Journal articles on the topic 'United States. Office of Homeland Security'

On October 12, 2017, the United States Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, took a short trip from Pennsylvania Avenue across the Potomac to Falls Church, Virginia. The Attorney General went to Falls Church to address personnel of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), the agency that administers the United States’ immigration courts. The Attorney General's chosen topic for the day was “the fraud and abuse in our asylum system.” “Over the years,” the Attorney General argued, “Congress has rationally passed legislation designed to create an efficient and fair procedure to properly admit persons andexpedite the removalof aliens who enter the United States illegally.” The Attorney General is referring here to the “expedited removal” procedures that Congress created in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Expedited removal gives the Department of Homeland Security the power to deport, without a hearing, any person who was not admitted to the United States and who cannot prove continuous presence for the prior two years. The Department of Homeland Security currently exercises a narrower expedited removal authority pursuant to the Department's prosecutorial discretion. Only individuals apprehended within two weeks of entry and within 100 miles of a land border are subject to expedited removal, per Department regulations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY During the summer of 2004, the First Coast Guard District in Boston, Massachusetts supported both Presidential political nominating conventions for the 2004 election. The Democratic National Convention was held in Boston, Massachusetts on July 26–29, 2004, and the Republican National Convention was held in New York City from August 30th to September 2, 2004. This was the first time both conventions have taken place within the geographic area of responsibility of a single Coast Guard District. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security declared both of these events as National Special Security Events under Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62). PDD-62 formalized and delineated the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in the development of security plans for major events. The 2004 Democratic and Republican Conventions were the first political conventions held in the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the months before the Democratic National Convention, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice stated that there was credible intelligence from multiple sources indicating that al-Qaeda planned to attempt an attack on the United States during the period leading up to the election. (Joint Statement of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft on May 28, 2004) The terrorist attacks on the Madrid rail system were a direct attempt by AI Qaeda to influence the elections in Spain, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was going to take all appropriate steps to prevent a similar attack in the United States. (Schmidt and Priest, Washington Post May 26, 2004; Page A02) The 2004 Conventions offered a significant challenge for the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies that had dual responsibility for coordinating security operations while being prepared to respond to a disaster including oil spills and hazardous substance releases—the combination of what was previously designated as crisis and consequence management under PDD-39. This paper will examine lessons learned from planning and operations in support of the conventions. Having served as the First District Project Officer for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, this paper is written as my observations of the lessons learned and offers some insight into what went well and possible areas for improvement as I observed throughout the more than 18 months of planning for these events of national significance. The Coast Guard planning and operational support for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions demonstrated the importance of a team approach to planning, interagency coordination and partnerships, pre-event preparedness activities, and pre-deploying personnel and resources for response. It is my hope that the observations contained in this paper can benefit federal, state, and local agencies as they prepare for large significant events in the future including National Special Security Events.

IntroductionHistory is replete with interoperability and resource reporting deficits during disaster that impact medical response and planning. Situational awareness for disaster and emergency medical response includes communicating health hazards as well as infrastructure and resource status, capability and GIS location. The need for actionable, real-time data is crucial to response. Awareness facilitates medical resource placement, response and recovery. A number of internet, web-based disaster resource and situational status reporting applications exist but may be limited or restricted by functional, jurisdictional, proprietary and/or financial requirements. Restrictions prohibit interoperability and inhibit information sharing that could affect health care delivery. Today multiple United States jurisdictions are engaged in infrastructure and resource situation status reporting via “virtual” states and regional projects considered components of “Virtual USA”.MethodsThis report introduces the United States' Department of Homeland Security's “Virtual USA” initiative and demonstrates a health application and interoperability via “Virtual Louisiana's” oil spill related exposure reporting during the 2010, British Petroleum Gulf Horizon catastrophe. Five weekly Louisiana Department of Health and Hospital summary reports from the Louisiana Poison Center; Hospital Surveillance Systems; Public Health Hotline; and Physician Clinic Offices were posted on the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness's “Virtual Louisiana”.Results227 total spill-related, exposure cases from five reporting weeks were provided by five Louisiana source agencies and reported in Virtual Louisiana. Cases were reported weekly and classified as “workers” or “population”; associated with the parish exposure locations (8), offshore (1), or unknown (1); and shared with four other virtual states.ConclusionsReal-time health and medical situation status, resource awareness, and incident impact could be facilitated through constructs demonstrated by “Virtual USA”.

A number of observers have speculated that a “new” style of emergency management has emerged in the United States in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. To date, there has been relatively little empirical evidence marshaled to assess this claim. This article reports the results of an on-going project designed to track how the staff of an office of emergency management in a large urban region allocate their time on a routine basis. This project began in the late 1990s allowing for a year-by-year comparison of time allotted to different emergency management functions. Among the findings reported here are that prior to 2002 emergency management staff spent the majority of their time on hazard preparedness projects but this time allocation shifted dramatically when a variety of federal homeland security grants became available to state and local governments. This shift in responsibilities may be a sign that domestic security concerns have supplanted the all-hazards approach to emergency management at the local level. But this paper argues that it may also be a product of the manner in which federal homeland security grants are administered and the dynamics of the intergovernmental structure of emergency management in the U.S.

AbstractIntroduction:Only 4% of the United States Homeland Security funding for public safety terrorism preparedness is allotted to emergency medical services (EMS), despite the primary threat from a mass-terrorism chemical weapons attack (MTCWA) being personal injury. This study examines the preparedness of the EMS torespond to, treat, and transport victims of such attacks.Hypothesis:It was hypothesized that US EMS agencies lack the necessary equipment to mitigate large-scalemorbidity and mortality from a MTCWA.Methods:Seventy after-action reports from full-scale, chemical weapons exercises conducted in large cities across the US were examined by the Office of Domestic Preparedness, Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program to ascertain if EMS responders had personal protective equipment sufficient to operate at the scene of aMTCWA.Results:Of the 50 after action reports that mentioned EMS personal protective equipment, only six (12%) EMS agencies equipped their staff with personal protective equipment.Conclusions:Results indicate that EMS responders are not prepared to safely respond to MTCWAs, which mayresult in a significant loss of life of victims and responders.

IntroductionThere are 60 Poison Centers in the United States that manage over 2.5 million poison exposure calls each year. A poison center can be reached 24 hours a day by dialing a national 800 hotline. Poison Centers are staffed by Specialists in Poison Information who are highly trained in clinical toxicology and are very skilled in telephone triage.DiscussionATSDR and the Poison Centers in HHS/FEMA Region 6 developed draft guidance for incorporating Poison Centers into the National Response Plan. That framework was used to incorporate Poison Centers into the gulf oil spill response of 2010. The National Poison hotline was promoted to provide medical support for those with health effects or health questions related to the spill. During the response the surveillance capabilities of the National Poison Data System (NPDS) were highlighted. The Louisiana Poison Center (LPC) and the other gulf states Poison Centers provided information on health effects related to the spill. Information was provided by the LPC to the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Public Health Section of Epidemiology and Environmental Toxicology, public information officer to assist in briefing the Governor, the Louisiana Governors Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to post to the Virtual Louisiana website, as well as ATSDR, CDC, EPA, and other agencies participating in the gulf response unified command. Poison Centers, for the first time, participated in a response on a national level, providing medical support for those with symptoms or medical questions related to the spill. In addition to assisting in the medical care of those exposed to substances related to the oil spill and the response efforts, Poison Centers also responded to questions about air and water quality and seafood safety.ConclusionPoison Centers are a valuable resource to assist in emergency response plans.

Colleges and universities must be prepared to respond to events that could compromise the safety of any person in a classroom, residence hall, office, or any other campus facility as well as for any event that could jeopardize the continuation of use of any campus facility. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) states, “Higher education institutions ... are realizing that improving their campus’ resistance to disaster will not only protect their own lives and those of their students, it will also safeguard their campus’ instruction, research, and public service.” The US Department of Homeland Security, FEMA developed the overarching strategy, the National Response Framework (NRF), for emergency preparedness for “government executives, private-sector and nongovernmental organization leaders.” FEMA and the Department of Education (DOE) developed specific guidelines for emergency preparedness for colleges and universities. This study linked these guidelines to the five principles of the NRF. Most institutions have an emergency preparedness plan, but just how effective are these plans? Do community colleges, state, independent, and proprietary institutions differ in terms of their level of emergency preparedness? The target population for this study is colleges and universities in the United States. This quantitative study measured how aligned the emergency preparedness plans of these colleges and universities are to the recommendations of FEMA and the US DOE, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools. The data suggest that much more needs to be done to bring college and university emergency plans into alignment with the government recommendations. Alignment with the government documents for this sample of US colleges and universities is extremely low for each principle of the NRF.

We explore the criminalization of Latina immigrants through the interwoven network of social control created by law, the justice system, and private corporations—the immigration industrial complex. Considerable scholarly research has focused on understanding the overtly coercive practices of deportation and the consequences for families and communities; less attention has been devoted to the social control mechanisms of detention facilities and “Alternative to Detention Programs” (ATD programs) operating in the United States. We know relatively little about the consequences for immigrant populations, especially of the purported “humane” practices in the enforcement apparatus. Based on existing documents produced by governmental offices, including Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Patrol, Government Accountability Office, nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, and private correctional facilities, we conducted semistructured interviews with 11 immigration lawyers who have access to women who are and/or have been detained, are in supervised ATD programs, are/were in deportation proceedings, or attempt(ed) to claim asylum. An examination of immigration confinement, especially the laws and policy decisions behind the exponential increase in these detentions, reveals important gender dynamics in these practices. The subtle and benevolence-signaling discourse evoking “family,” “motherhood,” and the care of children masks the harsh “business as usual” tactics that treat women and their children in ways indistinguishable from those used in the criminal justice system. We contend that this feminized and infantilized language functions to conceal widespread civil and human rights violations, physical and sexual violence, and mistreatment reproduced by the immigration detention system today.

This coautoethnographic case study used the Open-Source Public Health Intelligence process to explore and share the South East Texas Regional Advisory Councils’ (SETRAC) experience in collecting, processing, disseminating/visualizing, and analyzing COVID-19 data during the pandemic in the largest national medical setting in the United States. Specifically, it details the production of Business Intelligence reports powered by PowerBI both with general publics and with Regional Healthcare Preparedness Program (HPP) Coalition Coordinators, County Judges and City Mayors, Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) executive leadership, the Offices of the Texas Governor, and the Federal Pandemic Task Force led by the US Vice President, in order to provide a foundation for situational awareness, inter-regional collaboration, allocation of scare resources, and local, regional, and state policy decisions. It highlights best practices in risk and crisis communications during the COVID-19 response, underscores cross-sector collaboration and standardization of data collection for effective planning and response, discusses pervasive data revealed during the analysis, and evaluates collaborative and feedback processes that have implications for the Health Care System and Homeland Security Enterprise information sharing.

ABSTRACT This paper examines oil pollution response during disaster situations when the Stafford Act is invoked by the President and the National Response Framework provides funding under ESF-10. The interrelationship between the National Contingency Plan (NCP), created by various pollution statues (Clean Water Act/CWA, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability/CERCLA, Oil Pollution Act/OPA) and the National Response Framework (NRF), created to deal with declared disasters under the Stafford Act, is becoming more fractious as time passes and the financial scope of disasters grows. The paradigm that existed when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 2005 was not in evidence when Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy made landfall in the fall of 2012. The NCP envisions oil and chemical spill response in the context of a single spill, ideally with a known responsible party (RP), who takes action to respond to the spill. That RP is liable for costs and damages resulting from the spill. Action commences when the spill occurs and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) determines that federal action is required. If the federal funds (Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund/OSLTF, CERCLA/SUPERFUND) are used, the federal government seeks cost recovery afterwards. The NRF envisions the federal government acting like a “no-fault insurance” regime, providing federal resources/funds to states when their capabilities are overwhelmed and their citizens require immediate succor. FEMA action commences when the State requests and the President approves aid. The states agree to a cost share – not to exceed 25% of Federal funding. There is no private party liability when actions are complete. The Homeland Security Act established the NRF, and operationally subsumes the NCP under it. However, the Homeland Security Act does not address what fund (Stafford or the pollution funds) will be used when a declared disaster occurs. Furthermore, the Stafford Act structure (State requests, Presidential approvals, Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Coordinating Officer (FEMA FCO) appointment, area surveys, mission assignments) becomes sclerotic in a large incident when compared to the much more nimble NCP process (spill, FOSC decision, immediate funding). The effect for Coast Guard (CG) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) field responders is to lean forward with NCP processes to protect the public. FEMA, faced with dwindling resources, observes this tendency and declines to provide disaster funding when the other federal funds “can be used”. The paper proposes a new paradigm for the “Makris-Suiter” Agreement of 1998 between EPA and FEMA. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

The World Trade Center Attack or 9/11 tragedy has awakened the international community, particularly the United States (US) to sharpen its foreign policy in facing security threats coming from ‘weak states’. One of the most prominent weak states examples that pose a grave threat to other countries are the Northern Triangle Countries of Central America that referred to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Hence, this paper will discuss the rationale behind US initiatives in dealing with security threats in El Salvador as one of the Northern Triangle Countries. In analyzing the case, the writers will use the weak state concept and national interest concept. The result of this paper finds that El Salvador corresponds to the elements of a weak state and further poses security threats by giving rise to transnational criminal organizations, drug trafficking, and migrant problems in which overcoming those security threats has become US vital national interest. 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Abstract The ideation and execution of American homeland security has substantially evolved over the past fifteen years from a vague statement of principles to a very concrete, professional, and institutionalized field, with a cabinet-level department associated with various aspects of its practice. However, homeland security in the United States – defined as the protection of citizens, property, and interests beginning at international borders and expanding inward – is not yet fully developed or even secure in its own roles. As the evolution of both the theory and the practice continues, an important principle – analogous to one in the field of national security – must be sufficiently addressed and acted upon: the physical act of protecting sovereign territory.

The paper examines the Homeland Security Advisory System in light of existing knowledge about effective warning systems in the social science of disasters. It firsts describes an integrated warning system model and what is known about effective warning messages. The Homeland Security Advisory System is then contrasted to the successful hurricane warning system in the United States, to point out the existing difficulties with the former. It concludes with a section advocating an alternative all hazards approach to increase the resilience of communities.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) formally incorporated Human Systems Integration (HSI) in systems and policy development in 2012. Since then, DHS components have been establishing HSI capabilities to meet their unique human needs. This discussion panel will focus on the operational transformation and governance strategy for implementing a successful human systems integration (HSI) program across components within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Members of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) will discuss the challenges faced when advocating for HSI, and the best practices developed to better integrate research activities with systems engineering.

The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the deadliest terrorist attack in the United States prior to September 11th, 2001, provides valuable insights into many of the key homeland security challenges faced by a diverse Republic like the United States. These tactical, operational, and strategic-level challenges include but are not limited to: communication; operations and logistics; victim and family support; public perception, media, and information dissemination; the tensions between liberty and security in law and policymaking; and the relationship between the executive and legislative branches and their roles and tendencies during and after a national security crisis. Although the aftermath was marked by resilience in the face of great tragedy and some noteworthy successes, this article analyzes the effectiveness of the tiered, progressive emergency response, particularly highlighting shortcomings, broader implications, and impacts for the U.S. and other republics in their approach to dealing with terrorism and homeland security incidents moving forward.

Historically, the relationship between Mexico and the United States was one of respect, understanding, and cooperation. Geographic proxim¬ity demands that the two nations exist in harmony and collaborate to maintain a safe border and sustainable water consumption. However, with increasing frequency, the Department of Homeland Security challenges bi-lateral treaties entered into by Mexico and the United States. These treaties continue to face infringement as U.S. Presidents, past and present, build larger, longer south¬ern border walls. This article explores the federal laws supporting this border construction and further discusses the sparse caselaw examining constitutional challenges raised against the Department of Homeland Security regarding the Secretary’s waiver authority. Following this exploration, this study probes into the powers of treaty law as strong legal authority used to challenge and prevent future wall construction.

The creation of open-source terrorist and extremist crime databases has led to a more complete understanding of violence committed by members of the extreme far-right movement in the United States. Yet, important questions remain about how serious forms of extremist violence in the United States compare with far-right violence in other nations, which are also facing this type of threat to homeland security. The current study draws from structured action theory of extremist violence and extends an open-source methodology for the purposes of making cross-national comparisons of incident-, offender-, and victim-level characteristics of extreme far-right homicide in the United States and Germany. Despite some similarities, such as in offender race, legal outcomes, and places where homicides occurred, we find several key differences in the nature of extreme far-right homicide across these two countries. In particular, we find differences in geographic and temporal patterns as well as offender and victim demographic and background characteristics. We conclude our study by considering how the unique social, political, and economic contexts of the United States and Germany over the last 25 years serve to shape our findings.

The anthrax letters in the United States in October 2001, coming soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks, raised the fear of bioterrorism to a high level. Legislation to restrict access to select agents (i.e., those pathogens considered likely to be used in biological weapons) and to screen laboratory personnel for security risks soon followed; in addition, the major scientific journals in the field have agreed to practice self-censorship to prevent the publication of information that might be useful to terrorists. These developments are ushering in a new relationship between the field of biology and the state, raising important issues of governance. In this article I summarize the new regulatory regime, analyse its likely impact on the research community, and discuss the problems that the current approach to rule making creates for legitimacy and acceptance of the new regime.

This paper examines the impact on skilled labor migration to the United States of same-sex marriage legalization in European countries and US federal recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. Analyzing US Department of Homeland Security data, we find that European legalization decreased skilled labor admissions to the United States by 22 percent, most notably after six years. However, US recognition of foreign same-sex marriages mitigated this effect post-2013, indicating that such legalizations facilitate skilled labor movement between nations.

AbstractThis article situates the discussion of illicit trafficking in antiquities in the context of the relationship between the U.S. Departments of State and Homeland Security. The main argument is that U.S. cultural heritage policy is part of a broader agenda of political discourse that links matters of heritage to wider concerns of security. If the underlying goal of the U.S. State Department is mutual understanding through open dialogue, how can initiatives that focus on the criminal networks and security, efforts tackled by the Department of Homeland Security, contribute to building a positive image for the United States abroad? Here I explore strategic aspects of U.S. cultural policies and federally supported programs aimed at mitigating against the illicit trade in antiquities as part of building and maintaining cultural relations.

This paper looks into the US homeland security policy and the application of democratic principles when the nation is internally facing a situation of violence. Instead of a simple laws analysis, it is a research carried out in relation with a historical perspective. Dealing with the threats of the homeland security in the United States of America by referring to the Civil War and the September 11th Terrorist Attack, the paper shows the weaknesses and loopholes of the Constitution when it is about ensuring the national security. According to what we notice, violence makes the Executive disregard the Constitution and the international agreements when it has to protect the homeland and its people. The paper has concluded that referring to forces becomes unavoidable in some situations. Thus, the US Constitution should be amended with articles authorizing the use of military forces to overcome some threats due to rebellion or terrorism in order to preserve democracy so that to secure life within the territory of the country and, incidentally, that of the world.

The United States is susceptible to cyberattacks. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report provides several recommendations to prevent and respond to such attacks. However, many of these recommendations attempt to nationalize cybersecurity. This article presents a historical overview involving the Department of Homeland Security, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Commerce Clause, which outlines nationalization and its effects. It will note a similar trend for cybersecurity. Finally, the positive and negative consequences of nationalization are presented.

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charge is to, “Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation’s CIKR …” using an all-hazards approach. The effective implementation of this strategy hinges on understanding catastrophes and their potential effect on the functioning of infrastructure. Unfortunately, there has been no unifying theory of catastrophe to guide decision-making, preparedness, or response. In this paper, the authors present a framework based on network science and normal accident theory that can be used to guide policy decisions for homeland security. They show that exceedance probability encompasses operational definitions of risk and resilience and provides a unifying policy framework for homeland security investments. Such an approach allows one to classify hazards as ‘high’ or ‘low’ risk, according to the resiliency exponent, and guide investments toward prevention or response. This framework is applied to cyber exploits and electric power grid systems to illustrate its generality.

Terrorism is perhaps the greatest global security challenge post-World War II and, like several countries, Nigeria is also grappling with this scourge. The remarkable thing is that following pressure from the United States (US) and Western nations, Nigeria took a major step towards counterterrorism with the enactment of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. The Act was later replaced by the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013. Certainly, so far, this legislation remains the nation’s boldest effort in combatting terrorism. However, the Nigerian counterterrorism legal regime still falls short in some material respect, given the absence of a robust strategy and complementary institutional support system. This is not the same case in a country such as the US, where the principal counterterrorism legislation, the Patriot Act, is well complemented by the US National Counterterrorism Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security. Against this background, this Article examines the legal regime governing counterterrorism in Nigeria and the US, with the view of highlighting areas where Nigeria could gain useful insights from the US experience. The expectation is that given the robustness of the US counterterrorism regime, the experience to be gained cannot but further enrich the existing counterterrorism legal regime in Nigeria.

In the years after the 9/11 tragedy, the United States continues to face risks from all forms of major disasters, from potentially dangerous terrorist attacks to catastrophic acts of nature. Professionals in the fields of emergency management and homeland security have responsibilities for ensuring that all levels of government, urban areas and communities, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and individual citizens are prepared to deal with such hazards though actions that reduce risks to lives and property. Regrettably, the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the nation's ability to deal with disasters is unnecessarily challenged by the absence of a common understanding on how these fields are related in the workforce and educational arenas. Complicating matters further is the fact that neither of these fields has developed agreed definitions. In many ways, homeland security and emergency management have come to represent two different worlds and cultures. These conditions can have a deleterious effect on preparedness planning for public and private stakeholders across the nation when coordinated responses among federal, state, and local activities are essential for dealing with consequential hazards. This article demonstrates that the fields of emergency management and homeland security share many responsibilities but are not identical in scope or skills. It argues that emergency management should be considered a critical subset of the far broader and more strategic field of homeland security. From analytically based conclusions, it recommends five steps that be taken to bring these fields closer together to benefit more from their synergist relationship as well as from their individual contributions.

The Nepalese in the United States of America (USA) are an emerging diasporic community. In spite of the phenomenal growth of the Nepalese diaspora in the USA in the last more than two decades, little is known about this new diasporic community, especially regarding how the Nepalese adapt to American life. This study documents the rapid growth in Nepalese immigration to the USA in the twenty-first century, based on data from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Using the data from an online survey, it analyzes the experiences of the Nepalese in cultural adaptation, structural adaptation, marital adaptation, identificational adaptation, and receptional adaptation. The results show that although the Nepalese have become partly assimilated to American culture, they still to a large extent retain their ethnic culture, ethnic association, ethnic identity, and ethnic marital partners, and they have had mixed experiences of prejudice and discrimination. The findings have significant scholarly and practical implications.

United States public health and security capabilities are vulnerable to the magnitude and complexity of infectious diseases. Recently, human cases of a new H7N9 influenza in China have underscored the unpredictability of outbreaks. This article analyzes the federal government’s role in addressing an imminent pandemic threat from an organizational perspective, beginning with the Cabinet Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Health and Human Services (HHS), which jointly lead pandemic planning and response. This article recommends that these departments, their agencies, and international partners continue building and maintaining a heterarchy, the most optimal interorganizational structure for securing against and responding to a pandemic threat. This requires establishing clear, yet flexible responsibilities and shared systems, terminology, and tools. Given a hypothetical scenario in which a disease is introduced into the United States by a potentially infected foreign migrant entering through a maritime port of entry, current protocol and operations are promising. However, further heterarchical coordination is necessary to appropriately manage all plausible scenarios.

The detection of hazardous materials has been identified as one of the most urgent needs of homeland security, especially in scanning cargo containers at United States ports. To date, special nuclear materials have been detected using neutron or gamma interrogation, and recently the nuclear resonance fluorescence has been suggested. We show a new paradigm in detecting the materials of interest by a method that combines four signals (radiography/computer tomography, acoustic, muon scattering, and nuclear resonance fluorescence) in cargos. The intelligent decision making software system is developed to support the following scenario: initially, radiography or the computer tomography scan is constructed to possibly mark the region(s) of interest. The acoustic interrogation is utilized in synergy to obtain information regarding the ultrasonic velocity of the cargo interior. The superposition of the computer tomography and acoustic images narrows down the region(s) of interest, and the intelligent system guides the detection to the next stage: no threat and finish, or proceed to the next interrogation. If the choice is the latter, knowing that high Z materials yield large scattering angle for muons, the muon scattering spectrum is used to detect the existence of such materials in the cargo. Additionally, the nuclear resonance fluorescence scan yields a spectrum that can be likened to the fingerprint of a material. The proposed algorithm is tested for detection of special nuclear materials in a comprehensive scenario.

The sharing of homeland security information is a crucial aspect of modern policing in the United States. This article outlines some of the obstacles to information sharing at the state and local levels, including interagency and intra-agency issues that arise for police agencies. It explores the complexities of information sharing across a highly decentralized policing system. Many police departments lack a formal intelligence function that limits their ability to share information. This article offers an organizational change model using John Kotter’s Leading Change principles that police agencies of any size can follow. It outlines Kotter’s eight-stage process from establishing a sense of urgency through anchoring new approaches in the culture to create a framework for police departments to integrate homeland security information sharing. Its intent is to provide a framework for police agencies to incrementally implement some of the recommendations of the various strategic documents that guide information sharing.

The 9/11 attacks triggereda paradigm shift in the United States security policy, prioritizing to ensure homeland security and to fight against the terrorism in the new American strategy.The United States invasion of Afghanistan further ravaged the existing fragile state damaging the already crumbling socio-economic and human infrastructure. In addition, the spillover of war into Pakistan started a new era of instability and misery further complicating the socio-economic fabric of the country making it the most vulnerable to terrorism related incidents. The two decades prolonged conflict not only destroyed the economic, social, and political infrastructure in both states, meanwhile mass human rights violations have been committed by the coalition forces under the leadership ofthe United States. In this context, the present paper investigates human rights abuses through the prism of international human rights law. The study addresses the following questions. (a) To what extent the United States war against terror violates the international law of human rights, and how it helpsWashington to reconsolidate the regional hegemony. (b) Whetherthe war on terror improve the situation of human rights or further aggravate the conditions of civilians in targeted states. The studyunderlinesthat the war on terror failed to meet the merit of the right to intervene for self-defense, yet the coalition forces deliberately assimilatethe innocent civilians underthe vagueanti-terror war rhetoric. In addition, the war serves the United States hegemonic interests in South Asia, as the American presence in Afghanistan and the Indo-United States strategic partnership brought serious geopolitical implications for China and Pakistan.

This research explored federal intervention with the particular emphasis on examining how a collaborative relationship between Department of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS) led to greater effectiveness between these two federal departments and their subordinates (United States Northern Command and Federal Emergency Management Agency, respectively) during the preparation and response phases of the disaster cycle regarding US continental-based hurricanes. Through the application of a two-phased, sequential mixed methods approach, this study determined how their relationship has led to longitudinal improvements in the years following Hurricane Katrina, focusing on hurricanes as the primary unit of analysis.

High profile sporting events in the United States have been identified by the Department of Homeland Security as potential targets of terrorism (Lipton E: New York Times. March 16, 2005: A1). Other potential threats to major sports events include natural disasters and crowd management issues. It is therefore imperative that agencies involved in security planning at sports venues are trained in threat/risk assessment practices and engage in multiagency collaboration to ensure effective development and coordination of game day security plans. This article will highlight the potential threats to sports events, provide an overview of research conducted on sports event security, and outline some measures that can be utilized by emergency managers in their planning and preparation for managing major sports events.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located on a small island off the coast of Long Island's North Fork, has been clouded in mystery and misinformation for years. Often the topic of conspiracy theorists, this secret place has generated many myths—from aliens to anthrax and pink eels to secret submarines. But the truth of the center's mission is far less colorful yet far more crucial to the state of the nation's agriculture.In June 2003, operational responsibility for the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) transferred from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and PIADC became the core of the DHS effort to protect US livestock from foreign animal disease agents.

An effective terrorism alert system in a federal government has one central task: to motivate actors to take costly protective measures. The United States' color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) failed in this mission. In federal systems, national leaders cannot compel protective actions by setting an alert level; they must convince constituent governments and private parties that the desired actions are worth the costs. Such beliefs can be generated either by sharing the information behind an alert or by developing enough confidence in the alert system that the government's word alone suffices. The HSAS did neither, largely because it was not designed to generate confidence. Rather, the system's creators assumed that the public would trust the national leadership and believe in the utility of the system's information. Over time, as the HSAS became increasingly perceived as politically manipulated, there was no built-in mechanism to recover confidence in the system. An alternative, trust-based terrorist alert system could solve this problem. Building on the notion of “procedural fairness” from the psychological and legal traditions, this system would retain the political advantages of the HSAS, facilitate greater compliance among the requisite actors, and ameliorate many of the strategic problems inherent in terror alert systems.

AbstractJews and Jewish institutions have suffered the majority of reported religion-motivated hate crimes in the United States for nearly two decades. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 2014 the 609 reported anti-Semitic incidents made up 59% of all religious bias hate crimes alone. Rates of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes vary considerably over the course of a year. Yet, little scholarly attention has been given to what factors cause reported anti-Semitic hate crimes to fluctuate so substantially in the United States. This paper hypothesizes that violent Israeli military engagements are critical in explaining weekly surges of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes. Utilizing FBI hate crime data from 2001 to 2014 and fixed effects negative binomial regression models, consistent findings underscore that violent Israeli military engagements significantly increase the likelihood of a state reporting anti-Semitic hate crime. Most dramatically, their occurrence increases the likelihood of reported hate crime intimidating individuals or characterized as violent by nearly 35%. This paper underscores that homeland perpetrated violence can directly impact the security of diaspora communities.

Temporary visa-status migrants initially might be perceived as emancipated mobilities who are privileged enough to enter and exit the United States without taking any major risks. This article examines the struggles involved in the experiences of the Korean temporary visa-status migrants living in the United States, and especially the role of media in their transnational everyday lives. Using a quasi-ethnographic approach by conducting qualitative interviews with 40 Korean visa-status migrants, this article argues that the homeland media, both television and Internet, sustain “ontological security” throughout the radical transitions, feeling of “existential outsideness,” and transnational insecurities and precariousness. The study offers a helpful insight in both understanding the contemporary dispersed audiences and contextualizing different migrant positions within the easily lumped category of mobile elites or cosmopolitans.

Notwithstanding decades-long strains and stresses in their relations, Nigeria is one of the foremost African partners of the United States and a major recipient of American aid in Africa. Both countries have traditionally maintained very robust bilateral relations since the former’s political independence in 1960, especially given their economic ties. Until recently, their economic ties have been very robust, thanks to Nigeria’s sweet crude that the United States largely needed for decades. However, this study examines how the generally cordial bilateral relations between the two countries have not necessarily translated to effective security and anti-terrorism cooperation. Nigeria has consistently focused on the United States for anti-terrorism support, albeit with limited responses from the latter. In this regard, the study utilised both primary and secondary sources to investigate the puzzling inconsistencies in the anti-terrorism cooperation between these supposed allies. Thus, the study revealed that since both countries have a common interest in combating terrorism, a conventional realist approach can help us put in the proper perspective some understandable strategic reasons for their somewhat difficult anti-terrorism cooperation. The study concludes that as much as Nigeria desires American support, the dynamics of their anti-terrorism cooperation will not likely change for as long as the United States does not consider combating terrorism in Nigeria to be strategic to its Homeland Security.

Terrorism prevention has become the top priority among law enforcement and homeland security officials. To date, however, little empirical research has been conducted that directly compares the characteristics of successful terrorist attacks to failed and foiled terrorism incidents. To address this limitation in prior research, the current study examines the impact of opportunity, group structure, and temporally patterned precursor activities on far-right terrorism outcomes in the United States using data from the American Terrorism Study (ATS). Our findings partially support expectations that attractive and vulnerable targets, loners, conventional weaponry, and relatively fewer precursor activities are significantly associated with successful incidents.

Despite increased nurturing efforts, emergency management continues to reflect excessive fragmentation. Individuals remain locked within differing subcultural groups, eg, researchers vs practitioners and homeland security vs emergency management orientations. Too often they ask: “Why don’t you listen to me?” Important lessons can be learned from past bridge building efforts. The successes and failures of six specific efforts are summarized. Then, three of the most significant future challenges confronting emergency management within the United States are identified.Wisdom from the past must be applied to these challenges.

Despite the rapid growth of the Bangladeshi diaspora in the USA, knowledge about this new diasporic community remains very limited. This study argues and demonstrates that the Bangladeshi diaspora in the USA is a fast-growing and sizable diasporic community that requires systematic research and better understanding. It delineates the history of the Bangladeshi diaspora to the USA in four periods and documents the phenomenal growth of the Bangladeshi diasporic community in the USA since 1981, using data from the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). By taking into account the legal Bangladeshi immigration as well as the emigration and mortality rates of immigrants and undocumented Bangladeshi immigration, it estimates the current size of the Bangladeshi diasporic community in the USA at about 500,000 instead of a range of low-to-mid 200,000s normally cited. Additionally, using the pooled samples of the 2001–2019 American Community Surveys (ACS) and other ACS data, as well as the DHS data, this paper provides a demographic and socioeconomic portrait of the Bangladeshi diasporic community in the USA. The findings are generalizable to the population and fill some important gaps in the literature.

On October 5, 2022, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals announced its ruling on Texas v. United States, which found the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) memorandum (and program) illegal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to rule on the legality of the Biden Administration’s Final Rule on the program, which the Department of Homeland Security publicized in late August and is under review and set to take effect on October 31, 2022. On October 14, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas also found DACA illegal. However, Judge Andrew Hanan extended the temporary order allowing current recipients to renew their permits until further notice. The future of DACA remains uncertain, yet the anxiety, exhaustion, numbness, and tiredness that stem from its legal terrorism remain real for those who benefit from the program. In this essay, the authors, two undocumented immigrant educators with DACA, reflect on their experiences with DACA, the meaning of the latest rulings, their futures, and the responsibility of higher education institutions to their undocumented immigrant students and professionals.

Based on the analytical framework of securitization, this article argues that cooperation between China and the United States on climate change will not lose momentum despite President Trump’s seemingly passive stance. A securitization process on the climate issue has been ongoing in China since President Xi Jinping took office and proposed the Overall National Security Outlook (ONSO). Climate security was thus integrated into China’s political discourse as a key component of ecological and common security, leading to a period of China-U.S. cooperation during the Obama administration. Similarly, in the United States, climate policy has been cemented in security planning and assessment of various federal agencies. The U.S. security sector seems to be largely unaffected by the White House decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. A growing number of Americans treat climate change as a security threat and many U.S. states and cities, in collaboration with business leaders, have taken on a role in international climate diplomacy. Combined with existing intergovernmental collaborative projects, robust market forces and innovative local initiatives will continue to push China-U.S. climate cooperation forward. As a necessary step to sustain its ties with the United States on climate issues, the Chinese government needs to propose a renewed bilateral framework on energy and environment cooperation under the China-U.S. Comprehensive Economic Dialogue.

The article shows the role of pipeline transport in the Russian economy, analyzes the Russian legislation regulating the activities of this type of transport; analyzes typical violations detected in the operation of pipelines by control and supervisory authorities and the prosecutor's office; shows the role of Rostekhnadzor in detecting violations of high-risk objects. The article analyzes the legislation of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan in terms of legal regulation of the trunk pipeline transport and the supervision of it by the prosecutor's office; provides judicial practice on compensation for environmental damage caused by accidents on pipelines. In addition, a comparative analysis of the order of supervision in Russia and in the United States was carried out. The conclusion is made about the need to activate state supervision by Rostekhnadzor; improve regulatory regulation by adopting a specialized regulatory act.