Journal articles on the topic 'Vanguardia Rusa'

Las revistas Ombligo y Vital, dirigidas por Vicente Huidobro entre 1934 y 1935, presentan un repertorio de discursos en torno de la Revolución Rusa, el movimiento obrero en EE. UU. y las políticas conservadoras chilenas, gracias al cual es posible redefinir la figura del poeta, generalmente encasillada en la vertiente artística de las vanguardias latinoamericanas. El artículo analiza las polémicas entabladas entre Huidobro e intelectuales chilenos, para lo cual apelamos a nociones provenientes de la teoría de la argumentación propuesta por Perelman (1989). Observamos una ridiculización de la argumentación política mediante comentarios irónicos que refuerzan la denuncia a las doctrinas de derecha. Estos órganos de difusión, entonces construyen una escritura sostenida en la ironía a fin de disputar un lugar privilegiado en el campo literario local, lo que obliga al propio Huidobro a revisar su proyecto creador y, en consecuencia, a restablecer los préstamos entre vanguardia artística y vanguardia política.

El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar cómo la imagen que dio Manuel Chaves Nogales de la revolución rusa a través de sus artículos en los años treinta, siendo vanguardia del periodismo de entonces, tuvo un sentido histórico. La hipótesis es que el periodismo, informando sobre el presente, puede aportar a los historiadores alguna lección. Para mostrar la conciencia histórica del periodismo de Chaves Nogales se contextualiza al autor entre otros viajeros de la época a la Unión Soviética, se analiza la manera en la que Chaves interpreta las huellas de la revolución en las personas y en su entorno y se relaciona con la microhistoria.

Revolución democrática burguesa o revolución socialista? Instauración de un régimen con instituciones típicas de la democracia representativa o poder de lo soviets? A través del estudio del periódico La Vanguardia, se ofrece un análisis de los sucesivos posicionamientos por los que transitó Partido Socialista entre la revolución de febrero y la de octubre de 1917; proceso que condujo, finalmente, a la escisión con la consiguiente fundación del Partido Socialista Internacionalista, embrión del Partido Comunista argentino.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es ofrecer un panorama de desarrollo de los conceptos de modernismo y postmodernismo en Rusia. Análisis realizado a través del pensamiento históriográfico ruso, prestando una especial atención al movimiento formalista (y su relación con las vanguardias históricas) como una emblemática vertiente rusa de la corriente modernista. Se destacan algunos rasgos peculiares de su desarrollo en Rusia, que distinguen a estos fenómenos de sus equivalentes occidentales.

El artículo analiza la recepción de la literatura rusa por parte de José Carlos Mariátegui durante la década de 1920. La consumación de la Revolución Rusa supone, para la lectura de Mariátegui, un cambio de época que implica no solo un punto de giro en lo que respecta a la vida política y económica de Rusia, sino que también representa la corroboración de la inminente debacle del proceso civilizatorio burgués y, sobre todo, la posibilidad de una perspectiva revolucionaria en Perú. La centralidad que, en el marco de la crítica cultural, adquiere el análisis de fenómenos literarios, se advierte tanto en los estudios referidos a las vanguardias europeas como al incipiente realismo al que daría lugar la continuidad del proceso revolucionario bolchevique. Las intervenciones críticas de Mariátegui en el proceso que se abre con la revolución, por lo tanto, dan cuenta de una reinterpretación de la historia entendida como un proceso abierto, en el que el testimonio de parte se articula con la propuesta política.

A arte contemporânea e as transformações sofridas no século XX. Das vanguardas às novas tendências. Das formas assimétricas, rudes e chocantes, a arte nas ruas, fora dos museus, desestetizada, do pastiche. O surgimento de novos conceitos artísticos buscando libertação contra o Moderno e o moderno vanguardista, seu hermetismo e subjetivismo, engendram a antiarte e seus movimentos singulares de representação do cotidiano. A sociedade do consumo e da informação como plano de fundo artístisco produzindo uma arte que não só imita, ela é a própria vida.

La porcelana soviética vanguardista realizada entre 1918-1923 es una de las más prestigiosas y más caras en el mundo. Es un caso en la Historia del Arte que no tiene precedentes. Esto se debe no sólo a la calidad excepcional de la porcelana, sino también porque los diseños eran más que revolucionarios y glorificaban el país recién nacido. Con este trabajo se pretende hacer un acercamiento a la historia de su producción y relación con el estado y estudio de la porcelana vanguardista soviética.

O texto discute a persistência da temática urbana nas vanguardas latino-americanas do início do século XX, identificando alguns signos da celebração da cidade na produção poética do período. Enfoca quatro autores, sendo dois brasileiros, Mário e Oswald de Andrade, e dois argentinos, Oliverio Girondo e Jorge Luis Borges, para encontrar consonâncias e dissonâncias na representação urbana.

Quando a oportunidade de escrever uma resenha sobre Negação (Denial) (2016) para esta revista se apresentou, perguntei-me qual seria a relevância desse filme no contexto específico do Brasil hoje. Além disso, compartilhar esse espaço com um colega que esteve na vanguarda dos protestos sociais que encheram as ruas do Rio de Janeiro levantou uma discussão sobre minha perspectiva eurocêntrica.

Tendo influenciado muitas figuras da vanguarda russa, como Vladimir Maiakóvski e Velimír Khlébnikov, Pável Filónov e Andrei Platónov, os ensinamentos de Nikolai Fiódorov deixaram de ser citados já nos anos 1930 e foram suprimidos junto com o utopismo da cultura revolucionária inicial. Por isso, é mais interessante ainda encontrar menções abertas ao seu nome e às suas ideias nos trabalhos de um autor como Viktor Chklóvski, tão reconhecido oficialmente a partir dos anos 1930 e sobretudo depois da época do degelo, quando suas origens ligadas à vanguarda da cultura soviética o revestiram de um peso simbólico adicional. E é ainda mais curioso notar que, na obra inicial de Chklóvski, que fincava suas raízes na arte de vanguarda, o nome de Fiódorov está completamente ausente. Entretanto, a partir da camada Fiodoroviana já revelada, pode-se encontrar ecos do cosmismo russo também nos primeiros trabalhos de Chklóvski.

A criação da primeira república socialista na Rússia, em 1917, provocou no mundo inteiro uma extraordinária atmosfera de inquietude e renovação nos campos social, político e cultural, cujos desdobramentos se fizeram sentir durante todo o século XX. Em 2017, comemora-se o centenário desse tempestuoso momento histórico, que gerou um dos movimentos culturais e artísticos mais surpreendentes e multifacetados da história da arte moderna, denominado vanguardas russas. Muitos artistas russos se apresentam, então, como representantes genuínos da uma nova era proletária, combinando extremismo na forma e acentuada propaganda política, a produzir uma audaciosa simbiose de variadas tendências estéticas e artísticas, vicejantes durante os anos revolucionários. Discorrer sobre essa nova concepção de arte e cultura e sobre a profusão de experiências estéticas daquele período constitui um tema de extremo interesse.

Las fuerzas militares están a la vanguardia de las innovaciones tecnológicas, lo que les permite ejercer mayor control, protección y seguridad en el territorio. Este articulo presenta una revisión preliminar de los avances tecnológicos en el mundo, mediante la exploración de las noticias en las páginas web oficiales de cada país. La información recolectada fue categorizada en 18 áreas para identificar tendencias. Las innovaciones brindan herramientas técnicas eficaces para el cumplimiento de las misiones. Las categorías de vehículos, armas (de corto y largo alcance) y defensa son las más avanzadas, seguidas por las de aeronaves, comunicación, entrenamiento y logística; en las áreas de robots, sensores y ciberseguridad se pronostica crecimiento. Países como Rusia, China y Estados Unidos cuentan con mayor número de innovaciones, capital humano y económico, los demás pueden catalogarse como seguidores.

El 25 de mayo de1937 se inauguró en París la Exposition internationale des Arts et des Techniques appliqués à la Vie moderne. Cincuenta naciones fueron representadas. Los pabellones de la Alemania hitleriana y la Rusia estalinista fueron los claros protagonistas. En un contexto de aparente neutralidad, las construcciones de Albert Speer y Boris Iofan ganaron el premio ex aequo como los mejores pabellones de la muestra. Ambos respondían a una misma arquitectura totalitaria y monumental, coronados por simbólicos motivos esculturales. Justo al lado del alemán, discreto y de dimensiones reducidas, la España republicana presentó el que sería llamado como el pabellón de la vanguardia. Todo el díptico Ex aequo (2012-en proceso) contiene un subtítulo con fragmentos de poemas de Federico García Lorca, asesinado durante la Guerra Civil y homenajeado en el pabellón español.

O poeta Velimir Khlébnikov é conhecido por sua postura pacifista no contexto dos movimentos de vanguarda na Rússia. Este trabalho busca analisar a manifestação da temática das guerras na obra de Khlébnikov, a partir da observação de aspectos semânticos envolvidos nas escolhas do autor, como as referências a diversas armas e às diferentes guerras no decorrer da história.

Introducción: A la luz de las nuevas tecnologías, el área de la salud se enfrenta a nuevos escenarios que están transformando el mundo, uno de estos es el de la salud móvil que ha pasado de ser una utopía a una realidad. Para lograr conocer los ámbitos de la salud electrónica y la salud móvil, es imprescindible comprender el trasfondo en el que estos avances se desarrollan. Dicho contexto se enmarca en los terrenos de Internet, la cibercultura y la inteligencia colectiva, los cuales se construyen sobre las bases de la complejidad de la acción y la interacción humana. Objetivo: Analizar la trascendencia de conceptos clave para entender el trasfondo de la salud móvil. Materiales y métodos: Revisión documental de textos físicos y bases de datos electrónicas. Resultados: Se estructuró la información en tres categorías: cultura, ciberespacio e inteligencia colectiva; acción, interacción e Internet, y por último; salud móvil y Apps. Conclusiones: Para la sociedad actual de la información y el conocimiento, áreas de vanguardia como Internet y los dispositivos móviles son más que una tendencia tecnológica; se han convertido en ejes de innovación y construcción de futuro. La tecnología ofrece posibilidades fascinantes, sin embargo, es importante encontrar un sentido más profundo en desarrollos científicos que pueden cambiar el mundo como la salud móvil.

A partir de observações sobre aspectos formais, temáticos e filosóficos característicos da poética de Velimír Khlébnikov, e da inserção de sua criação no contexto das vanguardas russas do início do século XX, este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar e abordar exemplos de sua produção em prosa, texto dramático e ensaio. Khlébnikov é bastante conhecido no Ocidente por sua produção lírica e seu trabalho com outros gêneros ainda é pouco estudado e traduzido em língua portuguesa

Aunque el título del artículo parece aludir a la oposición entre ambos artistas, el análisis de sus vidas y obra evidencia que, aunque sus figuras son en gran medida contrapuestas, también poseen características que los unen. No obstante, dados los límites del presente trabajo, sólo vamos a detenernos en tres cuestiones: la firma, su relación con las mujeres y los retratos de familia. No nos parece adecuado tratar la cuestión atendiendo a la importancia que la posición social o su origen oriental u occidental poseen en la producción artística de uno u otro, por una cuestión en la que están de acuerdo todos los estudiosos de la obra de Filónov: su obra es tan absolutamente extraordinaria y original, que se encuentra al margen, no sólo de las vanguardias occidentales, sino de las propiamente rusas. Es un artista único, que creó un estilo único, “el arte analítico” y una escuela propia y, por tanto, sin parangón con ningún otro.

Nascido na região de Kursk, o poeta russo Nikolai Assiéiev (1889-1963) participou de importantes publicações soviéticas de vanguarda. Além de ter sido membro da revista LEF, onde conviveu com Vladimir Maiakóvski, foi também um dos diretores da revista Lirika, de onde emergiu o grupo literário Centrífuga (Tsentrifúga), do qual faziam parte, além de Assiéiev, Boris Pasternak e Serguei Bobróv. Entre outras honrarias, recebeu a Ordem de Lênin (1939), o Prêmio Stálin (1941) e a Ordem da Bandeira Vermelha do Trabalho (1959). No Brasil, dois de seus poemas foram traduzidos e publicados na antologia Poesia russa moderna, lançada em 1968, com tradução de Haroldo de Campos e Boris Schnaiderman. O poema Canção sobre Garcia Lorca (Песнь о Гарсиа Лорк), aqui apresentado em tradução poética, inédito em português, presta homenagem ao poeta espanhol Federico Garcia Lorca, executado por militares franquistas em 1936.

Fue una representante principal del movimiento de vanguardia de la pintura rusa, así como pionera y fundadora el denominado neoprimitivismo, en el cual evocó parte de la iconografía tradicional ortodoxa cristiana y, a su vez, de temas judíos y medievales.

In August 2017, a white supremacist rally marketed as “Unite the Right” was held in Charlottesville, Virginia. In participation were members of the alt-right, including neo-nazis, white nationalists, neo-confederates, and other hate groups (Atkinson). The rally swiftly erupted in violence between white supremacists and counter protestors, culminating in the death of a counter-protester named Heather Heyer, who was struck by a car driven by white supremacist James Alex Fields, and leaving dozens injured. Terry McQuliffe, the Governor of Virginia, declared a state of emergency on August 12, and the world watched while white supremacists boldly marched in clothing emblazoned with symbols ranging from swastikas to a cartoon frog (Pepe), with flags featuring the nation of “Kekistan”, and carrying tiki torches chanting, “You Will Not Replace Us... Jews Will Not Replace Us”.The purpose of this essay is not, however, to examine the Internet symbols that circulated during the Unite the Right rally but rather to hone in on a specific moment that illustrates a key part of Internet culture that was often overlooked during analysis of the events that occurred during the riots: a documentary filmmaker, C. J. Hunt, was at the rally to record footage for a project on the removal of Confederate monuments. While there, he saw a rally-goer dressed in the white polo t-shirt and khaki pants uniform of the white nationalist group Vanguard America. The rally-goer, a young white man, was being chased by a counter-protester. He began to scream and beg for mercy, and even went as far as stripping off his clothing and denying that he really believed in any of the group’s ideology. In the recording by Hunt, who asks why he was there and why he was undressing, the young white man responded that shouting white power is “fun”, and that he was participating in the event because he, quote, “likes to be offensive” (Hunt).As Hunt notes in a piece for GQ reflecting on his experience at the rally, as soon as the man was cut off from his group and confronted, the runaway racist’s demeanor immediately changed when he had to face the consequences of his actions. Trolls often rely on the safety and anonymity of online forums and digital spaces where they are often free from having to face the consequences of their actions, and for the runaway racist, things became real very quickly when he was forced to own up to his hateful actions. In a way, many members of these movements seem to want politics without consequence for themselves, but with significant repercussions for others. Milo Yiannopoulos, a self-professed “master troll”, built an entire empire worth millions of dollars off of what the far-right defends as ironic hate speech and a form of politics without consequences reserved only for the privileged white men that gleefully engage in it. The runaway racist and Yiannopoulos are borne out of an Internet culture that is built on being offensive, on trolling, and “troll” itself being an aspirational label and identity, but also more importantly, a political aesthetic.In this essay, I argue that trolling itself has become a kind of political aesthetic and identity, and provide evidence via examples like hoaxes, harassment campaigns, and the use of memes to signal to certain online populations and extremist groups in violent attacks. First coined by Walter Benjamin in order to explain a fundamental component of using art to foster consent and compliance in fascist regimes, the term since then has evolved to encompass far more than just works of art. Benjamin’s original conception of the term is in regard to a creation of a spectacle that prevents the masses from recognizing their rights – in short, the aestheticization of politics is not just about the strategies of the fascist regimes themselves but says more about the subjects within them. In the time of Benjamin’s writing, the specific medium was mass propaganda through the newly emerging film industry and other forms of art (W. Benjamin). To Benjamin, these aesthetics served as tools of distracting to make fascism more palatable to the masses. Aesthetic tools of distraction serve an affective purpose, revealing the unhappy consciousness of neoreactionaries (Hui), and provide an outlet for their resentment.Since political aesthetics are concerned with how cultural products like art, film, and even clothing reflect political ideologies and beliefs (Sartwell; McManus; Miller-Idriss), the objects of analysis in this essay are part of the larger visual culture of the alt-right (Bogerts and Fielitz; Stanovsky). Indeed, aesthetic aspects of political systems shift their meaning over time, or are changed and redeployed with transformed effect (Sartwell). In this essay, I am applying the concept of the aestheticization of politics by analyzing how alt-right visual cultures deploy distraction and dissimulation to advance their political agenda through things like trolling campaigns and hoaxes. By analyzing these events, their use of memes, trolling techniques, and their influence on mainstream culture, what is revealed is the influence of trolling on political culture for the alt-right and how the alt-right then distracts the rest of the public (McManus).Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Troll?Large scale analyses of disinformation and extremist content online tends to examine how certain actors are connected, what topics emerge and how these are connected across platforms, and the ways that disinformation campaigns operate in digital environments (Marwick and Lewis; Starbird; Benkler et al.). Masculine and white-coded technology gave rise to male-dominated digital spaces (R. Benjamin), with trolling often being an issue faced by non-normative users of the Internet and their communities (Benjamin; Lumsden and Morgan; Nakamura; Phillips, Oxygen). Creating a kind of unreality where it is difficult to parse out truth from lies, fiction from non-fiction, the troll creates cultural products, and by hiding behind irony and humor confuses onlookers and is removed from any kind of reasonable blame for their actions. Irony has long been a rhetorical strategy used in politics, and the alt right has been no exception (Weatherby), but for our current sociopolitical landscape, trolling is a political strategy that infuses irony into politics and identity.In the digital era, political memes and internet culture are pervasive components of the spread of hate speech and extremist ideology on digital platforms. Trolling is not an issue that exists in a vacuum – rather, trolls are a product of greater mainstream culture that encourages and allows their behaviors (Phillips, This Is Why; Fichman and Sanfilippo; Marwick and Lewis). Trolls, and meme culture in general, have often been pointed to as being part of the reason for the rise of Trump and fascist politics across the world in recent years (Greene; Lamerichs et al.; Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir; Glitsos and Hall). Although criticism has been expressed about how impactful memes were in the election of Donald Trump, political memes have had an impact on the ways that trolling went from anonymous jerks on forums to figures like Yiannapoulos who built entire careers off of trolling, creating empires of hate (Lang). These memes that are often absurd and incomprehensible to those who are not a part of the community that they come from aim to cheapen, trivialize, and mock social justice movements like Black Lives Matter, feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, and others.But the history of trolling online goes as far back as the Internet itself. “Trolling” is just a catch all term to describe online behaviors meant to antagonize, to disrupt online conversations, and to silence other users (Cole; Fichman and Sanfilippo). As more and more people started moving online and engaging in participatory culture, trolling continued to evolve from seemingly harmless jokes like the “Rick Roll” to targeted campaigns meant to harass women off of social media platforms (Lumsden and Morgan; Graham). Trolling behaviors are more than just an ugly part of the online experience, but are also a way for users to maintain the borders of their online community - it’s meant to drive away those who are perceived to be outsiders not just from the specific forum, but the Internet itself (Graham). With the rise of modern social media platforms, trolling itself is also a part of the political landscape, creating a “toxic counterpublic” that combines irony with a kind of earnestness to spread and inject their beliefs into mainstream political discourse (Greene). As a mode of information warfare, these subversive rhetorical strategies meant to contradict or reverse existing political and value systems have been used throughout history as a political tactic (Blackstock).The goal of trolling is not just to disrupt conversations, but to lead to chaos via confusion about the sincerity and meaning of messages and visuals, and rather than functioning as a politics of outrage (on the part of the adherents), it is a politics of being as outrageous as possible. As a part of larger meme culture, the aesthetics of trolls and their outrageous content manage to operate under the radar by being able to excuse their behaviors and rhetoric as just “trolling” or “joking”. This ambiguity points to trolling on the far right as a political strategy and identity to absolve them of blame or accusations of what their real intentions are. Calling them “trolls” hides the level of sophistication and vast levels of influence that they had on public opinion and discourse in the United States (Geltzer; Starks et al.; Marwick and Lewis). We no longer live in a world apart from the troll’s influence and immune from their toxic discourse – rather, we have long been under the bridge with them.Co-Opted SymbolsOne of the most well-known examples of trolling as a political aesthetic and tactic may be the OK hand sign used by the Christchurch shooter. The idea that the OK hand sign was a secretly white supremacist symbol started as a hoax on 4chan. The initial 2017 hoax purported that the hand sign was meant to stand for “White Power”, with the three fingers representing the W and the circle made with the index finger and thumb as the P (Anti-Defamation League, “Okay Hand Gesture”). The purpose of perpetuating the hoax was to demonstrate that (a) they were being watched and (b) that the mainstream media is stupid and gullible enough to believe this hoax. Meant to incite confusion and to act as a subversive strategy, the OK hand sign was then actually adopted by the alt-right as a sort of meme to not just perpetuate the hoax, but to signal belonging to the larger group (Allyn). Even though the Anti-Defamation League initially listed it as not being a hate symbol and pointed out the origins of the hoax (Anti-Defamation League, “No, the ‘OK’ Gesture Is Not a Hate Symbol”), they then switched their opinion when the OK hand sign was being flashed by white supremacists, showing up in photographs at political events, and other social media content. In fact, the OK hand sign is also a common element in pictures of Pepe the Frog, who is a sort of “alt right mascot” (Tait; Glitsos and Hall), but like the OK hand sign, Pepe the Frog did not start as an alt-right mascot and was co-opted by the alt-right as a mode of representation.The confusion around the actual meaning behind the hand symbol points to how the alt-right uses these modes of representation in ways that are simultaneously an inside joke and a real expression of their beliefs. For instance, the Christchurch shooter referenced a number of memes and other rhetoric typical of 4chan and 8chan communities in his video and manifesto (Quek). In the shooter’s manifesto and video, the vast amounts of content that point to the trolling and visual culture of the alt-right are striking – demonstrating how alt-right memes not only make this violent ideology accessible, but are cultural products meant to be disseminated and ultimately, result in some kind of action (DeCook).The creation and co-optation of symbols by the alt-right like the OK hand sign are not just memes, but a form of language created by extremists for extremists (Greene; Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir). The shooter’s choice of including this type of content in his manifesto as well as certain phrases in his live-streamed video indicate his level of knowledge of what needed to be done for his attack to get as much attention as possible – the 4chan troll is the modern-day bogeyman, and parts of the manifesto have been identified as intentional traps for the mainstream media (Lorenz).Thus, the Christchurch shooter and trolling culture are linked, but referring to the symbols in the manifesto as being a part of “trolling” culture misses the deeper purpose – chaos, through the outrage spectacle, is the intended goal, particularly by creating arguments about the nature and utility of online trolling behavior. The shooter encouraged other 8chan users to disseminate his posted manifesto as well as to share the video of the attack – and users responded by immortalizing the event in meme format. The memes created celebrated the shooter as a hero, and although Facebook did remove the initial livestream video, it was reuploaded to the platform 1.2 million times in the first 24 hours, attempting to saturate the online platform with so many uploads that it would cause confusion and be difficult to remove (Gramenz). Some users even created gifs or set the video to music from the Doom video game soundtrack – a video game where the player is a demon slayer in an apocalyptic world, further adding another layer of symbolism to the attack.These political aesthetics – spread through memes, gifs, and “fan videos” – are the perfect vehicles for disseminating extremist ideology because of what they allow the alt-right to do with them: hide behind them, covering up their intentions, all the while adopting them as signifiers for their movement. With the number of memes, symbols, and phrases posted in his manifesto and spoken aloud in his mainstream, perhaps the Christchurch shooter wanted the onus of the blame to fall on these message board communities and the video games and celebrities referenced – in effect, it was “designed to troll” (Lorenz). But, there is a kernel of truth in every meme, post, image, and comment – their memes are a part of their political aesthetic, thus implicit and explicit allusions to the inner workings of their ideology are present. Hiding behind hoaxes, irony, edginess, and trolling, members of the alt-right and other extremist Internet cultures then engage in a kind of subversion that allows them to avoid taking any responsibility for real and violent attacks that occur as a result of their discourse. Antagonizing the left, being offensive, and participating in this outrage spectacle to garner a response from news outlets, activists, and outsiders are all a part of the same package.Trolls and the Outrage SpectacleThe confusion and the chaos left behind by these kinds of trolling campaigns and hoaxes leave many to ask: How disingenuous is it? Is it meant for mere shock value or is it really reflective of the person’s beliefs? In terms of the theme of dissimulation for this special issue, what is the real intent, and under what pretenses should these kinds of trolling behaviors be understood? Returning to the protestor who claimed “I just like to be offensive”, the skepticism from onlookers still exists: why go so far as to join an alt-right rally, wearing the uniform of Identity Evropa (now the American Identity Movement), as a “joke”?Extremists hide behind humor and irony to cloud judgments from others, begging the question of can we have practice without belief? But, ultimately, practice and belief are intertwined – the regret of the Runaway Racist is not because he suddenly realized he did not “believe”, but rather was forced to face the consequences of his belief, something that he as a white man perhaps never really had to confront. The cultural reach of dissimulation, in particular hiding true intent behind the claim of “irony”, is vast - YouTuber Pewdiepie claimed his use of racial and anti-Semitic slurs and putting on an entire Ku Klux Klan uniform in the middle of a video were “accidental” only after considerable backlash (Picheta). It has to be noted, however, that Pewdiepie is referenced in the manifesto of the Christchurch shooter – specifically, the shooter yelled during his livestream “subscribe to Pewdiepie”, (Lorenz). Pewdiepie and many other trolls, once called out for their behavior, and regardless of their actual intent, double down on their claims of irony to distract from the reality of their behaviors and actions.The normalization of this kind of content in mainstream platforms like Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and even Instagram show how 4chan and alt-right Internet culture has seeped out of its borders and exists everywhere online. This “coded irony” is not only enabled rhetorically due to irony’s slippery definition, but also digitally via these online media (Weatherby). The aesthetics of the troll are present in every single platform and are disseminated everywhere – memes are small cultural units meant to be passed on (Shifman), and although one can argue it was not memes alone that resulted in the rise of the alt-right and the election of Donald Trump, memes are a part of the larger puzzle of the political radicalization process. The role of the Internet in radicalization is so powerful and insidious because of the presentation of content – it is funny, edgy, ironic, offensive, and outrageous. But these behaviors and attitudes are not just appealing to some kind of adolescent-like desire to push boundaries of what is and is not socially acceptable and/or politically incorrect (Marwick and Lewis), and calling it such clouds people’s perceptions of their level of sophistication in shaping political discourse.Memes and the alt-right are a noted phenomenon, and these visual cultures created by trolls on message boards have aided in the rise of the current political situation worldwide (Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir). We are well in the midst of a type of warfare based on not weapons and bodies, but information and data - in which memes and other elements of the far right’s political aesthetic play an important role (Molander et al.; Prier; Bogerts and Fielitz). The rise of the online troll as a political player and the alt-right are merely the logical outcomes of these systems.ConclusionThe alt-right’s spread was possible because of the trolling cultures and aesthetics of dissimulation created in message boards that predate 4chan (Kitada). The memes and inflammatory statements made by them serve multiple purposes, ranging from an intention to incite outrage among non-members of the group to signal group belonging and identity. In some odd way, if people do not understand the content, the content actually speaks louder and, in more volumes, that it would if its intent was more straightforward – in their confusion, people give these trolling techniques more attention and amplification in their attempt to make sense of them. Through creating confusion, distraction, and uncertainty around the legitimacy of messages, hand signs, and even memes, the alt-right has elevated the aestheticization of politics to a degree that Walter Benjamin could perhaps not have predicted in his initial lament about the distracted masses of fascist regimes (McManus). The political dimensions of trolling and the cognitive uncertainty that it creates is a part of its goal. Dismissing trolls is no longer an option, but also regarding them as sinister political operatives may be overblowing their significance. In the end, “ironic hate speech” is still hate speech, and by couching their extremist ideology in meme format they make their extremist beliefs more palatable -- and nobody is completely immune to their strategies.ReferencesAllyn, Bobby. “The ‘OK’ Hand Gesture Is Now Listed as a Symbol of Hate.” NPR 2019. <https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/764728163/the-ok-hand-gesture-is-now-listed-as-a-symbol-of-hate>.Anti-Defamation League. “No, the ‘OK’ Gesture Is Not a Hate Symbol.” Anti-Defamation League. 10 Dec. 2017 <https://www.adl.org/blog/no-the-ok-gesture-is-not-a-hate-symbol>.———. “Okay Hand Gesture.” Anti-Defamation League. 28 Feb. 2020 <https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/okay-hand-gesture>.Atkinson, David C. “Charlottesville and the Alt-Right: A Turning Point?” Politics, Groups, and Identities 6.2 (2018): 309-15.Benjamin, Ruha. Race after Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code. Polity, 2019.Benjamin, Walter. 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