Relevant bibliographies by topics / Veto. Governors

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Academic literature on the topic 'Veto. Governors'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 5 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Veto. Governors"

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McGrath, Robert J., Jon C. Rogowski, and Josh M. Ryan. "Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success." Political Science Research and Methods 6, no. 1 (January 19, 2016): 153–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.80.

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Presidential systems around the world vary in the proportion of legislators required to override an executive veto. We argue that the nature of the override provision affects executive influence in policymaking; as the proportion needed to override a veto increases, so should executive influence. We leverage varying override requirements across the US states to conduct a comparative study of executive influence over budgetary outcomes. Using governors’ budget requests and enacted appropriations for fiscal years 1987–2011, we provide evidence that state legislatures better accommodate budgetary requests in states with higher override requirements. Further, governors whose preferences are extreme relative to the legislature are more likely to have their budgetary goals met in states with a higher veto threshold.
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Lauth, Thomas P. "The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto." Public Budgeting & Finance 36, no. 4 (July 6, 2016): 26–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12115.

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Wilkins, Vicky M., and Garry Young. "The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (November 2002): 557. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3598659.

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WILKINS, VICKY M., and GARRY YOUNG. "The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (November 2002): 557–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3162/036298002x200729.

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Dearden, James A., and Thomas A. Husted. "Do governors get what they want?: An alternative examination of the line-item veto." Public Choice 77, no. 4 (December 1993): 707–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01047990.

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Abbott, Kenneth W., Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. "Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration." British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (July 21, 2015): 719–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123414000593.

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This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over the agent, however, orchestration relies on the soft control of like-minded intermediaries through material and ideational support. The two models overlap, and governors mix them in practice, but distinguishing between them analytically can broaden and deepen analysis of indirect forms of governance. This article discusses the circumstances under which each model provides a better fit for real-world problems, as well as the key limitations of each model. Among other things, orchestration is relatively more likely in democratic than authoritarian systems, when governors have limited direct capacities of their own and when veto players are more numerous. Orchestration is not always more desirable than delegation, but it provides an important alternative in some circumstances. Multiple examples from both domestic and international settings are used to illustrate this claim. The article closes with key considerations regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration.
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Daly, Rich. "Governor's Veto Seals Fate of Hawaii Prescribing Bill." Psychiatric News 42, no. 15 (August 3, 2007): 2–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/pn.42.15.0002.

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Nery, Tiago. "POLÍTICA EXTERNA BRASILEIRA, MODELO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO E COALIZÕES POLÍTICAS (1930-2016)." Cadernos do CEAS: Revista crítica de humanidades, no. 241 (September 25, 2017): 418. http://dx.doi.org/10.25247/2447-861x.2017.n241.p418-444.

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<div><p>O artigo analisa as relações entre a política externa brasileira, o modelo de desenvolvimento econômico e as coalizões políticas entre 1930 e 2016. A primeira seção destaca a importância da dimensão doméstica da política externa, que é influenciada por valores e ideias de diferentes atores, a exemplo dos partidos políticos. A segunda seção analisa duas ideias-força que historicamente caracterizaram a política externa brasileira: autonomia e desenvolvimento. Apesar da importância de ambas, durante o nacional-desenvolvimentismo a busca do desenvolvimento tornou-se o principal vetor da política exterior do país. A terceira seção analisa o governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso, destacando as relações entre as reformas econômicas, a coalizão política e a política externa. Na última seção, são analisados os governos Luís Inácio Lula da Silva e Dilma Rousseff. Esses governos se apoiaram em coalizões heterogêneas, ensaiaram uma política neodesenvolvimentista e adotaram uma política externa mais autônoma. A mudança na conjuntura internacional contribuiu para interromper os governos liderados pelo Partido dos Trabalhadores. Na conclusão, destacam-se a influência do modelo de desenvolvimento e das coalizões políticas na orientação da política externa brasileira.</p></div>
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D'Araujo, Maria Celina. "O estável poder de veto Forças Armadas sobre o tema da anistia política no Brasil." Varia Historia 28, no. 48 (December 2012): 573–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0104-87752012000200006.

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O trabalho propõe-se a demonstrar porque desde 1979 foi possível aos militares brasileiros atuarem como veto players sempre que entrou em debate a revisão da Lei de Anistia. Nossa hipótese é que esse poder de veto explica-se pela existência de uma grande autonomia militar antes, durante e depois da ditadura, associada aos baixos níveis de respeito aos direitos humanos na sociedade brasileira e ao baixo interesse do Congresso e do governo em geral pelo tema das Forças Armadas.
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Arretche, Marta. "Quando instituições federativas fortalecem o governo central?" Novos Estudos - CEBRAP, no. 95 (March 2013): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-33002013000100003.

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O artigo refuta o argumento de que o federalismo no Brasil enfraquece a União e favorece minorias sobrerrepresentadas no Congresso, mostrando que a regra de desproporção adotada no Brasil impede o veto da minoria sem que a maioria, por sua vez, tenha recursos para tiranizar a minoria. Além disto, a União tem amplos poderes legislativos, e os partidos inibem tendências inerentemente limitadoras do federalismo. Por fim, não é fato que a aprovação de matérias de interesse federativo exija aprovação em uma multiplicidade de arenas decisórias em que supermaiorias são necessárias. Em conjunto, as instituições do federalismo brasileiro aproximam o Brasil das fórmulas que favorecem a autoridade do governo central.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Veto. Governors"

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Koczak, Steven D. "Winning battles and losing wars| Governor George E. Pataki and the executive veto." Thesis, State University of New York at Albany, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3566337.

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The work first outlines a theoretical framework referred to as the Theory of the Strong Executive, drawn from what comparatively little literature there is about the state governors, as well as certain primary sources. The Theory of the Strong Executive outlines two sets of expectations for state governors, one theoretical (descriptive labels of expected political behavior) and one institutional (certain institutional or constitutional features one might expect to see).

The veto power, basically a legislative power granted to the executive, is critical for gubernatorial behavior, and gubernatorial power, under both sets of expectations, and is rather under-studied relative to its near-universally acknowledged importance. Governor George E. Pataki of New York State was selected for in-depth study, for various reasons, in an attempt to plug the gaps in the literature.

Certain conclusions specifically relating to Governor Pataki were arrived at. Several things of a more general applicability and interest also were learned. Governor Pataki used the veto early and often, usually to express a policy disagreement with the State Legislature (rather than, say, because a bill was too costly or technically defective). Governor Pataki's use of the veto reflected both partisan conflicts and institutional conflicts with the State Legislature. Governor Pataki's divided government issues extended beyond divided government in the strictly partisan sense to reflect a complex relationship with the Republican-led State Senate that resembled divided government. Though veto overrides occurred under Governor Pataki, a trend of overrides never emerged, and the veto retained its considerable power.

New York's governors appear to veto more often than governors of most other states, and Governor Pataki appeared to be a comparatively aggressive vetoer even relative to other New York governors. The strong inference, therefore, is that there was something unique about Governor Pataki, and there is something unique about the New York governorship. Fully understanding the differences between governors, between states and within a single state, requires close-up study.

Further aggregate studies of the gubernatorial veto, therefore, should keep in mind that more particular factors may be more important than they appear to be.

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Almeida, Mario Augusto Morato Pinto de. "A politica economica do governo João Goulart = restrições estruturais e vetos politicos." [s.n.], 2010. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/285966.

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Orientador: Pedro Paulo Zahluth Bastos
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia
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Resumo: Em meio a uma grande crise político-institucional, o governo João Goulart se iniciou em setembro de 1961. Além da instabilidade político-institucional, o governo se deparava com o aumento das mobilizações sociais e com a extrema politização das relações internacionais imposta pela Guerra Fria. Na área econômica, os seus principais desafios eram a inflação crescente e os problemas de balanço de pagamentos. Apesar de propostas oficiais enérgicas para o combate desses problemas, quando ocorreu a ruptura da legalidade, o Brasil se encontrava com inflação galopante, deterioração ainda maior das contas externas e crescimento negativo do produto per capita. A deterioração dos indicadores macroeconômicos e a intensificação da crise político-social inspiraram muitos analistas a responsabilizarem o próprio Jango pelo golpe militar de abril de 1964. Críticas dirigidas ao estilo político do ex-presidente são comuns nesse tipo de interpretação. Em relação à política econômica do governo, alguns estudos sublinham a ineficácia ou a irracionalidade dessas políticas. Este trabalho, por sua vez, enfatiza as restrições estruturais de ordem econômica (as tendências cíclicas de uma economia subdesenvolvida, as mudanças induzidas pelo Plano de Metas, etc.) e política (tensões sociais, as pressões advindas da política externa norte-americana e a crise político-institucional, etc.) como limitadores da capacidade dos instrumentos de política econômica de reverter a tendência de deterioração das principais variáveis macroeconômicas. Além disso, supomos que o governo, consciente de algumas dessas restrições, buscou em diversas ocasiões ampliar o espaço para implementação de políticas econômicas, por meio de reformas institucionais, barradas pela oposição conservadora no Poder Legislativo
Mestrado
Historia Economica
Mestre em Desenvolvimento Econômico
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Gabiati, Osvaldo Leandro. "O poder de veto dos governadores na política nacional : uma comparação a partir dos sistemas de partido na Argentina e no Brasil." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2006. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/3063.

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Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciência Política, Programa de Pós-Graduação, 2006.
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A presente dissertação analisa o poder de veto dos governadores estaduais no plano da política nacional por meio da comparação entre o caso argentino e o caso brasileiro tomando como eixo as diferentes características dos respectivos sistemas de partido. A pesquisa recupera a trajetória histórica do federalismo e dos sistemas de partido em ambos os países a partir de fontes secundárias, principalmente aquelas que realizam comparações regionais relativas ao desenvolvimento da federação e dos partidos políticos. Com base nas evidências históricas relativas ao desenvolvimento do federalismo e dos sistemas partidários no Brasil e na Argentina, três hipóteses foram levantadas: 1) devido a considerável institucionalização e baixa fragmentação do sistema partidário argentino, o poder de veto dos governadores foi limitado pela lógica interna dos partidos, o que coloca limites à autonomia dos deputados federais no Congresso; 2) no Brasil, cujo sistema partidário se caracteriza por ter um baixo nível de institucionalização e uma elevada fragmentação, o poder de veto dos governadores estaduais aumenta devido à possibilidade de manter o satus quo por meio da influência sobre os deputados federais no Congresso Nacional. Para verificar o anterior, foi complementada outra hipótese: 3) o maior ou menor esforço realizado por parte do Poder Executivo Federal para obter a disciplina do partido ou da coalizão governante, varia, em cada caso, a partir da institucionalização do sistema partidário. A pesquisa desenvolve duas análises, ambas qualitativas. A primeira centrou-se na descrição do desenvolvimento histórico das federações e dos sistemas de partido, enquanto a segunda abordou analiticamente a relação entre o poder de veto dos governadores e a institucionalização do sistema partidário. _______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
This work analyses the veto power of the state governors within domestic politics through a comparison between the Argentinian case and the Brazilian one considering the different political characteristics of their respective political party systems. The research recovers the historical path both of the federalism and of the party systems of the two countries through secondary sources, mainly those focused on regional comparisons related both to the development of the federation and the political parties. Three hypothesis were raised based on the historical evidences related to the development of federalism and the development of the party system in Brazil and in Argentina: 1) due to the considerable institutionalization and the low level of fragmentation of the Argentinian party system, the veto power of the provincial governors was limited by the internal logic of the parties, and this fact has created some limits to the autonomy of the federal representatives in Congress; 2) in Brazil, whose party system is characterized by low level of institutionalization and high fragmentation, the veto power of state governors increase due to the possibility of mantaining the status quo through their influence over the federal representatives in the National Congress. The other hypothesis was raised in order to reinforce this second one: 3) the quality of the effort made by the Executive branch of government in order to obtain the discipline of the party or the obedience of the governing coalition changes in each case depending on the institutionalization of the party system. This research develops two qualitative analysis. The first one is concerned with the description both of the historical development of the federations and the party systems and the second one is focused on the dicussion about the existing relation between the veto power of the governors and the intitutionalization of the party system. _______________________________________________________________________________ RESUMEN
La presente disertación analiza El poder de veto de los gobernadores proviciales em El plano de La política nacional, por médio de La comparación entre El caso argentino e El caso brasilero, tomando como eje las diferentes características de los respectivos sistemas de partidos. La investigación recupera La trayectoria histórica Del federalismo e do los sistemas de partido em ambos partidos a parti de fuentes secundarias principalmente aquellas que realizam comparaciones regionales relativas AL desarrollo de La fedaración y de los partidos políticos. Com base em las evidencias históricas relativas ao desarrolo Del federalismo de los sistemas partidarios em Brasil e Argentina três hipotesis fueron formuladas : 1) debido a La considerable institucionalización y baja fragmentacion del sistema partidário argentino, El poder interno de los gobernadores se vê limitado por La lógica interna de los partidos, lo que coloca limites a La autonomia de los diputados federales en El congreso; 2) En Brasil, cuyo sistema partidário de caracteriza por tener um bajo nível de institucionalización e una elevada fragmentación, El poder de veto de los gobernadores estaduales aumenta debido La posibilidad de mantener El status quo por médio de La influencia sobre los diputados federales en El congreso nacional. Para verificar lo anterio, fue complementada outra hipotesis: 3)El mayor o menor esfuerzo realizado por parte de El poder ejecutivo federal para obtener La disciplina Del partido o de La coalición gobernante, varia, em cada caso , a parti de analisis , ambos cualitativos. El primeiro se centro em la investigación dessarrolla dos histórico de las federaciones y de los sistemas de partido, mientras que El segundo analisis abordo de forma analítica La relacion entre El poder de veto de los gobernadores y La institucionalización Del sistema partidário.
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Pereira, Ricardo Filipe Amorim. "Relacionando o cumprimento das promessas políticas do(s) partido(s) do Governo com o conceito do agente com poder de veto." Master's thesis, Universidade de Aveiro, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10773/17012.

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Mestrado em Ciência Política
As promessas políticas são um elemento determinante nas relações entre forças partidárias e eleitores. Apesar de os estudos prévios mostrarem que a maioria das promessas são cumpridas pelos partidos de Governo, esse número varia consoante o tipo de Governo, com incidência maior de cumprimento nos Governos de maioria absoluta de um só partido. Esse facto parece traduzir uma dependência entre a possibilidade do partido enunciatário da promessa de a cumprir e a existência de agentes com poder de vetar a alteração de política pública subjacente. É com base nesta premissa que assenta o presente trabalho exploratório que visa instaurar a noção que o número de agentes com poder de veto existente num sistema político é a condição institucional mais importante e parcimoniosa capaz de tornar previsível a probabilidade de cumprimento das promessas políticas pelo(s) partido(s) do Governo. A outra fase da moeda prende-se com o trabalho de George Tsebelis (2001) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work e a forma como teorizou a estabilidade das políticas públicas, fenómeno que previu aumentar face a acréscimos no número de agentes com poder de veto. Inferindo a percentagem de promessas cumpridas como um proxy para a estabilidade de políticas públicas – aumenta essa percentagem com a diminuição da estabilidade das políticas públicas – o presente trabalho, em último grau, terá o efeito de possibilitar uma validação à teoria de Tsebelis diferente das habituais uma vez que incide numa variável até aqui não associada: a percentagem de promessas cumpridas pelo(s) partido(s) do Governo.
Political promises are a key element in relationships between party forces and voters. Although previous studies have shown that most of the promises are fulfilled by government parties, this number varies depending on the type of government, with the highest incidence of compliance in the absolute majority of governments of a single party. This fact seems to translate a dependency between the possibility of enunciatee advantage of the promise and meet the existence of agents with power to veto the underlying public policy change. It is based on this premise underlying the present exploratory work that aims to establish the notion that the number of agents with existing veto power in a political system is the most important institutional condition and parsimonious able to make predictable the likelihood of fulfillment of political promises by party(ies) of the Government. The other side of the coin relates to the work of George Tsebelis (2001) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work and how he theorized the stability of public policy, a phenomenon that predicted face increasing to increase in the number of agents with veto power. Inferring the percentage of promises fulfilled as a proxy for the stability of public policies - increase this percentage to decrease the stability of public policies - this work in last degree, will have the effect of enabling validation to different Tsebelis theory of usual as it focuses on a variable hitherto not associated: the percentage of promises fulfilled by the party(ies) of the Government.
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Dondi, Sebastiano. "Pouvoirs et contrepouvoirs : les limites juridiques au pouvoir majoritaire dans la dynamique du regime politique en Italie et en France." Thesis, Paris 10, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA100056.

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Le travail de recherche est une étude comparé des pouvoirs de veto (ou contrepouvoirs) que, selon la lettre des Constitutions italienne et française interviennent dans le produit du travail normatif du Pouvoir majoritaire (lois, ordonnances et décrets-loi). Il s’agit, spécifiquement, du referendum, de l’opposition parlementaire, du chef de l’Etat, du Conseil d’Etat et de la justice constitutionnelle. La thèse, après un premier chapitre qui propose une classification originale des contrepouvoirs, utile à les définir et à les encadrer dogmatiquement, se propose d’étudier en profondeur les relations qui les lient les contrepouvoirs entre eux-mêmes et également vis-à-vis du Pouvoir. La méthode utilisée (systématique et comparée) est innovatrice et se base sur une analyse empirique fondée sur des cas exemplaires
This PhD dissertation consists in a comparative study of veto players (or counter-powers) that, according to Italian and French Constitution, aim at affect the legislative activity of the executive and majoritarian power and of its majority in the Parliament, i.e. laws and decrees-law. They are summarily: the referendum, the opposition parties, the head of the State, the Conseil d’Etat and the constitutional justice. The research, after the initial chapter regarding an innovative classification of veto powers which describes them with a dogmatic approach, explores in depth the existing relations among veto players and their interactions with Power. The methodology is based on an empirical and systematic analysis of some classic case-studies
Il lavoro di ricerca è uno studio comparato tra Italia e Francia dei contropoteri che, secondo Costituzione, intervengono sul prodotto del lavoro del Potere maggioritario, le leggi e i provvedimenti di rango primario. Si tratta del referendum, l’opposizione parlamentare, il capo dello Stato, il Conseil d’Etat e la giustizia costituzionale. La tesi, dopo un capitolo iniziale dedicato ad una innovativa classificazione dei poteri di veto idonea a inquadrarli dogmaticamente, si propone di indagare in profondità le relazioni che legano fra di loro gli organi di contropotere e come questi interagiscano con il Potere. La metodologia utilizzata è innovativa e si basa su un’analisi empirica basata su casi esemplari e basata sul metodo sistematico
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Graça, Luís Felipe Guedes da. "Independência ou irrelevância?: produção legislativa e vetos na Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (1983-2010)." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2014. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=8115.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
A relação entre governadores e assembleias estaduais no Brasil é marcada pela tese de que os governadores possuem ampla capacidade para estabelecerem um pacto homologatório com os legislativos estaduais. Literatura recente tem buscado comparar as experiências dos diferentes estados. O Rio de Janeiro tem se destacado como um dos casos em que o legislativo conseguiu espaço para levar adiante uma agenda própria. Esse diagnóstico contrasta não só com a tese do poder dos governadores, mas também com a experiência histórica da máquina política chaguista no Estado. Essa tese busca entender como que a relação dos governadores do Estado do Rio de Janeiro com a Assembleia Legislativa do Estado se desenvolveu desde a retomada das eleições diretas para esse cargo em 1982 até o ano de 2010. A principal hipótese é a de que as mudanças no federalismo brasileiro e o ajuste fiscal levados a cabo durante os anos 1990 foram centrais para repactuar a relação entre os dois poderes. Essas mudanças nacionais permitiram que um desejo de maior independência na relação entre os poderes ganhasse espaço. A mudança na relação entre os poderes é comprovada pelo crescimento temporal na quantidade de vetos do governador derrubados pelo legislativo. A tese mostra, no entanto, que o ganho de espaço para atuação do legislativo não significou uma restrição às agendas do Executivo que continuou a ser ator central da política estadual.
The relationship between governors and state legislatures in Brazil is marked by the thesis that the governors have the capacity to establish a ratification pact with the state legislatures. Recent literature has sought to compare the experiences of different states. The Rio de Janeiro has emerged as one of the cases where the legislative was able to carry forward their own agenda. This diagnosis contrasts not only with the thesis of the governors powers, but also with the historical experience of chaguista political machine in the state. This thesis seeks to understand how the relationship of state governors of Rio de Janeiro with the State Legislative Assembly has developed since the resumption of direct elections for this position in 1982 through the year 2010. The main hypothesis is that the changes the Brazilian federalism and fiscal adjustment carried out during the 1990s decade were central to renegotiate the relationship between the two powers. These national changes allowed a desire for greater independence in the relationship between the powers to gain space. The change in the relationship between the powers is demonstrated by the growth in the amount of governor vetoes overturned by the legislature. The thesis shows, however, that the gain of the legislative did not meant a restriction on the agendas of the Executive which continued to be a central actor in state politics.
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N`duk, Quintino Na. "A defesa do governo de quem mais sabe. Uma alternativa para melhorar a democracia." Master's thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/50259.

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Com esta tese, pretende-se analisar a democracia representativa com sufrágio universal, desde o seu aparecimento no século XIX. O objetivo principal do trabalho consiste em analisar o princípio do sufrágio universal de uma forma realista à luz dos «três modelos sucessivos de democracia liberal, dos quais se pode dizer tenham prevalecido alternamente desde inícios do século XIX até o presente»1. Consequentemente, pretende-se explorar a função que estes modelos atribuem à participação política dos cidadãos na democracia liberal, bem como algumas das críticas ao princípio do sufrágio universal que foram apresentadas por vários teóricos liberais. Face às razões contraditórias que foram apresentadas por eles para justificar a limitação do sufrágio universal, tornou-se imperioso dizer que, no contexto atual da democracia representativa é possível defender sufrágio limitado recorrendo aos estudos empíricos sobre o comportamento dos votantes. Neste sentido, esta tese tem como fim a defesa do sistema epistocrático no qual o governo é eleito pelos eleitores mais informados sobre os fatos políticos à luz do princípio da competência política individual.
This thesis aims to analyze representative democracy with universal suffrage, since it’s emergence in the 19th Century. The prime objective of the work is to realistically analyze the principal of universal suffrage in light of the “three successive models of liberal democracy, which have prevailed alternately since the beginning of the 19th century until present day” 1. Consequently, the thesis seeks to explore the functionalities that these models attribute to political participation by citizens in liberal democracy, as well as some critiques on the principals of universal suffrage that have been presented by various liberal academics. Due to the contradictions they present to justify the limitation of universal suffrage, it becomes imperative to defend in the context of representative democracy resorting to the empirical studies on voter behavior. With that in mind, the ultimate end of this thesis is the defense of the epistocratical system in which the government is elected by the most informed voters regarding political affairs, considering individual political competence.
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Books on the topic "Veto. Governors"

1

Radatz, Clark. The partial veto in Wisconsin. Madison, Wis: State of Wisconsin, Legislative Reference Bureau, 2004.

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Radatz, Clark. The partial veto in Wisconsin: An update. Madison, Wis. (201 North, State Capitol, Madison 53702): State of Wisconsin, Legislative Reference Bureau, 1988.

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Wattson, Peter S. The veto power of the governor of Minnesot[a]. St. Paul, Minn: Program on State-Federal-Local Govt. in the U.S., Minnesota State Capitol, 1995.

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Tim, Burke. Report on the partial veto power and the 1986 partial vetoes. Olympia: House of Representatives, State of Washington, Office of Program Research, 1986.

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Tim, Burke. Report on the partial veto power and the 1985 partial vetoes. [Olympia, Wash.]: House of Representatives, State of Washington, Office of Program Research, 1985.

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Phillips, Justin H. (Justin Huhtelin), ed. The powers of American governors. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

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Matteo, Salvetti, ed. Il ritratto del vero governo del prencipe (1552). Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2008.

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Rosello, Lucio Paulo. Il ritratto del vero governo del prencipe (1552). Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2008.

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Maissen, Alfons, ed. Landrehter Nicolaus Maissen: Sia veta e siu temps 1621-1678 : per il treitschienavel onn de sia mort 1678-1978. Mustér, CH: Desertina, 1985.

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Senate, Texas Legislature. Supplement to Senate journal, Seventy-third Legislature, regular session: Text of Senate bill no. 5 (General Appropriations Act) and Governor's veto proclamation. [Austin]: State of Texas, 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Veto. Governors"

1

Collins, Richard B., Dale A. Oesterle, and Lawrence Friedman. "Executive Department." In The Colorado State Constitution, 91–104. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190907723.003.0004.

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This chapter looks at Article IV of the Colorado Constitution, which defines the executive department. By providing for the separate election of the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general, Section 1 seems to divide executive branch authority. In practice, this tension has mattered only when the attorney general and governor belonged to different political parties, and the attorney general asserted a legal position opposed by the governor. Section 1 imposes term limits on the state’s elective executives. Section 11 gives the governor the usual veto power followed by Section 12, giving the special power of the line-item veto over appropriations bills. Section 13 has complex provisions for succession if the governor’s office becomes vacant during a term.
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Cicero, Frank. "Civil War, a Partisan Convention, the Decisive Later 1860s." In Creating the Land of Lincoln. University of Illinois Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252041679.003.0007.

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Chapter 6 covers the Civil War years, during which portions of Illinois leaned toward secession even as white and black regiments mustered for service. The heavily partisan 1862 constitutional convention was led by Democrats who overstepped their charge, tackling the essential issues of increasing executive and legislator pay, strengthening the governor’s veto, and reducing the number of special-interest bills, but also betraying strong feelings against black settlement in the state and harassing the Republican governor. The proposed constitution was rejected by voters. Meanwhile, Chicago transformed into a modern metropolis, leading the region in commerce, finance, manufacturing, and philanthropy. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution cemented Abraham Lincoln’s legacy even as attitudes toward racial equality in parts of Illinois remained distinctly southern.
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Collins, Richard B., Dale A. Oesterle, and Lawrence Friedman. "Legislative Department." In The Colorado State Constitution, 105–70. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190907723.003.0005.

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This chapter explains Article V of the Colorado Constitution, which structures the legislative department. Original Section 1 vested all of the state’s legislative power in the general assembly. The rest of Section 1—added in 1910 and after—established, defined, and modified powers of citizens’ initiative and veto referendum. Section 3 defines the terms of senators and representatives and imposes term limits. Section 32 defines appropriations bills subject to the governor’s line-item veto, and Section 21 protects that veto power. Sections 20, 22a, and 22b require committee consideration of all bills but also prevent committees and caucus positions from killing bills. Sections 44–48.4 define and empower commissions to redistrict congressional and legislative seats.
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Pugh, Brian. "Barbour, the Influential Executive." In Chaos and Compromise, 95–114. University Press of Mississippi, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.14325/mississippi/9781496830197.003.0008.

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This chapter discusses how Governor Haley Barbour successfully penetrated the legislatively dominated budget making process. It shows how Barbour did not increase the formal powers of the executive branch of government, but how he did increase the informal executive powers significantly. Chapter 8 explains how Barbour gained budget power through political relationships on the state and federal levels, which ultimately resulted in the state of Mississippi withstanding one of the worst storms in the nation’s history, Hurricane Katrina. Unlike his predecessor discussed in the previous chapter, Governor Barbour did not get a single gubernatorial veto overridden because of the party loyalty that he championed among Republicans.
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Craig, Berry. "The Twilight of the Rebel Press." In Kentucky's Rebel Press. University Press of Kentucky, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813174594.003.0007.

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After the August elections, in which the Union Party greatly enhanced its majorities in the Kentucky house and senate, almost all the Confederate newspapers gave up on secession and fully embraced neutrality and peace. Earlier, the rebel editors had scorned neutrality as craven. Now they saw it as their last hope to keep Kentucky from fighting against the Confederacy. The rebel press denounced the establishment of Camp Dick Robinson, but the camp stayed open and symbolized Kentucky’s growing unionism. In September, Confederate and then Union armies invaded Kentucky. The legislature, over Governor Beriah Magoffin’s veto, ordered only the Confederates to leave, thus fully embracing the Union war effort.
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Cicero, Frank. "The Constitution of 1848." In Creating the Land of Lincoln. University of Illinois Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252041679.003.0005.

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Chapter 4 focuses on the 1847 Illinois state constitutional convention and the constitution approved by voters in 1848. Democrats comprised a majority of delegates, but Whigs built many successful coalitions. The new constitution sought greater balance of governmental powers, reducing the legislature’s appointive power, bestowing on the governor a weak veto power, and calling for direct election of judges. Age and residency requirements were specified for government service; citizenship was required of voters. Two contentious provisions put separately to voters were ultimately approved: one prohibiting free blacks from immigrating to the state and one calling for a property tax to relieve the state’s debt. With the 1848 constitution, Illinois transitioned from a frontier to a modern state.
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Leal, Marcelo Mafra, and Edgard Costa Oliveira. "GESTÃO DE RISCO SUA APLICAÇÃO NO GOVERNO DO DISTRITO FEDERAL (GDF)." In Engenharia de Produção: Vetor de Transformação do Brasil 2, 86–98. Atena Editora, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22533/at.ed.9221923127.

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Senna, Viviane de, and Adriano Mendonça Souza. "RELAÇÃO DOS GASTOS DO GOVERNO EM ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL COM AS VARIÁVEIS MACROECONÔMICAS BRASILEIRAS PELA ANÁLISE FATORIAL." In Engenharia de Produção: Vetor de Transformação do Brasil, 208–21. Atena Editora, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22533/at.ed.11919040916.

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