Academic literature on the topic 'United States. Congress 1833-1834)'

When President Andrew Jackson removed the public deposits from the Bank of the United States, he set off an economic and political crisis from which, scholars agree, the Whig Party emerged. We argue that petitioning in response to removal of the deposits shaped the emergence of the Whig Party, crystallizing a new line of Jacksonian opposition and dispensing with older lines of National Republican rhetoric and organization. Where petitioning against removal of the deposits was higher, the Whigs were more likely to emerge with organization and votes in the coming years. We test this implication empirically by using a new database of petitions sent to Congress during the banking crisis. We find that petitioning activity in 1834 is predictive of increased support for Whig Party candidates in subsequent presidential elections as well as stronger state Whig Party organization.

From the Grundtvig ArchivesEurope and America, or about the Imminent Change in State Relations (Fragment from 1820).By Gustav AlbeckThe fragment seems to be the beginning of a study (a review?), occasioned by C.F. von Schmidt-Phiseldeck’s book, "Europa und Amerika", oder die künftigen Verhältnisse der civilisierten Welt., which was published in the early summer of 1820.Grundtvig describes the book as .the strangest book that has been published in Denmark for a long time.. Its writer, who was German born, but became a Danish citizen already as a young man, held high posts in Danish government administration in the period from app. 1810 until his death in 1832 (e.g., in the College of Commerce and the National Bank), working at the same time as a writer of learned economic works as well as (more popular) philosophical writings.The book about Europe and America has been written from the writer’s conviction that the changed Europe (after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars) was going to loose her numerous colonies beyond the Atlantic Ocean and become weak and poor, whereas America (esp. the United States) would acquire increasing influence and wealth at the cost of the Old World.Grundtvig characterizes the dominant position of America as a matter of minor importance, and seems to want first of all to make his countrymen familiar with the thought that the European .State Household. is approaching a .Crisis., and to warn the apathetic Danes against the consequences of that crisis.The commentary on the fragment refers briefly to the - surprisingly few - passages in Grundtvig’s writings where he shows his view of America’s mission and place in world history. In .The World Chronicle., 1812, he describes Columbus as .a great Tool in God’s Hand, but adds that it was Columbus’ good fortune that the new continent ... did not come to bear his name.. This paradoxical attitude is noticeable wherever Grundtvig mentions America. The criticism is, in particular, directed against South America, whereas he often commends North America, esp. the .Free States. as a home of freedom. But Grundtvig has many difficulties in accepting the people of the American states, this peculiar motley crowd. (as he calls the immigrants in 1812), as a people created by God.In the 10th chapter of his book, Schmidt-Phiseldeck proposes the idea of a union of the states of Europe, a thought which he elaborated in detail in a subsequent volume, “Der europäische Bund”. If Grundtvig had finished his review, he would probably have rejected the idea of a union as early as 1820. At any rate, in the 1830s, he objects sharply to the Vienna Congress and its heavyhanded division of the European peoples, irrespective of their ethnic, national and cultural affiliations. He describes his view of these events, partly in his “Handbook of World History” (1833 sq), partly in the lectures he gave at Borch’s Kollegium in 1838 (which his son, Sven Grundtvig published in 1877 under the title .Within Living Memory. (“Mands Minde”)).There may be two explanations why Grundtvig did not finish his review in 1820. His intention seems primarily to draw attention to Schmidt-Phiseldeck’s book, but already in July 1820, A.C. Gierlew began work on a highly detailed, critical review, which appeared in 6 numbers of Dansk Litteratur-Tidende (Danish Literary News). At the same time a Danish translation of Schmidt-Phiseldeck’s book (by D. Didrichsen and H.A. Mortensen) was published, so that Grundtvig’s primary object was achieved.Another explanation why Grundtvig did not finish the article he had begun to work on, may be that in the summer of 1820, he felt tired and unfit for work, as it appears from his letter of September 9th, 1820, to his friend Christen Olesen.

This overview of the Luciolinae addresses the fauna of S. E. Asia including India, Sri Lanka, China, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Republic of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and the Australopacific area of Australia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu and Fiji.Of the 28 genera now recognised in the Luciolinae we address 27 genera from the study area as defined above, including three new genera which are described herein, and 222 species including 13 species newly described herein. Photuroluciola Pic from Madagascar is the only Luciolinae genus not addressed here. A key to genera is presented. Keys to species are either included here or referenced in existing literature. Twelve genera have had no new taxonomic decisions made nor are any new species records listed, and are addressed in an abbreviated fashion, with short diagnoses and plates of features of life stages: Aquatica Fu et al. 2010, Australoluciola Ballantyne 2013, Convexa Ballantyne 2009, Emeia Fu et al. 2012a, Inflata Boontop 2015, Lloydiella Ballantyne 2009, Missimia Ballantyne 2009, Pteroptyx Olivier 1902, Pyrophanes Olivier 1885, Sclerotia Ballantyne 2016, Triangulara Pimpasalee 2016, and Trisinuata Ballantyne 2013. Abscondita Ballantyne 2013 contains 8 species, and includes new records for Abs. anceyi (Olivier 1883), Abs. chinensis (L.) (which is newly synonymised with Luciola succincta Bourgeois), Abs. terminalis (Olivier 1883) including a first record from both Laos and Thailand, and Abs. perplexa (Walker 1858). Luciola pallescens Gorham 1880 is transferred to Abscondita and the pronotal colour range is addressed from a wide range of localities. Abs. berembun Nada sp. nov. and Abs. jerangau Nada sp. nov. are described from Malaysia. Hooked bursa plates are described for pallescens and berembun. Aquilonia Ballantyne 2009 is expanded to include 3 species. Gilvainsula Ballantyne 2009, represented by two species from the south eastern coast of New Guinea is synonymised under Aquilonia Ballantyne 2009, which is briefly redescribed and keyed from: Aquil. costata (Lea) from northern Australia, including many new records, Aquil. messoria (Ballantyne) comb. nov. and Aquil. similismessoria (Ballantyne) comb. nov. Asymmetricata Ballantyne 2009 now includes 4 species. As. bicoloripes (Pic 1927) comb. nov. and As. humeralis (Walker 1858) comb. nov. are transferred from Luciola, with L. doriae Olivier 1885, L. impressa Olivier 1910b and L. notatipennis Olivier 1909a newly synonymised with As. humeralis. Luciola aemula Olivier 1891 is synonymised with As. ovalis (Hope 1831). The variation in the extent of the anterior median emargination of the light organ in ventrite 7, and the possibility of a bipartite light organ in males of As. circumdata (Motsch. 1854) is explored. Females of both As. circumdata and As. ovalis (Hope 1831) are without bursa plates and the distinctively shaped median oviduct plate in each is described. Records from Thailand are recorded for both As. circumdata and As. ovalis. Atyphella Olliff 1890 now contains 28 species with 4 transferred from other genera, and one new species: Aty. abdominalis (Olivier 1886) comb. nov. and Aty. striata (Fabricius 1801) comb. nov. are transferred from Luciola, with Aty. carolinae Olivier 1911b and Aty. rennellia (Ballantyne 2009) comb. nov. transferred from Magnalata Ballantyne 2009. Atyphella telokdalam Ballantyne sp. nov. from Indonesia is described herein. Atyphella is now known from records in the Philippines and Indonesia as well as Australia and New Guinea. Colophotia Motschulsky 1853 is considered here from seven species for which intact types can be located for three. An abbreviated revision based on the United States National Museum collection only is presented, with specimens of C. bakeri Pic 1924, C. brevis Olivier 1903a, C. plagiata (Erichson 1834) and C. praeusta (Eschscholtz 1822) redescribed, using where possible features of males, females and larvae. Colophotia particulariventris Pic 1938 is newly synonymised with C. praeusta. Colophotia miranda Olivier 1886 and L. truncata Olivier 1886 are treated as species incertae sedis. Curtos Motschulsky 1845 includes 19 species with suggestions made, but not yet formalised, for the possible transfer of the following seven species from Luciola: Luciola complanata Gorham 1895, L. costata Pic 1929, L. delauneyi Bourgeois 1890, L. deplanata Pic 1929, L. extricans Walker 1858, L. multicostulata Pic 1927 and L. nigripes Gorham 1903. Curtos is not revised here. Emarginata Ballantyne gen nov. is described for E. trilucida (Jeng et al. 2003b) comb. nov., transferred from Luciola and characterised by the emarginated elytral apex. An extended range of specimens from Thailand is listed. Kuantana Ballantyne gen. nov. from Selangor, Malaysia is described from K. menayah gen. et sp. nov. having bipartite light organs in ventrite 7 and an asymmetrical tergite 8 which is not emarginated on its left side. Female has no bursa plates. Luciola Laporte 1833 s. stricto as defined by a population of the type species Luciola italica (L. 1767) from Pisa, Italy, is further expanded and considered to comprise the following19 species: L. antipodum (Bourgeois 1884), L. aquilaclara Ballantyne 2013, L. chapaensis Pic 1923 which is synonymised with L. atripes Pic 1929, L. curtithorax Pic 1928, L. filiformis Olivier 1913c, L. horni Bourgeois 1905, L. hypocrita Olivier 1888, L. italica (L. 1767), L. kagiana Matsumura 1928, L. oculofissa Ballantyne 2013, L. pallidipes Pic 1928 which is synonymised with L. fletcheri Pic 1935, L. parvula Kiesenwetter 1874, L. satoi Jeng & Yang 2003, L. tuberculata Yiu 2017, and two species treated as near L. laticollis Gorham 1883, and near L. nicollieri Bugnion 1922. The following are described as new: L. niah Jusoh sp. nov., L. jengai Nada sp. nov. and L. tiomana Ballantyne sp. nov. Luciola niah sp. nov. female has two wide bursa plates on each side of the bursa. Luciola s. lato (as defined here) consists of 36 species. Twenty-seven species formerly standing under Luciola have been assigned to other genera or synonymised. Seven species are recommended for transfer to Curtos, and 32 species now stand under species incertae sedis. Magnalata Ballantyne is reduced to the type species M. limbata and redescribed. Medeopteryx Ballantyne 2013 is expanded to 20 species with the addition of two new combinations, Med. semimarginata (Olivier 1883) comb. nov. and Med. timida (Olivier 1883) comb. nov., both transferred from Luciola, and one new species, Med. fraseri Nada sp. nov. from Malaysia. The range of this genus now extends from Australia and the island of New Guinea to SE Asia. Medeopteryx semimarginata females have wide paired bursa plates. Pygoluciola Wittmer 1939 now includes 19 species with 5 new species: P. bangladeshi Ballantyne sp. nov., P. dunguna Nada 2018, P. matalangao Ballantyne sp. nov. (scored by the code name ‘Jeng Matalanga’ in Ballantyne & Lambkin 2013), P. phupan Ballantyne sp. nov. and P. tamarat Jusoh sp. nov. Six species are transferred from Luciola: P. abscondita (Olivier 1891) comb. nov., P. ambita (Olivier 1896) comb. nov., P. calceata (Olivier 1905) comb. nov., P. insularis (Olivier 1883) comb. nov., P. nitescens (Olivier 1903b) comb. nov. and P. vitalisi (Pic 1934) comb. nov., and redescribed from males, and includes female reproductive anatomy for P. nitescens comb. nov. and P. dunguna, both of which have hooked bursa plates. Serratia Ballantyne gen. nov. is erected for S. subuyania gen. et sp. nov. and characterised by the serrate nature of certain antennal flagellar segments in the male. The following 37 species listed under species incertae sedis are further explored: Colophotia miranda Olivier 1886, Lampyris serraticornis Boisduval 1835, Luciola angusticollis Olivier 1886, L. antennalis Bourgeois 1905, L. antica (Boisduval 1835), L. apicalis (Eschscholtz 1822), L. aurantiaca Pic 1927, L. bicoloriceps Pic 1924, L. binhana Pic 1927, L. bourgeoisi Olivier 1895, L. dilatata Pic 1929, L. exigua (Gyllenhall 1817), L. exstincta Olivier 1886, L. fissicollis Fairmaire 1891, L. flava Pic 1929, L. flavescens (Boisduval 1835), L. fukiensis Pic 1955, L. immarginata Bourgeois 1890, L. incerta (Boisduval 1835), L. infuscata (Erichson 1834), L. intricata (Walker 1858), L. japonica (Thunberg 1784), L. klapperichi Pic 1955, L. lata Olivier 1883, L. limbalis Fairmaire 1889, L. marginipennis (Boisduval 1835), L. melancholica Olivier 1913a, L. robusticeps Pic 1928, L. ruficollis (Boisduval 1835), L. spectralis Gorham 1880, L. stigmaticollis Fairmaire 1887, L. tincticollis Gorham 1895, L. trivandrensis Raj 1947, L. truncata Olivier 1886, L. vittata (Laporte 1833) Pteroptyx atripennis Pic 1923 and P. curticollis Pic 1923. While phylogenetic analyses indicate their distinctiveness, no further taxonomic action is taken with Luciola cruciata Motschulsky 1854 and L. owadai Sâtô et Kimura 1994 from Japan given the importance of the former as a national icon. Analyses also indicate that Lampyroidea syriaca Costa 1875 belongs in Luciola s. str. A much wider taxonomic analysis of this genus including all the species is necessary before any further action can be taken.

The level of scientific understanding of the US experience in the legal protection of information privacy does not correspond to modern technological, socio-economic, and political and legal challenges that have arisen before Ukraine. The article provides a comprehensive description of the current US legislation on the protection of information privacy in the private sector, highlights the essential features that distinguish the approaches of the American legislator in this field from others, primarily European ones, and also identify prospects for the development of American legislation, taking into account the latest threats to privacy, arising in the conditions of rapid development of information and communication technologies. The American system of information privacy protection primarily uses the so-called sectoral approach. The essence of this approach is that the protection of information privacy is carried out only within a specific aspect (context) of collecting or using information and is aimed at pre-defined sectors of public life or specific groups of people. Accordingly, federal laws are classified into several groups: 1) protecting privacy in the field of finance; 2) protecting privacy in the field of education; 4) protecting privacy in health care; 5) protecting children privacy; 6) protecting consumer privacy. The federal sectoral approach in the United States is adaptive in nature: Congress intervened to regulate information privacy when new problems arose, and it was mainly new technological developments. In other words, when a new technology threatened the information privacy or perhaps grew at an unacceptable rate, Congress provided protection through the lens of a certain sector or category of people most affected by this new technology. The US experience makes it possible to clearly understand that the protection of information privacy and what should be considered sensitive can change rapidly due to changes in the way data is collected, processed and stored by various actors.

Proponents of the free culture movement argue that contemporary, “over-zealous” copyright laws have an adverse affect on the freedoms of consumers and creators to make use of copyrighted materials. Lessig, McLeod, Vaidhyanathan, Demers, and Coombe, to name but a few, detail instances where creativity and consumer use have been hindered by copyright laws. The “intellectual land-grab” (Boyle, “Politics” 94), instigated by the increasing value of intangibles in the information age, has forced copyright owners to seek maximal protection for copyrighted materials. A propertarian approach seeks to imbue copyrighted materials with the same inalienable rights as real property, yet copyright is not a property right, because “the copyright owner … holds no ordinary chattel” (Dowling v. United States 473 US 207, 216 [1985]). A fundamental difference resides in the exclusivity of use: “If you eat my apple, then I cannot” but “if you “take” my idea, I still have it. If I tell you an idea, you have not deprived me of it. An unavoidable feature of intellectual property is that its consumption is non-rivalrous” (Lessig, Code 131). It is, as James Boyle notes, “different” to real property (Shamans 174). Vaidhyanathan observes, “copyright in the American tradition was not meant to be a “property right” as the public generally understands property. It was originally a narrow federal policy that granted a limited trade monopoly in exchange for universal use and access” (11). This paper explores the ways in which “property talk” has infiltrated copyright discourse and endangered the utility of the law in fostering free and diverse forms of creative expression. The possessiveness and exclusion that accompany “property talk” are difficult to reconcile with the utilitarian foundations of copyright. Transformative uses of copyrighted materials such as mashing, sampling and appropriative art are incompatible with a propertarian approach, subjecting freedom of creativity to arbitary licensing fees that often extend beyond the budget of creators (Collins). “Property talk” risks making transformative works an elitist form of creativity, available only to those with the financial resources necessary to meet the demands for licences. There is a wealth of decisions throughout American and English case law that sustain Vaidhyanathan’s argument (see for example, Donaldson v. Becket 17 Cobbett Parliamentary History, col. 953; Wheaton v. Peters 33 US 591 [1834]; Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal 286 US 123 [1932]; US v. Paramount Pictures 334 US 131 [1948]; Mazer v. Stein 347 US 201, 219 [1954]; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aitken 422 U.S. 151 [1975]; Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co. 440 US 257 [1979]; Dowling v. United States 473 US 207 [1985]; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 471 U.S. 539 [1985]; Luther R. Campbell a.k.a. Luke Skyywalker, et al. v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S 569 [1994].). As Lemley states, however, “Congress, the courts and commentators increasingly treat intellectual property as simply a species of real property rather than as a unique form of legal protection designed to deal with public goods problems” (1-2). Although section 106 of the Copyright Act 1976 grants exclusive rights, sections 107 to 112 provide freedoms beyond the control of the copyright owner, undermining the exclusivity of s.106. Australian law similarly grants exceptions to the exclusive rights granted in section 31. Exclusivity was a principal objective of the eighteenth century Stationers’ argument for a literary property right. Sir William Blackstone, largely responsible for many Anglo-American concepts concerning the construction of property law, defined property in absolutist terms as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the whole universe” (2). On the topic of reprints he staunchly argued an author “has clearly a right to dispose of that identical work as he pleases, and any attempt to take it from him, or vary the disposition he has made of it, is an invasion of his right of property” (405-6). Blackstonian copyright advanced an exclusive and perpetual property right. Blackstone’s interpretation of Lockean property theory argued for a copyright that extended beyond the author’s expression and encompassed the very “style” and “sentiments” held therein. (Tonson v. Collins [1760] 96 ER 189.) According to Locke, every Man has a Property in his own Person . . . The Labour of his Body and the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. (287-8) Blackstone’s inventive interpretation of Locke “analogised ideas, thoughts, and opinions with tangible objects to which title may be taken by occupancy under English common law” (Travis 783). Locke’s labour theory, however, is not easily applied to intangibles because occupancy or use is non-rivalrous. The appropriate extent of an author’s proprietary right in a work led Locke himself to a philosophical impasse (Bowrey 324). Although Blackstonian copyright was suppressed by the House of Lords in the eighteenth century (Donaldson v. Becket [1774] 17 Cobbett Parliamentary History, col. 953) and by the Supreme Court sixty years later (Wheaton v. Peters 33 US 591 [1834]), it has never wholly vacated copyright discourse. “Property talk” is undesirable in copyright discourse because it implicates totalitarian notions such as exclusion and inalienable private rights of ownership with no room for freedom of creativity or to use copyrighted materials for non-piracy related purposes. The notion that intellectual property is a species of property akin with real property is circulated by media companies seeking greater control over copyrighted materials, but the extent to which “property talk” has been adopted by the courts and scholars is troubling. Lemley (3-5) and Bell speculate whether the term “intellectual property” carries any responsibility for the propertisation of intangibles. A survey of federal court decisions between 1943 and 2003 reveals an exponential increase in the usage of the term. As noted by Samuelson (398) and Cohen (379), within the spheres of industry, culture, law, and politics the word “property” implies a broader scope of rights than those associated with a grant of limited monopoly. Music United claims “unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted music is JUST AS ILLEGAL AS SHOPLIFTING A CD”. James Brown argues sampling from his records is tantamount to theft: “Anything they take off my record is mine . . . Can I take a button off your shirt and put it on mine? Can I take a toenail off your foot – is that all right with you?” (Miller 1). Equating unauthorised copying with theft seeks to socially demonise activities occurring outside of the permission culture currently being fostered by inventive interpretations of the law. Increasing propagation of copyright as the personal property of the creator and/or copyright owner is instrumental in efforts to secure further legislative or judicial protection: Since 1909, courts and corporations have exploited public concern for rewarding established authors by steadily limiting the rights of readers, consumers, and emerging artists. All along, the author was deployed as a straw man in the debate. The unrewarded authorial genius was used as a rhetorical distraction that appealed to the American romantic individualism. (Vaidhyanathan 11) The “unrewarded authorial genius” was certainly tactically deployed in the eighteenth century in order to generate sympathy in pleas for further protection (Feather 71). Supporting the RIAA, artists including Britney Spears ask “Would you go into a CD store and steal a CD? It’s the same thing – people going into the computers and logging on and stealing our music”. The presence of a notable celebrity claiming file-sharing is equivalent to stealing their personal property is a more publicly acceptable spin on the major labels’ attempts to maintain a monopoly over music distribution. In 1997, Congress enacted the No Electronic Theft Act which extended copyright protection into the digital realm and introduced stricter penalties for electronic reproduction. The use of “theft” in the title clearly aligns the statute with a propertarian portrayal of intangibles. Most movie fans will have witnessed anti-piracy propaganda in the cinema and on DVDs. Analogies between stealing a bag and downloading movies blur fundamental distinctions in the rivalrous/non-rivalrous nature of tangibles and intangibles (Lessig Code, 131). Of critical significance is the infiltration of “property talk” into the courtrooms. In 1990 Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote: Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with real property … Old rhetoric about intellectual property equating to monopoly seemed to have vanished, replaced by a recognition that a right to exclude in intellectual property is no different in principle from the right to exclude in physical property … Except in the rarest case, we should treat intellectual and physical property identically in the law – which is where the broader currents are taking us. (109, 112, 118) Although Easterbrook refers to patents, his endorsement of “property talk” is cause for concern given the similarity with which patents and copyrights have been historically treated (Ou 41). In Grand Upright v. Warner Bros. Judge Kevin Duffy commenced his judgment with the admonishment “Thou shalt not steal”. Similarly, in Jarvis v. A&M Records the court stated “there can be no more brazen stealing of music than digital sampling”. This move towards a propertarian approach is misguided. It runs contrary to the utilitarian principles underpinning copyright ideology and marginalises freedoms protected by the fair use doctrine, hence Justice Blackman’s warning that “interference with copyright does not easily equate with” interference with real property (Dowling v. United States 473 US 207, 216 [1985]). The framing of copyright in terms of real property privileges private monopoly over, and to the detriment of, the public interest in free and diverse creativity as well as freedoms of personal use. It is paramount that when dealing with copyright cases, the courts remain aware that their decisions involve not pure economic regulation, but regulation of expression, and what may count as rational where economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational where we focus on expression – in a Nation constitutionally dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning and culture. (Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 US 186 [2003] [J. Breyer dissenting]). Copyright is the prize in a contest of property vs. policy. As Justice Blackman observed, an infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use. While one may colloquially link infringement with some general notion of wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. (Dowling v. United States 473 US 207, 217-218 [1985]). Copyright policy places a great deal of control and cultural determinism in the hands of the creative industries. Without balance, oppressive monopolies form on the back of rights granted for the welfare of society in general. If a society wants to be independent and rich in diverse forms of cultural production and free expression, then the courts cannot continue to apply the law from within a propertarian paradigm. The question of whether culture should be determined by control or freedom in the interests of a free society is one that rapidly requires close attention – “it’s no longer a philosophical question but a practical one”. References Bayat, Asef. “Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the ‘Informal People.’” Third World Quarterly 18.1 (1997): 53-72. Bell, T. W. “Author’s Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing Rights.” Brooklyn Law Review 69 (2003): 229. Blackstone, W. Commentaries on the Laws of England: Volume II. New York: Garland Publishing, 1978. (Reprint of 1783 edition.) Boyle, J. Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996. Boyle, J. “A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?” Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87. Bowrey, K. “Who’s Writing Copyright’s History?” European Intellectual Property Review 18.6 (1996): 322. Cohen, J. “Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?” University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy 375 (2002). Collins, S. “Good Copy, Bad Copy.” (2005) M/C Journal 8.3 (2006). http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0507/02-collins.php>. Coombe, R. The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Demers, J. Steal This Music. Athens, Georgia: U of Georgia P, 2006. Easterbrook, F. H. “Intellectual Property Is Still Property.” (1990) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 13 (1990): 108. Feather, J. Publishing, Piracy and Politics: An Historical Study of Copyright in Britain. London: Mansell, 1994. Lemley, M. “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding.” Texas Law Review 83 (2005): 1031. Lessig, L. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books, 1999. Lessing, L. The Future of Ideas. New York: Random House, 2001. Lessig, L. Free Culture. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004. Locke, J. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988. McLeod, K. “How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An Interview with Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hank Shocklee.” Stay Free (2002). 14 June 2006 http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/20/public_enemy.html>. McLeod, K. “Confessions of an Intellectual (Property): Danger Mouse, Mickey Mouse, Sonny Bono, and My Long and Winding Path as a Copyright Activist-Academic.” Popular Music & Society 28 (2005): 79. McLeod, K. Freedom of Expression: Overzealous Copyright Bozos and Other Enemies of Creativity. United States: Doubleday Books, 2005. Miller, M.W. “Creativity Furor: High-Tech Alteration of Sights and Sounds Divides the Art World.” Wall Street Journal (1987): 1. Ou, T. “From Wheaton v. Peters to Eldred v. Reno: An Originalist Interpretation of the Copyright Clause.” Berkman Center for Internet & Society (2000). 14 June 2006 http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/OuEldred.pdf>. Samuelson, P. “Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?” Catholic University Law Review 38 (1989): 365. Travis, H. “Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 15 (2000): 777. Vaidhyanathan, S. Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity. New York: New York UP, 2003. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Collins, Steve. "‘Property Talk’ and the Revival of Blackstonian Copyright." M/C Journal 9.4 (2006). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0609/5-collins.php>. APA Style Collins, S. (Sep. 2006) "‘Property Talk’ and the Revival of Blackstonian Copyright," M/C Journal, 9(4). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0609/5-collins.php>.

In the decades before and after the First Opium War (1839-1842), the US missionary Reverend David Abeel laid out a sense of “South-Eastern Asian” for US readers of Journal of a Residence in China, and the Neighboring Countries, from 1829 to 1833 (1834). His phrase focuses multi-lingual print evangelicalism on an archipelago stretching across networks of opium traffic connecting India to China. His accounts also imply the layers of faiths and languages that shaped senses of geography before the existence of the United States and the convergence of mottled European imperialisms in the China trade. At the end of the war, Abeel moved to the coastal city of Amoy where he rationalized opium commerce as an evil outweighed by the potential benefits of opening treaty ports. The prominent administrator of Fujian and scholar Xú Jìyú (徐繼畬‎; 1795–1873) disagreed and adapted Abeel’s geographical tools to present a warning about the attempts to evangelize “South-East Asia.” His Yíng huàn zhì lüè (瀛擐志略‎; General Survey of the Maritime Circuit, a Universal Geography, 1849) portrays Catholic and Protestant commercial activity as a threat to indigenous jurisdiction the world over.