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Journal articles on the topic 'Von Neumann/Morgenstern'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Vind, Karl. "von Neumann Morgenstern preferences." Journal of Mathematical Economics 33, no. 1 (2000): 109–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00004-x.

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2

Heijmans, Johannes G. C. "Discriminatory von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions." Games and Economic Behavior 3, no. 4 (1991): 438–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90014-6.

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3

Nielsen, Lars Tyge. "Differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility." Economic Theory 14, no. 2 (1999): 285–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050294.

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4

Giocoli, Nicola. "Do Prudent Agents Play Lotteries? Von Neumann's Contribution to the Theory of Rational Behavior." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 28, no. 1 (2006): 95–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10427710500509714.

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The year 2003 marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of John von Neumann (1903–1957), one of greatest geniuses of the last century. Beyond contributing to fields as diverse as set theory, quantum mechanics, atomic energy, and automatic computing, von Neumann has also had a decisive influence upon modern economics. From the invention of game theory to the axiomatization of expected utility, from the introduction of convex analysis and fixed-point techniques to the development of the balanced growth model, the von Neumann heritage can be clearly traced in several areas of our discipline. The

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5

GREAVES, HILARY. "A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi–Sen–Weymark Debate on Utilitarianism." Utilitas 29, no. 2 (2016): 175–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820816000169.

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Harsanyi claimed that his Aggregation and Impartial Observer Theorems provide a justification for utilitarianism. This claim has been strongly resisted, notably by Sen and Weymark, who argue that while Harsanyi has perhaps shown that overall good is a linear sum of individuals’ von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities, he has done nothing to establish any connection between the notion of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility and that of well-being, and hence that utilitarianism does not follow.The present article defends Harsanyi against the Sen–Weymark critique. I argue that, far from being a term with pr

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6

Chichilnisky, Graciela. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities and Cardinal Preferences." Mathematics of Operations Research 10, no. 4 (1985): 633–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.4.633.

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7

Danan, Eric, Thibault Gajdos, and Jean-Marc Tallon. "Aggregating sets of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities." Journal of Economic Theory 148, no. 2 (2013): 663–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.018.

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8

Miyake, Mitsunobu. "Continuous representation of Von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences." Journal of Mathematical Economics 19, no. 4 (1990): 323–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(90)90024-4.

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9

Nakamura, Yutaka. "Differentiability of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions." Journal of Mathematical Economics 60 (October 2015): 74–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.008.

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10

BEN-EL-MECHAIEKH, HICHEM, and ROBERT W. DIMAND. "VON NEUMANN, VILLE, AND THE MINIMAX THEOREM." International Game Theory Review 12, no. 02 (2010): 115–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002556.

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Von Neumann proved the minimax theorem (existence of a saddle-point solution to 2 person, zero sum games) in 1928. While his second article on the minimax theorem, stating the proof, has long been translated from German, his first announcement of his result (communicated in French to the Academy of Sciences in Paris by Borel, who had posed the problem settled by Von Neumann's proof) is translated here for the first time. The proof presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is not Von Neumann's rather involved proof of 1928, but is based on what they called "The Theorem of the Alternative

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11

Dhillon, Amrita, and Jean-François Mertens. "An impossibility theorem with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences." Economics Letters 56, no. 3 (1997): 305–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00191-2.

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12

Peris, Josep E., and Begoña Subiza. "A reformulation of von Neumann–Morgenstern stability: -stability." Mathematical Social Sciences 66, no. 1 (2013): 51–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.01.001.

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13

Zinchenko, Alexandra B. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions for 1-convex games." Applied Mathematical Sciences 9 (2015): 161–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.12988/ams.2015.411940.

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14

Chang, C. "A note on the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution." International Journal of Game Theory 17, no. 4 (1988): 311–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01254539.

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15

Ehlers, Lars. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems." Journal of Economic Theory 134, no. 1 (2007): 537–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.006.

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16

Núñez, Marina, and Carles Rafels. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market." Journal of Economic Theory 148, no. 3 (2013): 1282–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.002.

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17

Kawasaki, Ryo. "Roth–Postlewaite stability and von Neumann–Morgenstern stability." Journal of Mathematical Economics 58 (May 2015): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002.

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18

Xiao, Xinling. "Stochastic Dominance under the Nonlinear Expected Utilities." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2014 (2014): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/713738.

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In 1947, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the well-known expected utility and the related axiomatic system (see von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953)). It is widely used in economics, for example, financial economics. But the well-known Allais paradox (see Allais (1979)) shows that the linear expected utility has some limitations sometimes. Because of this, Peng proposed a concept of nonlinear expected utility (see Peng (2005)). In this paper we propose a concept of stochastic dominance under the nonlinear expected utilities. We give sufficient conditions on which a random choiceXstochastic

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19

Mirowski, P. "What Were von Neumann and Morgenstern Trying to Accomplish?" History of Political Economy 24, Supplement (1992): 113–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-24-supplement-113.

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20

Kawasaki, Ryo. "Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets." Mathematical Social Sciences 74 (March 2015): 8–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.12.003.

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21

Schulte, Oliver, and James Delgrande. "Representing von Neumann–Morgenstern Games in the Situation Calculus." Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 42, no. 1-3 (2004): 73–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:amai.0000034523.18162.6b.

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22

Kultti, Klaus, and Hannu Vartiainen. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining." Journal of Economic Theory 137, no. 1 (2007): 721–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.11.006.

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23

Knoblauch, Vicki. "Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions." Theory and Decision 89, no. 3 (2020): 369–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09755-3.

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24

Moscati, Ivan. "Retrospectives: How Economists Came to Accept Expected Utility Theory: The Case of Samuelson and Savage." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 2 (2016): 219–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.2.219.

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Expected utility theory dominated the economic analysis of individual decision-making under risk from the early 1950s to the 1990. Among the early supporters of the expected utility hypothesis in the von Neumann–Morgenstern version were Milton Friedman and Leonard Jimmie Savage, both based at the University of Chicago, and Jacob Marschak, a leading member of the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics. Paul Samuelson of MIT was initially a severe critic of expected utility theory. Between mid-April and early May 1950, Samuelson composed three papers in which he attacked von Neumann and Mor

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25

GREAVES, HILARY. "Antiprioritarianism." Utilitas 27, no. 1 (2015): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820814000193.

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Prioritarianism is supposed to be a theory of the overall good that captures the common intuition of ‘priority to the worse off’. But it is difficult to give precise content to the prioritarian claim. Over the past few decades, prioritarians have increasingly responded to this ‘content problem’ by formulating prioritarianism not in terms of an alleged primitive notion of quantity of well-being, but instead in terms of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility. The resulting two forms of prioritarianism (respectively, ‘Primitivist’ and ‘Technical’ prioritarianism) are not mere variants on a theme, but ar

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26

FRAGNELLI, VITO, and ANA MECA. "A NOTE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR VON NEUMANN–MORGENSTERN MARKET GAMES." International Game Theory Review 12, no. 03 (2010): 287–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002684.

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We consider a von Neumann–Morgenstern market game and present a simple expression for the Shapley value via decomposition as the difference of an airport game and an extended airport game. The resulting formula has a useful interpretation for designing an allocation procedure among the agents.

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27

Gerber, Anke. "The Nash Solution as a von Neumann–Morgenstern Utility Function on Bargaining Games." Homo Oeconomicus 37, no. 1-2 (2020): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00095-9.

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AbstractIn this paper we prove that the symmetric Nash solution is a risk neutral von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function on the class of pure bargaining games. Our result corrects an error in Roth (Econometrica 46:587–594, 983, 1978) and generalizes Roth’s result to bargaining games with arbitrary status quo.

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28

Einy, Ezra, and Benyamin Shitovitz. "Symmetric von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies." Games and Economic Behavior 43, no. 1 (2003): 28–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00550-x.

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29

Mauleon, Ana, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, and Wouter Vergote. "von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching." Theoretical Economics 6, no. 3 (2011): 499–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te527.

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30

Fishburn, Peter C. "Retrospective on the utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2, no. 2 (1989): 127–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00056134.

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31

Delbaen, Freddy, Samuel Drapeau, and Michael Kupper. "A von Neumann–Morgenstern representation result without weak continuity assumption." Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, no. 4-5 (2011): 401–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.04.002.

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32

ESPINOSA, M. P., and E. INARRA. "VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM." International Game Theory Review 02, no. 01 (2000): 29–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198900000068.

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We address the problem of endogenous coalition formation in Cournot oligopoly markets. The formation of coalitions is formalised as an abstract system where the elements of the abstract set are derived from a valuation function and the dominance relation specifies the rules of coalition formation. We focus on a particular instance of this approach: Market structure determination under Cournot competition, and in the resulting Cournot merger system we find von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets.

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33

Falahati, Kazem. "The Standard Model of Rational Risky Decision-Making." Journal of Risk and Financial Management 14, no. 4 (2021): 158. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14040158.

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Expected utility theory (EUT) is currently the standard framework which formally defines rational decision-making under risky conditions. EUT uses a theoretical device called von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, where concepts of function and random variable are employed in their pre-set-theoretic senses. Any von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function thus derived is claimed to transform a non-degenerate random variable into its certainty equivalent. However, there can be no certainty equivalent for a non-degenerate random variable by the set-theoretic definition of a random variable, whils

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34

Ohnishi, Masamitsu, and Yusuke Osaki. "Comparative Risk Aversion under Background Risk Revisited." Economics Research International 2010 (January 20, 2010): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2010/180478.

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This paper determines a new sufficient condition of the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function that preserves comparative risk aversion under background risk. It is the single crossing condition of risk aversion. Because this condition requires monotonicity in the local sense, it may satisfy the U-shaped risk aversion observed in the recent empirical literature.

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35

GAMBARELLI, GIANFRANCO. "TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM." International Game Theory Review 09, no. 01 (2007): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198907001291.

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A technique is proposed to represent games in characteristic function form as games in normal form, enabling the former to exploit the concepts of solution of the latter. A new solution for games in characteristic function form is then introduced and some properties are found. A generalization of a result of von Neumann and Morgenstern is thus obtained.

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36

Giocoli, Nicola. "Robert Leonard, Von Neumann, Morgenstern and the Creation of Game Theory." OEconomia, no. 1-2 (June 1, 2011): 321–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/oeconomia.1777.

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37

Nakayama, Chikako. "The Process of Collaboration Between Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann." History of Economics Review 26, no. 1 (1997): 40–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10370196.1997.11733244.

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38

Wakker, Peter, and Daniel Deneffe. "Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities When Probabilities Are Distorted or Unknown." Management Science 42, no. 8 (1996): 1131–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.8.1131.

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39

Coulhon, T., and P. Mongin. "Social choice theory in the case of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities." Social Choice and Welfare 6, no. 3 (1989): 175–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00295858.

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40

Dreef, Marcel, Peter Borm, and Ben van der Genugten. "On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker." International Game Theory Review 05, no. 02 (2003): 83–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919890300091x.

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This article presents a generalization of the equilibrium analysis for the simple two-player poker game with alternate bidding of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. It approximates optimal play for this game if it is played with a regular deck of 52 cards and it discusses some strategic insights. In addition, the paper studies the relative skill level of this game.

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41

Lewis, Alain A., and Rangarajan Sundaram. "An alternate approach to axiomatizations of the von Neumann/Morgenstern characteristic function." Mathematical Social Sciences 15, no. 2 (1988): 145–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90019-4.

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42

Schilirò, Daniele. "Economics versus Psychology. Risk, Uncertainty and the Expected Utility Theory." Journal of Mathematical Economics and Finance 3, no. 1 (2017): 77. http://dx.doi.org/10.14505//jmef.v3.1(4).04.

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The present contribution examines the emergence of expected utility theory by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, the subjective the expected utility theory by Savage, and the problem of choice under risk and uncertainty, focusing in particular on the seminal work “The Utility Analysis of Choices involving Risk” (1948) by Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage to show how the evolution of the theory of choice has determined a separation of economics from psychology.

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43

Paine, Neil R. "An Extension of Nurmi's Summary Analysis of Voting Procedures." British Journal of Political Science 18, no. 2 (1988): 281–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000712340000510x.

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Nurmi has analysed a number of voting procedures with respect to various criteria. The purpose of this Comment is to extend Nurmi's analysis to include the so-called social utility method of candidate selection. This method assumes that each voter has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over all candidates (i.e., that, roughly speaking, each voter can assign a cardinal rating to each candidate); then the winning candidate is the one with the greatest utility total.

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44

Lambrecht, Ulrich, James Stone, Horst Pütz, Ulf Morgenstern, Ludger Tewes, and Helmut Grieser. "Editionen." Das Historisch-Politische Buch (HPB) 65, no. 3 (2017): 246–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/hpb.65.3.246.

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Ps. Aurelius Victor: De viris illustribus urbis Romae. Die berühmten Männer der Stadt Rom (Ulrich Lambrecht) Palladius: Das Bauernjahr (Ulrich Lambrecht) Peter Winzen (Hg.): Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell. Erinnerungen an die ausgehende Kaiserzeit und politischer Schriftwechsel (James Stone) Volker Michels (Hg.): „Ich bin ein Mensch des Werdens und der Wandlungen.“ Hermann Hesse (Horst Pütz) Antje Neumann (Hg.): Harry Graf Kessler – Henry van de Velde. Der Briefwechsel (Ulf Morgenstern) Wassili Stepanowitsch Christoforow, Wladimir Gennadjewitsch Makarow, Matthias Uhl (Hg.): Verhört. Die Befragu

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45

Brady, Michael E., and Howard B. Lee. "Is There an Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox? A Note on its Resolution." Psychological Reports 64, no. 3_suppl (1989): 1087–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1989.64.3c.1087.

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The Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox can be shown to be nonparadoxical if Keynes' concept of weight-of-evidence is incorporated in decision making under risk and/or uncertainty. Keynes' concept is a more advanced version of C. S. Peirce's “second number” approach and is identical to R. Carnap's reliability-unreliability index. The Ellsberg-Fellner Paradox is paradoxical only to decision theorists who accept the Von Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage axioms. Decision theorists who accept the logical approach to probability can bypass this problem.

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46

Hirai, Toshiyuki, and Naoki Watanabe. "von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: The existence proof." Mathematical Social Sciences 94 (July 2018): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.04.001.

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47

Abdellaoui, Mohammed. "A Genuine Rank-Dependent Generalization of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem." Econometrica 70, no. 2 (2002): 717–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00301.

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48

Hirai, Toshiyuki. "von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies." Economic Theory 37, no. 1 (2007): 81–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0284-x.

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49

Shitovitz, Benyamin, and Shlomo Weber. "The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set." Journal of Mathematical Economics 27, no. 4 (1997): 375–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00786-6.

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50

Inarra, E., C. Larrea, and A. Saracho. "The von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2×2 games." Economics Letters 125, no. 1 (2014): 70–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.025.

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