Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Universalisme moral'

Ce mémoire aborde la question de Puniversalisme éthique. L’auteur analyse les positions de Jürgen Habermas et de Jean-Paul II. Après avoir mis en lumière les préoccupations de Habermas, sa conception de la rationalité, et plus précisément de la rationalité pratique, ainsi que sa théorie de Pagir communicationnel sont examinées. Cette démarche est le préalable à la présentation de l’éthique de la discussion habermassienne, i.e. de la théorie discursive de la morale. La partie sur Jean-Paul II porte sur une seule œuvre : l’encyclique Veritatis Splendor. L’analyse s’attarde à la conception de la raison pratique et au concept de vérité à l’œuvre dans l’exposé de la position du Magistère sur Puniversalisme moral. Le concept de loi naturelle est également examiné dans la mesure où celle-ci est la figure catholique de Puniversalisme moral. Ce mémoire permet enfin de cerner les divergences et les convergences des deux auteurs quant à la possibilité d’une morale universaliste.

De nos jours la mondialisation préoccupe tout le monde : individus, communautés, groupes, Etats, politiques, citoyens ordinaires, universitaires, intellectuels, nonintellectuels, l'humanité. Le fourmillement d'études surtout économiques et la manifestation d'innombrables mouvements sociaux, conférences et discours politiques qu'elle suscite sont les preuves. N’y a-t-il pas là une raison pour en faire un objet de réflexion pour la philosophie, elle qui veut avoir l’intelligence des choses et du monde, être une quête de sens et une prise de conscience des préoccupations du temps ? Certains facteurs permettent de postuler que la mondialisation est un phénomène multidimensionnel, qu'elle manifeste ou exprime l'universel. Quels sont alors les fondements philosophiques du mondialisme, expression de l'universalisme moderne ? Située dans le temps et l'espace, la mondialisation semble ne pas avoir les mêmes effets pour tous. En outre, notre monde mondialisé paraît malade, dangereux et vide de sens. La justice sociale, la paix durable et la sécurité, la solidarité, la préservation de l'écosystème, la survie de la planète terre et de l'espèce humaine constituent ses défis. Ces aspects n'expriment-ils pas le signe d'une rupture avec les valeurs universalistes de la modernité : idéal de liberté, d'égalité, d'autonomie, de paix et de bonheur de l'homme ? Comment alors fonder une pensée de la mondialisation qui soit créatrice de sens et d'espérance ? Telles sont les grandes interrogations sur lesquelles porte cette thèse, se déroulant en quatre étapes : - Découvrir la mondialisation (la mondialisation comme processus) - Penser la mondialisation (de l’universalisme moderne au mondialisme) - Réagir à la mondialisation (à partir du contexte africain) - Agir dans la mondialisation (refonder une éthique de responsabilité)
Nowadays universalization worries everyone: individuals, communities, groups, States, policies, citizens ordinary, university, intellectuals, nonintellectuals, humanity. The swarming of economic surveys especially and the demonstration of innumerable social movements, conferences and speeches political that it causes are the evidence. There is not there a reason to make an object of reflexion for philosophy, it which wants to have the intelligence of the things and the world, to be a search of sense and an awakening of the concerns of time? Certain factors make it possible to postulate that universalization is a multidimensional phenomenon, whether it expresses or expresses the universal one. Which are then the philosophical bases of the mondialism, expression of modern universalism? Located in time and space, universalization seems not to have the same effects for all. Moreover, our globalized world appears sick, dangerous and meaningless. Social justice, lasting peace and safety, solidarity, the safeguarding of the ecosystem, the survival of the planet ground and the mankind constitute its challenges. These aspects do not express the sign of a break-up with the values universalists of modernity: ideal of freedom, equality, autonomy, peace and happiness of the man? How then to found a thought of the universalization which is creative sense and of hope? Such are the great interrogations to which this thesis relates, being held in four stages: - To discover universalization (universalization like process) - To think universalization (of modern universalism to the mondialism) - To react to universalization (starting from the African context) - To act in universalization (to refound an ethics of responsibility)

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This work seeks to sustain the particularistic view of Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics as opposed to universal readings. The analysis of the passages on the method of practical philosophy, about virtue as mean and about prudence as perceptive ability of the virtuous man will show that Aristotle‟s Ethics is actually particularistic. Although you can not defend an extreme particularism, because the record of universalizations and generalizations also find shelter, yet there is a distinct particularistic base that gives priority to the perception of what is relevant in every situation.
Este trabalho busca sustentar a visão particularista da Ethica Nicomachea de Aristóteles em contraposição às leituras universalistas. A análise das passagens sobre o método da filosofia prática, sobre a virtude como mediedade e sobre a prudência como capacidade perceptiva do homem virtuoso mostrará que a ética de Aristóteles é efetivamente particularista. Embora não seja possível defender um particularismo extremo, pois o registro das universalizações e generalizações também encontram guarida, ainda assim se verifica a nítida base particularista que dá prioridade à percepção do que é relevante em cada situação.

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Muitos trabalhos vindos da teoria política contemporânea dão atenção especial a políticas de reconhecimento. Esta tese tem como foco uma analise da relação entre teoria política e o argumento multiculturalista contemporâneo. Começo com uma análise do paradigma d A Política do Reconhecimento de Charles Taylor e suas fontes teóricas e considero outros contemporâneos teóricos do reconhecimento com suas respectivas fontes teóricas como: Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, Will Kimlicka, John Rawls, e Jürgen Habermas. Posteriormente volto a analisar a interdependência entre reconhecimento, teoria crítica e universalismo de direitos. Em minha visão este é o único caminho rumo a um reconhecimento autêntico em sociedades democráticas, liberais e pluralistas

Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka den eventuella konflikten mellan sekulariserad och religiös etik och moral.  Studien tar sin utgångspunkt i religiös absolutism kontra sekulariserad relativism. Jag vill även ta reda på om det finns etiska grundtankar som flertalet kan vara överens om.

La liberté et l'universalité sont des critères de la moralité fondés en raison et qui n'admettentrien de relatif. Dans cette étude, nous soupçonnons le relativisme d’être à l’origine de la crisemorale d’aujourd’hui. Ensuite, parce ce que ce courant de pensée soulève un doute sur l’unitéde la raison, et donc de la liberté et de l’universalité pour le genre humain. Pour cela, nousvoulons opposer au relativisme la philosophie kantienne, laquelle pose la liberté etl’universalité comme étant deux concepts fondamentaux dans la conception kantienne de lamoralité, atemporels et dépassant le champ de toute expérience. De fait, nous comprenonsmieux l’effort de Kant qui consiste à poser l’autonomie de la volonté comme le principeunique et universel de la morale (pour le genre humain) et à désapprouver toutes les doctrinesmorales qui sont fondées par exemple sur la culture, la religion ou le bonheur personnel. AvecKant, on ne peut donc dériver la morale de tout cela
Liberty and universality are criteria of morality ; they are grounded in reason and admitnothing relative. In this study, relativism is put into question as being at the origin of today’smoral crisis. More to the point, this school of thought raises a doubt about the unity ofreason, and therefore the liberty and universality for mankind. In this perspective, the thesisconfronts relativism to the Kantian philosophy, which puts forward the concepts of ‘freedom’and ‘universality’ as fundamental in understanding morality that is timeless and goes beyondthe scope of any experience. In fact, we understand better Kant's premise which consists inputting forward the principle of party autonomy as the unique and universal criteria ofmorality (to mankind) and in disapproving all moral doctrines which are based, for example,on culture, religion or personal happiness. From a Kantian point of view, one cannot derivemorality from the latters

Islam, its texts and lived practice, finds growing importance within the global discourse on bioethics, as there is an increasing Muslim population and burgeoning interest in biomedical research and biotechnologies in the Muslim world. The aim of this thesis is to assess if and how Islam influences the ethical decision making of researchers, REC (researcher ethics committee) members, guideline developers and Islamic scholars in the biomedical research context. I began addressing this question by first reviewing the literature that has been published to explore the role that Islam plays in the literature on biomedical research ethics. There is evidence that some Muslim countries have developed "Islamic" guidelines. That is, guidelines with the explicit aim of setting out Islamic values and stating their relevance to the ethics of research. A review of research guidelines employed within countries with a significant Muslim population, was carried out, to investigate the role of Islam in such guidelines. The literature and guideline review revealed that although international guidelines have been adapted to incorporate Islamic views, studies have shown that the latter are of limited practical application within a "Muslim country" setting. An empirical study was carried out in two case study sites to assess the extent to which Islam influences ethical decision making within the context of biomedical research. 56 semi-structured interviews were carried out in Malaysia (38) and Iran (18) with researchers, REC members, guideline developers and Islamic scholars to understand whether Islam influences what they consider to be an ethico-legal problem, and if the latter emerges, then how such issues are addressed. The empirical study indicates five main conclusions. The first is that Islam and its institutional forms do impact ethical decision making in the day-to-day practice of biomedical research in countries with a Muslim population and/or in the research careers of Muslim researchers. Secondly, it shows that there are many distinctive mechanisms, such as the involvement of Islamic scholars, the process of ijtihad (independent reasoning) and the production of fatawah (legal edicts), by which Islam does identify and develop ethical views about biomedical matters. Thirdly, HIV/AIDS poses major challenges to the world of Islam as it does the rest of world. The epidemic raises issues that touch on cultural sensitivities that are important to Islamic societies and this study has shown that no simple or single response was observed to the ethical issues arising from HIV/AIDS. Fourthly, researchers face practical challenges when deliberating women's autonomy in contexts where Islam is appropriated within 'male dominated' contexts. The role and status of women is disputed in such contexts with views ranging from women needing their husband's permission to leave the home to men and women having equal freedoms. Finally, this study describes and analyses how the personal faith of researchers and their deep commitment to Islamic ethics and law influences their understanding of their legal and moral accountability and ethico-legal decision making. It shows that researchers adopt multiple roles and are required to balance numerous value systems and priorities and face moral anxiety and frustration when these different moral sources are in conflict. Overall, this study indicates that, in the countries studied, Islam does influence biomedical research ethics, and that this can be appreciated through the growing reference to Islam and its scriptural sources in biomedical research ethics literature, research ethics guidelines and the role of Islam in the day-to-day practice of biomedical researchers in the case study sites, that has been captured in the empirical study.

The purpose of this study is to seek to an answer to the question of what constitutes a tenable model for global ethics. This is done in part by a critical engagement with four different models of global ethics; two proposals from political philosophy and two contributions from theological ethics. The models analyzed in the study are: (1) the capabilities approach as developed by Martha Nussbaum, (2) Seyla Benhabib’s discourse ethics and model of cosmopolitan federalism, (3) David Hollenbach’s model of the common good and human rights, and (4) the model for responsibility ethics and theological humanism as developed by William Schweiker. These models contain different understandings of global justice, human rights, and sustainable development. The study works with six primary problems: (1) Which are the main moral problems associated with different processes of globalization? (2) What should be the response to these problems, in the form of a normative ethical model? (3) What is the relation between global ethics and universalism? (4) What kind of institutional vision for the international arena does a tenable global ethic promote? (5) Given the human diversity and global pluralism, what would be a reasonable view of the human being included in a global ethic? (6) What kind of ethical theory is sustainable for global ethical reflection? These questions also form the basis for the analysis of the models. The study uses a set of criteria in order to assess the answers that the models offer for these questions. These criteria also constitute the framework within which the author’s contribution to the discussion of global ethics is phrased. The criteria are founded on an idea of what characterizes global ethical reflection. The contention is that a tenable global ethic should be relevant, and it should also be related to a reasonable view of human beings and a plausible ethical theory. Together these support the criterion of communicability, which argues that a global ethic should above all be communicable, i.e. capable of enabling cross-cultural communication. A central argument which this study makes is that a kind of ethical contextualism is more reasonable than an epistemological universalism.

La thèse étudie la fondation morale de la justice politique, et plus particulièrement l'opposition entre universalisme et contextualisme. S'opposent une position de droit (déontologique) qui fait de l'individu un être rationnel porteur de droits indépendamment de son contexte de vie, et une position plus historique (téléologique), qui étudie les parcours des communautés humaines afin de comprendre les évaluations morales de chacune et les projets qui s'y attachent. Après avoir dégagé le noyau théorique de cette opposition à l'aide des pensées de Kant et de Hegel, la pensée de Ricœur est étudiée comme une tentative d'imbrication de ces deux perspectives normatives. Ricœur, sur la base d'un sujet qu'il montre brisé mais néanmoins capable, développe un concept de raison pratique, selon un double versant moral et politique. L'imbrication des revendications kantiennes et hégéliennes est rendue possible grâce aux deux «concepts mixtes» d'autonomie et de conscience historique
The thesis studies the moral foundation of political justice, and more particularly the opposition between universalism and contextualism. Are opposed a legal (deontological) approach conceiving the individual as a bearer of rights independently of his living environment, and a more historical (teleological) approach wich looks at the development of human communities to understand each one's moral claims and projects. After having analysed the underlying conceptual background of this opposition through the thoughts of Kant and Hegel, the thought of Paul Ricœur is studied as an attempt to interweave both moral perspectives. Ricœur, on the basis a subject that is shown to be broken but yet capable, develops a concept of practical reason wich includes both a moral and a political perspective. The interweaving of Kantian and Hegelian claims is then made possible on the basis of the "two-sided concepts" of autonomy and historical conscience

Est-il encore légitime de distinguer, d’une part, la « simple raison », apte à convaincre n’importe quel penseur honnête et lucide, et d’autre part, le domaine de la foi religieuse, où les différences de conviction seraient a priori irréductibles, parce que soumises à des conditions de validité sui generis? Dans quelle mesure ce « partage des voix » entre la raison et la foi, que commandait au siècle des Lumières l’« exigence de l’émancipation » ou de l’affranchissement des tutelles autoritaires (le Selberdenken, le « penser par soi-même »), est-il encore d’actualité pour nous? Les temps ne sont-ils pas mûrs pour une autre attitude de la raison philosophique par rapport à la foi religieuse, qui se proposerait de mettre en question la théorie qui opposait la raison et la révélation comme deux « sources » irréductibles de vérité? Le présent travail poursuivra trois objectifs principaux, dont la visée commune consistera à clarifier les tenants et aboutissants de la critique de la « simple raison » (reason alone) chez Charles Taylor, au regard de la totalité de son œuvre. Dans un premier temps, nous soulignerons que notre auteur récuse le paradigme épistémologique de la philosophie moderne au nom d’un paradigme herméneutique, plus sensible à la finitude langagière et historique de la raison humaine. Notre auteur reconnaît en effet au « débat herméneutique » (hermeneutical debate) une importance cruciale dans le contexte de la sécularité (ou de notre « âge séculier »), qui se caractérise par la coexistence d’une pluralité croissante de perspectives éthiques et spirituelles. Dans un deuxième temps, nous soutiendrons que ce paradigme herméneutique admet une distinction fondamentale entre deux modes de réflexion, l’argumentation transcendantale et la quête d’authenticité, et montrerons que l’argumentation transcendantale peut à son tour être comprise comme une modalité particulière de la « simple raison » dans le contexte du paradigme herméneutique. Ces deux premiers moments de nos analyses, de nature essentiellement exégétique, constitueront la majeure partie de notre thèse. Dans un troisième temps, nous examinerons la distinction entre l’argumentation transcendantale et la quête d’authenticité de façon à mettre en question les limites assignées par notre auteur à la première. Plus précisément, notre intention est de démontrer que la critique herméneutique de la simple raison proposée par Taylor présuppose elle-même la viabilité d’une « éthique transcendantale » et, par conséquent, la viabilité d’une conception transcendantale de la simple raison dans la sphère de la rationalité pratique. Cette éthique transcendantale affleure en plusieurs lieux dans son œuvre sous la forme d’un « humanisme » de type néo-aristotélicien, solidement ancré dans ses analyses des conditions d’arrière-plan inéluctables (ou transcendantales) de l’agir humain, sans toutefois être explicitement conçue et assumée en tant que telle.
Is it still legitimate to distinguish, on the one hand, ‘‘reason alone’’ or nonreligiously informed reason, whose conclusions are in principle able to satisfy any honest and lucid thinker, and on the second hand, the domain of religious faith, where differences of conviction would be a priori irreducible? Is this divide between reason and faith, which was prompted at the time of the Auflkärung by a great call to ‘‘emancipation’’ (to ‘‘think for yourself’’, Selberdenken), still relevant for us today? Are the times not ripe for another philosophical attitude in relation to religious faith, which would call into question the theory that opposed reason and revelation as two irreducible ‘‘sources’’ of truth? This dissertation will pursue three main objectives, whose common aim is to clarify the motives and implications of the critique of ‘‘reason alone’’ in Charles Taylor’s work. First, we will show that Taylor rejects the ‘‘epistemological’’ paradigm of modern philosophy in the name of a hermeneutic paradigm, more sensitive to the linguistic and historical finitude of human reason. Our author maintains, indeed, that ‘‘hermeneutical debates’’ are now obligatory in our secular age, characterized by the coexistence of a growing plurality of ethical and spiritual perspectives. Secondly, we will argue that this hermeneutic paradigm admits of a fundamental distinction between two modes of reflection, that of ‘‘transcendental arguments’’ and the ‘‘quest for authenticity’’, and will show that transcendental arguments can in turn be understood as a specific modality of ‘‘reason alone’’ in the context of the hermeneutic paradigm. These two first stages of our analysis, mainly of an exegetical nature, will constitute the major part of our dissertation. Thirdly, we will examine the distinction between transcendental arguments and the quest for authenticity, to challenge the limits assigned by Taylor to the first domain. Specifically, we intend to demonstrate that the hermeneutical critique of reason propounded by Taylor presupposes the viability of a ‘‘transcendental ethics’’ and, therefore, the viability of a transcendental conception of reason in the domain of practical rationality. This transcendental ethics emerges at several occasions in his work as a kind of neo-Aristotelian ‘‘humanism’’, firmly anchored in his analysis of the inescapable background conditions of human agency, without being explicitly recognized as such.

In an era when adversarial politics is condemned for either being archaic or right-wing extremism, proposing that incivility can be used to counter existing hegemonies, despite its potential to incite violence, is proposing an unorthodox project. By rejecting foundationalist approaches to the current incivility crisis, this study sees an opportunity for it to act as a populist rapture that defies simple binary categorisation and deconstructs incivility, at an ontological level, to reveal the deep meanings and concealed causes that contrast the grand narrative of hate speech. After an overview in chapter one, the study continues with a theoretical review of literature on incivility, guided by the works of radical democracy theorists who universalise what seems particular to Kenya. This review is followed by the description of Bakhtin’s concept of carnivalesque as utani, a joking relationship common in East Africa. For its theoretical perspective, the study is guided by Mouffe’s theory of agonistic democracy and a research method developed by transforming Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) work in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic, into a method for Discourse Analysis. Various concepts from Laclau and Mouffe’s work are used to innovate an explanation of how political practices in social media, both linguistic and material texts, enhance incivility and the struggle to fix a regime’s preferred meaning. Guided by Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Analysis, the study describes how the government is using linguistic tools and physical technologies to repair the dislocation caused by incivility in social media in its attempts to re-create hegemonic practices. Without engaging in naïve reversal of the polarities between acceptable and unacceptable speech, and considering that at the ontological level politics is a friend—enemy relation, the study argues that incivility in social media is part of the return of politics in a post-political era, rather than simple unacceptable speech. While remaining aware of the dangers of extreme speech, but without reinforcing the anti-political rational consensus narrative, incivility is seen as having disruptive counterhegemonic potential, that is, if we consider the powerplay inherent in democracy. It means that binary opposition is blind to the way power produces, and is countered through unacceptable speech.
Communication Science
D. Litt. et Phil. (Communication Science)