Relevant bibliographies by topics / Veto. Governors

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Academic literature on the topic 'Veto. Governors'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 5 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Veto. Governors"

1

McGrath, Robert J., Jon C. Rogowski, and Josh M. Ryan. "Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success." Political Science Research and Methods 6, no. 1 (2016): 153–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.80.

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Presidential systems around the world vary in the proportion of legislators required to override an executive veto. We argue that the nature of the override provision affects executive influence in policymaking; as the proportion needed to override a veto increases, so should executive influence. We leverage varying override requirements across the US states to conduct a comparative study of executive influence over budgetary outcomes. Using governors’ budget requests and enacted appropriations for fiscal years 1987–2011, we provide evidence that state legislatures better accommodate budgetary
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Lauth, Thomas P. "The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto." Public Budgeting & Finance 36, no. 4 (2016): 26–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12115.

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Wilkins, Vicky M., and Garry Young. "The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2002): 557. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3598659.

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WILKINS, VICKY M., and GARRY YOUNG. "The Influence of Governors on Veto Override Attempts: A Test of Pivotal Politics." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2002): 557–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3162/036298002x200729.

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Dearden, James A., and Thomas A. Husted. "Do governors get what they want?: An alternative examination of the line-item veto." Public Choice 77, no. 4 (1993): 707–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01047990.

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Abbott, Kenneth W., Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. "Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration." British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2015): 719–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123414000593.

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This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over the agent, however, orchestration relies on the soft control of like-minded intermediaries through m
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Daly, Rich. "Governor's Veto Seals Fate of Hawaii Prescribing Bill." Psychiatric News 42, no. 15 (2007): 2–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/pn.42.15.0002.

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Nery, Tiago. "POLÍTICA EXTERNA BRASILEIRA, MODELO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO E COALIZÕES POLÍTICAS (1930-2016)." Cadernos do CEAS: Revista crítica de humanidades, no. 241 (September 25, 2017): 418. http://dx.doi.org/10.25247/2447-861x.2017.n241.p418-444.

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<div><p>O artigo analisa as relações entre a política externa brasileira, o modelo de desenvolvimento econômico e as coalizões políticas entre 1930 e 2016. A primeira seção destaca a importância da dimensão doméstica da política externa, que é influenciada por valores e ideias de diferentes atores, a exemplo dos partidos políticos. A segunda seção analisa duas ideias-força que historicamente caracterizaram a política externa brasileira: autonomia e desenvolvimento. Apesar da importância de ambas, durante o nacional-desenvolvimentismo a busca do desenvolvimento tornou-se o principal
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D'Araujo, Maria Celina. "O estável poder de veto Forças Armadas sobre o tema da anistia política no Brasil." Varia Historia 28, no. 48 (2012): 573–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0104-87752012000200006.

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O trabalho propõe-se a demonstrar porque desde 1979 foi possível aos militares brasileiros atuarem como veto players sempre que entrou em debate a revisão da Lei de Anistia. Nossa hipótese é que esse poder de veto explica-se pela existência de uma grande autonomia militar antes, durante e depois da ditadura, associada aos baixos níveis de respeito aos direitos humanos na sociedade brasileira e ao baixo interesse do Congresso e do governo em geral pelo tema das Forças Armadas.
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Arretche, Marta. "Quando instituições federativas fortalecem o governo central?" Novos Estudos - CEBRAP, no. 95 (March 2013): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-33002013000100003.

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O artigo refuta o argumento de que o federalismo no Brasil enfraquece a União e favorece minorias sobrerrepresentadas no Congresso, mostrando que a regra de desproporção adotada no Brasil impede o veto da minoria sem que a maioria, por sua vez, tenha recursos para tiranizar a minoria. Além disto, a União tem amplos poderes legislativos, e os partidos inibem tendências inerentemente limitadoras do federalismo. Por fim, não é fato que a aprovação de matérias de interesse federativo exija aprovação em uma multiplicidade de arenas decisórias em que supermaiorias são necessárias. Em conjunto, as in
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Veto. Governors"

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Koczak, Steven D. "Winning battles and losing wars| Governor George E. Pataki and the executive veto." Thesis, State University of New York at Albany, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3566337.

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<p> The work first outlines a theoretical framework referred to as the Theory of the Strong Executive, drawn from what comparatively little literature there is about the state governors, as well as certain primary sources. The Theory of the Strong Executive outlines two sets of expectations for state governors, one theoretical (descriptive labels of expected political behavior) and one institutional (certain institutional or constitutional features one might expect to see). </p><p> The veto power, basically a legislative power granted to the executive, is critical for gubernatorial behav
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Almeida, Mario Augusto Morato Pinto de. "A politica economica do governo João Goulart = restrições estruturais e vetos politicos." [s.n.], 2010. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/285966.

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Orientador: Pedro Paulo Zahluth Bastos<br>Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T22:50:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Almeida_MarioAugustoMoratoPintode_M.pdf: 2089034 bytes, checksum: 7b914dd5b049ffff5856548729c25fa7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010<br>Resumo: Em meio a uma grande crise político-institucional, o governo João Goulart se iniciou em setembro de 1961. Além da instabilidade político-institucional, o governo se deparava com o aumento das mobilizações sociais e com a extrema politização das relaçõe
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Gabiati, Osvaldo Leandro. "O poder de veto dos governadores na política nacional : uma comparação a partir dos sistemas de partido na Argentina e no Brasil." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2006. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/3063.

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Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciência Política, Programa de Pós-Graduação, 2006.<br>Submitted by Thaíza da Silva Santos (thaiza28@hotmail.com) on 2009-12-14T18:48:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Osvaldo Leandro Gabiati.pdf: 637053 bytes, checksum: 18a2c475316f5081862c02ce8206d2c3 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Lucila Saraiva(lucilasaraiva1@gmail.com) on 2010-01-08T23:09:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Osvaldo Leandro Gabiati.pdf: 637053 bytes, checksum: 18a2c475316f5081862c02ce8206d2c3 (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2010-01-08T23:09:38Z
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Pereira, Ricardo Filipe Amorim. "Relacionando o cumprimento das promessas políticas do(s) partido(s) do Governo com o conceito do agente com poder de veto." Master's thesis, Universidade de Aveiro, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10773/17012.

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Mestrado em Ciência Política<br>As promessas políticas são um elemento determinante nas relações entre forças partidárias e eleitores. Apesar de os estudos prévios mostrarem que a maioria das promessas são cumpridas pelos partidos de Governo, esse número varia consoante o tipo de Governo, com incidência maior de cumprimento nos Governos de maioria absoluta de um só partido. Esse facto parece traduzir uma dependência entre a possibilidade do partido enunciatário da promessa de a cumprir e a existência de agentes com poder de vetar a alteração de política pública subjacente. É com base nesta pre
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Dondi, Sebastiano. "Pouvoirs et contrepouvoirs : les limites juridiques au pouvoir majoritaire dans la dynamique du regime politique en Italie et en France." Thesis, Paris 10, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA100056.

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Le travail de recherche est une étude comparé des pouvoirs de veto (ou contrepouvoirs) que, selon la lettre des Constitutions italienne et française interviennent dans le produit du travail normatif du Pouvoir majoritaire (lois, ordonnances et décrets-loi). Il s’agit, spécifiquement, du referendum, de l’opposition parlementaire, du chef de l’Etat, du Conseil d’Etat et de la justice constitutionnelle. La thèse, après un premier chapitre qui propose une classification originale des contrepouvoirs, utile à les définir et à les encadrer dogmatiquement, se propose d’étudier en profondeur les relati
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Graça, Luís Felipe Guedes da. "Independência ou irrelevância?: produção legislativa e vetos na Assembleia Legislativa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (1983-2010)." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2014. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=8115.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior<br>A relação entre governadores e assembleias estaduais no Brasil é marcada pela tese de que os governadores possuem ampla capacidade para estabelecerem um pacto homologatório com os legislativos estaduais. Literatura recente tem buscado comparar as experiências dos diferentes estados. O Rio de Janeiro tem se destacado como um dos casos em que o legislativo conseguiu espaço para levar adiante uma agenda própria. Esse diagnóstico contrasta não só com a tese do poder dos governadores, mas também com a experiência histórica da máquina po
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N`duk, Quintino Na. "A defesa do governo de quem mais sabe. Uma alternativa para melhorar a democracia." Master's thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/50259.

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Com esta tese, pretende-se analisar a democracia representativa com sufrágio universal, desde o seu aparecimento no século XIX. O objetivo principal do trabalho consiste em analisar o princípio do sufrágio universal de uma forma realista à luz dos «três modelos sucessivos de democracia liberal, dos quais se pode dizer tenham prevalecido alternamente desde inícios do século XIX até o presente»1. Consequentemente, pretende-se explorar a função que estes modelos atribuem à participação política dos cidadãos na democracia liberal, bem como algumas das críticas ao princípio do sufrágio universal qu
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Books on the topic "Veto. Governors"

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Radatz, Clark. The partial veto in Wisconsin. State of Wisconsin, Legislative Reference Bureau, 2004.

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Radatz, Clark. The partial veto in Wisconsin: An update. State of Wisconsin, Legislative Reference Bureau, 1988.

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Wattson, Peter S. The veto power of the governor of Minnesot[a]. Program on State-Federal-Local Govt. in the U.S., Minnesota State Capitol, 1995.

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Tim, Burke. Report on the partial veto power and the 1986 partial vetoes. House of Representatives, State of Washington, Office of Program Research, 1986.

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Tim, Burke. Report on the partial veto power and the 1985 partial vetoes. House of Representatives, State of Washington, Office of Program Research, 1985.

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Phillips, Justin H. (Justin Huhtelin), ed. The powers of American governors. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

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Matteo, Salvetti, ed. Il ritratto del vero governo del prencipe (1552). FrancoAngeli, 2008.

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Rosello, Lucio Paulo. Il ritratto del vero governo del prencipe (1552). FrancoAngeli, 2008.

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9

Maissen, Alfons, ed. Landrehter Nicolaus Maissen: Sia veta e siu temps 1621-1678 : per il treitschienavel onn de sia mort 1678-1978. Desertina, 1985.

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Senate, Texas Legislature. Supplement to Senate journal, Seventy-third Legislature, regular session: Text of Senate bill no. 5 (General Appropriations Act) and Governor's veto proclamation. State of Texas, 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Veto. Governors"

1

Collins, Richard B., Dale A. Oesterle, and Lawrence Friedman. "Executive Department." In The Colorado State Constitution. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190907723.003.0004.

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This chapter looks at Article IV of the Colorado Constitution, which defines the executive department. By providing for the separate election of the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general, Section 1 seems to divide executive branch authority. In practice, this tension has mattered only when the attorney general and governor belonged to different political parties, and the attorney general asserted a legal position opposed by the governor. Section 1 imposes term limits on the state’s elective executives. Section 11 gives the governor the usual veto power followed by Section 12, giving the special power of the line-item veto over appropriations bills. Section 13 has complex provisions for succession if the governor’s office becomes vacant during a term.
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Cicero, Frank. "Civil War, a Partisan Convention, the Decisive Later 1860s." In Creating the Land of Lincoln. University of Illinois Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252041679.003.0007.

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Chapter 6 covers the Civil War years, during which portions of Illinois leaned toward secession even as white and black regiments mustered for service. The heavily partisan 1862 constitutional convention was led by Democrats who overstepped their charge, tackling the essential issues of increasing executive and legislator pay, strengthening the governor’s veto, and reducing the number of special-interest bills, but also betraying strong feelings against black settlement in the state and harassing the Republican governor. The proposed constitution was rejected by voters. Meanwhile, Chicago transformed into a modern metropolis, leading the region in commerce, finance, manufacturing, and philanthropy. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution cemented Abraham Lincoln’s legacy even as attitudes toward racial equality in parts of Illinois remained distinctly southern.
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Collins, Richard B., Dale A. Oesterle, and Lawrence Friedman. "Legislative Department." In The Colorado State Constitution. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190907723.003.0005.

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This chapter explains Article V of the Colorado Constitution, which structures the legislative department. Original Section 1 vested all of the state’s legislative power in the general assembly. The rest of Section 1—added in 1910 and after—established, defined, and modified powers of citizens’ initiative and veto referendum. Section 3 defines the terms of senators and representatives and imposes term limits. Section 32 defines appropriations bills subject to the governor’s line-item veto, and Section 21 protects that veto power. Sections 20, 22a, and 22b require committee consideration of all bills but also prevent committees and caucus positions from killing bills. Sections 44–48.4 define and empower commissions to redistrict congressional and legislative seats.
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Pugh, Brian. "Barbour, the Influential Executive." In Chaos and Compromise. University Press of Mississippi, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.14325/mississippi/9781496830197.003.0008.

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This chapter discusses how Governor Haley Barbour successfully penetrated the legislatively dominated budget making process. It shows how Barbour did not increase the formal powers of the executive branch of government, but how he did increase the informal executive powers significantly. Chapter 8 explains how Barbour gained budget power through political relationships on the state and federal levels, which ultimately resulted in the state of Mississippi withstanding one of the worst storms in the nation’s history, Hurricane Katrina. Unlike his predecessor discussed in the previous chapter, Governor Barbour did not get a single gubernatorial veto overridden because of the party loyalty that he championed among Republicans.
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Craig, Berry. "The Twilight of the Rebel Press." In Kentucky's Rebel Press. University Press of Kentucky, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813174594.003.0007.

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After the August elections, in which the Union Party greatly enhanced its majorities in the Kentucky house and senate, almost all the Confederate newspapers gave up on secession and fully embraced neutrality and peace. Earlier, the rebel editors had scorned neutrality as craven. Now they saw it as their last hope to keep Kentucky from fighting against the Confederacy. The rebel press denounced the establishment of Camp Dick Robinson, but the camp stayed open and symbolized Kentucky’s growing unionism. In September, Confederate and then Union armies invaded Kentucky. The legislature, over Governor Beriah Magoffin’s veto, ordered only the Confederates to leave, thus fully embracing the Union war effort.
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Cicero, Frank. "The Constitution of 1848." In Creating the Land of Lincoln. University of Illinois Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252041679.003.0005.

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Chapter 4 focuses on the 1847 Illinois state constitutional convention and the constitution approved by voters in 1848. Democrats comprised a majority of delegates, but Whigs built many successful coalitions. The new constitution sought greater balance of governmental powers, reducing the legislature’s appointive power, bestowing on the governor a weak veto power, and calling for direct election of judges. Age and residency requirements were specified for government service; citizenship was required of voters. Two contentious provisions put separately to voters were ultimately approved: one prohibiting free blacks from immigrating to the state and one calling for a property tax to relieve the state’s debt. With the 1848 constitution, Illinois transitioned from a frontier to a modern state.
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Leal, Marcelo Mafra, and Edgard Costa Oliveira. "GESTÃO DE RISCO SUA APLICAÇÃO NO GOVERNO DO DISTRITO FEDERAL (GDF)." In Engenharia de Produção: Vetor de Transformação do Brasil 2. Atena Editora, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22533/at.ed.9221923127.

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Senna, Viviane de, and Adriano Mendonça Souza. "RELAÇÃO DOS GASTOS DO GOVERNO EM ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL COM AS VARIÁVEIS MACROECONÔMICAS BRASILEIRAS PELA ANÁLISE FATORIAL." In Engenharia de Produção: Vetor de Transformação do Brasil. Atena Editora, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22533/at.ed.11919040916.

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