Academic literature on the topic 'United States – Economic policy – 1971-'

The US economic embargo against Cuba has been in place for fifty years. During that period, its rationale and goals have not changed. As it is stressed in the article, principal purpose of the US sanctions strategy is either to modify the international behavior of Cuba, which Washington regarded as a threat to US strategic interests in the Latin America region, or to eliminate the Cuban political regime entirely. Measured against these goals, the sanctions clearly have failed. Author examines key factors having restricted sanctions’ ability to achieve American proclaimed goals regarding to Cuba. In this context, it is underscored that controversial maintenance of the US embargo against Cuba among US allies directly affected the results of sanctions strategy against Cuba. It is stressed that since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the government. The United States embargo against Cuba is a commercial, economic, and financial embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba. An embargo was first imposed by the United States on sale of arms to Cuba on the 14th of March 1958, during the Fulgencio Batista regime. On October 19, 1960 the U.S. placed an embargo on exports to Cuba except for food and medicine after Cuba nationalized American-owned Cuban oil refineries without compensation. On February 7, 1962 the embargo was extended to include almost all imports. Currently, the Cuban embargo is enforced mainly through six statutes: the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Helms–Burton Act 1996, and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. The stated purpose of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 is to maintain sanctions on Cuba so long as the Cuban government refuses to move toward democratization and greater respect for human rights. The article emphasizes that The Helms–Burton Act further restricted United States citizens from doing business in or with Cuba, and mandated restrictions on giving public or private assistance to any successor government in Havana unless and until certain claims against the Cuban government were met.

« From the Sino-Soviet strategic project to the Sino-American strategic project » is a purposely schematic interpretative essay on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1979 with emphasis on, the latter phase of that evolution, that of the 1969—1979 period, and more particularly on the last year of that decade, 1979. The project, both defensive and offensive, of American and Chinese co-leadership of the planet that Mao had undertaken to carry out in 1971-1972 with the encouragement of Nixon had to be more or less put aside from 1973 to 1978 because of the seriousness of the domestic crises that were successively shaking both China and the United States during those years. In 1978—79, it was able to be reactivated by Deng Xiaoping who sought, with the benediction of the White House, to add an economic and a cultural dimension to Us diplomatic and strategic dimension. It is unlikely however in the near future that the United States will consider China as other than an auxiliary aspect of the fundamental game of their relations with the most powerful of their adversary-partners, the U.S.S.R. As in the case of the Sino-Soviet strategic project that China promoted from 1949 to 1959, the Sino-American strategic project that China has sought to « sell » the United States since 1969 has not, therefore, much chance of success.

Abstract: After the reform of the world monetary system in 1971, the competition between countries for the global market is taking place in completely new conditions. Monetary and fiscal authorities have accumulated vast experience in regulating the economy and strengthening country competitive advantages through complex mechanisms of quantitative easing, foreign exchange rates manipulation, increasing debts, etc. Overcoming the consequences of the financial crises of the 21st century every time forces monetary regulators to implement increasingly radical measures in order to save the economy by injecting enormous amounts of liquidity into the market to buy out bad corporate debts as well as government debt securities. At the same time, the questions of how monetary policy affects the level of economic inequality and who is its beneficiary are becoming more relevant.The article seeks to analyze the impact of changes in monetary policy parameters on wealth inequality in the United States. Given the cyclical nature of economic inequality, the main method of research was chosen as a graphical statistical analysis, since it allows to identify trends effectively and keep in focus more than 100-year picture of changes in the analyzed indicators. For a more holistic picture, the dynamics of economic wealth inequality level were compared not only with key indicators of monetary policy, but also with the dynamics of marginal tax rates in US.One conclusion of the research is that wealth inequality depends more on fiscal adjustment and marginal tax rates than on monetary factors. Inadequate marginal income and inheritance tax rates are factors of rising of wealth inequality in US. Changing of monetary system settings also influences on the level of wealth inequality, because it affects the valuation of financial assets, and therefore the wealth of the richest people in US. Another important conclusion is the idea that the new monetary policy, despite all fears that it is a source of growing economic inequality, is acceptable with marginal income and inheritance tax rates of about 60% and with effective macroprudential regulation of US economy.

The rise of China was not an issue in 1971 or 1972. Therefore, neither the United States nor Japan thought about the consequences of US–China and Japan–China rapprochement in the early 1970s (Kissinger, 2011). The diplomatic normalization between Japan and China took place in 1972 as an appendage of the United States–China rapprochement in 1971, at least in American eyes. At this time, the United States was waging war in Vietnam, while the Cold War was still at the heyday of massive nuclear buildups by the United States and the Soviet Union. China was in the midst of domestic turmoil called the Cultural Revolution, while facing the hostile Soviet Union. To ease their burdens, both countries concluded the surprising rapprochement. It was a great surprise to Japan because it had not been notified about this rapprochement even a couple of days before. In 1971, China entered the United Nations. Japan went ahead of the United States and had achieved diplomatic normalization by 1972. Japan wanted to develop a new market in China when its economy was booming whereby Japan wanted to alleviate the extreme of ‘leaning to one side’ (to the United States). China wanted to alleviate security threats coming from the Soviet Union (‘anti-hegemonism’) and to have Japan involved in the development of the half-frozen economy, especially with the massive Japanese official development assistance. On the disputed islands called Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese government wanted to settle the issue, but the Chinese government saw no immediate urgency to do so. In 1978, both the United States and Japan consolidated their ties with China, again with Japan going ahead of the United States. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping came back into power, paving the road to ‘economic reform and the opening to the world’. His famous sentence, yangguan taohui (keep low profile, nurture strength), was propagated as the new Chinese policy line, both internally and externally (Vogel, 2011). He focused on economic development while keeping peace on all borders. China started to grow in the 1980s in a strident fashion, although voices for political reform were also on the rise. Such voices culminated in 1989 after the death of former Secretary General Hu Yaopang, a reformist who was dismissed from office in 1987 by Deng Xiaoping. On 4 June 1989, large numbers of demonstrators assembled in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, demanding more freedom and democracy. Deng Xiaoping ordered the all-out suppression of the dissidents. The Tiananmen Square massacre led to embargos by the West and by Japan. The embargos were lifted in 1991. Both Japan and Europe were keen on this. The Chinese economy then registered a two digit annual growth rate for two decades until 2011. Meanwhile the terms of the Japan–China Friendship Treaty of 1978 − that is China forgiving Japan for not paying indemnity − became known in China, giving rise to opposition to the Friendship Treaty in the 1990s. The United States was preoccupied with anti-terrorism after 9/11 in 2001, and the thought of growth in China in the 2000s scarcely came to mind. But by 2011, the growth of China was visible and tangible; a fact that no one can deny is that China is expected to surpass the United States in terms of Gross National Product sooner or later.

Abstract We develop a new index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) based on newspaper coverage frequency. Several types of evidence—including human readings of 12,000 newspaper articles—indicate that our index proxies for movements in policy-related economic uncertainty. Our U.S. index spikes near tight presidential elections, Gulf Wars I and II, the 9/11 attacks, the failure of Lehman Brothers, the 2011 debt ceiling dispute, and other major battles over fiscal policy. Using firm-level data, we find that policy uncertainty is associated with greater stock price volatility and reduced investment and employment in policy-sensitive sectors like defense, health care, finance, and infrastructure construction. At the macro level, innovations in policy uncertainty foreshadow declines in investment, output, and employment in the United States and, in a panel vector autoregressive setting, for 12 major economies. Extending our U.S. index back to 1900, EPU rose dramatically in the 1930s (from late 1931) and has drifted upward since the 1960s.

The Eisenhower Administration sought to create a large role for U.S. multinational corporations, who could provide a significant amount of the capital needed for trade expansion and industrial growth. This policy became known as "trade not aid." The trade not aid policy reflected both the fiscal conservatism and ideological beliefs of the Eisenhower Administration. By 1957 Eisenhower shifted to a policy of trade and aid. This study examines three foreign economic policies in the context of American-East Asian relations. It focused primarily on Japan, since that country served as the center of the American regional "workshop economy" concept in Asia. Tracing the development of the trade/aid program, this thesis then compares and contrasts governmental policies with business activity and opinion during the 1950s. It concludes that the foreign economic policy of the Eisenhower Administration contained serious flaws, served the needs of only a few countries in the region, and was weighted heavily toward a military support role rather than economic development. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.)

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, Technology and Policy Program, 2004.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-85).
(cont.) over time as pollution levels change. Using these new models, we valued the economic benefit of reduced air pollution due to the Clean Air Act regulations to be over $7 trillion from 1970 to 2000, or 2.1% of aggregate US economic welfare over the period. This does not include the benefits into the future (after 2000) from reduction in mortality due chronic exposure during these years. The economic benefit of those saved mortalities is another $7 trillion using a 3% discount rate. Another calculation is the remaining economic burden of unmitigated pollution levels (actual historical pollution). We estimate this to be approximately $9 trillion over the same period. The $9 trillion burden includes the early mortalities due to chronic exposure to PM before and during this period. While these economic benefits of air pollution regulation are large ($7 trillion), they are considerably less than the $27.6 trillion estimated in EPAs own analysis of the benefits of air pollution regulation. The main difference for our lower estimate is the stock-flow accounting of mortality due to chronic exposure. There are considerable uncertainties in these estimates both because of uncertainties in the relationship between air pollution exposure and the health effects, and in the assumptions needed to value these effects.
In the last 30 to 40 years, an increasing awareness of the link between urban air pollutant levels and negative health effects have led to numerous studies and policies that are targeted towards both understanding the linkage and mitigating its effects. In 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) created the Clean Air Act directed at reducing harmful emissions that cause high pollution levels in urban areas. Ever since then, environmental economists and policy makers have attempted to better understand the economic impacts of these regulations through cost and benefit analysis. Towards that end, we have developed a methodology for fully integrating the health effects from exposure to air pollution into a computable general equilibrium economic model. This model represents the first attempt at fully incorporating the economic valuation of air pollution in an integrated economic model that has endogenously built-in consumer demand and preference curves to accurately represent the demand for air pollution health. This framework provides a way to consistently value effects with commonly used approaches for valuing costs of mitigation and to explore uncertainties in these estimates. Furthermore, we also describe a new stock and flow model to track the extra mortalities from chronic exposure to particulate matters. Past frameworks have assumed an immediate relationship between pollution levels and mortality levels. While this is true for mortality due to acute exposure, changes in mortalities from chronic exposure due to a change in pollution levels are only gradually realized and so the full effects on the economy are observed for many years. This new framework allows the tracking of total pollution in-take and its effect on mortality levels
by Trent Yang.
S.M.

The United States is the only developed nation that fails to provide its citizens with paid parental leave. The lack of parental benefit provision operates to the detriment of individuals and society as a whole by contributing to inequity across gender, race, socioeconomic status, and sexual orientation. As the demographics of the American workforce have changed, public policy has not kept pace. Paid parental leave is associated a number of health, economic, and social benefits. However, the greatest barrier to legislating paid parental leave is the philosophical underpinnings of American politics, specifically the strong current of liberal individualism and absence of maternalism. This thesis examines the policy option space for paid parental leave in the United States and recommends a paid parental leave policy that is gender-neutral and has a combination of three months individual leave and three months of shared leave at 100 percent wage replacement.

For a variety of reasons since 1979, the United States of America has severed all political ties and retreated to a policy of enacting economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Such reasons include security concerns and human rights abuses. Historical research and surveys of economic data suggest that the sanctions have had limited effectiveness on the Iranian economy. Furthermore, the increasing tension between the United States and Iran caused by sanctions would also suggest that the latter is unlikely to curb its foreign policy to suit the interests of the U.S. My research indicates that despite the current malady of issues that define the American-Iranian relationship today, a once prosperous and peaceful partnership existed between the two countries only a short time ago. In conclusion, it will be shown that both countries would be financially and militarily better off if sanctions were eased and their peaceful partnership might be restored.

The effects of the Federal Communications Commission Registration Program of 1977 on the structure of the domestic telecommunications equipment producing industry was evaluated. Econometric analysis and anecdotal evidence were used as the foundation for the investigation. The major hypothesis of the paper was that the FCC Registration Program of 1977 changed the structure of the telecommunications equipment producing industry from a monopoly to an industry characterized by competition. This resulted in a change in the equilibrium price and output in the market place with price decreasing and output increasing. The three major component subsectors, i.e., transmission equipment, switching equipment, and customer premises equipment (CPE) were discussed individually and collectively to determine any differential effects. This was particularly relevant because the FCC Registration Program focussed on CPE. Empirically, the central hypothesis was supported. Also, differential effects in the various subsectors were found.
M.A.

The Antidumping and Countervailing Duty laws are competition policy instruments with which the United States ostensibly seeks to promote the role of market forces, enhance competition and thereby uphold the post-war international economic order. However, through a combination of administrative pragmatism and statutory emendation, these trade laws have evolved into instruments with which the United States impedes market forces and insulates its domestic economy from the very competition these laws supposedly aim to encourage. This is a paradox. Important political issues arise from this paradox which are obscured by the traditional methods of examining trade policy. This dissertation demonstrates that the political aspects can be made apparent if the laws are thought of as instruments of economic statecraft. Through an original application of the theoretical framework David Baldwin has developed in Economic Statecraft, it is argued that the trade remedy laws utilize state power for the purpose of changing the behaviour, beliefs, policies and propensities to act of foreign governments or firms. By examining the detail inherent in the two statutes it is demonstrated that far from compelling foreigners to abide by market forces and undertake competitive trade practices, the US penalizes them for doing so. On the pretext that foreigners' trade practices are "unfair", the US is compelling them to engage in genuinely anticompetitive practices. Competition is the central mechanism of the post-war international trade system. Therefore, the United States is undermining that order with its use of these instruments of statecraft. Further, remedy policy is generating political conflict between the US and its major trading partners because there is fundamental disagreement as to the normal and appropriate role for governments and firms to play in a modern market economy. Differences of opinion about what is "unfair" in this context arise, as is demonstrated, on political grounds rather than economic ones.

The United States` Critical Infrastructure System (CIs) represents an umbrella concept grouping all those resources that are essential for national economic, financial, and social system. These critical infrastructures are vital and without them, or with any damages to them, would cripple the nation, states, and/or local communities and tribes. Based on a systematic review approach (methodology), this paper aims to review the United States’ Critical Infrastructure Protection System (USCIPS) at tree aspects. In section one, the policy pillars of USCIPS are outlined based on studding Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) and National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Section two discusses the interdependent nature of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors and identified the further designation of life-line sectors. Final sector introduces USCIPS stakeholders, collaboration and partnership across between the private sector and public sector stakeholders.

Potential benefits of light alternative-powered vehicles are analyzed along with technical, social, and political factors affecting their widespread adoption in the United States. Light alternative-powered vehicles (LAV) include human-powered vehicles such as bicycles and velomobiles, electric bicycles, light electric vehicles, hybrid human-electric, and similar vehicles. Currently bicycles comprise the vast majority of this class of vehicle. Widespread adoption of light alternative-powered vehicles can result in reduced transportation energy consumption, reduced greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution, reduced urban noise, and reduced user costs. Annually, the average US driver could reduce gasoline consumption by 2000 liters, greenhouse gas emissions by 4 metric tonnes, and realize an annual savings of $5,000. In the United States the use of light alternative vehicles is quite low, due primarily to a combination of social, economic, and political factors, including transportation regulations. While dramatic increases in the use LAVs is not likely without changes in these factors, technological factors may significantly affect perception and use. Significant technical factors include improved batteries and control systems, reduced manufacturing cost, improved usability, and improved infrastructure. Scale is an important factor. Most of the technical factors are solvable with current or emerging technologies, but the demand for LAVs the United States does not justify the investment required. Light alternative-powered vehicles have the potential be a significant part of energy and GHG policy in the United States, but are limited more by political factors than by technology.

Capitalism has faced the most severe and the longest crisis since 1929. Resource of the emerging financial crisis in the second half of 2007 was mortgage crisis that experienced in the United States. The collapse of housing market has caused great instability in the financial markets and then turned into the strong liquidity crisis and spread all over the world. The impact of global economic crisis on the world economies in the last quarter of 2008 was very fast and it occured in a devastating way. In this process, the asset prices declined, capital of financial institutions seriously damaged and this caused bankruptcy of many large financial organizations such as Lehman Brothers. In this context, the growth rates in the world fell down quickly, external demand contraction and global export decreased. At this point, developed countries applied large scale financial incentive packages. Especially, the Central Banks of developed countries have provided exceptional levels of liquidity that is used as a monetary policy tool by taking the risk of deterioration of their balance sheets. During this period, as a result of these policies followed by money and finance authorities have changed only the shape of global crisis and as a result the financial crisis has turned into a debt crisis. The effects of Global Economic Crisis on the Turkish economy emerged prominently in the last quarter of 2008. However, in comparison with many European countries, it is clear that all dynamics have became more favourable for Turkey after 2010.

The goal of this paper is to analyze the possible effects of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement aimed to be signed between the European Union and the United States by the end of 2015. The TTIP is expected to have important social, economic and political benefits for the European Union and the United States. In this respect, following a short description of the TTIP, the possible effects of this agreement on the European Union, the United States as well as on world trade will be described. The effects of such an agreement on Turkey will also be examined both with respect to Turkey’s already existing relations with the European Union and the United States. In parallel with these, the advantages and disadvantages of the existing Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the European Union will be evaluated with respect to the TTIP. Based on this analysis, some policy alternatives for Turkey will be proposed that might help Turkey to overcome the current disadvantages that will result from the TTIP and that might strengthen its trade relations with both the European Union and the United States by transforming those disadvantages into advantages.

In 2009, the transportation sector was the second largest consumer of primary energy in the United States, following the electric power sector and followed by the industrial, residential, and commercial sectors. The pattern of energy use varies by sector. For example, petroleum provides 96% of the energy used for transportation but its share is much less in other sectors. While the United States consumes vast quantities of energy, it has also pledged to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. In order to assist in planning for future energy needs, the purpose of this study is to develop a model for transport energy demand that incorporates past trends. This paper describes the development of two types of transportation energy models which are able to predict the United States’ future transportation energy-demand. One model uses an artificial neural network technique (a feed-forward multilayer perceptron neural network coupled with back-propagation technique), and the other model uses a multiple linear regression technique. Various independent variables (including GDP, population, oil price, and number of vehicles) are tested. The future transport energy demand can then be forecast based on the application of the growth rate of effective parameters on the models. The future trends of independent variables have been predicted based on the historical data from 1980 using a regression method. Using the forecast of independent variables, the energy demand has been forecasted for period of 2010 to 2030. In terms of the forecasts generated, the models show two different trends despite their performances being at the same level during the model-test period. Although, the results from the regression models show a uniform increase with different slopes corresponding to different models for energy demand in the near future, the results from ANN express no significant change in demand in same time frame. Increased sensitivity of the ANN models to the recent fluctuations caused by the economic recession may be the reason for the differences with the regression models which predict based on the total long-term trends. Although a small increase in the energy demand in the transportation sector of the United States has been predicted by the models, additional factors need to be considered regarding future energy policy. For example, the United States may choose to reduce energy consumption in order to reduce CO2 emissions and meet its national and international commitments, or large increases in fuel efficiency may reduce petroleum demand.

The concept of influence can be defined as a tool of international actors, a form of power, the ability to overcome obstacles in order to achieve different purposes or the desired result in the process of power relations established between actors in international politics. According to the approach that aims to reach the concept of influence as the desired result, in the process of setting up influence states try to influence each other through different methods and tools in which can be used through states’ own capacities. In addition to political and military tools, economic impact tools related to the field of foreign trade and finance are frequently used today. Economic impact tools, such as external aid, which may be positive or rewarding, may also be negative or punitive in a range from the boycott to the blockade. The study aims to provide a qualitative assessment of the United States' (US) economic sanctions against Iran in the context of the use of economic impact tools in international politics. In order to achieve this aim, 12 executive orders issued by the US on the grounds that Iran poses a threat to its national security, foreign policy and economy will be examined. In the conclusion of the study, the assumption that the US sanctions against Iran almost for 40 years has become a multilateral structure such as commercial and financial blockade from a structure related to bilateral relations such as boycott and embargo will be tested.

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technologies (OFCT) has established the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) to conduct research and development (R&D) activities related to storage, transportation and disposal of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and high level radioactive waste (HLW). The U.S. has, in accordance with the U.S. Nuclear Waste Policy Act (as amended), focused efforts for the past twenty-plus years on disposing of UNF and HLW in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The recent decision by the U.S. DOE to no longer pursue the development of that repository has necessitated investigating alternative concepts for the disposal of UNF and HLW that exists today and that could be generated under future fuel cycles. The disposal of UNF and HLW in a range of geologic media has been investigated internationally. Considerable progress has been made by in the U.S and other nations, but gaps in knowledge still exist. The U.S. national laboratories have participated in these programs and have conducted R&D related to these issues to a limited extent. However, a comprehensive R&D program investigating a variety of storage, geologic media, and disposal concepts has not been a part of the U.S. waste management program since the mid 1980s because of its focus on the Yucca Mountain site. Such a comprehensive R&D program is being developed and executed in the UFDC using a systematic approach to identify potential R&D opportunities. This paper describes the process used by the UFDC to identify and prioritize R&D opportunities. The U.S. DOE has cooperated and collaborated with other countries in many different “arenas” including the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and through bilateral agreements with other countries. These international activities benefited the DOE through the acquisition and exchange of information, database development, and peer reviews by experts from other countries. Recognizing that programs in other countries have made significant advances in understanding a wide range of geologic environments, the UFDC has developed a strategy for continued, and expanded, international collaboration. This paper also describes this strategy.

The Kyrgyz Republic economy openness is studied within the framework of the Eurasia. Insufficient level of the financial and economic standing of Kyrgyzstan is clarified. Reasons for Governmental regulating use in the area of monetary, tax and budget policy in USA have been set up. Conditions of the development of industrial countries economy are under consideration. The necessity of financialisation of all capital of country is defined. Kyrgyzstan public budget’s permanent deficiency formation reasons are studied. A necessity of integration economic relations development within the framework of Eurasia is offered. A necessity of sustainable economic relations establishment as well as finding solution for external debt between Kyrgyzstan and Russia have been justified. It is recommended to strengthen effective fight against a scale corruption, «shadow» economy and criminalization of economy and finances. The increase of efficiency and responsibility of top managers of the public administration level have been offered. The necessity of the independent mastering of own gold-mining fields is justified. The need to attract the foreign direct investments to the area of mining and processing industry have been offered. Within the framework of acceleration of economic integration. Needs for the development of exploring and processing of hydrocarbons as well as building of large economic entities especially the hydroelectric power stations, namely Kambar-Ata-1 Hydro-Power Plants have been suggested. By this it is also suggested to Russia to develop this as strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan. Creation of integral customs system and energy cooperation suggested. It should be supported by establishment of unique equivalent among Eurasia states. By this it is to be possible to find acceptable solutions in finance and economy and to form a united economic cooperation considering a sovereignty of each state. It is necessary to develop the identical financial reporting of point-of-sale and payment balances, balance of international investments, compliable national republics and on the whole on Eurasia. To walk away from the calculation and actual use of dollar of the USA in finance and economic operations. Based on econometric prognosis of gross internal product and the public budget of Kyrgyzstan is made calculating on the per to 2025 year.

Economic structures are a major cause of long-term growth or stagnation. Different economic structures have different ranges of structural learning, innovation, and different effects on income distribution, which are key determinants of economic performance. Through theory about economic structures it is explained why institutions work differently in space and time. This paper shows using a case study in the United States, that the source of recent financial crises rests on the structural characteristics of the economy. Constant deindustrialization is increasing inequality, and a debt-intensive credit boom has emerged to offset the deflationary effects of this structural change. The strong application of the austerity system in Europe and other parts of the world, even after the evidence points to less frugal policies, illustrates the theory of power it has over public policy. The economic structure should be put at the center of analysis, to better understand the economic changes, income disparities and differences in the dynamics of political economy through time and space. This paper provides a critical overview of the rapidly developing comparative studies of institutions and economic performance, with an emphasis on its analytical and political implications. The paper tries to identify some conceptual gaps in the literature on economic growth policy. Emphasis is placed on the contrasting experiences of East Asia and Latin America. This paper argues that the future investments in this field should be based on rigorous conceptual difference between the rules of the game and the game, and between the political and institutional, embedded in the concept of management. It also emphasizes the importance of a serious understanding of the endogenous and distributive nature of institutions and steps beyond the narrow approach of property law relations in management and development. By providing insights from the political channels through which institutions affect economic performance, this paper aims to contribute to the consolidation of theoretically based, empirically based and relevant to policy research on political and institutional foundations of growth and prosperity.

Preventing non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in an effective and sustainable way will require forward-looking policy solutions that can address multiple objectives. This was true pre–COVID-19 and is even more true now. There are already examples from across the globe and within the United States that show how these may be possible. Although there are still many unknowns around how the design, targeting, level, sequencing, integration, and implementation of fiscal policies together can maximize their NCD prevention potential, there is already clear evidence that health taxes and particularly sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes are cost-effective. Nonetheless, policies alone may not succeed. Political will to prioritize well-being, protections against industry interference, and public buy-in are necessary. If those elements align, pricing policies that consider the context in question can be designed and implemented to achieve several goals around reducing consumption of unhealthy SSBs and foods, narrowing existing nutritional and health disparities, encouraging economic and social development. The US and its local and state jurisdictions should consider these pricing policy issues and their contexts carefully, in collaboration with community partners and researchers, to design multi-duty actions and to be prepared for future windows of opportunities to open for policy passage and implementation.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

Current immigration policies may undermine the historic strength of the United States in attracting and retaining international AI talent. This report examines the immigration policies of four U.S. economic competitor nations—the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Australia—to offer best practices for ensuring future AI competitiveness.

Eminent Domain is the power of the government or quasi-government entities to take private or public property interests through condemnation. Eminent Domain has been a significant issue since 1879 when, in the case of Boom Company v. Patterson, the Supreme Court first acknowledged that the power of eminent domain may be delegated by state legislatures to agencies and non-governmental entities. Thus, the era of legal takings began. Though an important legal dispute then, more recently eminent domain has blossomed into an enduring contentious social and political problem throughout the United States. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Thus, in the wake of the now infamous decision in Kelo v. City of New London, where the Court upheld the taking of private property for purely economic benefit as a “public use,” the requirement of “just compensation” stands as the primary defender of constitutionally protected liberty under the federal constitution. In response to Kelo, many state legislatures passed a variety of eminent domain reforms specifically tailoring what qualifies as a public use and how just compensation should be calculated. Texas landowners recognize that the state’s population is growing at a rapid pace. There is an increasing need for more land and resources such as energy and transportation. But, private property rights are equally important, especially in Texas, and must be protected as well. Eminent domain and the condemnation process is not a willing buyer and willing seller transition; it is a legally forced sale. Therefore, it is necessary to consider further improvements to the laws that govern the use of eminent domain so Texas landowners can have more assurance that this process is fair and respectful of their private property rights when they are forced to relinquish their land. This report compiles statutes and information from the other forty-nine states to illustrate how they address key eminent domain issues. Further, this report endeavors to provide a neutral third voice in Texas to strike a more appropriate balance between individual’s property rights and the need for increased economic development. This report breaks down eminent domain into seven major topics that, in addition to Texas, seemed to be similar in many of the other states. These categories are: (1) Awarding of Attorneys’ Fee; (2) Compensation and Valuation; (3) Procedure Prior to Suit; (4) Condemnation Procedure; (5) What Cannot be Condemned; (6) Public Use & Authority to Condemn; and (7) Abandonment. In analyzing these seven categories, this report does not seek to advance a particular interest but only to provide information on how Texas law differs from other states. This report lays out trends seen across other states that are either similar or dissimilar to Texas, and additionally, discusses interesting and unique laws employed by other states that may be of interest to Texas policy makers. Our research found three dominant categories which tend to be major issues across the country: (1) the awarding of attorneys’ fees; (2) the valuation and measurement of just compensation; and (3) procedure prior to suit.

Semiconductors are a key component in fueling scientific progress, promoting economic advancement, and ensuring national security. This issue brief summarizes each component of the semiconductor supply chain and where the United States and its allies possess the greatest leverage. A related policy brief, “Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains,” recommends policy actions to ensure the United States maintains this leverage and uses it to promote the beneficial use of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence.

At present, most global GHG emissions – over 75% – are from fossil fuels. By necessity, reaching net zero emissions therefore requires dramatic reductions in fossil fuel demand and supply. Though fossil fuels have not been explicitly addressed by the UN Framework on Climate Change, a conversation has emerged about possible “supply-side” agreements on fossil fuels and climate change. For example, a number of countries, including Denmark, France, and New Zealand, have started taking measures to phase out their oil and gas production. In the United States, President Joe Biden has put a pause on new oil and gas leasing on federal lands and waters, while Vice President Kamala Harris has previously proposed a “first-ever global negotiation of the cooperative managed decline of fossil fuel production”. This paper aims to contribute to this emerging discussion. The authors present a simple analysis on where fossil fuel extraction has happened historically, and where it will continue to occur and expand if current economic trends continue without new policy interventions. By employing some simple scenario analysis, the authors also demonstrate how the phase-out of fossil fuel production is likely to be inequitable among countries, if not actively and internationally managed.

Forced by the 1997 Southeast Asian crisis to recognize the external vulnerabilities that openness to volatile capital flows result in and upset over the post-crisis policy responses imposed by the IMF, countries in the sub-region saw the need for a regional financial safety net that can pre-empt or mitigate future crises. At the outset, the aim of the initiative, then led by Japan, was to create a facility or design a mechanism that was independent of the United States and the IMF, since the former was less concerned with vulnerabilities in Asia than it was in Latin America and that the latter’s recommendations proved damaging for countries in the region. But US opposition and inherited geopolitical tensions in the region blocked Japan’s initial proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund, a kind of regional IMF. As an alternative, the ASEAN+3 grouping (ASEAN members plus China, Japan and South Korea) opted for more flexible arrangements, at the core of which was a network of multilateral and bilateral central bank swap agreements. While central bank swap agreements have played a role in crisis management, the effort to make them the central instruments of a cooperatively established regional safety net, the Chiang Mai Initiative, failed. During the crises of 2008 and 2020 countries covered by the Initiative chose not to rely on the facility, preferring to turn to multilateral institutions such as the ADB, World Bank and IMF or enter into bilateral agreements within and outside the region for assistance. The fundamental problem was that because of an effort to appease the US and the IMF and the use of the IMF as a foil against the dominance of a regional power like Japan, the regional arrangement was not a real alternative to traditional sources of balance of payments support. In particular, access to significant financial assistance under the arrangement required a country to be supported first by an IMF program and be subject to the IMF’s conditions and surveillance. The failure of the multilateral effort meant that a specifically Asian safety net independent of the US and the IMF had to be one constructed by a regional power involving support for a network of bilateral agreements. Japan was the first regional power to seek to build such a network through it post-1997 Miyazawa Initiative. But its own complex relationship with the US meant that its intervention could not be sustained, more so because of the crisis that engulfed Japan in 1990. But the prospect of regional independence in crisis resolution has revived with the rise of China as a regional and global power. This time both economics and China’s independence from the US seem to improve prospects of successful regional cooperation to address financial vulnerability. A history of tensions between China and its neighbours and the fear of Chinese dominance may yet lead to one more failure. But, as of now, the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s support for a large number of bilateral swap arrangements and its participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership seem to suggest that Asian countries may finally come into their own.