Journal articles: 'Utilitarian and deontological arguments'

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Mancic, Zeljko. "Cyberpiracy and morality: Some utilitarian and deontological challenges." Filozofija i drustvo 21, no. 3 (2010): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1003103m.

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This paper analyses one of the main problems of our time in the world of Internet ? cyber piracy. It is often said that it is illegal, since pirates who practice it violate certain domestic and international laws. When we ask for justification of this laws and their enforcement, philosophers and legalists usually apply to one of the two sorts of philosophical arguments - deontology and utilitarianism. The former think that piracy is immoral in itself, while the others argue it should be prevented, otherwise it will produce very bad consequences for society sooner or later, and thus diminish the overall happiness of the society. It will be shown, howe?ver, that both of these arguments, when closely considered, fail with their intention, and, if we decide to follow them, we actually arrive to the very opposite conclusion - piracy is justified.

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Braga, Antonio Frederico Saturnino. "O ARGUMENTO DE J. RAWLS PARA A PRIORIDADE DAS LIBERDADES BÁSICAS." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 36, no. 114 (April 6, 2010): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v36n114p131-150/2009.

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Este artigo analisa o argumento para a prioridade das liberdades básicas apresentado por J. Rawls em sua obra Liberalismo Político, em resposta às críticas feitas por H. Hart ao argumento exposto em Uma Teoria da Justiça. Uma vez que as críticas de Hart apontam para a insuficiência da primeira obra de Rawls no confronto com argumentos de teor utilitarista, o artigo analisa o capítulo VIII de Liberalismo Político à luz do debate entre o deontologismo rawlsiano e a teoria utilitarista. A grande novidade que Rawls introduz em relação à sua primeira obra consiste na tese de que a prioridade das liberdades funda-se numa concepção de pessoa admitidamente liberal. Além de apresentar as dificuldades que esta concepção acarreta para Rawls, identifico e discuto uma possível saída para estas dificuldades.Abstract: In this article I analyze the argument for the priority of the basic liberties presented by J. Rawls in Political Liberalism, responding to H. Hart’s criticisms to his previous argument, presented in A Theory of Justice. Since Hart’s criticisms point to the weakness of Rawls’ first book in the face of utilitarian arguments, I analyze chapter VIII of Political Liberalism bearing in mind the debate between Rawls’ deontological theory and the utilitarian theory. The great novelty introduced by Rawls concerning his first book is his claim that the priority of the liberties rests on a admittedly liberal conception of person. Besides presenting the difficulties that this conception entails, I identify and discuss a possible way out of them.

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Lackey, Douglas P. "Immoral Risks: A Deontological Critique of Nuclear Deterrence." Social Philosophy and Policy 3, no. 1 (1985): 154–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500000212.

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I. Beyond UtilitarianismIn the summer of 1982, I published an article called “Missiles and Morals,” in which I argued on utilitarian grounds that nuclear deterrence in its present form is not morally justifiable. The argument of “Missiles and Morals” compared the most likely sort of nuclear war to develop under nuclear deterrence (DET) with the most likely sort of nuclear war to develop under American unilateral nuclear disaramament (UND). For a variety of reasons, I claimed diat the number of casualties in a two-sided nuclear war developing under DET would be at least fifteen times greater than the number of casualties in a one-sided nuclear attack developing under UND. If one assumes that human lives lost or saved is the principal criterion by which nuclear weapons policies should be measured, it follows that DET is morally superior to UND on utilitarian grounds only if the chance of a two-sided nuclear war under DET is more than fifteen times less dian the chance of a one-sided nuclear attack under UND. Since I did not believe that the chance of nuclear war under deterrence is fifteen times less than the chance of nuclear war under unilateral nuclear disarmament, I inferred diat utilitaranism failed to justify DET. Indeed, on utilitarian grounds, DET stood condemned.

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Segev, Re'em. "Balancing, Judicial Review, and Disobedience: Comments on Richard Posner's Analysis of Anti-Terror Measures (Not a Suicide Pact)." Israel Law Review 42, no. 2 (2009): 234–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700000558.

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The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner's argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the Constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner's conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner's main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures.

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Deane-Drummond, Celia. "The Ethics of Assisted Dying: A Case for a Recovery of Prudence Among the Virtues." Studies in Christian Ethics 24, no. 4 (November 2011): 449–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946811415014.

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The starting point for discussion in this paper is a case study, namely that of the controversy surrounding the case of withdrawing feeding from Eluana Englaro who had been in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) for seventeen years. I press the case for a recovery of classical prudence or practical wisdom, as understood by Thomas Aquinas, rather than beginning with deontological or utilitarian arguments. I suggest that prudence has relevance not just for specific issues concerned with cases involving PVS, but also addresses wider problems raised by secular end-of-life ethical discourse, with its emphasis on individual choice on the one hand and concerns about the slippery slope towards more liberal legislation on the other hand. Greater attention to the hospice movement is, I suggest, ambiguous in ethical terms. Finally, I argue that one of the strengths of a Thomistic understanding of prudence is its deep connection with the life of grace as that informed by consideration of the work of the Holy Spirit. This incorporates a theological element without falling into the trap of a deontology that can be dismissed by those outside the household of faith, while allowing a Christian witness to persist in such a contested public arena.

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Diamond, Eitan. "Before the Abyss: Reshaping International Humanitarian Law to Suit the Ends of Power." Israel Law Review 43, no. 2 (2010): 414–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700000820.

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In the increasingly legalized landscape in which armed conflicts are now waged, international humanitarian law has become an integral and ever more central part of military strategy. States can and do use it to gain advantage over their adversaries, but must also contend with challenges that arise when it is wielded against them. In their efforts to respond to these challenges official and unofficial advocates of State powers have advanced modes of argumentation which question the fundamental structure of international humanitarian law. This Article takes issue with one such argument that mobilizes the theologico-political principle of the “lesser-evil” to conclude that acts which are absolutely prohibited under international humanitarian law should nevertheless be deemed legally permissible when their foreseen consequences are less harmful than lawful alternatives. The Article demonstrates that this argument threatens to blur IHL's sharp boundaries and expand its zone's of elasticity thereby undermining its structural principles. More specifically, the Article maintains that the argument in question rests on exaggerated faith in the judgment of belligerent parties, that it fails on its own utilitarian logic and that it ignores deontological reasoning fundamental to international humanitarian law. The Article contends that accepting this argument would severely compromise IHL's capacity to limit violence and preserve human dignity and therefore advocates that it be rejected.

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March, Andrew. "Sources of Moral Obligation to non-Muslims in the "Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities" (Fiqh al-aqalliyyāt) Discourse." Islamic Law and Society 16, no. 1 (2009): 34–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156851908x413757.

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AbstractThis article surveys four approaches towards moral obligation to non-Muslims found in Islamic legal thought. I refer to the first three approaches as the "revelatory-deontological," the "contractualist-constructivist" and the "consequentialist-utilitarian." The main argument is that present in many contemporary works on the "jurisprudence of Muslim minorities" (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt) is an attempt to provide an Islamic foundation for a relatively thick and rich relationship of moral obligation and solidarity with non-Muslims. This attempt takes the form of a fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to political ethics that appeals not to juridical reasoning of the type "is x permissible and in which conditions?" but rather to Islamic ideals of what it means to live a good life, of what believing, normatively-committed Muslims want to pursue in this world. This meta-ethical approach builds on and goes beyond the first three. This fourth "comprehensive-qualitative" approach to moral obligation to non-Muslims is novel, emergent and not found in the writings of outright reformers but in those of conservative, "neo-classical," sharī'a-minded—even Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated—Muslim scholars. What adds to the force of this argument is that the other meta-ethical discourses, particularly of contract and utility (maslaha), already get these scholars quite far towards a doctrine of "loyal resident alienage" in non-Muslim societies. That even orthodox Muslim scholars go further shows that they have some interest in giving a theological or principled foundation to a much thicker and richer form of moral obligation to non-Muslims, a relationship which involves recognizing non-Muslims qua non-Muslims and contributing to their well-being.

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Zhang, Xiangyi, Zhihui Wu, Shenglan Li, Ji Lai, Meng Han, Xiyou Chen, Chang Liu, and Daoqun Ding. "Why People With High Alexithymia Make More Utilitarian Judgments." Experimental Psychology 67, no. 1 (January 2020): 23–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000474.

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Abstract. Although recent studies have investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments, such an effect remains elusive. Furthermore, moral judgments have been conflated with the moral inclinations underlying those judgments in previous studies. Using a process dissociation approach to independently quantify the strength of utilitarian and deontological inclinations, the present study investigated the effect of alexithymia on moral judgments. We found that deontological inclinations were significantly lower in the high alexithymia group than in the low alexithymia group, whereas the difference in the utilitarian inclinations between the two groups was nonsignificant. Furthermore, empathic concern and deontological inclinations mediated the association between alexithymia and conventional relative judgments (i.e., more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments), showing that people with high alexithymia have low empathic concern, which, in turn, decreases deontological inclinations and contributes to conventional relative judgments. These findings underscore the importance of empathy and deontological inclinations in moral judgments and indicate that individuals with high alexithymia make more utilitarian judgments over deontological judgments possibly due to a deficit in affective processing.

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Koehn, Daryl. "A Role for Virtue Ethics in the Analysis of Business Practice." Business Ethics Quarterly 5, no. 3 (July 1995): 533–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857397.

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Abstract:This article explores differences in the ways in which utilitarian, deontological and virtue/aretic ethics treat of act, outcome, and agent. I argue that virtue ethics offers important and distinctive insights into business practice, insights overlooked by utilitarian and deontological ethics.

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Mandal, Jharna, DinoopKorol Ponnambath, and SubhashChandra Parija. "Utilitarian and deontological ethics in medicine." Tropical Parasitology 6, no. 1 (2016): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/2229-5070.175024.

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Armstrong, Joel, Rebecca Friesdorf, and Paul Conway. "Clarifying Gender Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments: The Complementary Roles of Harm Aversion and Action Aversion." Social Psychological and Personality Science 10, no. 3 (February 16, 2018): 353–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550618755873.

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Moral dilemmas entail situations where decisions consistent with deontological principles (following moral rules) conflict with decisions consistent with utilitarian principles (maximizing overall outcomes). Past work employing process dissociation (PD) clarified that gender differences in utilitarianism are modest, but women are substantially more deontological than men. However, deontological judgments confound two motivations: harm aversion and action aversion. The current work presents a mega-analysis of eight studies ( N = 1,965) using PD to assess utilitarian and deontological response tendencies both when deontology entails inaction and when it requires action, to assess the independent contributions of harm aversion and action aversion. Results replicate and clarify past findings: Women scored higher than men on deontological tendencies, and this difference was enhanced when the deontological choice required refraining from harmful action rather than acting to prevent harm. That is, gender differences in deontological inclinations are caused by both harm aversion and action aversion.

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Fleischmann, Alexandra, Joris Lammers, Paul Conway, and Adam D. Galinsky. "Paradoxical Effects of Power on Moral Thinking: Why Power Both Increases and Decreases Deontological and Utilitarian Moral Decisions." Social Psychological and Personality Science 10, no. 1 (December 15, 2017): 110–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550617744022.

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The current research explores the role of power in moral decision-making. Some work suggests that power increases utilitarianism; other work suggests power increases deontological judgments. Conversely, we propose that power can both increase and decrease both deontological and utilitarian decisions by building on two recent insights in moral psychology. First, we utilize the moral orientation scale to assess four thinking styles that jointly predict moral dilemma decisions. Second, we employ process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian judgments as orthogonal rather than opposite constructs. We conducted two preregistered confirmatory studies that replicated exploratory findings. In Study 1, power increased three moral thinking styles: integration, deliberation, and rule orientation. In Study 2, these decision-making styles simultaneously mediated the effects of power on utilitarian and deontological responses in opposing ways, leading to null effects overall. These results reconcile previous findings and demonstrate the complex yet systematic effects power has on moral decision-making.

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Rüther, Markus, and Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs. "Human Enhancement: Deontological Arguments." Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie 2, no. 1 (April 2019): 161–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42048-019-00036-5.

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Barabadi, Elyas, Mohsen Rahmani Tabar, and James R. Booth. "The Relation of Language Context and Religiosity to Trilemma Judgments." Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 52, no. 6 (July 2021): 583–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00220221211033987.

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Utilitarian judgments maximize benefit for the most people, whereas deontological judgments are based on moral norms. Previous work shows that people tend to make more utilitarian judgments in their second compared to their native language, whereas higher religiosity is associated with more deontological judgments. However, it is not known whether the effect of language context is moderated by the religiosity of the individual. We hypothesized that more religious participants from all three languages would favor deontological choices irrespective of language context. In order to investigate this, we studied native speakers of Persian who either had Arabic or English as their second language, and all participants were given a standard measure of religiosity. Decision making was measured by the classic trolley trilemma in which a participant could “push” a person to save the lives of more people which is considered a utilitarian judgment. Alternatively, they could “switch” a track to save the lives of more people (“indirect”), or do nothing (“inaction”), both of which are considered deontological. Consistent with the literature showing more utilitarian judgments in the second language, English participants preferred the push option, whereas Persian participants favored the inaction option. L2 Arabic participants more often chose the indirect option. However, participants’ religiosity moderated this effect of language context. Although L2 Arabic participants’ choices were not influenced by religiosity, higher religiosity in the L2 English and L1 Persian groups was associated with more deontological choices.

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Tseng, Po-En, and Ya-Huei Wang. "Deontological or Utilitarian? An Eternal Ethical Dilemma in Outbreak." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 16 (August 13, 2021): 8565. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18168565.

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Both deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics are important theories that affect decision making in medical and health care. However, it has been challenging to reach a balance between these two ethical theories. When there is a conflict between these two ethical principles in the medical context, the conflict must be addressed in order to reach an appropriate solution for patients and others involved. To demonstrate decisions made in terms of deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics, the study will use the film Outbreak as example to further understand these two ethics in relation to epidemiology and public health. The paper will also analyze film scenarios to examine how deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics are involved and strike a balance with different pearspectives to reach an appropriate public health solution. To reach more just solutions, it is essential to determine how to make wise decisions by balancing deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics. However, the decision-making process is complicated because any solution must consider not only medical ethics but also political, environmental, and military issues. In order to reach an appropriate public health decision, those involved should be inclined toward empathy and contemplate things from different ethical perspectives to deal with ethical/moral dilemmas and create greater beneficence and justice for patients and humanity at large.

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Hayakawa, Sayuri, David Tannenbaum, Albert Costa, Joanna D. Corey, and Boaz Keysar. "Thinking More or Feeling Less? Explaining the Foreign-Language Effect on Moral Judgment." Psychological Science 28, no. 10 (August 14, 2017): 1387–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617720944.

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Would you kill one person to save five? People are more willing to accept such utilitarian action when using a foreign language than when using their native language. In six experiments, we investigated why foreign-language use affects moral choice in this way. On the one hand, the difficulty of using a foreign language might slow people down and increase deliberation, amplifying utilitarian considerations of maximizing welfare. On the other hand, use of a foreign language might stunt emotional processing, attenuating considerations of deontological rules, such as the prohibition against killing. Using a process-dissociation technique, we found that foreign-language use decreases deontological responding but does not increase utilitarian responding. This suggests that using a foreign language affects moral choice not through increased deliberation but by blunting emotional reactions associated with the violation of deontological rules.

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Brown, Mitch, and Donald F. Sacco. "Is pulling the lever sexy? Deontology as a downstream cue to long-term mate quality." Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 36, no. 3 (December 27, 2017): 957–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0265407517749331.

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Deontological and utilitarian moral decisions have unique communicative functions within the context of group living. Deontology more strongly communicates prosocial intentions, fostering greater perceptions of trust and desirability in general affiliative contexts. This general trustworthiness may extend to perceptions of fidelity in romantic relationships, leading to perceptions of deontological persons as better long-term mates, relative to utilitarians. In two studies, participants indicated desirability of both deontologists and utilitarians in long-term mating (LTM) and short-term mating contexts. In Study 1 ( n = 102), women perceived a deontological man as more interested in long-term bonds, more desirable for LTM, and less prone to infidelity, relative to a utilitarian man. However, utilitarian men were undesirable as short-term mates. Study 2 ( n = 112) had both men and women rate opposite-sex targets’ desirability after learning of their moral decisions in a trolley problem. We replicated women’s preference for deontological men as long-term mates. Interestingly, both men and women reporting personal deontological motives were particularly sensitive to deontology communicating long-term desirability and fidelity, which could be a product of the general affiliative signal from deontology. Thus, one’s moral basis for decision-making, particularly deontologically motivated moral decisions, may communicate traits valuable in LTM contexts.

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Palmer, Daniel E. "Upping the Stakes: A Response to John Hasnas on the Normative Viability of the Stockholder and Stakeholder Theories." Business Ethics Quarterly 9, no. 4 (October 1999): 699–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857947.

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Abstract:This essay responds to Hasnas’s recent article “The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed” in Business Ethics Quarterly. Hasnas claims that the stockholder theory is more plausible than commonly supposed and that the stakeholder theory is prone to significant difficulties. I argue that Hasnas’s reasons for favoring the stockholder over the stakeholder theory are not as strong as he suggests. Following Hasnas, I examine both theories in light of two sets of normative considerations: utilitarian and deontological. First, I show that utilitarian considerations clearly favor the stakeholder theory. I then argue that though Hasnas rightly accents the basic deontological constraint at the core of the stockholder theory, he is wrong to think that acknowledging such a constraint necessarily counts against the stakeholder theory. Here, I develop Ross’s notion of prima facie obligations to show how a viable stakeholder theory might be developed within a deontological framework.

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Doerflinger, Johannes T., and Peter M. Gollwitzer. "Emotion emphasis effects in moral judgment are moderated by mindsets." Motivation and Emotion 44, no. 6 (July 18, 2020): 880–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11031-020-09847-1.

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Abstract In two studies, emotion emphasis effects on moral judgment are demonstrated. The studies indicate that emphasizing negative consequences in trolley-type dilemmas with emotional language produces more utilitarian responses if such emphasis is on the consequences of the deontological option, and more deontological responses if it is on the consequences of the utilitarian option. This effect was moderated by action-phase related mindsets. Individuals in an implemental mindset were less susceptible to the emotion emphasis effect than individuals in a deliberative mindset (Studies 1, 2). By also using an eye-tracking task in Study 2, we demonstrated that our implemental mindset participants’ visual attention was more focused—in particular on goal-directed means—than that of the deliberative mindset participants.

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Jain, Harshita. "Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility: A Utilitarian and Deontological Perspective." Open Journal of Business and Management 08, no. 05 (2020): 2278–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojbm.2020.85139.

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Migliore, Simone, Giulia D’Aurizio, Francesca Parisi, Sabrina Maffi, Barbara Squitieri, Giuseppe Curcio, and Francesco Mancini. "Moral Judgment and Empathic/Deontological Guilt." Psychological Reports 122, no. 4 (July 19, 2018): 1395–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0033294118787500.

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Background People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological. Aim Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions. Methods We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an “authority”), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study. Results We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged. Conclusions These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an “authority” differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.

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Goldstein-Greenwood, Jacob, Paul Conway, Amy Summerville, and Brielle N. Johnson. "(How) Do You Regret Killing One to Save Five? Affective and Cognitive Regret Differ After Utilitarian and Deontological Decisions." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 46, no. 9 (January 28, 2020): 1303–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167219897662.

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Sacrificial moral dilemmas, in which opting to kill one person will save multiple others, are definitionally suboptimal: Someone dies either way. Decision-makers, then, may experience regret about these decisions. Past research distinguishes affective regret, negative feelings about a decision, from cognitive regret, thoughts about how a decision might have gone differently. Classic dual-process models of moral judgment suggest that affective processing drives characteristically deontological decisions to reject outcome-maximizing harm, whereas cognitive deliberation drives characteristically utilitarian decisions to endorse outcome-maximizing harm. Consistent with this model, we found that people who made or imagined making sacrificial utilitarian judgments reliably expressed relatively more affective regret and sometimes expressed relatively less cognitive regret than those who made or imagined making deontological dilemma judgments. In other words, people who endorsed causing harm to save lives generally felt more distressed about their decision, yet less inclined to change it, than people who rejected outcome-maximizing harm.

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HEDNER, THOMAS, and LENNART HANSSON. "A Utilitarian or Deontological Approach Toward Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease?" Acta Medica Scandinavica 224, no. 4 (April 24, 2009): 293–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0954-6820.1988.tb19587.x.

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Garbutt, G., and P. Davies. "Should the practice of medicine be a deontological or utilitarian enterprise?" Journal of Medical Ethics 37, no. 5 (January 29, 2011): 267–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jme.2010.036111.

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Cekic, Nenad. "Utilitarianism and the idea of university: A short ethical analysis." Filozofija i drustvo 29, no. 1 (2018): 73–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1801073c.

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The standard objection to the utilitarian vision of morality is that utilitarian so-called ?Greatest-Happiness Principle? could justify counter-intuitive practices such as punishing and sacrifice of innocents, breaking of promises and manipulation. The underlying presumption is that the greatest cause (general utility, ?happiness?) must be capable of justifying causing suffering of the few. The fact is that, in the upbringing and education of humans (children), some degree of manipulation is needed. Instead, in that process, we use concepts which belong to deontological prescriptions (?obligations,? ?duties?) such as ?Do not lie? or ?Do not steal.? Our question is: Can we imagine the University guided by the simple utility principle. We must remember that a University is for adults, not for children. Why now not be open and at the University say that everything we do we do for the sake of hedonistic ?happiness,? not for the sake of duty. That seems suspicious for several reasons. Maybe the most noteworthy objection is that Mill?s version of the utilitarianism tends to divide humanity into two classes: moral aristocracy, which seeks ?higher pleasures,? and others who do not. Does that mean that utilitarians must organize secret utilitarian universities for moral aristocracy? Does it mean that moral aristocracy, according to the utility principle, should organize ?deontological,? manipulative public universities for lower classes?

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Conway, Paul, and Bertram Gawronski. "Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: A process dissociation approach." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 104, no. 2 (February 2013): 216–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031021.

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Muda, Rafał, Paweł Niszczota, Michał Białek, and Paul Conway. "Reading dilemmas in a foreign language reduces both deontological and utilitarian response tendencies." Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 44, no. 2 (February 2018): 321–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000447.

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Carvalho, Constança, Augusta Gaspar, Andrew Knight, and Luís Vicente. "Ethical and Scientific Pitfalls Concerning Laboratory Research with Non-Human Primates, and Possible Solutions." Animals 9, no. 1 (December 29, 2018): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ani9010012.

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Basic and applied laboratory research, whenever intrusive or invasive, presents substantial ethical challenges for ethical committees, be it with human beings or with non-human animals. In this paper we discuss the use of non-human primates (NHPs), mostly as animal models, in laboratory based research. We examine the two ethical frameworks that support current legislation and guidelines: deontology and utilitarianism. While human based research is regulated under deontological principles, guidelines for laboratory animal research rely on utilitarianism. We argue that the utilitarian framework is inadequate for this purpose: on the one hand, it is almost impossible to accurately predict the benefits of a study for all potential stakeholders; and on the other hand, harm inflicted on NHPs (and other animals) used in laboratory research is extensive despite the increasing efforts of ethics committees and the research community to address this. Although deontology and utilitarianism are both valid ethical frameworks, we advocate that a deontological approach is more suitable, since we arguably have moral duties to NHPs. We provide suggestions on how to ensure that research currently conducted in laboratory settings shifts towards approaches that abide by deontological principles. We assert that this would not impede reasonable scientific research.

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Byrd, Nick, and Paul Conway. "Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies." Cognition 192 (November 2019): 103995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.007.

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Benjamin, Marlene. "Moral Theory and Human Rights: Scheffler on Structure and Content." Dialogue 31, no. 2 (1992): 273–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300038555.

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Human rights claims rely on both utilitarian and deontological perspectives of the moral universe. The persuasiveness of these claims depends on the extent to which they resonate harmoniously with a person's other moral opinions. If these opinions cannot be grounded in a larger structure of ra-tionally defensible moral principles, differences of opinion cannot be satis-factorily resolved. When this happens, action protective of rights —about which there may be not only different but diametrically opposed opinion — will be hard to achieve.

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Reynolds, Caleb J., Kassidy R. Knighten, and Paul Conway. "Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who is deontological? Completing moral dilemmas in front of mirrors increases deontological but not utilitarian response tendencies." Cognition 192 (November 2019): 103993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.005.

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Watters, Bryan SC. "Leadership in the ‘Wicked’ Problem of Bosnia’s civil war: A case study examining ethical decision making under duress." Leadership 15, no. 1 (September 5, 2017): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1742715017725641.

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The author, as a UN Commander in Bosnia in the early 1990s, faced what he believed to be an ethically insoluble dilemma entangled in the Wicked Problem of Bosnia’s civil war. Bosnia’s civil war was a Wicked Problem constructed by history, the warring factions and the UN’s policy of neutrality. The moral uncertainty of leading in Bosnia’s Wicked Problem generated a tendency to construct Tame Problems enabling forthright action guided by deontological principles of moral certainty. The reality of the Wicked Problem required leaders to adopt Utilitarian judgements based on projected consequences, as in Bosnia’s grey zone the Deontological certainties did not appear valid. When a Wicked Problem morphed into a crisis or Critical Problem requiring direct action, the morally correct course had to be instinctive aligning with Virtue ethics, the ethical character of the actors. This article is an attempt at reflective learning through post hoc sense making of events portrayed in a case study, the events fractured relationships, changed lives and provided stark lessons.

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Ying, Lin, and Tang Zhiwen. "Study on The Neural Mechanisms of Utilitarian and Deontological on Managerial Moral Decision-Making." Psychology of China 2, no. 10 (2020): 1046–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.35534/pc.0210074.

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Playford, Richard C., Tom Roberts, and E. Diane Playford. "Deontological and utilitarian ethics: a brief introduction in the context of disorders of consciousness." Disability and Rehabilitation 37, no. 21 (December 8, 2014): 2006–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3109/09638288.2014.989337.

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Leach-López, Maria A., Claire A. Stammerjohan, William W. Stammerjohan, and Megan M. Leach. "Ethical Decision Making of Future Mexican Managers." International Review of Advances in Business, Management and Law 1, no. 1 (June 15, 2018): 85–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.30585/irabml.v1i1.58.

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A study to measure ethical decision making of Mexican business students compared to their US counterparts. Results suggest that Mexican students’ ethical decision-making frameworks differ from those documented by Keller et al. (2007) in their study of US students. Mexican students were not found to be highly religious, but subscribed more to utilitarian, deontological and hermeneutical frameworks for their ethical values. It is suggested that multinational firms doing business in Mexico might want to schedule ethics training of managers and to have a set of standards that employees can follow.

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Gerrie, Jim. "Using and Refusing." Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16, no. 3 (2012): 317–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/techne201216320.

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James Rachels has argued on Utilitarian grounds that since removing life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide both aim at the very same end,hastening death to limit suffering, there are no morally significant moral distinctions between them. Others have argued for maintaining this distinction based on various forms of deontological and rights-based ethical theories that maintain that all acts of killing are inherently wrong. I argue that the enduring controversy over physician-assisted suicide might not be caused by such fundamental differences of opinion about moral theory, such as that which exists between Utilitarianism and Deontology, so much as by a commonly held misunderstanding of technology. In particular, the conclusion that there are no relevant ethical distinctions between killing and letting die can only be drawn by a Utilitarian, such as Rachels, by ignoring the recent work of philosophers of technology on the non-neutrality thesis.

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Hamlin, Alan P. "Rights, Indirect Utilitarianism, and Contractarianism." Economics and Philosophy 5, no. 2 (October 1989): 167–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100002376.

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Economic approaches to both social evaluation and decision-making are typically Paretian or utilitarian in nature and so display commitments to both welfarism and consequentialism. The contrast between the economic approach and any rights-based social philosophy has spawned a large literature that may be divided into two branches. The first is concerned with the compatibility of rights and utilitarianism (or Pare-tianism) seen as independent moral forces (e.g., the debate on the possibility of a Paretian liberal). This branch of the literature may be characterized as an example of the broader debate between the teleological and deontological approaches. The second is concerned with the possibility that substantial rights may be grounded in utilitarianism (or Pare-tianism) with the moral force of rights being derived from more basic commitments to welfarism and consequentialism. This branch of the literature may be characterized as an exploration of the flexibility of the teleological approach, and, in particular, its ability to give rise to views more normally associated with the deontological approach. This essay is concerned with the second branch of the literature.

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Narveson, Jan. "Waldron on Private Property." Dialogue 29, no. 1 (1990): 133–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300012828.

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Do individuals have a right to private property? That is the question pursued in this lengthy investigation (445 pages). Waldron distinguishes utilitarian arguments from “Right-based” ones. That is hardly an exhaustive distinction, one would think; reliance on its being so would not bode well. But having made such a distinction, he believes that the question comes to whether there are “any good right-based arguments for private property.” This, he thinks, amounts to the question: are any important individual interests served “by the existence of private property as opposed to someother sort of property regime?” The alternative, he thinks, is to turn to utilitarian arguments about property institutions, “rather than having it treated as the basis of right” (p. 5). How we are to measure “importance,” and to whom the proposed regimes are to be important is not discussed. And of course some think that we can, too, have a utilitarian-based theory of rights. And there will be other complaints about Waldron's framework; but we will not be able to go further into such matters here.

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Winking, Jeffrey, and Jeremy Koster. "Small-scale utilitarianism: High acceptance of utilitarian solutions to Trolley Problems among a horticultural population in Nicaragua." PLOS ONE 16, no. 4 (April 5, 2021): e0249345. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249345.

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Researchers often use moral dilemmas to investigate the specific factors that influence participants’ judgments of the appropriateness of different actions. A common construction of such a dilemma is the Trolley Problem, which pits an obvious utilitarian solution against a common deontological dictum to not do harm to others. Cross-cultural studies have validated the robustness of numerous contextual biases, such as judging utilitarian decisions more negatively if they require contact with other individuals (contact bias), they force others to serve as a means to an end (means bias), and if they require direct action rather than inaction (omission bias). However, such cross-cultural research is largely limited to studies of industrialized, nation-state populations. Previous research has suggested that the more intimate community relationships that characterize small-scale populations might lead to important differences, such as an absence of an omission bias. Here we contribute to this literature by investigating perceptions of Trolley Problem solutions among a Mayangna/Miskito community, a small-scale indigenous population in Nicaragua. Compared to previously sampled populations, the Mayangna/Miskito participants report higher levels of acceptance of utilitarian solutions and do not exhibit an omission bias. We also examine the justifications participants offered to explore how Mayangna/Miskito culture might influence moral judgments.

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Savayda, Оlena. "PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL FORMATION OF DEONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT: A RETOSPECTIVE OF THE IDEAS OF JEREMY BENTHAM." Social & Legal Studios 12, no. 2 (June 30, 2021): 39–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.32518/2617-4162-2021-2-39-44.

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The article analyzes the historiography of the development of deontological knowledge and examines the main scientific works of the English philosopher and jurist Jeremiah Bentham, which are devoted to the problems of deontology. The main basic criteria set by a scientist for the professional component through the prism of moral requirements and various types of culture are considered, and attention is drawn in particular to the deontological foundations in law enforcement activities. We are talking about the need for law enforcement officers to realize the importance of their social mission as Guardians of law and freedom, who are obliged to risk their own lives in countering crime and offenses, and prevent violations of the rights and freedoms of citizens in their professional activities. This requirement of the deontological foundations of law enforcement has both a legal and moral dimension. Exploring and revealing the content of deontological foundations, attention is focused on the two main social regulators of social relations as morality and law. It is also noted that Ukraine, along with other European countries in its arsenal in the regulation of social relations has common values (meaning democratic, legal values), such as good (according to Je. Bentham), which is equated to natural and legal values. Therefore, in their professional activities and the regulation of public relations (especially conflicts), first of all, law enforcement agencies must adhere to such a specified value as good. The main theory of Je. Bentham – utilitarianism is also mentioned. The main idea of which is what needs to be done for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. And therefore, to denote the utilitarian system of ethics Je. Bentham introduces such a new concept as "deontology" – the doctrine of the right, proper (not only in life but also in professional activities).

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Ştefan, Ionuţ. "Arguments for and Against Abortion in Terms of Teleological and Deontological Theories." Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 (September 2014): 927–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.08.301.

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Singer, Ming, and Alexander Mackenzie. "DIFFERENTIAL ENCODING OF THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL STANDARDS." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 30, no. 8 (January 1, 2002): 765–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2002.30.8.765.

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This study explored the encoding salience of the two fundamental ethical standards of extrinsic utility and intrinsic duty. The specific research question was: “To what extent are the two key notions of human good encoded in distinctive cognitive schemas?” The release-fromproactive- interference (RPI) experimental paradigm in memory research was used to address the question. Words in the conceptual categories of “money” and “morals” were selected to denote the utilitarian and deontological notions respectively. Results show a significant release in recall when words were shifted from one notion to the other. The theoretical and practical implications of the differential encoding of the two ethical standards are then discussed.

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Pavlakos, George. "Constitutional Rights, Balancing and the Structure of Autonomy." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 24, no. 1 (January 2011): 129–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900005099.

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The question of the character of constitutional rights norms is complex and admits of no easy answer. Without reducing the complexity of the issue, I attempt in this paper to formulate some clear views on the matter. I shall argue that constitutional rights reasoning is a species of rational practical reasoning that combines both balancing (as Robert Alexy admits) and the grounds as to why balancing is appropriate (deontological constraints). Absent the latter type of reason, the application of constitutional principles remains a pure instance of balancing. Each time those reasons are touched upon, however, balancing becomes subject to deontological constraints. Yet deontological reasons are neither self-proclaiming nor complete. Rather they require for their articulation the background of an already operational practice of practical (legal) reasoning. This practice exemplifies what I shall dub the structure of autonomy, that is, a set of regulative ideals, not yet definitive norms, that derive from the reflective character of human agency. This structure comes to light when one turns to the agent’s point of view – to the point of view of someone who is engaged reflectively with practical questions (questions about rights are par excellence questions of this type). The structure of autonomy is more fundamental than any deontological or teleological reasons: it is in its light that deontology and teleology need to be understood as representing merely complementary forms of argument, which can be employed in reasoning that aims to maximise constitutional rights provisions. At the same time, the structure of autonomy as a regulative ideal generates prima facie reasons for allocating greater weight to deontological arguments in the relevant contexts of balancing. Such prima-facie reasons do not prescribe fully-fledged deontological constraints, but merely set the burden of proof in favour of specific reasons and ensure that the structure of autonomy be respected overall.

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Fernandes, Carina, Ana Ribeiro Gonçalves, Rita Pasion, Fernando Ferreira-Santos, Tiago Oliveira Paiva, Joana Melo e Castro, Fernando Barbosa, Isabel Pavão Martins, and João Marques-Teixeira. "European Portuguese adaptation and validation of dilemmas used to assess moral decision-making." Trends in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy 40, no. 1 (April 5, 2018): 38–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/2237-6089-2017-0022.

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Abstract Objective To adapt and validate a widely used set of moral dilemmas to European Portuguese, which can be applied to assess decision-making. Moreover, the classical formulation of the dilemmas was compared with a more focused moral probe. Finally, a shorter version of the moral scenarios was tested. Methods The Portuguese version of the set of moral dilemmas was tested in 53 individuals from several regions of Portugal. In a second study, an alternative way of questioning on moral dilemmas was tested in 41 participants. Finally, the shorter version of the moral dilemmas was tested in 137 individuals. Results Results evidenced no significant differences between English and Portuguese versions. Also, asking whether actions are “morally acceptable” elicited less utilitarian responses than the original question, although without reaching statistical significance. Finally, all tested versions of moral dilemmas exhibited the same pattern of responses, suggesting that the fundamental elements to the moral decision-making were preserved. Conclusions We found evidence of cross-cultural validity for moral dilemmas. However, the moral focus might affect utilitarian/deontological judgments.

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FIRTH, STEVEN J. "The Quality Adjusted Life Year: A Total-Utility Perspective." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27, no. 2 (March 6, 2018): 284–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180117000615.

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Abstract:Given that a properly formed utilitarian response to healthcare distribution issues should evaluate cost effectiveness against the total utility increase, it follows that any utilitarian cost-effectiveness metric should be sensitive to increases in both individual and social utility afforded by a given intervention. Quality adjusted life year (QALY) based decisionmaking in healthcare cannot track increases in social utility, and as a result, the QALY cannot be considered a strict utilitarian response to issues of healthcare distribution. This article considers arguments against, and a possible defence of, the QALY as a utilitarian concept; in response, the article offers a similar — but properly formed — utilitarian metric called the (IALY). This article also advances a tool called the ‘glee factor’ (GF) on which the IALY may lean in a similar way to which the QALY leans on the Rosser Index.

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CRISP, ROGER. "NEUTRALITY AND PLEASURE." Economics and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (March 2007): 81–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026626710700123x.

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John Broome's ground-breaking Weighing Lives makes precise, and supplies arguments previously lacking for, several views which for centuries have been central to the utilitarian tradition. In gratitude for his enlightening arguments, I shall repay him in this paper by showing how he could make things easier for himself by denying neutrality and accepting hedonism.

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PAULO, NORBERT. "In Search of Greene's Argument." Utilitas 31, no. 1 (June 26, 2018): 38–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820818000171.

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The moral psychologist Joshua Greene has proposed a number of arguments for the normative significance of empirical research and for the unreliability of deontological intuitions. For these arguments, much hinges on the combination of various components of Greene's research – namely the dual-process theory of moral judgement, ‘personalness’ as a factor in moral decision-making, and his functional understanding of deontology and consequentialism. Incorporating these components, I reconstruct three distinct arguments and show that the Personalness Argument for the claim that empirical research can advance normative ethics and the Combined Argument against deontology are both sound and interesting in themselves. They do not, however, cast doubt on traditional deontology or reserve a specific role for neuroscience. The Indirect Route argument overcomes some of the other arguments’ limitations. It is, however, invalid. I conclude by pointing out the broader philosophical relevance of Greene's arguments as shedding light on second-order morality.

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Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. "REPLY TO RIPSTEIN: NOTES ON WELFARIST VERSUS DEONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES." Economics and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (April 2004): 209–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267104001300.

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In Fairness versus Welfare (FVW), we advance the thesis that social policies should be assessed entirely with regard to their effects on individuals' well-being. That is, no independent weight should be accorded to notions of fairness such as corrective or retributive justice or other deontological principles. Our claim is based on the demonstration that pursuit of notions of fairness has perverse effects on welfare, on other problematic aspects of the notions, and on a reconciliation of our thesis with the evident appeal of moral intuitions. Here we summarize our three arguments and explain that Professor Ripstein's commentary largely fails to respond to them. (We will pass over some of what he says because it has little to do with our book, and we will not address his rather surprising attacks on our scholarship because the reader can readily verify their inaccuracy.)

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Kyei Edwards, Alexander, and Samuel Asare Amoah. "Deontological Perspective of the Free Secondary Education Policy in Ghana." World Journal of Educational Research 7, no. 1 (January 14, 2020): p16. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/wjer.v7n1p16.

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The Free Senior High School (aka. FSHS) policy of the Ghana government has attracted views from both critics and supporters. The objective for this investigation was to examine the deontological ethics of the FSHS educational policy leadership within the framework of utilitarianism-it is as a “duty” and for “public good”. Critics are questioning the policy leadership, intentionality, feasibility, and sustainability. Supporters are also defending the FSHS as a timely social intervention, for equitable access, and the ability of the national economy to afford by re-strategizing government priorities, national indebtedness, and the entire school management system. The research design was exploratory mixed method using a sample study (N=55) that came from six schools (students, head teachers, teachers, and parents) in one region. Data were analysed under the themes: perceptions, benefits, and challenges. Responses showed that the FSHS seems to be a natural progression from the FCUBE policy that is hailed as successful by the international donors. Respondents confirmed the benefits derived from the FSHS policy as altruistic. The discussions followed the theory of ethical deontology, policy leadership implications, democratization of education in Ghana, and the utilitarian concept for future national development. Recommendations include the Government of Ghana (GoG) should ensure “fitness” and “rightness” to align with national priorities in the economy. Secondly, GoG should fight against corruption and “noise” in the FSHS implementation system. Thirdly, the GoG should consider cost sharing and decentralization of education provision in Ghana. Policy makers (legistrators) should ensure that the education system recognizes Ghanaian children as deserving better quality and the incommensurability of values of Education for All.

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Alper, Sinan. "Explaining the Complex Effect of Construal Level on Moral and Political Attitudes." Current Directions in Psychological Science 29, no. 2 (January 30, 2020): 115–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721419896362.

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The literature on construal-level theory has provided a rich but complex set of findings regarding how abstract and concrete construals affect moral and political attitudes. One set of findings suggests that abstractness sharpens and polarizes moral and political judgments, whereas other findings suggest the opposite. In this article, I first review and explain both sets of findings. Second, I argue that it is possible to reconcile seemingly contradictory results by considering (a) the interpersonal variation in core values, (b) the confounding effects of utilitarian and deontological thinking styles, and (c) potentially different effects of different manipulations of abstractness. I conclude by arguing that consideration of these factors would resolve the complexity in the relationship between construal levels and moral and political attitudes.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Utilitarian and deontological arguments'

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