Journal articles on the topic 'United States. Department of Homeland Security'

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) formally incorporated Human Systems Integration (HSI) in systems and policy development in 2012. Since then, DHS components have been establishing HSI capabilities to meet their unique human needs. This discussion panel will focus on the operational transformation and governance strategy for implementing a successful human systems integration (HSI) program across components within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Members of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) will discuss the challenges faced when advocating for HSI, and the best practices developed to better integrate research activities with systems engineering.

On October 12, 2017, the United States Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, took a short trip from Pennsylvania Avenue across the Potomac to Falls Church, Virginia. The Attorney General went to Falls Church to address personnel of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), the agency that administers the United States’ immigration courts. The Attorney General's chosen topic for the day was “the fraud and abuse in our asylum system.” “Over the years,” the Attorney General argued, “Congress has rationally passed legislation designed to create an efficient and fair procedure to properly admit persons andexpedite the removalof aliens who enter the United States illegally.” The Attorney General is referring here to the “expedited removal” procedures that Congress created in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Expedited removal gives the Department of Homeland Security the power to deport, without a hearing, any person who was not admitted to the United States and who cannot prove continuous presence for the prior two years. The Department of Homeland Security currently exercises a narrower expedited removal authority pursuant to the Department's prosecutorial discretion. Only individuals apprehended within two weeks of entry and within 100 miles of a land border are subject to expedited removal, per Department regulations.

AbstractThis article situates the discussion of illicit trafficking in antiquities in the context of the relationship between the U.S. Departments of State and Homeland Security. The main argument is that U.S. cultural heritage policy is part of a broader agenda of political discourse that links matters of heritage to wider concerns of security. If the underlying goal of the U.S. State Department is mutual understanding through open dialogue, how can initiatives that focus on the criminal networks and security, efforts tackled by the Department of Homeland Security, contribute to building a positive image for the United States abroad? Here I explore strategic aspects of U.S. cultural policies and federally supported programs aimed at mitigating against the illicit trade in antiquities as part of building and maintaining cultural relations.

Abstract The ideation and execution of American homeland security has substantially evolved over the past fifteen years from a vague statement of principles to a very concrete, professional, and institutionalized field, with a cabinet-level department associated with various aspects of its practice. However, homeland security in the United States – defined as the protection of citizens, property, and interests beginning at international borders and expanding inward – is not yet fully developed or even secure in its own roles. As the evolution of both the theory and the practice continues, an important principle – analogous to one in the field of national security – must be sufficiently addressed and acted upon: the physical act of protecting sovereign territory.

Historically, the relationship between Mexico and the United States was one of respect, understanding, and cooperation. Geographic proxim¬ity demands that the two nations exist in harmony and collaborate to maintain a safe border and sustainable water consumption. However, with increasing frequency, the Department of Homeland Security challenges bi-lateral treaties entered into by Mexico and the United States. These treaties continue to face infringement as U.S. Presidents, past and present, build larger, longer south¬ern border walls. This article explores the federal laws supporting this border construction and further discusses the sparse caselaw examining constitutional challenges raised against the Department of Homeland Security regarding the Secretary’s waiver authority. Following this exploration, this study probes into the powers of treaty law as strong legal authority used to challenge and prevent future wall construction.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY During the summer of 2004, the First Coast Guard District in Boston, Massachusetts supported both Presidential political nominating conventions for the 2004 election. The Democratic National Convention was held in Boston, Massachusetts on July 26–29, 2004, and the Republican National Convention was held in New York City from August 30th to September 2, 2004. This was the first time both conventions have taken place within the geographic area of responsibility of a single Coast Guard District. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security declared both of these events as National Special Security Events under Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62). PDD-62 formalized and delineated the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in the development of security plans for major events. The 2004 Democratic and Republican Conventions were the first political conventions held in the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the months before the Democratic National Convention, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice stated that there was credible intelligence from multiple sources indicating that al-Qaeda planned to attempt an attack on the United States during the period leading up to the election. (Joint Statement of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft on May 28, 2004) The terrorist attacks on the Madrid rail system were a direct attempt by AI Qaeda to influence the elections in Spain, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was going to take all appropriate steps to prevent a similar attack in the United States. (Schmidt and Priest, Washington Post May 26, 2004; Page A02) The 2004 Conventions offered a significant challenge for the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies that had dual responsibility for coordinating security operations while being prepared to respond to a disaster including oil spills and hazardous substance releases—the combination of what was previously designated as crisis and consequence management under PDD-39. This paper will examine lessons learned from planning and operations in support of the conventions. Having served as the First District Project Officer for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, this paper is written as my observations of the lessons learned and offers some insight into what went well and possible areas for improvement as I observed throughout the more than 18 months of planning for these events of national significance. The Coast Guard planning and operational support for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions demonstrated the importance of a team approach to planning, interagency coordination and partnerships, pre-event preparedness activities, and pre-deploying personnel and resources for response. It is my hope that the observations contained in this paper can benefit federal, state, and local agencies as they prepare for large significant events in the future including National Special Security Events.

This research explored federal intervention with the particular emphasis on examining how a collaborative relationship between Department of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS) led to greater effectiveness between these two federal departments and their subordinates (United States Northern Command and Federal Emergency Management Agency, respectively) during the preparation and response phases of the disaster cycle regarding US continental-based hurricanes. Through the application of a two-phased, sequential mixed methods approach, this study determined how their relationship has led to longitudinal improvements in the years following Hurricane Katrina, focusing on hurricanes as the primary unit of analysis.

This paper examines the impact on skilled labor migration to the United States of same-sex marriage legalization in European countries and US federal recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. Analyzing US Department of Homeland Security data, we find that European legalization decreased skilled labor admissions to the United States by 22 percent, most notably after six years. However, US recognition of foreign same-sex marriages mitigated this effect post-2013, indicating that such legalizations facilitate skilled labor movement between nations.

The United States is susceptible to cyberattacks. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report provides several recommendations to prevent and respond to such attacks. However, many of these recommendations attempt to nationalize cybersecurity. This article presents a historical overview involving the Department of Homeland Security, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Commerce Clause, which outlines nationalization and its effects. It will note a similar trend for cybersecurity. Finally, the positive and negative consequences of nationalization are presented.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located on a small island off the coast of Long Island's North Fork, has been clouded in mystery and misinformation for years. Often the topic of conspiracy theorists, this secret place has generated many myths—from aliens to anthrax and pink eels to secret submarines. But the truth of the center's mission is far less colorful yet far more crucial to the state of the nation's agriculture.In June 2003, operational responsibility for the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) transferred from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and PIADC became the core of the DHS effort to protect US livestock from foreign animal disease agents.

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charge is to, “Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation’s CIKR …” using an all-hazards approach. The effective implementation of this strategy hinges on understanding catastrophes and their potential effect on the functioning of infrastructure. Unfortunately, there has been no unifying theory of catastrophe to guide decision-making, preparedness, or response. In this paper, the authors present a framework based on network science and normal accident theory that can be used to guide policy decisions for homeland security. They show that exceedance probability encompasses operational definitions of risk and resilience and provides a unifying policy framework for homeland security investments. Such an approach allows one to classify hazards as ‘high’ or ‘low’ risk, according to the resiliency exponent, and guide investments toward prevention or response. This framework is applied to cyber exploits and electric power grid systems to illustrate its generality.

Terrorism is perhaps the greatest global security challenge post-World War II and, like several countries, Nigeria is also grappling with this scourge. The remarkable thing is that following pressure from the United States (US) and Western nations, Nigeria took a major step towards counterterrorism with the enactment of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. The Act was later replaced by the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013. Certainly, so far, this legislation remains the nation’s boldest effort in combatting terrorism. However, the Nigerian counterterrorism legal regime still falls short in some material respect, given the absence of a robust strategy and complementary institutional support system. This is not the same case in a country such as the US, where the principal counterterrorism legislation, the Patriot Act, is well complemented by the US National Counterterrorism Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security. Against this background, this Article examines the legal regime governing counterterrorism in Nigeria and the US, with the view of highlighting areas where Nigeria could gain useful insights from the US experience. The expectation is that given the robustness of the US counterterrorism regime, the experience to be gained cannot but further enrich the existing counterterrorism legal regime in Nigeria.

The Nepalese in the United States of America (USA) are an emerging diasporic community. In spite of the phenomenal growth of the Nepalese diaspora in the USA in the last more than two decades, little is known about this new diasporic community, especially regarding how the Nepalese adapt to American life. This study documents the rapid growth in Nepalese immigration to the USA in the twenty-first century, based on data from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Using the data from an online survey, it analyzes the experiences of the Nepalese in cultural adaptation, structural adaptation, marital adaptation, identificational adaptation, and receptional adaptation. The results show that although the Nepalese have become partly assimilated to American culture, they still to a large extent retain their ethnic culture, ethnic association, ethnic identity, and ethnic marital partners, and they have had mixed experiences of prejudice and discrimination. The findings have significant scholarly and practical implications.

United States public health and security capabilities are vulnerable to the magnitude and complexity of infectious diseases. Recently, human cases of a new H7N9 influenza in China have underscored the unpredictability of outbreaks. This article analyzes the federal government’s role in addressing an imminent pandemic threat from an organizational perspective, beginning with the Cabinet Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Health and Human Services (HHS), which jointly lead pandemic planning and response. This article recommends that these departments, their agencies, and international partners continue building and maintaining a heterarchy, the most optimal interorganizational structure for securing against and responding to a pandemic threat. This requires establishing clear, yet flexible responsibilities and shared systems, terminology, and tools. Given a hypothetical scenario in which a disease is introduced into the United States by a potentially infected foreign migrant entering through a maritime port of entry, current protocol and operations are promising. However, further heterarchical coordination is necessary to appropriately manage all plausible scenarios.

High profile sporting events in the United States have been identified by the Department of Homeland Security as potential targets of terrorism (Lipton E: New York Times. March 16, 2005: A1). Other potential threats to major sports events include natural disasters and crowd management issues. It is therefore imperative that agencies involved in security planning at sports venues are trained in threat/risk assessment practices and engage in multiagency collaboration to ensure effective development and coordination of game day security plans. This article will highlight the potential threats to sports events, provide an overview of research conducted on sports event security, and outline some measures that can be utilized by emergency managers in their planning and preparation for managing major sports events.

On October 5, 2022, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals announced its ruling on Texas v. United States, which found the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) memorandum (and program) illegal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to rule on the legality of the Biden Administration’s Final Rule on the program, which the Department of Homeland Security publicized in late August and is under review and set to take effect on October 31, 2022. On October 14, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas also found DACA illegal. However, Judge Andrew Hanan extended the temporary order allowing current recipients to renew their permits until further notice. The future of DACA remains uncertain, yet the anxiety, exhaustion, numbness, and tiredness that stem from its legal terrorism remain real for those who benefit from the program. In this essay, the authors, two undocumented immigrant educators with DACA, reflect on their experiences with DACA, the meaning of the latest rulings, their futures, and the responsibility of higher education institutions to their undocumented immigrant students and professionals.

Despite the rapid growth of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the USA, knowledge about this new diasporic community remains very limited. This study argues and demonstrates that the Bangladeshi diaspora in the USA is a fast-growing and sizable diasporic community that requires systematic research and better understanding. It delineates the history of the Bangladeshi diaspora to the USA in four periods and documents the phenomenal growth of the Bangladeshi diasporic community in the USA since 1981, using data from the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). By taking into account the legal Bangladeshi immigration as well as the emigration and mortality rates of immigrants and undocumented Bangladeshi immigration, it estimates the current size of the Bangladeshi diasporic community in the USA at about 500,000 instead of a range of low-to-mid 200,000s normally cited. Additionally, using the pooled samples of the 2001–2019 American Community Surveys (ACS) and other ACS data, as well as the DHS data, this paper provides a demographic and socioeconomic portrait of the Bangladeshi diasporic community in the USA. The findings are generalizable to the population and fill some important gaps in the literature.

Today, terrorist groups are recruiting, inspiring, and guiding global strategies not just by Internet operations, but through an organized, steady infusion of propaganda videos and call-to-action messages. Most worrisome: increasing evidence that the youth population represents a particularly susceptible cohort, being drawn into the ranks of terrorist organizations operating worldwide. In response, this article will address the pros and cons of social media banning, its effects on constitutional rights, and its effectiveness towards decreasing radicalization and recruitment. The research presented here aims to further the field of Homeland Security and to encourage debates on how to decrease terrorism and youth recruitment and whether banning social media would assist the Department of Homeland Security's mission. In conclusion, this article explores both sides of the spectrum while offering insight for scholars, organizations, and practitioners regarding the attainability of social media banning in the United States.

The sharing of homeland security information is a crucial aspect of modern policing in the United States. This article outlines some of the obstacles to information sharing at the state and local levels, including interagency and intra-agency issues that arise for police agencies. It explores the complexities of information sharing across a highly decentralized policing system. Many police departments lack a formal intelligence function that limits their ability to share information. This article offers an organizational change model using John Kotter’s Leading Change principles that police agencies of any size can follow. It outlines Kotter’s eight-stage process from establishing a sense of urgency through anchoring new approaches in the culture to create a framework for police departments to integrate homeland security information sharing. Its intent is to provide a framework for police agencies to incrementally implement some of the recommendations of the various strategic documents that guide information sharing.

Government organizations in the United States routinely face harmful scrutiny from the mainstream media, politicians, and citizens. The messages from these sources communicate that many Americans are not happy with their government nor its public agencies. These sentiments are likely to lower the prestige of public organizations in the eyes of current employees and hamper retention efforts. However, there is a limited amount of empirical research that has explored the consequences of employees’ perceived organizational prestige (POP) perceptions in public organizations. This study seeks to fill this gap by exploring the direct association that POP perceptions have on a range of work outcomes for the purpose of stimulating future research on the topic. Based on a sample of federal employees working for the Department of Homeland Security in the United States, this study found that POP was significantly related to job and organizational satisfaction, commitment, self-reported performance, work related stress, and turnover intentions. The implications of findings for future research are discussed.

Government organizations in the United States routinely face harmful scrutiny from the mainstream media, politicians, and citizens. The messages from these sources communicate that many Americans are not happy with their government nor its public agencies. These sentiments are likely to lower the prestige of public organizations in the eyes of current employees and hamper retention efforts. However, there is a limited amount of empirical research that has explored the consequences of employees’ perceived organizational prestige (POP) perceptions in public organizations. This study seeks to fill this gap by exploring the direct association that POP perceptions have on a range of work outcomes for the purpose of stimulating future research on the topic. Based on a sample of federal employees working for the Department of Homeland Security in the United States, this study found that POP was significantly related to job and organizational satisfaction, commitment, self-reported performance, work related stress, and turnover intentions. The implications of findings for future research are discussed.

IntroductionHistory is replete with interoperability and resource reporting deficits during disaster that impact medical response and planning. Situational awareness for disaster and emergency medical response includes communicating health hazards as well as infrastructure and resource status, capability and GIS location. The need for actionable, real-time data is crucial to response. Awareness facilitates medical resource placement, response and recovery. A number of internet, web-based disaster resource and situational status reporting applications exist but may be limited or restricted by functional, jurisdictional, proprietary and/or financial requirements. Restrictions prohibit interoperability and inhibit information sharing that could affect health care delivery. Today multiple United States jurisdictions are engaged in infrastructure and resource situation status reporting via “virtual” states and regional projects considered components of “Virtual USA”.MethodsThis report introduces the United States' Department of Homeland Security's “Virtual USA” initiative and demonstrates a health application and interoperability via “Virtual Louisiana's” oil spill related exposure reporting during the 2010, British Petroleum Gulf Horizon catastrophe. Five weekly Louisiana Department of Health and Hospital summary reports from the Louisiana Poison Center; Hospital Surveillance Systems; Public Health Hotline; and Physician Clinic Offices were posted on the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness's “Virtual Louisiana”.Results227 total spill-related, exposure cases from five reporting weeks were provided by five Louisiana source agencies and reported in Virtual Louisiana. Cases were reported weekly and classified as “workers” or “population”; associated with the parish exposure locations (8), offshore (1), or unknown (1); and shared with four other virtual states.ConclusionsReal-time health and medical situation status, resource awareness, and incident impact could be facilitated through constructs demonstrated by “Virtual USA”.

In September 2007, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the National Preparedness Guidelines which advocate a capabilitiesbased planning (CBP) approach to preparedness for state, local, and tribal governments. This article provides an overview of capabilities-based planning and a more specific focus on the aims, objectives, and components of the DHS CBP model. The article also summarizes what scholars have previously suggested are fundamental elements for successful emergency and disaster planning focusing specifically on Quarantelli’s 10 research-based principles. The article evaluates the effectiveness of the DHS CBP model in helping local governments incorporate these fundamental elements into their planning efforts and concludes with an overall assessment of the DHS CBP model as a framework for local planning success.

The United States requires an enormous class of workers to keep essential services online. The Department of Homeland Security uses a sweeping definition of such essential industries from grocery stores to hospitals to warehouses, which collectively employed 90 million workers prior to the COVID-19 outbreak. A portion of these essential workers—or “frontline” workers—must physically show up to their jobs and have been especially vulnerable to additional health and economic risks, including many employed in infrastructure-related activities. This analysis—based on Brookings Institution posts written in March and June 2020—defines the country’s essential workforce and explores their economic and demographic characteristics in greater depth, revealing a need for continued protections and investments as part of the COVID-19 recovery.

Bush's presidency begins with Al Qaeda attack on US territory, they adopted new strategies to counter radical Islamist groups and ensure American security, and the new setup established a new central agency, known as 'The Department of Homeland Security.' Secondly, they decided to keep the war out of American territory and invaded Afghanistan and quash the sanctuaries of Al-Qaeda and get rid of the government in Afghanistan. Another strategy was 'the doctrine of Preventive war' and the last action was against Saddam Hussain about whom they used to claim that Iraq possessed "Weapon of Mass Destruction." They pursued Afghan Taliban, too, as the enemies of the United States. The reason for such war was that the Bush administration or war policy makers had no understanding of Afghan society. To such an ignorant invader over the complex society, the ethnically diverse and religiously traditional fault lines caused tremendous trouble.

From 2011–2014, the United States Department of Homeland Security recorded an extraordinary increase in the number of unaccompanied children arriving at the southern border from Central America’s “Northern Triangle”—the area made up of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In fact, in fiscal year 2014, United States Customs and Border Protection apprehended over 50,000 unaccompanied children from the Northern Triangle. That is thirteen times more than just three years earlier. This Article examines the intersecting humanitarian and legal crises facing these children and offers an administrative solution to the problem. The children are fleeing a genuine humanitarian crisis—a region overrun by violent gangs that regularly target young people for recruitment. Once in the United States, these children face their own legal crisis. Indeed, they must confront numerous procedural and substantive hurdles, trying to avoid removal. As a result, many of the children are at serious risk of being deported and subsequently killed by the very gangs that they fled. Given this situation, the Article argues that President Obama’s administration should provide temporary humanitarian protection to these migrants by exercising its congressionally delegated power to designate El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as new “temporary protected status” countries. Under this proposal, the United States would provide a temporary safe haven to nationals of these three countries until the horrific gang violence in the Northern Triangle subsides.

Our nation continues to experience increased frequency and severity of weather disasters. All of these risks demand that we look at the current system and assess if this system, which is predicated on strong Federal leadership in partnership with State and local governments and which failed so visibly in Hurricane Katrina, needs to be rebuilt on a new model. We are suggesting a plan of action that, we believe, is practical, achievable, and will reduce the costs in lives, property, environmental and economic damage from future disasters. The next President is the only person who can make this happen.We suggest that the next President undertake the following steps: (1) move FEMA out of the Department of Homeland Security; (2) appoint a FEMA Director, who is a trusted adviser to the President; (3) include the appointment of the FEMA Director in the first round of Presidential appointees to the Cabinet; (4) rebuild the Federal Response Plan; (5) remove the hazard mitigation and long-term recovery functions from FEMA; (6) invest $2.5 billion annually in hazard mitigation; (7) support community disaster resiliency efforts. The next President will have the opportunity to build the new partnership of Federal, State and local governments, voluntary agencies, nonprofits and the private sector that is needed to make our nation resilient. The question is will the next President take advantage of this opportunity?

This paper argues that 'fusion centers' are byproducts of the privatization of state surveillance and assaults on civil liberties, at least in the United States, the nation on which the research is based, with special focus on the recent case of the Maryland State Police spying scandal. In fusion centers, members of local, state, and federal police and intelligence units, as well as private-sector organizations, share information with each other by means of computerized technology and store it in databases. While the official purpose is to protect public safety, the practice of 'data-mining' and unclear lines of authority lead to fusion centers being unaccountable to the public and, hence, a threat to the democratic process. These conditions are encapsulated in the case of official espionage in the state of Maryland at least between 2004 and 2006. Drawing on official documents, the history of 'homeland security' since World War II and the characteristics of fusion centers, the Department of Homeland Security, and events in Maryland are surveyed. Working within the contexts of social history, surveillance theory, and political economy, this paper is grounded in the work of Beck, Churchill and Wall, Donner, Fuchs, Graham, Lyon, McCulloch and Pickering, and Monahan.

“We saw no issues,” reports the Department of Homeland Security in a self-study of its practices for detaining children at the US–Mexico border, “except one unsanitary bathroom.” The system is working as it should; all is well. “CBP [Customs and Border Protection] facilities we visited,” the report summarizes, “appeared to be operating in compliance with the 2015 National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search.” A footnote on page 2 of the September 2018 document defines the prisoners at these facilities, the “unaccompanied alien children,” as “aliens under the age of eighteen with no lawful immigration status in the United States and without a parent or legal guardian in the United States ‘available’ to care and [provide] physical custody for them.” Available is in scare quotes. This tic of punctuation discloses to us that the parents of these children have been arrested and removed. They are not available, and cannot take physical custody of their children, because they themselves are in physical custody. In a further typographical error, the word “provide” has been omitted: the children are without a parent or legal guardian in the United States “available” to care and physical custody for them. The dropped word turns “physical custody” into a verb and sets this new action, to physical custody, in tense relation to “care.”

Society’s rising expectations for improved treatments and better health outcomes continuously push the boundaries of discovery in biomedical research. One focus of such research is to develop the newest drugs to address humanity’s increasing exposure to emerging infectious diseases. This has led both privately and publicly funded researchers to take on the task of studying highly infectious diseases in laboratory settings. Illustrating this phenomenon is the recent work of two research laboratories at universities that have demonstrated how easily the avian flu virus (influenza A H5N1) could be manipulated into a highly infectious and deadly form for humans. These studies, which were funded by the United States Government through the National Institutes of Health of the US Department of Health and Human Services, have sparked a fierce debate as to their risks and benefits to humankind. Lacking in the current debate, however, is any significant attempt to describe in basic terms the risks and benefits of such research or the basic safeguards already built into the biomedical research enterprise that serves to protect the public’s welfare.In this article, the authors will attempt to frame the ongoing debate for those outside the scientific research community by discussing a number of competing public policy issues that the recent H5N1 controversy raises about research on dangerous pathogens or biological agents and the concerns that emergency planners and managers nation-wide face when such research is conducted in their communities.

E-Verify is a federal electronic verification system that allows employers to check whether their newly hired workers are authorized to work in the United States. To use E-Verify, firms first must enroll with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Participation is voluntary for most private-sector employers in the United States, but eight states currently require all or most employers to use E-Verify. This article uses confidential data from DHS to examine patterns of employer enrollment in E-Verify. The results indicate that employers are much more likely to sign up in mandatory E-Verify states than in states without such mandates, but enrollment is still below 50 percent in states that require its use. Large employers are far more likely to sign up than small employers. In addition, employers are more likely to newly enroll in E-Verify when a state’s unemployment rate or the state’s population share of likely unauthorized immigrants rises. However, enrollment rates are lower in industries with higher shares of unauthorized workers. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that enrolling in the program is costly for employers in terms of both compliance and difficulty in hiring workers. A strictly enforced nationwide mandate that all employers use an employment eligibility program like E-Verify would be incompatible with the current reliance on a large unauthorized workforce. Allowing more workers to enter legally or legalizing existing workers might be necessary before implementing E-Verify nationally.

Recently, John Doe, an undocumented immigrant who was detained by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), was admitted to a hospital off-site from a detention facility. Custodial officers accompanied Mr. Doe into the exam room and refused to leave as physicians examined him. In this analysis, we examine the ethical dilemmas this case brings to light concerning the treatment of patients in immigration detention and their rights to privacy. We analyze what US law and immigration detention standards allow regarding immigration enforcement or custodial officers’ presence in medical exams and documentation of detainee health information. We describe the ethical implications of the presence of officers in medical exam rooms, including its effects on the quality of the patient-provider relationship, patient privacy and confidentiality, and provider's ability to provide ethical care. We conclude that the presence of immigration enforcement or custodial officers during medical examination of detainees is a breach of the right to privacy of detainees who are not an obvious threat to the public. We urge ICE and the US Department of Homeland Security to clarify standards for and tighten enforcement around when officers are legally allowed to be stationed in medical exam rooms and document detainees’ information.

Public charge, a term used by immigration officials for over 100 years, refers to a person who relies on public assistance at the government’s expense. Immigrants who are deemed at high risk of becoming a public charge can be denied green cards; those outside of the United States can be denied entry. Current public charge policy largely applies to cash benefits. The Department of Homeland Security has proposed a regulation that will allow officials to consider the take-up of both cash and non-cash benefits when making public charge determinations. Nearly 90 percent of children with immigrant parents are U.S.-born and therefore eligible for public benefits. Most of these children live in mixed-status households. We examine the potential child poverty impact of the proposed regulation. Our results show that depending on the chilling effect, more than 2 million citizen children could lose access to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program as a result of the proposed regulation.

After the attacks of 9/11/2001 the federal government implemented new policies intended to protect people and institutions in the United States. A surprising policy requires education researchers conducting research under contract to the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to obtain security clearances, sometimes known as security screenings. Contractor employees whose work meets any of four conditions are required to “undergo personnel security screenings.” Two of the four conditions are mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, issued by President George W. Bush in 2004. This article focuses on the other two conditions triggering security screenings by ED, which are when contractor employees either “require access to unclassified sensitive information, such as Privacy Act-protected, personally identifiable, proprietary or other sensitive information and data” or “perform duties in a school or location where children are present.” Neither is a national security concern. Since 2007 the American Educational Research Association has objected to security screenings triggered by these two requirements; however, the policy was reissued by ED in July 2010. This article describes the experiences of contracting organizations and their employees. The majority have complied with the requirements, although often under duress. Two historical precedents are cited and discussed, when the government in the 1950s implemented loyalty oath provisions allegedly to protect citizens. Sociological and psychological research is explored that sheds light on people’s behavior when faced with requirements such as these screenings. A lengthy list of objections to the policy is explained and discussed.

Abstract The cybersecurity of critical infrastructures is an essential topic within national and international security as 16 critical infrastructure sectors touch various aspects of American society. Because the failure to provide adequate cybersecurity controls within the critical infrastructure sectors renders the country open to an attack that could have a debilitating effect on security, national public health, safety, and economic security, this matter is so vital that there is the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning and resilient critical infrastructure. An organization identified as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the mission to be the risk advisor for the United States (US). Other organizations, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), have approved a specific Knowledge Unit (KU) to address cybersecurity for critical infrastructures associated with doctoral-level granting programs. To address this challenge, it is necessary to identify threats better and defend against them while mitigating risks to an acceptable level. Only then can a nation build a more secure and resilient infrastructure for the future while defending against present-day bad actors as cyberwarfare, cyber espionage, and cybersecurity attacks are the modern-day threats that need to be addressed in planning, designing, implementation, and maintenance. Therefore, the researchers developed a case study reviewing threats against different sectors defined in the PPD.

Abstract Foreign animal diseases (FADs) are recognized as a threat to agriculture, with potential devastating effects on our nation’s livestock and poultry industries. As weapons of bioterrorism, FADs also represent a threat to our nation’s homeland security. Veterinarians play a vital role in protecting our nation’s agricultural resources through their ability to identify and promptly respond to FADs, some of which are of public health concern. Veterinarians working in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were surveyed to assess their awareness of FADs and their preparedness to recognize and respond to potential cases. Two hundred thirty-seven veterinary practitioners completed an online questionnaire which included demographic and practice characteristics, federal accreditation status, awareness of FAD history in the United States, awareness of current FAD threats, training, and professional experiences with FADs. In the analysis, we identified topics respondents were most familiar, and those which they feel pose the greatest disease threat. We also assessed respondents’ interest in receiving supplemental training on FADs. Results of this survey indicate that most participating Pennsylvania veterinarians are familiar with FADs and have had educational exposure to FADs either during their formal veterinary education or through the United States Department of Agriculture veterinary accreditation program. However, the majority feels unprepared to recognize FADs. Most survey respondents expressed an interest in receiving supplemental training on FADs, and were willing to travel to receive the training.

ABSTRACT Although facilities in the United States have not been subject to major oil spills caused by intentional acts, around the world acts of war and terrorism account for a large fraction of reported major oil spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires response plans that address a “worst case discharge;” however, the implementing regulatory agencies did not foresee the possibility of deliberate attacks that could involve multiple storage tanks or several pipeline response zones. In addition, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the problems with the current U.S. federal response and contingency plans. The U.S. Coast Guard published a rule that requires operators of marine-transportation-related oil facilities to implement a variety of security measures. Inland facilities and pipelines are generally exempt from the security regulations; nevertheless, those facilities and pipelines can take steps to increase their own security preparedness by emulating the Coast Guard provisions. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7, issued on December 17, 2003, identified critical infrastructure sectors and sector-specific agencies to facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sectors. The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for coordinating the protection of critical infrastructures in the Energy Sector, which includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil. In this paper, we discuss recent trends in Federal requirements and current provisions for oil industry security planning. We highlight types of major oil facilities that need to consider the possibility of a terrorist attack, as well as recommendations by industry groups. We conclude with suggested areas for industry planning improvement.

Recent technological advancements in surveillance and data analysis software have drastically transformed how the United States manages its immigration and national security systems. In particular, an increased emphasis on information sharing and predictive threat modeling following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has prompted agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security to acquire powerful data analysis software from private sector vendors, including those in Silicon Valley. However, the impacts of these private sector technologies, especially in the context of privacy rights and civil liberties, are not yet fully understood. This article interrogates those potential impacts, particularly on the lives of immigrants, by analyzing the relational database system Investigative Case Management (ICM), which is used extensively by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to track, manage, and enforce federal immigration policy. As a theoretical framework, the we use Benjamin Bratton’s concept of the “interfacial regime,” or the layered assemblages of interfaces that exist in modern networked ICT infrastructures. By conducting a document analysis, we attempt to visually situate ICM within the federal government’s larger interfacial regime that is composed by various intertwined databases both within and outside the government’s realm of management. Furthermore, we question and critique the role ICM plays in surveilling and governing the lives of immigrants and citizens alike.

This coautoethnographic case study used the Open-Source Public Health Intelligence process to explore and share the South East Texas Regional Advisory Councils’ (SETRAC) experience in collecting, processing, disseminating/visualizing, and analyzing COVID-19 data during the pandemic in the largest national medical setting in the United States. Specifically, it details the production of Business Intelligence reports powered by PowerBI both with general publics and with Regional Healthcare Preparedness Program (HPP) Coalition Coordinators, County Judges and City Mayors, Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) executive leadership, the Offices of the Texas Governor, and the Federal Pandemic Task Force led by the US Vice President, in order to provide a foundation for situational awareness, inter-regional collaboration, allocation of scare resources, and local, regional, and state policy decisions. It highlights best practices in risk and crisis communications during the COVID-19 response, underscores cross-sector collaboration and standardization of data collection for effective planning and response, discusses pervasive data revealed during the analysis, and evaluates collaborative and feedback processes that have implications for the Health Care System and Homeland Security Enterprise information sharing.

The Emergency Use Authorisation (EUA) authority plays a vital role in US FDA. They provide the authority/permission to use the unregistered products/registered product with unregistered route to treat the life threatening damages to the patients in world in some emergency conditions. The aim of this work is to give an overview on EUA in life threatening conditions and there challenges in getting the permissions under regulations with example of E-bola virus. The e-bola is a virus. It is a hemorrhagic fever deadly disease caused by one of the E-bola viral strain, which is wide spread in West Africa. The -Secretary of the Department of homeland security (DHS), determined, pursuant to section 319F-2 of the Public Health Service Act, that the Ebola virus presents a material threat against the United States population sufficient to affect national security. Issuance of EUA by the FDA Commissioner requires several steps under section 564 of the FD&C Act. The FDA Commissioner, can only issue the EUA, if criteria for issuance under the statute are met. This study’s highlights the importance of the EUA in emergency when there is no medicine for disease/virus in the world. For example the FDA has issued a EUA to use the ReEBOV which is the Rapid Antigen Test device designed by Lusys lab co. Pvt. Ltd. for detecting the Zaire Ebola virus.

State surveillance programs often operate in direct tension with ideals of democratic governance and accountability. The fraught history of surveillance programs in the United States, for instance, illustrates that government agencies mobilize discourses of exceptional circumstances to engage in domestic and foreign spying operations without public awareness or oversight. While many scholars, civil society groups, and media pundits have drawn attention to the propensity of state surveillance programs to violate civil liberties, less attention has been given to the complex trust dynamics of state surveillance. On one hand, in justifying state surveillance, government representatives claim that the public should trust police and intelligence communities not to violate their rights; on the other hand, the very act of engaging in secretive surveillance operations erodes public trust in government, especially when revelations about such programs come to light without any advance notice or consent. In order to better understand such trust dynamics, this paper will analyze some of the competing trust relationships of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ‘fusion centers,’ with a focus on the role of these organizations in policing the Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011 and 2012.

Several governmental entities: the Secretary of Transportation; the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Commerce; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and industry, aligned their resources to develop the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new approach to safety at airports in the United States (U.S.). NextGen places the responsibility for safety within airport management and changing the FAA's role from testing, inspecting, and certifying to approval and periodic audits of the Safety Management Systems (SMS) programs at U.S. airports. The purpose of the research was to determine, through a comprehensive literature review and evaluation, whether SMS will be used as the framework for U.S. airports to move safely into the year 2025. The researcher concluded that the vision for SMS implementation was well defined and the requirements fairly clear, but guidance and support for SMS implementation at U.S. airports are lacking.

Abstract This article discusses the vexed relationship between women’s activism, state security, and feminist empowerment by focusing on the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative, a program that seeks to build partnerships between government agencies and Muslim communities to prevent homegrown terrorism. From its inception, CVE has been controversial among Muslim and non-Muslim leaders within Southern California’s civil rights communities. While some suggest that American Muslims must play a leading role in countering domestic terrorism by working with government agencies, others feel that these partnerships are only meant to extend surveillance into Muslim communities. In this article, the authors critically examine how women are incorporated into local counterterrorism measures via CVE to think about the impact of such incorporation on their intimate, familial, and community relationships in the local politics of the War on Terror. The authors are interested in how liberal feminist discourses of motherhood and empowerment are appropriated in the service of national security and how such articulations of feminism domesticate and delink critique from the politics of racial solidarity and empire in the increasingly xenophobic sociopolitical landscape of the United States. Based on ethnographic research in Southern California’s Muslim communities, the authors trace the complex contours of women’s agency and the transnational politics of “Muslim America.” The authors draw on intersectional and anti-imperialist theories, as well as a body of feminist securitization scholarship to think about the ways that women’s activism, communal resistance, and national security are interlinked in the construction of the discourses around counterterrorism and their affiliated policies.

Colleges and universities must be prepared to respond to events that could compromise the safety of any person in a classroom, residence hall, office, or any other campus facility as well as for any event that could jeopardize the continuation of use of any campus facility. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) states, “Higher education institutions ... are realizing that improving their campus’ resistance to disaster will not only protect their own lives and those of their students, it will also safeguard their campus’ instruction, research, and public service.” The US Department of Homeland Security, FEMA developed the overarching strategy, the National Response Framework (NRF), for emergency preparedness for “government executives, private-sector and nongovernmental organization leaders.” FEMA and the Department of Education (DOE) developed specific guidelines for emergency preparedness for colleges and universities. This study linked these guidelines to the five principles of the NRF. Most institutions have an emergency preparedness plan, but just how effective are these plans? Do community colleges, state, independent, and proprietary institutions differ in terms of their level of emergency preparedness? The target population for this study is colleges and universities in the United States. This quantitative study measured how aligned the emergency preparedness plans of these colleges and universities are to the recommendations of FEMA and the US DOE, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools. The data suggest that much more needs to be done to bring college and university emergency plans into alignment with the government recommendations. Alignment with the government documents for this sample of US colleges and universities is extremely low for each principle of the NRF.

Objective. The International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) require countries to report potential public health emergencies of international concern to the World Health Organization. Given that in the U.S. federal system, disease surveillance and reporting is a state, territory, or local-level responsibility, we wanted to discern the level of familiarity at the state and local level with the international obligations for disease reporting under IHR (2005). Methods. We conducted a multisectoral survey of states, commonwealths/territories, and localities to assess basic knowledge of IHR (2005) and potential impediments to implementation. Respondents included both legal and policy experts from departments of health, agriculture, transportation, and homeland security. Results. Our survey demonstrated that domestic knowledge of IHR (2005) and of the United States' obligations under the regulations is not widespread, particularly in nonhealth sectors. Of the respondents who were familiar with IHR (2005), some noted legal issues as a concern for implementation, but the lack of federal guidance was perceived as a more fundamental impediment. Conclusion. Considerably more work needs to be done at the federal level to educate and guide state sectors for the U.S. to ensure its fulfillment of international legal obligations.

Geographic Response Plans (GRPs) are location-specific plans developed to provide guidance for oil spill responses throughout the United States. Until recently, the majority of crude oil transportation in the United States has occurred via waterways on oil tankers and barges, therefore, most existing GRPs focus on the protection of sensitive biological resources and socio-economic features in near shore environments. The recent development of crude oil extraction from the Bakken formation has resulted in a significant increase in the volume of crude oil being transported via railroads and pipelines and has highlighted the need for inland response planning. Rail cars transporting the volatile and flammable Bakken crude oil now traverse more than 850 miles of New York State on two major Class 1 Railroads. In response, Executive Order 125 was issued by the governor directing state agencies to strengthen the state's preparedness for incidents involving crude oil transportation. New York State's (NYS) Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Services and Department of Health, are leading a multi-stakeholder effort to develop Inland GRPs for the 21 NYS counties currently impacted by crude-by-rail transportation. County steering committees were established consisting primarily of local first response agencies, as well as their state and federal partners. Utilizing Sensitive Resource Maps developed by DEC, coupled with the local steering committee input, location-specific response plans were drafted, reviewed, and set as final working “evergreen” documents, which are open for update/refinement at any time in the future. The NYSDEC GRPs are similar to typical GRPs in that they are map-based, location-specific contingency plans that outline response strategies for the protection of sensitive resources. However, the NYSDEC GRPs differ from traditional GRPs in several ways. They extend contingency planning to cover spills on land, in addition to surface water-based spills. Due to the flammability of Bakken crude oil, much more emphasis is placed on the fire risks associated with a train derailment. This is done by mapping sensitive human receptors (e.g., schools, daycare centers, assisted living centers, etc.), critical infrastructure, and identifying fire (and vapor) suppression assets. The NYSDEC GRPs also place more emphasis on the initial response options available to local first responders, options that can be implemented before other response assets may arrive on-scene (State, Federal, and RP). This presentation will discuss the development, structure, proposed implementation, training and exercises associated with this ongoing program.

The World Trade Center Attack or 9/11 tragedy has awakened the international community, particularly the United States (US) to sharpen its foreign policy in facing security threats coming from ‘weak states’. One of the most prominent weak states examples that pose a grave threat to other countries are the Northern Triangle Countries of Central America that referred to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Hence, this paper will discuss the rationale behind US initiatives in dealing with security threats in El Salvador as one of the Northern Triangle Countries. In analyzing the case, the writers will use the weak state concept and national interest concept. The result of this paper finds that El Salvador corresponds to the elements of a weak state and further poses security threats by giving rise to transnational criminal organizations, drug trafficking, and migrant problems in which overcoming those security threats has become US vital national interest. 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