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Journal articles on the topic 'Uruguay Round and Doha Round'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 17 February 2022

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1

GRYNBERG, ROMAN. "Towards Doha-lite." World Trade Review 3, no. 3 (November 2004): 427–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745604002022.

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The works of Winters and Martins (W&M) and Mattoo and Subramanian (M&S) are two serious and innovative papers that begin to analyse not only what the WTO means for small states but now, just as significantly, what the numerical preponderance of small states might mean for the WTO. This latter issue is especially significant as members grapple with increasingly complex web of interests that need to be accommodated in order to arrive at a consensus in the Doha round. While neither papers represents the position of the World Bank and IMF, what they both have in common is that they approach the current round from the possibility that some WTO members, the smallest, poorest and most trade preference dependent – for example, Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Jamaica – may only benefit from Doha round trade liberalisation in geological time! The research, while not representing official Bretton Woods views, constitutes a dramatic shift in thinking inside the beltway from that which existed at the end of the Uruguay round when the dominant position was that ‘all members would benefit’.

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2

Deitos, Marc Antoni. "Antidumping e a Organização Mundial do Comércio: da emergência à incerteza da regulação internacional/Anti-dumping and the World Trade Organization: from the emergency to the uncertainty of the international regulation." Brazilian Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (December 21, 2015): 608–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2237-7743.2015.v4n3.08.p608.

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Esse artigo tem como objetivo analisar a mudança de padrão do comportamento dos Estados nas negociações dos sucessivos acordos antidumping do sistema multilateral de comércio desde Bretton Woods. Parte-se do estudo histórico do comportamento dos Estados em relação aos códigos antidumping, após o fechamento das Rodadas Kennedy, Tóquio e Uruguai, e as reformas que se seguiram nas legislações domésticas dos signatários. Demonstra-se que, historicamente, os países aproximaram as práticas internas aos acordos multilaterais. Contudo, o mandato de abertura para negociar um novo acordo antidumping em Doha inseriu um componente desestabilizador na evolução histórica da regulação multilateral das medidas antidumping. Os membros, diante das incertezas de Doha, se anteciparam ao fechamento da rodada, alterando as legislações nacionais para adaptá-las aos novos desafios do comércio internacional, em movimento contrário ao historicamente verificado. Esse comportamento tende a dificultar ainda mais o fechamento da Rodada de Doha, uma vez que os membros limitaram, antecipadamente, em suas legislações nacionais antidumping, grande parte dos temas que poderiam transigir nas negociações internacionais.Palavras-chave: antidumping; Organização Mundial do Comércio; Rodada de Doha. Abstract: This article analyses the change in the pattern of State behavior throughout the successive antidumping agreements at the multilateral trade regime since Bretton Woods. It analyses the historic pattern of State behavior related to the antidumping agreements after each round of negotiation – Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Round. It suggests that, historically, the signatories have brought together national and international regulations. On the other hand, it also suggests that the Doha Round has made a change in this historic pattern of State behavior. Confronted with Doha Round uncertainties, WTO members issued new anti-dumping regulations to face the challenges imposed by the actual international economic context. This behavior difficult even more to reach a final say on the new antidumping agreement negotiated during the Doha Round. The signatories have already written down their international position, when they passed new antidumping regulations at home. This behavior constraints the natural bargain that occurs in international negotiations, since it implicates changes in brand new national legislation. Key-words: antidumping; World Trade Organization; Doha Round. DOI: 10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n3p608-627

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3

Steger, Debra P. "Commentary on the Doha Round: Institutional Issues." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850065. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1152.

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Commentary on Robert Howse's article "WTO Governance and the Doha Round." Debra Steger is Executive in Residence at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law where she is working to establish a new institute for international law, economy and security in Canada. Previously, she was Senior Counsel with Thomas & Partners, a law firm specializing in international trade and investment matters. From 1995-2001, she served as the founding Director of the Appellate Body Secretariat of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, during which time she helped to establish the Appellate Body as the first appellate tribunal in international trade. She is Chair of the Trade and Customs Law Committee of the International Bar Association, and has been on the executive of the Trade Committee of the International Law Association for the past 10 years. She is also a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the Journal for International Economic Law. She participates on the Advisory Council of the UNCTAD Project on Building Capacity through Training in Dispute Settlement in International Trade Investment and Intellectual Property as well as the Governing Council of the World Trade Law Association. During the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, she was the Senior Negotiator for Canada on Dispute Settlement and the Establishment of the World Trade Organization as well as the Principal Legal Counsel to the Government of Canada for all of the Uruguay Round agreements. From 1991—1995, she was General Counsel of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal in Ottawa, the agency responsible for administering the antidumping, countervail, safeguards, and government procurement legislation in Canada. Her most recent book is entitled: “Peace Through Trade: Building the WTO” which was published by Cameron May International Legal Publishers in 2004. Steger holds an LL.M. from the University of Michigan Law School, an LL.B. from the University of Victoria Faculty of Law, and a B.A. (Honours) in History from the University of British Columbia.

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4

Messerlin, Patrick. "Agricultural Liberalization in the Doha Round." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850049. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1136.

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Agriculture is an urgent and vital problem for developing countries, and even more so for the poorest countries that are often dependent on a very small set of commodities, many of which are highly subsidized and protected in the OECD countries. The Uruguay Round brought agriculture into the WTO legal framework, but did not lower the effective level of OECD farm protection after 1995 and granted many exceptions to WTO rules that reinforced agricultural protection. While there are a number of diverging forces that are potential sources of change in the levels and patterns of agricultural protection, the recent farm policies adopted by the U.S. and EU reflect an absence of significant domestic reform and appear to be going in the wrong direction. The analysis of agricultural liberalization reveals very large potential gains for both developed and developing countries that will come especially from own-country liberalization as well as from inter-country trade, significant benefits that may be realized by the poorest developing countries, and limited benefits from existing preferential agricultural arrangements. An ideal program for agricultural liberalization in the Doha Round would involve substantial reductions in the high tariffs that exist in both developed and developing countries using the Swiss formula approach and limiting exceptions and special and differential treatment, elimination of agricultural export subsidies, and making meaningful reductions in domestic supports. The negotiations should not get hung up on issues of food security and the effects of higher prices for low-income consumers, and a special safeguard for agriculture is not recommended. It is imperative that agricultural liberalization should be combined with appropriate domestic policies and actions and international assistance, if needed, to help finance emergency food inventories and aid to disadvantaged groups. Patrick A. Messerlin is Professor of Economics at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) and director of the Groupe d'Economie Mondiale de Sciences Po (GEM) which is an independent research center seeking to improve the performance of French and European public policies in a global world. In 2002-2005, he was co-chairman with Dr Ernesto Zedillo, Former President of Mexico, Director of the Yale Center for the Study on Globalization, of the Task Force on Trade in the UN Millenium Development Goals Project, which produced a Report on Trade for Development released in May 2005. In 2001-2002, he was special advisor to Mike Moore, WTO Director General. He has published a dozen books and a hundred papers on trade theory and policy. His most recent book is Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s, Institute for International Economics (Washington) 2001.

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5

Blandford, David. "El establecimiento de reglas de la Organización Mundial de Comercio sobre laayuda interna. Una evaluación del enfoque de la Ronda de Doha." Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales 5, no. 9 (October 19, 2011): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.7201/earn.2005.09.01.

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<div data-canvas-width="513.466583333333">The elements of the approach to disciplining domestic support for agriculture in the Doha round of WTO negotiations are evaluated using data for a selection of OECD countries. Despite a substantial increase in complexity in comparison to the Uruguay Round Agreement, the new approach is unlikely to require real reductions in trade-distorting support. As a result it is unlikely to stimulate further reforms in domestic agricultural policies in OECD countries.</div>

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6

Prekajac, Zora. "Agriculture and developing countries in the new round of negotiations within WTO." Privredna izgradnja 48, no. 1-2 (2005): 53–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/priz0502053p.

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The Ministerial Conference held in Doha (Qatar) launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in World Trade Organization. It is called the development round because the interests and needs of developing countries are in the focus of negotiations. One of the most important (and controversial) questions is the liberalization of international trade in agricultural products. The beginning of that process was the conclusion of the Agreement on agriculture during the Uruguay Round which was followed by the negotiations initiated in 2000. The negotiations are supposed to finish until the end of the year 2006. Analyzing the recent results of negotiations, we can conclude that a lot of questions are not harmonized and that in front of the negotiators is a very difficult and complex task to overcome the existing differences and find compromise solutions. The results of the Doha negotiations (including agriculture) are very important for the future of the multilateral trading system.

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7

Singh, J. P., and Surupa Gupta. "Agriculture and Its Discontents: Coalitional Politics at the wto with Special Reference to India’s Food Security Interests." International Negotiation 21, no. 2 (June 2, 2016): 295–326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341334.

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The demise of the Doha round of trade negotiations is often attributed to deadlocks in agricultural negotiations between the developed and the developing world. Why has agriculture been so difficult to negotiate? This article explains North-South agricultural negotiations through the lens of coalition politics, especially the shift from bloc to issue-based diplomacy from the developing world. We argue against the proposition in the negotiation literature that multiple coalitions at the international level allow negotiators room to maneuver. Our study shows that bloc coalitions in fact allowed for compromise more than issue-based coalitions in agriculture, which are often supported by strong domestic constituencies. Empirically, the article focuses on the Uruguay Round when the North and South struck an agreement on agriculture and the Doha Round, which remains deadlocked. The article also provides an in-depth case study of India’s agricultural interests and its food security program in the context of thewto.

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8

Quinsaat, Sharon Madriaga. "The Philippines Waltzes with the Big Boys: Coalition-building Strategy in the WTO." Asian Survey 52, no. 5 (September 2012): 970–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.5.970.

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Abstract This article explores the emergence and development of the Philippine coalition-building strategy in the World Trade Organization (WTO) from the Uruguay Round to the Doha Development Agenda. Coalition building is an outcome of social learning, adaptation, and bounded rationality of trade negotiators based on years of working within the norms of the WTO.

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9

Crump, Larry, and Daniel Druckman. "Turning Points in Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property." International Negotiation 17, no. 1 (2012): 9–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180612x630910.

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Abstract Application of a turning points analysis to detailed chronologies of events that transpired prior to and during two matched cases of multilateral intellectual property rights (TRIPS) negotiations yields useful lessons for understanding negotiation process and effective negotiator behavior. The unfolding negotiation process is traced in the GATT Uruguay Round and prior to and during the WTO Doha Ministerial. Departures from earlier trends in the chronologies merit special attention. A departure is defined as a clear and self-evident change from earlier events or patterns in the form of an impactful decision taken by one or more parties. By coding the causes (precipitants) and effects (consequences) of the departures, we perform a turning points analysis. The turning points analysis, composed of three-part sequences, reveals the triggers and impacts of departures during the extended TRIPS negotiation process. The analyses will allow a comparison of the patterns that unfolded during the two phases of TRIPS negotiations, which will highlight the breakthroughs that occurred during the Uruguay Round and the crises that emerged later, prior to and during the Doha Ministerial. Improving the effectiveness of multilateral trade negotiations depends in part on understanding how critical turning points emerge.

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10

Duchesne, Erick. "Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence." Canadian Journal of Political Science 37, no. 4 (December 2004): 1070–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423904500215.

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Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence, Theodore H. Cohn, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002, pp. xi, 329.At a time when all eyes are riveted on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ups and downs associated with its current round of negotiation initiated in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, Theodore Cohn's latest publication provides a vivid reminder: The global trading regime is made up of much more than the WTO. The GATT/WTO is still pivotal in Cohn's diachronic overview of the evolution of the global trade regime since the creation of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1947, but unlike several other studies on a similar topic, the author untangles the relationship between the GATT/WTO and other formal and informal international institutions, such as the G7/G8, the Quadrilateral Group (Quad), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G77, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Each institution, as well as the United States and the European Union, is given relatively equal coverage in this notable study. Yet, as an indication that the GATT/WTO is still primus inter pares, most chapters revolve around the major negotiation rounds of the international organization. Chapter 2 traces the origins and early period of the postwar trade regime (1947–1962). Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the Kennedy (1962–1972) and Tokyo (1973–1979) rounds of the GATT respectively. Chapter 5 details the uncertainty associated with the survival of the GATT (1980–1986). Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the momentous Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986–1994), and chapter 8 highlights the post-Uruguay Round period (1995–2001).

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11

ADLUNG, RUDOLF, PETER MORRISON, MARTIN ROY, and WEIWEI ZHANG. "FOG in GATS commitments – why WTO Members should care." World Trade Review 12, no. 1 (March 15, 2012): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474745611000486.

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AbstractThe entry into force of the General Agreement on Trade in Services in 1995 marked a new stage in the history of the multilateral system. Given the peculiarities of services trade, the Agreement contains a variety of conceptual innovations, including its extension to transactions (modes of supply), beyond conventional cross-border trade, and various types of non-tariff restrictions. In turn, the new concepts needed time to be absorbed by the ministries and agencies involved, many of which might have been surprised by ‘their’ sectors being covered by a trade agreement and the ensuing government-internal coordination needs. Thus, understandably, the schedules that emerged from the Uruguay Round, which still account for the majority of current commitments, contain a variety of ill-specified entries. Such entries undermine the transparency and predictability of market conditions, thereby affecting trade and investment decisions in services. Poorly specified commitments also give rise to trade disputes. While the scheduling conventions agreed for the Doha Round provided for technical refinements that would leave the substance of commitments unchanged, this possibility was used far more sparingly than could have been expected. Moreover, additional flaws would have been introduced if some of the (preliminary) offers had entered into effect. The following discussion tries to explain the scope for refinements and develop a clearer picture of the commitments warranting correction – whether in the form of a final Doha Round outcome or through negotiation-independent action by WTO Members.

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12

Singh, J. P. "Trade Negotiations at the (Possible) End of Multilateral Institutionalism." International Negotiation 25, no. 1 (February 3, 2020): 31–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718069-23031166.

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Abstract Multilateral negotiations are often facilitated through international organizations, but are not coterminous with them. This essay advances a few ‘mid-level’ propositions with respect to the negotiation structure that provides an overall context and the negotiation process where tactics guide the exchange of concessions. In terms of negotiation structure, a stable institutional structure is giving rise to a transitional one resulting in system spoilers in international negotiations leading to deadlocks and no-agreements. The bargaining phases are marked with games of chicken and grand-standing making it hard to effectively practice common negotiation tactics such as coalition-building, trade-offs and linkages. The article provides examples from the Uruguay Round and the breakdown of the Doha Round of trade negotiations through the World Trade Organization. The essay’s propositions address the breakdown of existing multilateralism through international organizations, but also document the continuation of underlying multilateral principles.

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13

Cardwell, Michael, and Christopher Rodgers. "Reforming the WTO Legal Order for Agricultural Trade: Issues for European Rural Policy in the Doha Round." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55, no. 4 (October 2006): 805–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/lei131.

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AbstractEuropean farm policy has undergone radical change in recent years, culminating in the Agenda 2000 reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy agreed in 1999 and then their Mid-Term Review in 2003. In particular, subsidy payments have been substantially ‘decoupled’ from production and switched decisively towards providing income support for farmers under a new ‘single farm payment’ scheme. These reforms have been predicated upon the need to win acceptance for Community farm subsidies in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. This article examines the new law of the Common Agricultural Policy against the background of the domestic support reduction commitments contained in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. It questions the extent to which the single farm payment scheme fulfils the requirements for ‘green box’ exemption from such commitments. Options for the re-negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture are discussed, including measures to improve the justiciability of its terms and to exclude discriminatory and trade-distorting domestic support. The article also considers the implications of the recent WTO Appellate Body Decisions inUnited States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton and European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar. It concludes that the Community will have difficulty gaining acceptance for its reforms among WTO Members. Whatever the legitimacy of its subsidy regime within the framework of the current Agreement on Agriculture, the emergence of a strong negotiating position among developing countries, posited on opposition to the volume of farm support maintained by the Community and United States, may present even greater obstacles to the conclusion of a new Agreement on Agriculture in the Doha Round.

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Igwe, Isaac O. C. "WTO, A Multilateral Trade Institution or a Parallel Organisation: Reform Initiatives Addressing the WTO Agricultural Trade Distortions to Developing Countries." ATHENS JOURNAL OF LAW 7, no. 1 (December 31, 2020): 65–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajl.7-1-4.

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The World Trade Organisation (WTO) process and its ethos are fast losing their development objectives. The crisis, challenges and complexities in the implementation of WTO policies on agriculture and market access has not abated. Intellectuals, researchers and academics opine that the implementation of WTO policies have not only encouraged power and development divide between the Industrialised nations and the developing nations, it has worsened the rate of global economic inequality. Although the inclusion of agriculture in the Uruguay Round was taken as a major achievement, the commitment to minimum market access for most protected products, reducing export subsidies and a considerable measure of support, did not do much to lower agricultural protection. The promises made to the developing countries under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) on agriculture, market access, reduction of subsidies/tariffs and implementation issues were limited and not fulfilled. Can the emerging WTO market capacities and alliances lead to a change in the decision-making process? This writing aims to critically analyse the existing WTO legal problems hindering market flows and the incidence of barriers to trade in agriculture being much higher than protection of developing countries farmers which has impacted their development.+ Keywords: WTO; Legal; Agriculture; Implementation; Inequality; Developing Countries; Doha Development Agenda; Decision-marking; Market Access; Development.+

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15

Batista, Juliana Peixoto. "FLEXIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE DOHA ROUND AS À LA CARTE SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT: RETRACING THE URUGUAY STEPS?" Cadernos PROLAM/USP 9, no. 16 (June 1, 2010): 164. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1676-6288.prolam.2010.82411.

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16

Fasan, Olu. "Global Trade Law: Challenges and Options for Africa." Journal of African Law 47, no. 2 (October 2003): 143–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855303002079.

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The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, completed in 1994, has fundamentally transformed the legal landscape of the world trading system, making the WTO arguably the most powerful international economic institution in the world. Yet, the systemic problems that have dogged the WTO since its establishment in 1995 have their roots in the nature of this transformation and its implications for developing countries, especially African states. Developing countries, hitherto excluded from GATT rules, became subject to expanded WTO legal rules and disciplines on a range of new areas, including services, intellectual property rights and investment measures. The possibility of deepening and widening the rule-base of the trade regime is also likely with the Doha agenda, which includes possible negotiations on new rules dealing with investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement.Clearly, the increasing legalization and internationalization of trade rules have implications for weak states. International legalization involves sophisticated bargaining where power relations play a significant role. The purpose of this article is to explore, in the context of some of the theories of international law and political economy, how the preferences and interests of African countries are reflected in international rule making that involves both weak and powerful states. The article traces the institutional and legal evolution of the world trading system and how African countries have been affected by these developments. The new Doha agenda is examined with a view to establishing whether it holds out any real hope of redressing the imbalances in the system. Finally, suggestions are made as to how global trade rules can be fair, and therefore made to work for poor states.

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17

Deardorff, Alan V., and Robert M. Stern. "Alternatives to the Doha Round." Journal of Policy Modeling 31, no. 4 (July 2009): 526–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2009.05.014.

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18

Ann Elliott, Kimberly. "Does the Doha Round Matter?" Current History 108, no. 714 (January 1, 2009): 39–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2009.108.714.39.

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19

Koopmann, Georg. "Doha Round—Squaring the Triangles." Intereconomics 41, no. 3 (May 2006): 122–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10272-006-0182-7.

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20

Harrison, Glenn W., Thomas F. Rutherford, and David G. Tarr. "Quantifying the Uruguay Round." Economic Journal 107, no. 444 (September 1, 1997): 1405–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00055.x.

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21

Cline, William R. "Evaluating the Uruguay Round." World Economy 18, no. 1 (January 1995): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.1995.tb00198.x.

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Nguyen, Trien, Carlo Perroni, and Randall Wigle. "A Uruguay Round Success?" World Economy 18, no. 1 (January 1995): 25–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.1995.tb00199.x.

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23

Howse, Robert. "WTO Governance and the Doha Round." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850064. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1151.

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WTO jurisprudence and governance will not be explicit subjects of discussion or negotiation at the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, with the partial exception of dispute settlement review. Nonetheless, governance questions are at the heart of debates about the WTO’s legitimacy and deserve serious consideration. With this mind, a checklist and a series of questions are provided that are deemed to be relevant to the immediate future of the WTO and the ultimate fate of the Doha Round negotiations. Several issues are raised, as follows. The architecture of the WTO as represented in the “Single Undertaking” requires all WTO Members to adhere to the WTO Agreement even when doing so may not always be in a country’s interest. Decision-making in the WTO is based on consensus, and there may be a need for the design of more effective procedures and for better representation of the different views of Members. The accountability of the WTO as an institution may be at issue insofar as it relates to the roles of different members and the relationships with civil society. There is a clear need for technical assistance, policy development, and policy surveillance to make the WTO a more open, transparent, efficient, equitable, and socially responsible institution. Robert Howse is Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. His research and teaching interests are focused on international economic law (trade, investment and finance) and legal and political philosophy (theorizing law and governance beyond the state, and especially the thought of Alexandre Kojeve and Leo Strauss). His recent books include The Regulation of International Trade, Third Edition, co-authored with Michael J. Trebilcock, to be released this month in the US; The Federal Vision, co-edited with Kalypso Nicolaidis (2001); and Alexandre Kojeve Outline of a Phenomenology of Right (2000), co-translator with Bryan Frost and principal author of the interpretative commentary. Howse has also authored or co-authored opinion essays in general interest publications such as The Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Policy Review, and Legal Affairs. He is series editor of the Oxford Commentaries on WTO Law and serves on the editorial advisory board of the European Journal of International Law. He has also been a reporter on WTO law for the American Law Institute. For part of the fall 2005 semester, Howse has been a visiting instructor at the University of Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne).

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Kakkar, Anurag. "Dynamics of the Doha Development Round." RESEARCH REVIEW International Journal of Multidisciplinary 5, no. 8 (August 17, 2020): 6–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.31305/rrijm.2020.v05.i08.002.

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25

Pankaj, Prabhat K. "Whither WTO: Future of Doha Round." Asia Pacific Business Review 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 92–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097324700600200212.

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26

Subedi, Surya P. "The Road From Doha: The Issues for the Development Round of the Wto and the Future of International Trade." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52, no. 2 (April 2003): 425–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/52.2.425.

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After the debacle in Seattle in December 1999, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of WTO members took place successfully under tight security in the capital city, Doha, of the small Arabian state of Qatar in November 2001. The Doha conference did not adopt any new treaty or protocoll to add to the network of WTO agreements already in place. It did, however, approve a ‘broad and balance ’ work programme in the form of two declarations—a main declaration and one on trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and public health, plus a decision on implementation designed to alleviate the difficulties of developing countries in implementing the existing WTO agreements. In other words, the Doha conference agreed on the nature and scope of the next round of trade negttiations, named as the ‘Development Round’. Although some least-developed countries had argued that ‘no new round should be started until there has been full implementation of the agreements concluded in the last Round, and an evaluation of their effects done’, the Doha Conference decided to start a new round of trade negotiations. How development oriented is the agenda of the new round of trade negotiations? What is going to be negotiated during th e negotiations? Is it indeed going to be a ‘Development Round’ in more than name? The object of this article is to analyse the background to the Doha conference, to assess the nature of negotiations at the conference and to evaluate its outcome.

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27

Streeten, Paul. "The Uruguay Round: an assessment." International Affairs 71, no. 3 (July 1995): 613–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2624875.

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28

Hindley, Brian. "Agriculture in the Uruguay Round." International Affairs 70, no. 3 (July 1994): 553–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2623752.

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29

Nguyen, Trien T., Carlo Perroni, and Randall M. Wigle. "Uruguay round Impacts on Canada." Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 22, no. 4 (December 1996): 342. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3551453.

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Mbirimi, Ivan. "Zimbabwe in the Uruguay Round." Development Policy Review 9, no. 1 (March 1991): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.1991.tb00172.x.

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Greenaway, David. "The Uruguay Round: An Assessment." Economic Journal 107, no. 440 (January 1, 1997): 232–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ej/107.440.232.

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McCulloch, Rachel. "Services and the Uruguay Round." World Economy 13, no. 3 (June 28, 2008): 329–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.1990.tb00599.x.

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Northrop, Michael. "The Uruguay Round: A GATTastrophe." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 18, no. 2 (April 1993): 171–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/030437549301800203.

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Adlung, Rudolf. "GATT and the “Uruguay Round”." Intereconomics 22, no. 1 (January 1987): 14–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02929790.

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35

Dörrenbächer, Christoph, and Oliver Fischer. "Telecommunications in the Uruguay Round." Intereconomics 25, no. 4 (July 1990): 185–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02926169.

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36

Colleen, Hamilton, and John Whalley. "Coalitions in the Uruguay round." Review of World Economics 125, no. 3 (September 1989): 547–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02707667.

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Brown, Andrew, and Robert M. Stern. "Achieving Fairness in the Doha Development Round." Global Economy Journal 5, no. 4 (December 7, 2005): 1850071. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1158.

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The question addressed in this article is how the fairness of the global trading system as embodied in the GATT/WTO is to be assessed. Opinions about what constitutes fairness differ widely, and there is surely no incontrovertible yardstick. But it should be possible to be clearer about the criteria that are appropriate and what they mean in more operational terms. Why fairness is a condition of the agreements among governments that form the global trading system is first discussed. It is then suggested that fairness can best be considered within the framework of two concepts: equality of opportunity and distributive equity. It is argued that the criterion of maximum economic efficiency is not a primary yardstick of fairness, and though it is relevant in choosing among alternative ways of realizing fairness, it is not without its own limitations. There is a discussion of what equality of opportunity and distributive equity mean when applied to the commitments that governments make in the global trading system. For this purpose, these commitments are divided into four categories: those relating directly to market access; those concerning supporting rules designed to prevent cheating in market access commitments or to facilitate trade flows; those relating to procedures for the settlement of disputes or the use of trade remedy measures; and those relating to governance of the system. Finally, some comments are offered about fairness in the Doha Development Round, focusing in particular on the central issue of market access. Andrew G. Brown was formerly Director in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at the United Nations. He was responsible for analysis of international economic and social issues, and for staff support of UN committees and expert groups. He served earlier as chief economist or economic advisor in governments of developing countries. He is the author of History of Multilateral Trade Cooperation since 1850 and co-author of papers on the global trading system. Robert M. Stern is Professor of Economics and Public Policy (Emeritus) in the Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.

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Das, Dilip K. "Intellectual Property Rights and the Doha Round." Journal of World Intellectual Property 8, no. 1 (November 1, 2005): 33–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2005.tb00236.x.

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Scott, James, and Sophie Harman. "Beyondtrips: Why thewto‘s Doha Round is unhealthy." Third World Quarterly 34, no. 8 (September 2013): 1361–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.831539.

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Arndt, Sven W. "DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND: REACHING BEYOND TRADE LIBERALIZATION." Pacific Economic Review 12, no. 3 (August 2007): 381–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2007.00361.x.

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Francois, J., H. Van Meijl, and F. Van Tongeren. "Trade liberalization in the Doha Development Round." Economic Policy 20, no. 42 (April 1, 2005): 350–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2005.00141.x.

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Evenett, Simon J. "The Doha Round impasse: A graphical account." Review of International Organizations 9, no. 2 (May 27, 2014): 143–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9195-3.

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Paarlberg, Robert L. "How Agriculture Blocked the Uruguay Round." SAIS Review 12, no. 1 (1992): 27–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sais.1992.0011.

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Brotosusilo, Agus. "GATT (''Uruguay Round'' dan Kepentingan Indonesia)." Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan 22, no. 6 (June 7, 2017): 576. http://dx.doi.org/10.21143/jhp.vol22.no6.1020.

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Abstract:

Perundingan "Uruguay Round" yang membahas mekanisme perdagangan diantara negara majudan berkembang hingga saat ini masih "alot" dibicarakan. Disamping membicarakan hal-halyang umum dibahas pula mekanisme perdagangan pertanian, hasil wilayah hukum serta adanya "issue-issue baru" ikut pula diangkat seperti perlindungan hak cipta, merk, "investment measure" dan sebagainya. Bagi Indonesia perundingan ini mempunyai arti penting dalam menentukan pola perdagangannya. Apabila pembicaraan tersebut ''final" maka ada aspek positif maupun negatif yang dapat diraihnya.

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Dunkel, Arthur. "Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations*." Foreign Trade Review 21, no. 4 (January 1987): 369–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0015732515870402.

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Mathur, M. G. "The Uruguay Round, Montreal and After." Foreign Trade Review 23, no. 2 (July 1988): 123–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0015732515880201.

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Rajagopal, Siddhartha. "Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations." Foreign Trade Review 31, no. 3 (October 1996): 38–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0015732515960303.

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Walker, Lucy. "The uruguay round: in whose interests?" Review of African Political Economy 22, no. 66 (December 1995): 564–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056249508704161.

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Carlisle, Charles R. "Remarks on the Uruguay Round Negotiations." Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice 16, no. 4 (October 1991): 401–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/gpp.1991.30.

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Koopmann, Georg. "Final curtain for the Uruguay round?" Intereconomics 27, no. 6 (November 1992): 253–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02928056.

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