org/en/blog/227/13/04/25/136›. Internet World Stats News. The Internet Hits 1.5 Billion. 2009. 3 July 2014 ‹ http://www.internetworldstats.com/pr/edi038.htm›. Lyon, David. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life. Buckingham: Open UP, 2001. Lyon, David. “9/11, Synopticon, and Scopophilia: Watching and Being Watched.” The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility. Eds. Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty. Toronto: UP of Toronto, 2006. 35-54. Marx, Gary T. “What’s New about the ‘New Surveillance’? Classify for Change and Continuity.” Surveillance & Society 1.1 (2002): 9-29. McMillan, Robert. “With Unrest in Iran, Cyber-Attacks Begin.” PC World 2009. 17 Apr. 2015 ‹http://www.pcworld.com/article/166714/article.html›. Meikle, Graham, and Sherman Young. Media Convergence: Networked Digital Media in Everyday Life. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Morozov, Evgeny. “How Dictators Watch Us on the Web.” Prospect 2009. 15 June 2014 ‹http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/how-dictators-watch-us-on-the-web/#.U5wU6ZRdU00›.Open Net. “Iran.” 2009. 26 June 2014 ‹https://opennet.net/research/profiles/iran›. Reporters without Borders. “Web 2.0 versus Control 2.0.” 2010. 27 May 2014 ‹http://en.rsf.org/web-2-0-versus-control-2-0-18-03-2010,36697›.Rosen, Jay. The People Formerly Known as the Audience. 2006. 7 Dec. 2013 ‹http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-rosen/the-people-formerly-known_1_b_24113.html›. Shaw, Frances. “'Walls of Seeing': Protest Surveillance, Embodied Boundaries, and Counter-Surveillance at Occupy Sydney.” Transformation 23 (2013). 9 Dec. 2013 ‹http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_23/article_04.shtml›. “The Warning of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the Weblogs and Websites.” BBC, 2009. 27 July 2014 ‹http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/06/090617_ka_ir88_sepah_internet.shtml›. Thompson, John B. The Media And Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. Thompson, John B. “The New Visibility.” Theory, Culture & Society 22.6 (2005): 31-51. 10 Dec. 2013 ‹http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/22/6/31.full.pdf+html›. Tusa, Felix. “How Social Media Can Shape a Protest Movement: The Cases of Egypt in 2011 and Iran in 2009.” Arab Media and Society 17 (Winter 2013). 15 July 2014 ‹http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=816&p=0›. Tzu, Sun. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. S.l.: Pax Librorum Pub. H, 2009. Valizadeh, Reza. “Invitation to the Public Shooting with the Camera.” RFI, 2011. 19 June 2014 ‹http://www.persian.rfi.fr/%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%84%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-20110307/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86›. Wagner, Ben. Exporting Censorship and Surveillance Technology. Netherlands: Humanist Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries (Hivos), 2012. 7 July 2014 ‹https://hivos.org/sites/default/files/exporting_censorship_and_surveillance_technology_by_ben_wagner.pdf›. World Bank. Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 People). The World Bank. N.d. 27 June 2014 ‹http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2›.

With the current military mental health crisis, it is important to understand the role of the leader in military mental health. First, the impact of military leader behaviors on the well-being of military personnel is reviewed. Next, the role of leader attitudes as a precursor to leader behaviors is discussed. The relation of leader behaviors to leader personality using the NEO Five Factor Model (FFM) is reviewed, as well as the relation of prejudicial attitudes to the NEO FFM personality factors. A research project is described that attempted to draw these concepts together, assessing the NEO FFM personality dimensions and mental health attitudes of US Army ROTC cadets, the future leaders of the US Army. No significant relations were observed between NEO FFM personality traits and mental health attitudes, even after controlling for Impression Management. Also, the predicted positive correlation between positive mental health attitudes and Impression Management was not found. These results suggest that more research and more refined measures are needed in the area of leader attitudes toward soldier mental health problems, and how those attitudes might impact the soldiers.

Past research has shown that members of the military have less favorable beliefs regarding mental health services. To date, no known research has been conducted examining the beliefs about psychological services of students enrolled in ROTC. 136 undergraduate students participated in a study in which the beliefs about psychological services of students in a ROTC program were compared with students in the general college population. Participants completed the Beliefs About Psychological Services (BAPS) scale online. This scale consisted of three subscales that were analyzed independently; Expertness, Stigma Tolerance, and Intent. Results showed that the main effect of ROTC participation on all three subscales of BAPS was significant at the p ≤ 0.005 level. These results suggested that students enrolled in ROTC may have less favorable beliefs about psychological services than students in the general college population. Limitations of the study were discussed and directions for future research include: replication of the findings of this study, the use of a larger and more diverse sample, and the development of methods to improve ROTC students beliefs about psychological services in order to increase the chances of these individuals seeking necessary mental health treatment.
Department of Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services