Academic literature on the topic 'United States. Commission on More Effective Government'

Infant formula must be not only safe but also effective in doing what it is supposed to do, meaning it must be nutritionally adequate. Regulatory agencies have given a great deal of attention to the safety of infant formula, but they have not given enough attention to the issue of nutritional adequacy. In 1981, the Codex Alimentarius Commission said, “Infant formula means a breast-milk substitute specially manufactured to satisfy, by itself, the nutritional requirements of infants during the first months . . .” However, in new rules published in June 2014, the only functional test of infant formula required by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was to require research as whether infant formula led to adequate physical growth. The research is to be done by the manufacturers. The FDA issued no clear guidance on how the research findings were to be assessed and used. The FDA could do much more to ensure that parents, healthcare workers, and relevant government agencies know how different methods of infant feeding compare in relation to their nutritional adequacy.

Exports of technology and items containing technical information are regulated by the United States government. United States export control regulations exist to help protect national security, economic, and political interests. United States defense industry companies manufacture products and develop technologies and information that the United States has a particular interest in protecting. Therefore, defense industry companies must comply with United States export control regulations when exporting items and information to their international partners and customers. An “export” not only includes shipments of hardware or other tangible assets to foreign end-users but also includes the sharing of certain types of information with foreign recipients in the form of phone conversations, emails, meetings, conferences, presentations, and so on. Many employees of defense industry companies travel internationally with company issued laptops and cellphones containing company information that could be viewed by foreign persons. All of these activities are considered exports and may require prior authorization from the United States government under export control regulations. Failure to follow export regulations could result in a violation requiring a report to the United States government that may result in civil penalties or criminal charges. Additionally, intentional as well as unintentional releases of information to certain foreign persons could be detrimental to a defense industry company’s business and reputation and may even result in security concerns for the United States. Although the government has an interest in regulating defense industry companies’ technology and information, critics argue that strong export control regulations may result in invasions of privacy, violations of free speech, and a displacement of the United States as a leader in a world of technological advancement. However, despite current regulations, defense industry information is still at risk of cyberattacks and inadvertent data releases, creating potential threats to national security and the security of company technology and information. In an effort to secure company and sensitive information while exporting, defense industry companies utilize encryption and other cybersecurity measures. Advancing technologies in cybersecurity can help the government and defense industry companies by bolstering the security of their information. These same advancements can also aid attackers in breaking through cybersecurity defenses. Some advances in technology are even preventing law enforcement from gathering necessary information to conduct investigations when cyber-attacks occur, making it difficult to identify criminal actors and seek justice.The United States government faces challenges in creating and up- dating regulations to keep up with consistently advancing technology. Likewise, defense industry companies must adhere to government regulations by creating robust compliance programs, but they should also implement security and compliance measures above and beyond what the government requires to ensure more effective security for their technology and information. This Article discusses the effect of advancing cyber technology; United States export regulations; reporting requirements related to the export of encrypted items; and encryption technology in the defense industry. First, the Article defines encryption and encrypted items. Second, the Article explains United States regulations of ex- ports and specifically, regulations related to encryption and encrypted items. Third, the Article explains the need for defense industry companies to export and to use encrypted items. Fourth, the Article analyzes criticisms of export regulations and the differing views on United States controls. Fifth, the Article will discuss the complexities of com- plying with export regulations and defense industry compliance pro- grams. Sixth, the Article examines the outlook for encryption technology, the future of regulations related to cybersecurity, and the outlook for defense industry security measures and compliance with regulations. The United States government is beginning to recognize the need for more advanced security measures to protect domestically produced technology and information, especially information that puts national security at risk. Specifically, the technology and information produced by United States defense industry companies should be protected from getting into the hands of our foreign adversaries at all costs. In response to the growing need for security measures, the United States government has implemented new programs, commissions, agencies, and projects to create more robust security systems and regulations. The United States should employ the most talented and experienced cybersecurity professionals to innovate and produce security systems that protect our nation’s most sensitive information. The government should then provide these systems to its defense industry companies at minimal cost and should require companies to use the best technology in its security measures. With or without the government’s assistance, defense industry companies within the United States must also implement their own measures of protection. Current policies offer little protection of sensitive and export controlled information including encrypted items and in- formation. In addition, the government should also provide the defense industry companies better guidance and access to resources in order to assist them in protecting the important information and encrypted items.207 For example, any new systems or software purchased by the United States should be made available to defense industry companies as the standard. If the government truly wishes to protect its most important technology and information, it should provide the new systems at minimal cost to the defense industry. Advancements in security programs should be shared with defense industry companies as soon as they are available and ready for use. Nevertheless, the government may not want to provide defense industry companies with the best security technology because in the event that the government needs to conduct an investigation, a company utilizing strong cyber- security and encryption software is much more difficult to investigate. Alternatively, the United States could update current regulations to require that defense industry companies must utilize specific security measures or face a penalty for failing to do so. Such regulation could require defense companies to implement more robust security pro- grams with updated security software. This is a less effective solution as the advancement in cyberattack technology increases so rapidly, and reformed regulations will likely be outdated as soon as they are implemented. It makes more sense to require that defense companies must implement the most updated software and programs determined by government security experts and cyber-security experts. Also, by allowing defense companies to decide which security companies it will work with, the defense companies obtain the option to shop for the best and most expensive program, or the company could choose the cheapest option, resulting in less efficient security. Cybersecurity regulations that are too specific run the risk of being outdated quickly, whereas broad requirements leave the option for companies to implement the lowest of security measures. Even if the government declines these suggested measures, defense industry companies should make the protection of their sensitive in- formation and encrypted items top priority. This method would re- quire complete buy-in from the senior management within the company and a thorough flow-down of cultural beliefs among its employees. A change in norms must be implemented, and defense industry personnel should be inundated with reminders on the importance of information security. Companies should provide employees with easy access to guidance, training, and assistance in handling, sharing, protecting, and exporting sensitive and export controlled information. Changing company culture takes time, and failure to change personnel beliefs will result in a lack of understanding and potential violations of export control regulations. In the worst cases, data spills and cyberattacks could result in the loss of sensitive or even classified in- formation that could jeopardize national security. Huge unauthorized data releases of sensitive information will negatively affect a company’s reputation thus affecting its ability to generate revenue. The risks in using and exporting encryption technology and sensitive information should be a major concern for defense industry companies. This concern should motivate the government to invest significant resources into compliance programs. Resources such as dedicated and qualified personnel can create policy and procedure to ensure compliance with United States government regulations, and the procedures will provide guidance and training to all employees. In addition, companies should employ IT security, data security, and counterintelligence personnel to work with the compliance team in innovating preventive measures and in addressing any potential data releases and export violations. Immediate actions and counter measures should be prioritized not just among the compliance and security teams but should be a known, expected response from all employees. In other words, cybersecurity norms should be instilled company-wide and thoroughly policed from within the company. How a company chooses to implement such measures remains discretionary, but a better resourced compliance department dedicated to implementing effective policies and responding quickly to potential issues will prevent export control violations and data releases of important information. Defense industry companies transfer export controlled information that may subject the United States to security risks. The United States responds to this risk by implementing regulations to control the high- risk exports. Defense industry companies must comply with these regulations. Therefore, defense industry companies should approach exports and cybersecurity from the standpoint that technology is always advancing—failure to simultaneously advance security and compliance measures will leave the country and the company vulnerable to attack.

The Metropolitan Transportation Commission pavement management system (MTC PMS) has been used by many cities and counties in the United States for more than 15 years. MTC PMS was evaluated to determine the extent to which the software can support the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 34 reporting requirements, established in 1999. A local agency PMS can take information from a pavement network database to produce useful reports, which can be utilized jointly with the information from other assets managed by an agency to support the requirements for a comprehensive asset management system and other reporting requirements. The objective of this study was to elaborate GASB 34 requirements for reporting infrastructure assets, examine the capabilities of MTC PMS in supporting those standard requirements, and recommend any modifications of MTC PMS needed to better support GASB 34. It is evident from the study that MTC PMS has the capability, to some extent, of supporting GASB 34 for reporting on a pavement network according to both the GASB 34 reporting methods: the depreciation method and the modified approach. It partially supports the prerequisites for using the modified approach, which require that the managing agency have an asset management system with certain designated characteristics. Some modifications of MTC PMS software were proposed to make this management system more effective as a tool supporting an asset management system and overall GASB 34 requirements.

This article is divided into four parts: the first is a brief survey of race relations in Canada before the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation; the next two parts are devoted to an outline of the scope of this legislation and of the administration and enforcement of it ; finally, the last part suggests some current and possible future developments to make it more effective. Prior to the nineteenth century both the French and the British settlers in the colonies that have become a part of Canada had slaves. Slavery was not, however, very extensive due to lack of large agricultural holdings. At the end of the eighteenth century the legislature in Upper Canada and some judges in Lower Canada limited its expansion and helped to end its practice. The British Imperial Emancipation Act of 1833 brought it to an end. In the next few decades, up to the American Civil War, some Canadians helped run-away slaves from the slave-holding states in the United States, while others actively discouraged them from coming. By the end of the nineteenth century a new source of racial tension arose on the West Coast between the newer immigrants from Asia and the older immigrants from Europe. The result was the enactment of numerous discriminatory laws by the legislature of British Columbia and subsequently, on a lesser scale, by the other western provinces. Most of these remained on the statute books until after World War II. None of these laws were held invalid by the courts on the basis of their discriminatory nature. In addition, both the common law and the Civil Code were interpreted as not prohibiting private discrimination, except by hotel-keepers and common carriers. The change from this situation started in the I930's with a few specific legislative prohibitions of discrimination in specific instances. In the 1940's Ontario, with respect to signs and advertisements and Saskatchewan, with respect to a whole range of activities, enacted legislation prohibiting discrimination, enforcing their prohibitions with penal sanctions. The 1950's saw the introduction of fair employment and fair accommodation practices acts. By the I960's these were being consolidated into comprehensive human rights codes administered by human rights commissions. This trend has continued up to this year, with the result that all eleven jurisdictions have commissions charged with enforcing antidiscrimination codes or acts. The usual, but not invariable, procedure is the laying of a complaint, the investigation of it by the commission staff, an attempt to bring about a settlement and finally, failing that, a hearing before an adjudicative tribunal to determine whether an act of discrimination did occur and, if so, what redress is appropriate. In concluding, three suggestions are made regarding measures that could be taken to strengthen the effectiveness of anti-discrimination legislation: (I) contract compliance; (2) greater independence for the commissions from the government; and (3) giving the legislation paramountcy over other statutes.

Abstract Introduction: Burkitt lymphoma (BL) is an aggressive non-Hodgkin lymphoma with an estimated 1480 new cases diagnosed in the United States in 2016. BL is simultaneously one of the most aggressive lymphomas, with a tumor volume doubling time of just 24 hours, and one of the most curable, with several clinical trials showing 3-year survival rates over 80%. However, recent studies have identified a significant discrepancy between clinical trial and "real-world" survival, implying access to care may play an important role in BL outcomes. A patient's insurance status represents a major factor in the utilization of cancer therapies and outcomes in the United States. Underinsured patients are more likely to be diagnosed at an advanced stage, receive substandard therapy, and have worse outcomes. We examined the effect of insurance status on survival in adults with BL and compared the impact of insurance status on BL outcomes to that seen in plasmablastic lymphoma (PBL), an aggressive lymphoma that has poor outcomes regardless of treatment. Methods: We used data from the National Cancer Database (NCDB), a nationwide, hospital-based cancer registry jointly sponsored by the American Cancer Society and American College of Surgeons that contains 34 million historical records and captures 75% of newly diagnosed cancer cases in the United States. Commission on Cancer (CoC)-accredited facilities report patients' vital status and date of death to the NCDB annually. We included patients > 18 years old diagnosed 2004-2014 with BL or PBL as the primary tumor who received all or part of initial course of treatment at the reporting facility. Patients missing information on insurance status or survival were excluded, as were those who had non-Medicare/Medicaid government insurance (VA, Indian Health Services). Chi-square tests were used to compare sociodemographic and clinical characteristics by insurance status. All analyses were performed for both BL and PBL and stratified on age 65, due to changes in eligibility for Medicare at that age. Kaplan-Meier survival curves were stratified by insurance status, and log-rank tests were performed. Univariate Cox proportional hazard models were generated to describe the unadjusted associations for the covariables, and multivariable Cox proportional hazard models were generated to estimate the hazard ratio (HR) associated with insurance status when adjusted for prognostic factors. Results: We identified 7,073 BL patients and 475 PBL patients in the NCDB who met inclusion criteria. Of the 5235 BL patients < 65 years, 65.0% had private insurance, 17.2% had Medicaid, 7.6% had Medicare, and 10.2% had no insurance. Of the 1838 BL patients ≥ 65 years, 12.9% had private insurance, 1.5% had Medicaid, 85% had Medicare, and 0.65% had no insurance. Uninsured and Medicaid-insured patients were more likely to be Hispanic or black, have lower socioeconomic status (SES), have B symptoms, be HIV-positive, and have a Charlson-Deyo comorbidity score ≥ 2 when compared with privately insured patients. Medicare patients were more likely to be female, have ≥1 comorbidity, and not receive chemotherapy treatment when compared to privately insured patients. BL patients without private insurance had significantly worse overall survival compared to those with private insurance, regardless of age group (adjusted HR age <65: uninsured 1.41 [95% confidence interval 1.2,1.7], Medicaid 1.17 [1,1.4], Medicare 1.5 [1.2,1.8]; adjusted HR age ≥ 65: uninsured 6 [2.1,17.3], Medicare 1.33 [1,1.8]; see Figure). Conversely, Cox regression models demonstrated that PBL patients without private insurance experienced no significant differences in overall survival in either age group. For BL patients age <65, low SES, presence of B symptoms, advanced stage, HIV-positive status, comorbidity score ≥ 2, and lack of treatment were significant, independent predictors of worse outcomes and contributed to the disparities in survival by insurance status. For BL age > 65, B symptoms, comorbidity score ≥ 2, and lack of treatment were significant, independent predictors of worse outcomes. Conclusion: We identified insurance status as an important predictor of clinical outcomes for BL. Our findings suggest that expanding access to care may improve survival disparities in BL, for which curative therapy exists, but not PBL, where more effective therapies are needed to improve outcomes. Disclosures Flowers: Celgene: Consultancy, Research Funding; Bayer: Consultancy; V Foundation: Research Funding; Research to Practice: Research Funding; Infinity: Research Funding; Acerta: Research Funding; National Institutes Of Health: Research Funding; Clinical Care Options: Research Funding; Educational Concepts: Research Funding; Abbvie: Consultancy, Research Funding; Pharmacyclics LLC, an AbbVie Company: Research Funding; OptumRx: Consultancy; Spectrum: Consultancy; Genentech/Roche: Consultancy, Research Funding; National Cancer Institute: Research Funding; Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group: Research Funding; Onyx: Research Funding; Burroughs Welcome Fund: Research Funding; TG Therapeutics: Research Funding; Prime Oncology: Research Funding; Millennium/Takeda: Research Funding; Janssen Pharmaceutical: Research Funding; Seattle Genetics: Consultancy; Gilead: Consultancy.

In 1948 the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) was established to abate pollution of a major river basin in the United States. The commission consists of representatives of eight states in the Ohio River Valley and the United States Government. The necessity of such an interstate commission, representing multiple jurisdictions, reflects the nature of the Ohio River which is approximately 1,580 km in length, transverses six states, and is extensively used for public and industrial water supply, wastewater disposal, transportation, power generation and recreation. ORSANCO's programmes include coordination and communication, setting and enforcing wastewater discharge standards, operating key water quality monitoring programmes for the Ohio River and major tributaries, data assessments and studies to evaluate problems and programmes for remediation, and monitoring when spills occur. The Commission's approach to achieving improved water quality, while at the same time balancing the needs of the users of the river, is accomplished by successfully involving and integrating the various interests in river management (governmental agencies, industry, public utilities, other river users and the general public) into its programme planning and implementation. Thus an intergovernmental agency which encourages co-operation with non-governmental entities can be an effective approach to sustainable management of a major river.

<p><strong>Abstract.</strong> There are a wide variety of initiatives and guidelines recommending publishing government data, especially geospatial data as open data, for instance:</p><p>G8 launched in June 2013 in a meeting in Lough Erne (Ireland) the G8 Open Data Charter recognizing that Open Data improves Governance and it is an innovation engine. Geographic data where included as one of the areas of great value. The eight countries were committed to approve an action plan before 2013 October and yearly publish a report.</p><p>G20 and United Nations supports the International Open Data Charter since 2015 extending the former proposal to all the countries. Six basic principles are defined: data should be open by default, timely and comprehensive, accessible and usable, comparable and interoperable, for improved Governance and Citizen Engagement, and for inclusive development and innovation. Until now 19 national and 43 local governments has adopted the chart and 46 organisations has endorsed it.</p><p>The European Interoperability Framework v2, approved by the European Commission on March 2017 to improve the quality of European public services devotes a full section to explain what exactly Open Data is and to support it.</p><p>The United Nations Global Geographic Information Management (UN GGIM) recognizes in its Integrated Geospatial Information Framework – Part 1 Overarching Strategic Framework (July 2018) that geospatial information is a key component of the government’s open data agendas which stimulates opportunities and include government delivery systems focused on the citizen in an efficient and effective way.</p><p>But, although it seems there is a wide consensus on the positive effect of having governamental Open Data, and there is a common understanding of the theoretical meaning of Open Data (data with no barriers for use and reuse by everybody under any circumstances) there is not a common practical understanding about what Open Data is. In our opinion, the more detailed and precise technical definition of Open Data is due to the Open Knowledge International (opendefinition.org), but the problem is that there is not an Abstract Test Suite to check and verify if a dataset is published fulfilling the requirements defined in it.</p><p>By the other hand, Open Data are not yet widely implemented. The Global Open Data Index 2018 states that the National Map 1: 250,000 data are published as Open Data only in the 10 % of the countries studied. We think one of the reasons of the lack of implementation Open Geographic Data (OGD) is that there is no a standard easily verifiable technical definition of OGD.</p><p>Because of that, the Spanish Standardization Technical Committee 148 “Digital Geographic Information” decided in 2016 to define a Spanish standard on Open Geographic Data to have an objective procedure to verify and certify if a geospatial dataset is published or not as Open Data, as a tool to promote and support Open Data.</p><p>UNE 148004:2018 “Datos geográficos abiertos” (Open Geographic Data) was approved in 2018 after following the standard UNE processes, including two rounds of comments and one public information period. More than the eighty five per cent of the comments received were totally or partially accepted and we think the result reflects the consensus reached in the Spanish geographic data community around this topic.</p><p>This Spanish standard stablish a technical full and detailed definition of what exactly is Open Geographic Data (OGD) and defines a set of objective requirements to be fulfilled in order to publish a geographic dataset as Open Data. It is based in three main principles:</p><ul><li>Principle of minimizing barriers, following the idea that Open Data are data published without economic, technical and legal barriers for their use and reuse.</li><li>Principle of no-discrimination of any kind of users, field of application, social group and future use of data.</li><li>Principle of technological neutrality, which is in fact a particularization of the former one, stating that any user shall be discriminated on the basis of the technological solutions (browser, operating system, software…) he has chosen.</li></ul><p>Applying those general principles, UNE 148004:2018 defines four conceptual levels for geographic data in the way of progress towards having OGD: available, well described, under an open license and in an open format geographic data. It provides also an Abstract Test Suit for verifying and certifying, if required, Open Geographic Data.</p><p>In this communication a general approach to open geographic data, a justification for developing this standard and a brief and complete summary of its contents and prescription are given. We think this new Spanish standard will promote and support Open Data in the field of Geographic Information and we hope it will promote the progress and grow of the Spanish geospatial sector.</p>

China committed to initiate the accession to Government Procurement Agreement when it entered the WTO as a compromise to the requirements made by GPA parties, mostly the developed western countries such as the United States. China started its official attempt to join the GPA on December 28, 2007 by submitting the first offer to the GPA Commission. Six revised offer were then submitted during the past years. The position of the United States and China in international trade changed dramatically since then. This article finds that Trump Administration&rsquo;s attitude toward China&rsquo;s accession to GPA is mixed and the US government might impede China&rsquo;s accession with the analysis on the current American foreign trade policy and the latest development in government procurement in the US&rsquo;s related international agreements and domestic laws. However, this accession process can only be delayed but not terminated even if the standpoint of the US is proved to be negative due to the theoretical and technical analysis on GPA. Effective and significant measures will be taken by Chinese government since the president Xi Jinping made the statement to accelerate the accession to GPA in Boao Forum in early 2018.

The implementation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the public sector has numerous benefits. Government administrators are aggressively seeking ways to enhance the development and implementation of more effective and efficient government services. One electronic government initiative that is growing in importance and popularity is electronic tax filing. This study explores the factors that contribute to e-file utilization. To test the proposed model a survey is administered to 152 taxpayers in the United States. Results of structural equation modeling indicate that performance expectancy, social influence, facilitating conditions, optimism bias, perceived reputation and risk all have a significant impact on e-government usage. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Perceived risk has been identified by the literature as a limiting factor in e-government adoption and success. However, there has been little effort spent examining how and why perceived risk comes to differ from actual probabilistic risk and the means by which the gap can be reduced. These questions were examined by applying the Social Amplification of Risk Framework to the case of e-government in the United States. Several factors that are known to exacerbate perceived risk were identified from the literature and shown to be in place in the United States. The presence of these factors suggests that more effective risk communication is required in order to realign perceived risk with probabilistic risk. Recommendations on how to improve e-government risk communication through technical and human means are provided.

AbstractWhile the subset of introduced species that become invasive is small, the damages caused by that subset and the costs of controlling them can be substantial. This chapter takes an in-depth look at the economic damages non-native species cause, methods economists often use to measure those damages, and tools used to assess invasive species policies. Ecological damages are covered in other chapters of this book. To put the problem in perspective, Federal agencies reported spending more than half a billion dollars per year in 1999 and 2000 for activities related to invasive species ($513.9 million in 1999 and $631.5 million in 2000 (U.S. GAO 2000)). Approximately half of these expenses were spent on prevention. Several states also spend considerable resources on managing non-native species; for example, Florida spent $127.6 million on invasive species activities in 2000 (U.S. GAO 2000), and the Great Lakes states spend about $20 million each year to control sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) (Kinnunen 2015). Costs to government may not be the same as actual damages, which generally fall disproportionately on a few economic sectors and households. For example, the impact of the 2002 outbreak of West Nile virus exceeded $4 million in damages to the equine industries in Colorado and Nebraska alone (USDA APHIS 2003) and more than $20 million in public health damages in Louisiana (Zohrabian et al. 2004). Zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha) cause $300–$500 million annually in damages to power plants, water systems, and industrial water intakes in the Great Lakes region (Great Lakes Commission 2012) and are expected to cause $64 million annually in damages should they or quagga mussels (Dreissena bugensis) spread to the Columbia River basin (Warziniack et al. 2011).

Land administration strategies and processes need to be structured within a broad policy framework, the shape of which will depend on the jurisdiction concerned. A common thread between systems will be the promotion of economic development, social justice and equity, political stability, and environmentally sustainable development. The processes of re-engineering, total quality management, and other management reforms discussed in Chapter 9 were originally designed for use in the private sector so that organizations could respond better to the demands of the market place. More recently, they have increasingly been adopted by public sector administrators who have been forced to respond to the market oriented approach and hence have been required to upgrade land administration systems. In the United States the processes of re-engineering have been packaged under such labels as ‘entrepreneurial government’ and ‘reinventing government’ and were addressed in the National Performance Review (known as the Gore Commission) which had a mandate to ‘re-invent and to reinvigorate the entire national government’. The ideas were picked up by many other governments—from Australia to the UK (Butler 1994), the Netherlands to New Zealand, and Singapore to Sweden-regardless of party or ideology. Although reinventing government means different things to different people, it has generally entailed: 1. restructuring the way government services are organized; 2. developing new strategies and processes for managing government services (for instance, simplifying administrative programmes); 3. empowering the recipients of public services. As with the private sector, a crucial component of reinventing government has been the effective use of information technology (IT). Governments in general have only recently begun to review their national information strategies and to develop new ways in which they deliver services to citizens and businesses. Over the past few years, IT has changed the way that many people live through the creation of new products and services. Examples include the use of credit and debit cards, the ability to withdraw cash from a ‘hole in the wall’ even in a foreign country, the mobile phone and fax machine, and access to information on the Internet. Information technology now makes it possible for citizens and businesses to deal directly with government agencies if they so wish (UK Government 1996).

The third case study investigates the case of the European Union. It finds that the EU’s constituent units enjoy an unusually influential role in its council model of subcentral representation. Member states shape EU trade policy at both stages of formal decision-making. In-between these formal veto points, collaborative relations between supranational and national executives are supported by a dense and formalized network of committees as well as a clear-cut division of procedural authorities. Turning to the two theorized intervening factors, the chapter finds that the nexus between European integration and international liberalization has been particularly close in procurement, reinforcing member states’ openness. Politicization of procurement liberalization, in turn, has remained low despite recent years’ contestation against CETA and TTIP. Ultimately, the EU case corroborates the initial expectation that shared rule systems are institutionally and procedurally well-equipped to adapt flexibly to the demands of multilevel trade governance and organize openness more effectively than self-rule models. EU member states have developed strategies to avoid the joint-decision trap’s propensity to decision-making blockades and lowest common denominator outcomes. Among these means rank a clear-cut division of procedural competences with the Commission, a densely institutionalized system of IGR largely secluded from domestic public and party political pressures, and the adoption of legislative proposals by qualified majority. This general institutional and procedural set-up has allowed the Union to act as a ‘market-making polity’ both internally, forging an integrated procurement market, as well as externally, pursuing an offensive agenda in the WTO and in preferential trade agreements.

This chapter draws on a 40-year history of patchwork efforts to use data to inform the development of public policy and shape its implementation. I begin with a description of the evolution of the policy process, drawing largely on experiences within the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Labor. All three agencies have been major supporters of and contributors to advances in the methods of policy analysis and the use of program evaluation to guide decision making. The chapter draws on the roles of these agencies in laying the groundwork for the current emphasis on evidence-based policymaking, in part because of their leadership roles and in part because of the author’s first-hand experience working with these agencies. Of particular note is its attention to the lead up to the present context in which policy analysis and program evaluation are central to both the policy development and monitoring processes. The chapter ends with a discussion of the current movement to create and use credible evidence on the impacts and cost-effectiveness of programs, policies and practices as the foundation for more efficient and effective government and, where evidence is lacking, for integrating a knowledge-building agenda into the roll-out of strategies for change.

The United States Congress, despite its poor reputation for policymaking, has substantial analytical capacity. While congressional committees possess some of this capability, most of the expertise resides in its three support agencies—the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Within their relative portfolios each of these three agencies has provided the Congress with the ability to make policy, challenge policy proposals coming from the president, and hold the executive branch accountable. All of these agencies face the challenge of providing thorough and credible analyses within the confines of the legislative process and timetable. Further, they must maintain their credibility for nonpartisan analysis in the midst of a political environment that is only growing more polarized. These agencies supply a great deal of high quality information. The challenge for the Congress is how to make better use of this analysis in crafting more effective public policies.

Perceived risk has been identified by the literature as a limiting factor in e-government adoption and success. However, there has been little effort spent examining how and why perceived risk comes to differ from actual probabilistic risk and the means by which the gap can be reduced. These questions were examined by applying the Social Amplification of Risk Framework to the case of e-government in the United States. Several factors that are known to exacerbate perceived risk were identified from the literature and shown to be in place in the United States. The presence of these factors suggests that more effective risk communication is required in order to realign perceived risk with probabilistic risk. Recommendations on how to improve e-government risk communication through technical and human means are provided.

Welsh constitutional development in recent times is characterized by a convoluted and ongoing set of legislative transformations and by the emergence of a distinct policy approach not only for the sub-state polity itself but also under the banner of a ‘new Union’ for the United Kingdom as a whole. Examination of the design and dynamics of the Wales Act 2017 serves to illuminate the difficulties and rewards of the territorial constitutional journey, especially in terms of central government conservatism in the face of principled argument and of the scope afforded for home-grown democratic renewal. In terms of the extended Brexit process, where competing conceptions of the UK territorial constitution are brought to the fore, the Welsh Labour Government is seen combatting potentials for centralization under the rubric of a ‘UK internal market’, deal-making in the name of mutual benefit, and championing a new brand of shared governance in the UK. Today, the workings of the justice system in Wales are being examined on their own for the first time in two centuries by an independent commission established by the Welsh Government. With a new stage in the Welsh constitutional journey in prospect, a series of foundational questions is raised. This chapter reviews the key elements of the arrangements made for devolving legislative and executive power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, explaining how these arrangements have developed over time and are still doing so. Particular attention is paid to the implications of the result of the independence referendum in Scotland in September 2014, not just for Scotland but also for England. Consideration is given to how mechanisms for making devolution work more effectively might be devised and to what the effects might be on devolution if the UK’s membership of the EU or its commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights are seriously called into question.

Connected Government requires different government organizations to connect seamlessly across functions, agencies, and jurisdictions in order to deliver effective and efficient services to citizens and businesses. In the countries of the European Union, this also involves the possibility of delivering cross-border services, which is an important step toward a truly united Europe. To achieve this goal, European citizens and businesses should be able to interact with different public administrations in different Member States in a seamless way to perceive them as a single entity. Interoperability, which is a key factor for Connected Government, is not enough in order to achieve this result, since it usually does not consider the social dimension of organizations. This dimension is at the basis of co-operability, which is a form of non-technical interoperability that allows different organizations to function together essentially as a single organization. In this chapter, it is argued that, due to their unique capacity of coupling several technologies and processes with interpersonal styles, awareness, communication tools, and conversational models, the integration of social computing services and tools within inter-organizational workflows can make them more efficient and effective. It can also support the “learning” process that leads different organizations to achieve co-operability.

Washington and Ottawa have tried to keep out most of the Central Americans fleeing to North America beginning in the civil wars of the 1980s. Central America and Mexico buffer the United States, which in turn buffers Canada. The U.S. government has propped up client states in Central America; paid for refugee camps; and provided training, equipment, and financing for migration controls further south. Mexico has weak rights of territorial personhood, so rather than strictly controlling entry across its southern border, its entire territory has become a “vertical frontier” with the United States. Aggressive U.S. enforcement at the Mexican border traps transit migrants in Mexico and creates an incentive for the Mexican government to deport them. But harsh U.S. enforcement on its border and the fact that it targets Mexicans as well as third-country nationals impedes the bilateral cooperation that would make Mexico a more effective buffer.

<em>Abstract.</em>—The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) has applied guidelines outlined in its genetic policy for the release of finfishes in Florida to the conservation and management of Florida Bass <em>Micropterus floridanus</em>. A statewide genetic study was initiated after interspecific hybrids with nonnative Largemouth Bass <em>M. salmoides </em>were found in 10% of a bass sample collected in 1999 from Lake Parker, which is located 150 km south of the previously recognized intergrade zone. Using allozyme polymorphisms, mitochondrial DNA restriction fragment length polymorphisms, and microsatellite genotypes, genetic structure was resolved among 48 widely distributed populations of bass across Florida, some containing pure Florida Bass and others containing intergrades with Largemouth Bass. The FWC defined four geographic regions of Florida as genetic management units and prohibited government agencies from moving Florida Bass, Largemouth Bass, or hybrids between regions. All broodfish at the state’s Florida Bass Conservation Center hatchery are now genetically certified as pure Florida Bass prior to spawning, and wild fish are regularly added to the spawning stock to avoid the accumulation of domesticated traits. A large effective population size (about 100 or more breeders per spawning group) of hatchery broodfish is kept at the hatchery to maintain adequate genetic diversity of production fingerlings. A Florida statute was created making the nonnative Largemouth Bass and their hybrids a conditional nonnative species south and east of the Suwannee River; as such, it is currently illegal to possess them within the native range of Florida Bass without an FWC permit. Standards were also developed to genetically authenticate and manage the broodstock from private fish hatcheries requesting a FWC permit to possess, sell, or transport cultured Florida Bass within the regulated region of the state. Similar guidelines were developed for private pond management companies and other organizations that request a permit to relocate and stock wild bass in Florida. The FWC has taken two important steps forward in protecting the genetic integrity of Florida Bass: (1) developing genetic markers and applying them to bass conservation (particularly the genetic testing of broodfish), and (2) enabling fishery managers to develop and implement the rules and practices necessary for conservation of Florida’s black bass <em>Micropterus </em>spp. populations.

The electric power industry in the United States will face a number of great challenges in the next two decades, including increasing electricity demand and the aging of the current fleet of power plants. These challenges present a major test for the industry, which must invest between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion by 2030 to meet the increased demand. In addition to these challenges, the potential for climate legislation, controversy over hydraulic fracturing, and post-Fukushima safety concerns have all resulted in significant uncertainty regarding the economics of all major sources of base-load electricity. Currently nuclear power produces 22% of the nation’s electricity, and over 70% of the nation’s low-carbon electricity, even though unfavorable economic conditions have stalled construction of new reactors for over 30 years. The economics are changing, however, as evidenced by the recent construction and operating licenses (COLs) awarded by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Southern Company and SCANA Corporation to build two new units each. The successful construction of these units could lead to more favorable financing for future plants. This improved financing, especially if combined with appropriate additional government support, could provide serious momentum for the resurgence of nuclear power in the United States. The most important way in which government support could benefit nuclear power is by increasing the amount of loan guarantees provided to the first wave of new nuclear power plants. This will help encourage additional new builds, which will help reduce the financing risk premium for new nuclear and improve interest rates for future plants. Instead of simply increasing loan guarantees for nuclear energy, a permanent federal financing structure should be established to provide loan guarantees for “clean energy” technologies in general, a category in which nuclear energy should be included. Most importantly, any changes should be made as part of a coherent, long-term energy policy, which would provide utilities with the correct tools to make the necessary investments, and the confidence that will allow them to undertake large-scale projects.

Abstract The Mayak Production Association (PA Mayak), an industrial site in Russia, will be assigned multiple new plutonium disposition missions in order to implement the Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of Russian Federation Concerning The Management And Disposition Of Plutonium Designated As No Longer Required For Defense Purposes And Related Cooperation signed September 1, 2000, by Gore and Kasyanov, In addition, the mission of industrial-scale mixed-oxide (MOX) fabrication will be assigned to either the Mining Chemical Combine (MCC) industrial site at Krasnoyarsk-26 (K-26) or PA Mayak. Over the next decades, these new missions will generate radioactive wastes containing weapons-grade plutonium. The existing Mayak and K-26 onsite facilities and infrastructures cannot currently treat and immobilize these Pu-containing wastes for storage and disposal. However, the wastes generated under the Agreement must be properly immobilized, treated, and managed. New waste treatment and immobilization missions at Mayak may include operating facilities for plutonium metal-to-oxide conversion processes, industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication, BN-600 PAKET hybrid core MOX fuel fabrication, and a plutonium conversion demonstration process. The MCC K-26 site, if assigned the industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication mission, would also need to add facilities to treat and immobilize the Pu-containing wastes. This paper explores the approach and cost of treatment and immobilization facilities at both Mayak and K-26. The current work to date at Mayak and MCC K-26 indicates that the direct immobilization of 1.6 MT of weapons-grade plutonium is a viable and cost-effective alternative.

Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) report, License Renewal Standard Review Plan (SRP-LR), and regulatory guide were issued by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in June 2001. The intent of these documents was to provide the technical and process basis that will lead to a more effective, efficient and predictable license renewal process for industry and the NRC. The GALL report provides the aging effects on components and structures, identifies the relevant existing plant programs, and evaluates the program attributes to manage aging effects for License Renewal. The GALL report also identifies when existing plant programs would require further evaluation for License Renewal. The SRP-LR allows the applicant to reference the GALL report to demonstrate that the programs at the applicant’s facility correspond to those reviewed and approved in the GALL report. Programs that correspond to those in the GALL report will not need further detailed review by the staff. Implementation of the aging management program are verified as part of the license renewal inspection program. The GALL report identifies one acceptable way of demonstrating that components and structures have adequate aging management programs. However, applicants may propose alternatives to the programs identified in GALL. During the license renewal review, the NRC primarily focuses on areas where existing programs should be augmented or new programs developed for License Renewal. This paper will provide an overview of these documents and some of the lessons learned during a demonstration project in the application of the new guidance. This topic will be of interest to the U.S. participants considering License Renewal and desiring to know state-of-the-art information about License Renewal in the United States.

Reactor thermal power uprate (Power uprate) of operating light water reactors has long successful experiences in many nuclear power plants in the United States of America and European countries since late 1970’s. And it will be also introduced in Japan soon. This paper mainly describes the outline of the attempt of five-percent reactor thermal power uprate of Tokai No.2 Nuclear Power Station (Tokai-2) operated by the Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC). It will be the leading case in Japan. Tokai-2 is GE type Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) of 1100 MW licensed electric power output and it commenced commercial operation in November 28, 1978. Power uprate is an effective approach for increasing electric power output. And it is recognized as one of the measures for effective and efficient use of existing Japanese operating nuclear power plants. It can contribute to inexpensive and stable electric power supply increase. Especially “Stretch Power Uprate (SPU)” requires only minor equipment modification or component replacement. It is also a countermeasure against global warming. Therefore it is a common theme to be accomplished in the near future for both Japanese electric power companies and government. JAPC started feasibility studies on power uprate in 2003. And in 2007, JAPC established a plan to achieve five-percent power uprate in Tokai-2 and announced this project to the public. This is a leading attempt in the Japanese electric power companies and it is the first case under the current Japanese regulatory requirements. In this plan, JAPC reflected lessons learned from preceding nuclear power plants in the United States and European countries, and tried to make most use of the performance of existing systems and components in Tokai-2 which have been periodically or timely renewed by utilizing more reliable and efficient design. JAPC plans to submit application documents to amend current License for Reactor Establishment Permit shortly. It will contain a complete set of revised safety analysis results based on the uprated reactor thermal power condition. Successful introduction of Tokai-2 power uprate will contribute to the establishment of regulatory process for power uprate in Japan and following attempts by other Japanese electric power companies.

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has a Generic Issues Program (GIP) to address Generic Issues (GI). A GI is defined as “a regulatory matter involving the design, construction, operation, or decommissioning of several, or a class of, NRC licensees or certificate holders that is not sufficiently addressed by existing rules, guidance, or programs.” This rather legalistic definition has several practical corollaries: First, a GI must involve safety. Second, the issue must involve at least two plants, or it would be a plant-specific issue rather than a GI. Third, the potential safety question must not be covered by existing regulations and guidance (compliance). Thus, the effect of a GI is to potentially change the body of regulations and associated guidance (e.g., regulatory guides). The GIP was started in 1976, thus it is a relatively mature program. There have been approximately 850 issues processed by the program to date. More importantly, even after 30 years, new GIs continue to be proposed. The entire set of Generic Issues (GIs) is updated annually in NUREG-0933, “A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues.” GIs tend to involve complex questions of safety and regulation. The efficient and effective means of addressing these issues is very important for regulatory effectiveness. If an issue proves to pose a genuine, significant safety question, then swift, effective, enforceable, and cost-effective action needs to be taken. Conversely, if an issue is of little safety significance, the issue should be dismissed in an expeditious manner, avoiding unnecessary expenditure of resources and regulatory burden or uncertainty. This paper provides an overview of the 5-stage program, from identification through the regulatory assessment stage. The paper also includes a discussion of the program’s seven criteria, sources of proposed GIs, recent improvements, publicly available information, historical performance, and status of current GIs.

There has been significant research in recent years to analyze and improve the impact behavior and puncture resistance of railroad tank cars. Ultimately, the results of this work will be used by the Government regulatory agencies in the United States and Canada to establish performance-based testing requirements and to develop methods to evaluate the crashworthiness and structural integrity of different tank car designs. This paper describes results of recent side impact testing and corresponding analyses using detailed finite element analyses (FEA). The test and analyses were performed to evaluate the side impact puncture performance of DOT-111 tank cars. The tank car was filled with water to approximately 97 percent of the volume. The tank was then sealed but not pressurized. The tank car was impacted at the Transportation Technology Center, Inc. by a 297,125-pound ram car with 12-by 12-inch ram head fitted to the ram car impacted the tank center. The analyses were on overall good agreement with the measured impact response. The lading was found to play a more significant role in the impact response than in previous testing and analyses of pressure tank cars. This is not surprising considering the reduced structural stiffness of the tanks compared to thicker pressure tank cars and the reduced effective stiffness from the initially unpressurized tank at impact. The smaller outage volume also contributes to a dramatic increase in the tank pressure as the dent formation reduces the tank volume and compresses the contents of the tank.

One of the first nuclear engineering programs in the United States was established at Virginia Tech in the mid-1950’s and continued until the mid-1980’s when it was abandoned due to a drop both in student interest and government support. In 2006, as a result of interest shown by the nuclear industry in Virginia, discussions were undertaken that led to the approval to offer Master’s and Doctorate Degrees in nuclear engineering in 2013. In parallel with these efforts, we began teaching undergraduate courses in anticipation of offering a minor in nuclear engineering to all Virginia Tech engineering and science students. Currently we have 140 undergraduate students taking nuclear engineering classes, nuclear engineering undergraduate research hours, and participating in nuclear-engineering-related senior design activities. Our program has been conceived and designed with the objective of providing the nuclear engineering workforce required to address the most important nuclear-related issues of our time including: enhancing the safe and productive use of nuclear energy; contributing to the development of advanced technologies for national and international nuclear security and safeguards; developing advanced medical devices for nuclear diagnostics and therapy; and the establishment of effective policies for the utilization of nuclear energy and its regulation. The Master’s degree program involves 7 courses and the equivalent of two semesters of thesis research for a total of 30 credit hours. The PhD program, which builds on the Master’s degree program, requires 5 additional courses, and the equivalent of 4 semesters of dissertation research for a total of 60 credit hours beyond the Master’s degree. The curriculum is supported by a rigorous, benchmarked assessment and evaluation process to assure that the goals of the program are attained. Currently five faculty members support the nuclear engineering program, and typical total enrollment in our graduate programs runs between 35 and 50 students. When we reach full strength, with the addition of two more nuclear engineering faculty members, we expect to be graduating 12 Master’s students and 7 PhD students per year.

The current regulations, as set forth by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to insure that light-water nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) maintain their structural integrity when subjected to planned normal reactor startup (heat-up) and shut-down (cool-down) transients are specified in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, which incorporates by reference Appendix G to Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code. The technical basis for these regulations are now recognized by the technical community as being conservative and some plants are finding it increasingly difficult to comply with the current regulations. Consequently, the nuclear industry has developed, and submitted to the ASME Code for approval, an alternative risk-informed methodology that reduces the conservatism and is consistent with the methods previously used to develop a risk-informed revision to the regulations for accidental transients such as pressurized thermal shock (PTS). The objective of the alternative methodology is to provide a relaxation to the current regulations which will provide more operational flexibility, particularly for reactor pressure vessels with relatively high irradiation levels and radiation sensitive materials, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. The NRC and its contractor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have recently performed an independent review of the industry proposed methodology. The NRC / ORNL review consisted of performing probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses for a matrix of cool-down and heat-up rates, permutated over various reactor geometries and characteristics, each at multiple levels of embrittlement, including 60 effective full power years (EFPY) and beyond, for various postulated flaw characterizations. The objective of this review is to quantify the risk of a reactor vessel experiencing non-ductile fracture, and possible subsequent failure, over a wide range of normal transient conditions, when the maximum allowable thermal-hydraulic boundary conditions, derived from both the current ASME code and the industry proposed methodology, are imposed on the inner surface of the reactor vessel. This paper discusses the results of the NRC/ORNL review of the industry proposal including the matrices of PFM analyses, results, insights, and conclusions derived from these analyses.

Being able to follow the chain of contagion of COVID-19 is important to help save lives and control the epidemic without sustained costly lockdowns. This is especially relevant in Latin America, where economic contractions have already been the largest in the regions history. Given the high rates of transmission of COVID-19, relying only in manual contact tracing might be infeasible. Acceptability and uptake of contact tracing apps with exposure notifications is key for the implementation the “test, trace and treat” triad. In the first study of its kind in Latin America, we find that for a nationally representative sample of 10 countries, an opt-out regime with automatic installation significantly increases the probability of acceptance of such apps in almost 22 p.p. compared to an opt-in regime with voluntary installation. This triples the size and is of opposite sign of the effect found in Europe and the United States. We see that an opt-out regime is more effective in increasing acceptability in South America compared to Central America and Mexico; for those who claim not to trust the national government; and for those who do not use their smartphones for financial transactions. The severity of the pandemic at the place of residence does not seem to affect the effectiveness of the opt-out regime versus an opt-in one, but feeling personally at risk does increase the willingness to accept contact tracing apps with exposure notifications in general. These results can shed light on the use of default options in public health in the context of a pandemic in Latin America.