Relevant bibliographies by topics / Vote-Buying

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Vote-Buying'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 17 June 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Vote-Buying"

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Hasen, Richard L. "Vote Buying." California Law Review 88, no. 5 (2000): 1323. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3481262.

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Nichter, Simeon. "Conceptualizing vote buying." Electoral Studies 35 (September 2014): 315–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.02.008.

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Rahmatunnisa, Mudiyati. "MENYOAL PRAKTEK VOTE BUYING DAN IMPLIKASINYA TERHADAP INTEGRITAS PEMILU." Jurnal Keadilan Pemilu 1, no. 2 (2022): 35–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v1i2.170.

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Praktek vote buying merupakan salah satu bentuk pelanggaran utama yang kerap terjadi dalam proses elektoral. Artikel ini mendiskusikan kompleksitas pemaknaan konsep, bentuk dan penyebab terjadinya vote buying. Selain itu, mendiskusikan pula bagaimana pengaruh vote buying terhadap perwujudan pemilu yang berintegritas dan strategi apa yang dapat dilakukan untuk meminimalisir praktek vote buying. Dengan menggunakan penelusuran literatur kontemporer dan relevan, vote buying merupakan konsep yang illusive dan dimaknai beragam. Praktek ini berpotensi marak terjadi dengan berbagai bentuknya ketika proses elektoral berkelindan dengan kemiskinan, rendahnya tingkat pendidikan, dan low level of political attitudes. Praktek vote buying secara signifikan mendistorsi prinsip kebebasan, keadilan dan kompetisi dari pemilu berintegritas. Meski sulit untuk sama sekali dihilangkan, upaya meminimalisir prevalensi vote buying dapat ditujukan baik kepada vote buyers dan juga vote sellers.
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NICHTER, SIMEON. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 (2008): 19–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055408080106.

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Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative explanation, which I term “turnout buying,” suggests why parties might offer rewards even if they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their passive constituencies. Because turnout buying targets supporters, it only requires monitoring whether individuals vote. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying. Reward targeting helps to distinguish between these strategies. Whereas Stokes's vote-buying model predicts that parties target moderate opposers, a model of turnout buying predicts that they target strong supporters. Although the two strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data in Stokes 2005 are more consistent with turnout buying.
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Gersbach, Hans, and Felix Mühe. "VOTE-BUYING AND GROWTH." Macroeconomic Dynamics 15, no. 5 (2011): 656–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100510000246.

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Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote-buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule, and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote-buying prohibitively costly.
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Brooks, Thom. "Vote Buying and Tax-cut Promises." Theoria 63, no. 146 (2016): 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/th.2016.6314602.

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Abstract Both vote buying and tax-cut promises are attempts to manipulate voters through cash incentives in order to win elections, but only vote buying is illegal. Should we extend the ban on vote buying to tax-cut promises? This article will argue for three conclusions. The first is that tax-cut promises should be understood as a form of vote buying. The second is that campaign promises are a form of vote buying. The third conclusion is that campaign promises, including tax-cut promises, should not be banned. An important distinction is drawn between enforceable wrongful incentives and unenforceable wrongful incentives. The difference between vote buying and tax-cut promises is not wrongfulness but enforceability.
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González-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and Covadonga Meseguer. "Remittances and Vote Buying." Latin American Research Review 53, no. 4 (2018): 689–707. http://dx.doi.org/10.25222/larr.396.

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Dekel, Eddie, Matthew O. Jackson, and Asher Wolinsky. "Vote Buying: General Elections." Journal of Political Economy 116, no. 2 (2008): 351–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/587624.

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Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan Carol Stokes. "Vote Buying in Argentina." Latin American Research Review 39, no. 2 (2004): 66–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/lar.2004.0022.

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Tawakkal, George Towar Ikbal, Wisnu Suhardono, Andrew D. Garner, and Thomas Seitz. "CONSISTENCY AND VOTE BUYING: INCOME, EDUCATION, AND ATTITUDES ABOUT VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA." Journal of East Asian Studies 17, no. 3 (2017): 313–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2017.15.

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AbstractThis article examines ambivalence—the simultaneous holding of two or more conflicting values or beliefs about a political issue—among Indonesian citizens’ attitudes about vote buying. Using an original survey taken during the 2014 Indonesian elections, we analyse the factors related both to citizens’ normative views about vote buying and their willingness to accept gifts from candidates. A large number of citizens demonstrate ambivalence by viewing the practice as unjustified or corrupt and yet expressing willingness to accept money from candidates. We also examine the differential effects of education and income on these attitudes. Consistent with “demand side” theories of vote buying, low income creates economic pressure to accept money but does not influence normative attitudes about vote buying. Education, however, has a broader effect by influencing both normative attitudes and willingness to accept money. We consider implications of these results for Indonesian officials focused on reducing vote-buying behavior.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Vote-Buying"

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Yildiz, Baris. "Buying hearts and minds: modeling popular support during an insurgency via a sequential vote-buying game." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5615.

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.<br>The population plays a crucial role in the outcome of an insurgency. The government needs intelligence from the population to effectively target and defeat the insurgents. In this thesis, we adapt a vote-buying model from political science to the insurgency context to analyze the level of intelligence the population will provide to the government. The model is a two-player sequential game in which both the government and insurgents can "pay" individuals for their support. These payments can take the form of direct bribes or the provision of benefits, such as building schools and roads. In the model, an individual supports the government by providing it with intelligence. We specify the optimal payment strategy for the insurgents and the government and determine how much support the government will receive. In an extension to the base model we allow the insurgents to use coercion as a means to deter individuals from supporting the government. Our analysis illustrates that coercion can be an effective tool for the insurgents in some situations but may backfire in others.
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Wu, Su-Fang. "Formal and informal political relationships in provincial Taiwan : a case study of local election networks in context." Thesis, Anglia Ruskin University, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.287024.

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Adojutelegan, Nat. "Vote-Selling: Infrastructure and Public Services." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/4829.

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Vote-selling in Nigeria pervades and permeates the electoral space, where it has become the primary instrument of electoral fraud. Previous research has indicated a strong correlation between vote-buying and underinvestment and poor delivery of public services. There remains, however, a significant gap in the current literature regarding the nature of the relationship between vote-selling and the delivery of public services. The purpose of this study was to uncover voters' behaviors by investigating their common and lived experiences with respect to the provision of infrastructure, delivery of public services, and voting during elections. Using Bandura's theory of reciprocal determinism, the research explored the connection between environment and vote-selling. Data were collected through semistructured interviews with 10 individuals who participated in the most recent elections in Akoko North West Local Government, Ondo State, Nigeria. The data were analyzed using Moustakas's transcendental phenomenological process. Key findings suggest a reciprocal relationship between vote-selling, and infrastructure and public services. The study findings also revealed that vote-sellers' feel justified because vote-selling is perceived as a product of disappointment, lack of trust and voters' apathy, willingness to accept their own share of 'national cake,' and poverty. These findings are consistent with Bandura's proposition that people create the society and equally react to environmental factors. This study contributes to the existing literature and may enhance social change initiatives by improving the understanding of the connection between the provision of infrastructure and the delivery of public services and vote-selling.
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Owen, David A. "MASS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF POLITICAL CLIENTELISM IN THAI PROVINCES." OpenSIUC, 2011. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/437.

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Over the last four decades, many developing countries transitioned to democracy with populations aspiring to break from authoritarian tradition for more representative government. While this wave of democratization was encouraging initially, observers came to realize that the break from tradition was anything but complete. The traditional clientelistic relations that pervaded political systems during authoritarian periods have been eroded by democratization in some countries, while in other countries, clientelism is thriving and continuing to impact political participation, primarily through vote-buying between patrons and clients. Therefore, the extent to which democratization erodes clientelism as widely expected, could not be assumed. The questions of what are the causal effects of clientelism on political participation, how does the vote-buying process unfold, how effective are the efforts to combat vote-buying, and what is the debate over the ethics of vote-buying motivate this dissertation; I draw on the experiences of Thai provinces to answer them. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the impact of clientelism, measured by vote-buying, on political participation using a multi-method approach. Using new primary and secondary data sources, I make several important original contributions with this study. First, I answer the question regarding the causal effects of clientelism on political participation by testing the resource theory and the theory of clientelism. I find that the poor, who are most likely to be enmeshed in clientelistic networks, voted just as often as the rich in two of the three general elections and both the national and local level elections. People in the countryside, the poor, vote more than their urban counterparts in both the national and local level elections. The poor also participate in the other forms of politics just as much as the rich. I find those with less education vote just as much as those with more education in all three general elections and the national level election, however, those with higher education voted more in the local level election. Those with higher education also boycott, demonstrate, and sign petitions more than those with lower education. I find that clientelism is the reason lower socioeconomic status rural individuals participate in politics as without clientelism, they would not be expected to participate as much as their richer and more educated urban counterparts. Second, I answer the question regarding how the vote-buying process unfolds by exploring original primary interview data collected by the author of elite and mass views of vote-buyers, sellers, intermediaries, and the vote-buying process. I find that all the actors involved have their own reasons and motivations for participating in the vote-buying process: vote-sellers are predominantly poor and poverty drives their need for the compensation provided through vote-buying, while vote-buyers and their intermediaries are very much aware of the needs of potential vote-sellers and they intentionally exploit these needs. Even though the poor are driven to become vote-sellers, we cannot readily assume that vote-buying is successful for vote-buyers, or in other words, we cannot assume that vote-buying results in votes for the vote-buyer. Prior to my study, scholars have made such an assumption, whether directly stated or inferred, which may lead to erroneous conclusions about the effectiveness of vote-buying resulting in votes for the vote-buyer. To overcome this, I developed a model of the vote-buying process where vote-buying is divided into specific steps: the offer to buy votes, the acceptance of the offer, the compensation, the showing up at the polls, and the casting of a vote for the vote-buyer. By employing my model of the vote-buying process, we see that sometimes voters act in a manner that is consistent with the vote-buyer's demands and others times they do not at virtually all the steps of the vote-buying process for very specific reasons, including poverty. Third, I answer the question regarding the effectiveness of efforts to combat vote-buying by exploring elite and mass views of the effectiveness of institutional constraints and civic education in combating vote-buying. My findings suggest that institutional constraints, namely the Election Commission, have some impact on reducing vote-buying, though the Election Commission is plagued with far-reaching limitations. I find attempts at civic education, however, are not really measurable. Even if these attempts at civic education were measurable, I do not believe there is any reason to suspect they would be effective considering they do not address the poverty issue. Finally, I answer the question regarding the debate over the ethics of vote-buying by exploring elite and mass views of the justifications for vote-buying. I then analyze the impact of vote-buying on the legitimacy of the Thai political system. I find that some Thais perceive vote-buying as unethical because it is illegal and dishonest, while others do not necessarily perceive vote-buying as unethical because of poverty and vote-buying norms Thais use to justify selling their votes. Moreover, I find that poverty and vote-buying norms impact the legitimacy of the Thai political system, especially for the rural poor, to the point where I argue that vote-buying does not necessarily negatively impact legitimacy of the Thai political system. Overall, this dissertation has answered the important questions about clientelism and the vote-buying measure. This study is important because clientelism is one of the most important informal institutional obstacles to free and fair elections and the findings in this study offer clarity of the impact of clientelism, and the vote-buying measure, on political participation in the Thai context.
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Nieto, Vazquez Octael. "A one-shot deal on the spot : how vote buying affects electoral behaviour : experimental evidence from Mexico." Thesis, University of Essex, 2018. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/22353/.

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For the 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections, about 50 million voters went to polls to elect more than two thousand posts. The runner-up attributed the defeat to a massive vote-buying mobilisation in favour of the front-runner. Reports from electoral observers supported that version. Did vote buying modify voters choices? Although the literature has approached vote buying from several angles, there remain disputes and gaps in our understanding of the mechanisms involved and their direct implications for electoral outcomes. In this dissertation, I assess both, asking i) how are Mexican voters confronted by vote-buying strategies, ii) what mechanisms for targeting and buying votes do parties deploy, and iii) how strong are the effects on voting choices. First, I propose an extended two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation to frame the analysis and to resolve conflations and confusions in previous research. Second, I employ a mixed-methods research design, analysing thousands of phone calls reporting vote-buying to a national hotline service, a series of semi-structured interviews with brokers, and a list experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in Mexico. Qualitative evidence from calls and interviews confirm the two-stage model: that activists begin to target voters long time before polling days by knocking on doors, proffering rewards as an exchange for votes and compiling lists of electors. Near and during polling days, activists conduct the second mobilisation strategy to monitor voters and ensure compliance by distributing benefits broadly across the country. Survey evidence shows that 15% of those electors switching voting choices near polling days were contacted by activists during the Election Day, which suggests that further research on vote buying should be more attentive to the timing of the exchange. This research contributes to the literature on vote buying in three ways. First, it extends theoretical approaches of models of vote-buying mobilisation. Second, it provides qualitative evidence from both citizens and brokers to understand mechanisms of targeting and buying votes. Third, it highlights some indirect questioning strategies -including but not confined to the list experiment- that are helpful for estimating vote-buying.
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Barboza, Danilo Praxedes. "As denúncias de compra de votos como estratégia eleitoral. Análise da relação entre denúncias de compra de votos e a dinâmica de competição eleitoral nas eleições municipais de 2012 em São Paulo." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-22062015-135836/.

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presente pesquisa objetiva analisar as motivações estratégicas inerentes às denúncias de compra de votos na dinâmica eleitoral brasileira, a partir da análise das denúncias apresentadas à Justiça Eleitoral nas eleições municipais de 2012 em São Paulo. Para tanto, a dissertação se divide em quatro partes, a saber: (1) discussão sobre o contexto histórico da criação da Lei Contra a corrupção eleitoral (Lei nº 9.840/1999); (2) breve revisão bibliográfica do conceito de compra de votos e análise da literatura sobre o tema no Brasil; (3) análise das características das denúncias de compra de votos apresentadas à Justiça Eleitoral nas eleições municipais paulistas de 2012, com ênfase na caracterização dos atores candidatos e partidos, da prática tipo de benesses oferecidas, outros crimes eleitorais praticados e dos resultados dos processos judiciais; (4) análise das motivações estratégicas inerentes às denúncias de compra de votos, a partir da análise de dados de competição eleitoral local e características socioeconômicas dos municípios. Pretende-se demonstrar na presente pesquisa que a incidência de denúncias de compra de votos na realidade política brasileira está vinculada fortemente à dinâmica da competição eleitoral local, e não necessariamente na real incidência da prática ilícita, se configurando, portanto, como uma ferramenta na disputa eleitoral.<br>This research aims to analyze the strategic motivations for vote-buying allegations in the Brazilian electoral competition, based on the analysis of denunciations made to the Electoral Court in the 2012 municipal elections of São Paulo, Brazil. Therefore, the dissertation is divided into four parts, namely: (1) discussion of the historical context of the creation of the law \"Against electoral corruption\" (Law nº 9.840/1999); (2) literature review of the concept of vote-buying and analysis of the literature on the subject in Brazil; (3) analysis of the characteristics of vote-buying complaints to the Electoral Court in the São Paulo municipal elections of 2012, with emphasis on characterization of the actors - candidates and parties, practice - kind of handouts offered, other electoral crimes - and results of court proceedings; (4) analysis of the strategic motivations for vote-buying allegations, from the data of local electoral competition and socioeconomic characteristics of the municipalities. The intent is to demonstrate that the incidence of vote-buying allegations in the Brazilian political reality is strongly linked to the dynamics of the local electoral competition, configured so as a tool in the electoral running, and not necessarily linked with the real occurrence of the illicit practice.
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Correia, Paula Ferolla. "Cooperação, comércio e investimentos: um estudo de caso do alinhamento de votos de Brasil e Angola na AGNU." Universidade de São Paulo, 2018. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/101/101131/tde-15012019-104957/.

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O alinhamento de voto no sistema internacional tem sido objeto de estudo desde o estabelecimento de Organizações Internacionais, principalmente após a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Parte da literatura trata da formação de grupos de votação em troca da alocação de ajuda externa por países desenvolvidos, que se verifica como uma estratégia de política externa a qual perdura a relação desigual de dependência econômica e barganha de voto no sistema internacional. Assim, a fundação da ONU e de outras Organizações que a sucederam destacou a crescente relevância em estudar os determinantes do comportamento dos Estados em votações multilaterais, tendo em vista seus posicionamentos de política externa. Já a cooperação brasileira se diferencia do formato tradicional de ajuda externa e enfoca na relação de parceria e redução de discrepâncias entre países em desenvolvimento. Buscou-se analisar a relação entre a ajuda externa brasileira, no formato de cooperação técnica bilateral, e o comportamento de voto de seus receptores na Assembleia Geral da ONU (AGNU), sendo que a alocação seria um meio para influenciar o comportamento de voto a favor de seus interesses de política externa no sistema internacional. Entretanto, os dados observados não apontam claramente para a barganha de votos nesse escopo, de forma que as análises sobre alocação da cooperação técnica brasileira, fluxo de comércio e investimentos levaram à escolha de Angola para o desenvolvimento de um estudo de caso. Logo, este estudo se aprofunda no alinhamento político entre Brasil e Angola, em cooperação técnica, fluxos bilaterais de comércio e investimentos e discursos diplomáticos. Verificou-se que o Brasil utiliza, em Angola, o modelo de cooperação pela transferência de conhecimentos, enquanto busca fortalecer as relações bilaterais, ampliar o prestígio brasileiro e alinhar votos na AGNU, de acordo com o interesse em se tornar uma liderança no cone Sul e em promover a reforma da AGNU e do Conselho de Segurança. Além disso, as entrevistas realizadas mostraram que as relações comerciais e de investimento de multinacionais brasileiras em Angola também contribuíram para a aproximação política entre os países, envolvendo o âmbito público e privado. Conclui-se que o alinhamento entre Brasil e Angola na AGNU não é um comportamento constante, de forma que não se verifica uma coalizão de voto. Por fim, esse alinhamento decorre dos interesses de países em desenvolvimento, quanto a representação do Brasil na esfera de membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança.<br>Voting alingment in the international system has been a study object since the formation of International Organizations, mainly after the II World War. Part of the literature on this matter leans on voting groups formation in exchange for foreign aid allocation from developed countries, which is verified as a foreign policy strategy that endures the unequal relation of economic dependence and vote buying in the international system. Thus, UN foundation, among other organizations which succedded it, highlights the growing relevance of compreheding the determinants of State behaviour in multilateral votings, considering their foreign policy interests. Brazilian Cooperation, on the other hand, differs from traditional foreign aid format and focuses on the partnership relation and reduction of discrepancies among developing countries. We sought to analyze the correlation between Brazilian foreign aid, as Bilateral Technical Cooperation, and voting behaviour of its recepients in the UN General Assembly. Thus, the allocation would be used as a tool to influence voting behaviour towards Brazilian Foreign Policy objectives in the international system. However, the data observed do not clearly point out vote buying in this domain, so that further analysis about Brazilian technical cooperation, trade and investment flows led to the choice of Angola for a case-study. This study is about the political alignment between Brazil and Angola, related to technical cooperation, bilateral trade, investment flows and diplomatic discourses. It showed that Brazilian Foreign Aid model in Angola focuses on expertise transfer, while it aims to strengthen bilateral relations, increase Brazilian prestige and promote vote alignments in UNGA. Thus, Brazilian motivation is according with the interest in becoming a leader in the South cone and supporting the political reform in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Besides, the interviews showed that comercial relations and investments of Brazilian multinationals in Angola also contribute to the political approximation among both countries, involving the public and private sphere. It\'s possible to conclude that the voting alignment between Brazil and Angola in the General Assembly is not a constant behavior, since no vote coalition was identified. Therefore, this alingment is due to developing countries interests, in regards to Brazil\'s representation among the permanent members of the Security Council.
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Israel, Elie. "Analysis of Monetary Policy Cycles and Economic Elites." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lille (2022-....), 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024ULILA023.

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Cette thèse est structurée autour de deux grandes thématiques indépendantes, chacunearticulée en deux chapitres distincts. La première porte thématique sur l'économie desélites, avec une attention particulière aux mécanismes de rotation des élites dans lesorganisations internationales et les systèmes politiques nationaux.Le premier chapitre se concentre sur le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI), en examinantles déterminants de la rotation des membres de l'administration entre 2009 et 2021.L'analyse montre que les crises économiques, notamment les crises de la dette, ont unimpact significatif sur la durée des mandats de ces élites, mettant en lumière l'importancedes facteurs externes sur leur stabilité, en parallèle avec des facteurs impliqués tels quel'expérience professionnelle ou l'éducation. Cette approche permet de mieux comprendreles pressions systémiques auxquelles sont confrontées ces élites technocratiques dans lesenvironnements de crise.Ce chapitre a été co-écrit avec Etienne FARVAQUE ,Maqsood ASLAM et FranckMALAN.Le deuxième chapitre traite des élites politiques, avec un focus sur l'accès des femmesau pouvoir dans les démocraties modernes. Nous avons appliqué une méthodologiequantitative rigoureuse basée sur une base de données inédite des chefs d'État de 1950 à2015. Les résultats révèlent que les crises économiques et politiques jouent un rôle clé dansl'accession des femmes au pouvoir, confirmant l'existence du phénomène de la "falaise deverre", où les femmes sont plus souvent nommées dans des contextes à haut risque. Cetteanalyse approfondie contribue à la littérature sur le genre et le leadership politique, eniiisoulignant les défis spécifiques auxquels les femmes sont confrontées dans les systèmesdominés par des structures masculines. Ce chapitre, je l'ai écrit seul.La deuxième thématique de cette thèse se concentre sur les cycles politico-économiques.Le troisième chapitre examine les dynamiques spécifiques aux cycles en Haïti, unpays en proie à de fortes instabilités économiques et politiques. L'étude démontre que lesélections en Haïti sont souvent associées à des manipulations économiques considérables,exacerbées par un environnement institutionnel fragile et dominé par des pratiquesclientélistes. L'analyse des données montre que les fluctuations de la masse monétaire etles épisodes d'inflation sont directement corrélés aux périodes électorales, illustrant lesdéfaillances des mécanismes de régulation budgétaire et monétaire du pays. Ce chapitre aété co-écrit avec Etienne FARVAQUE, Maqsood ASLAM et Raulin CADETLe quatrième chapitre se focalise sur le cas du Royaume-Uni, en analysant les cyclespolitico-monétaires avant l'indépendance de la Banque d'Angleterre en 1997. L'étuderévèle que la manipulation de la politique monétaire avant les élections était courante,surtout sous les gouvernements libéraux. Cette analyse démontre l'importance desréformes institutionnelles dans la stabilisation des cycles économiques et souligne lanécessité d'une gestion indépendante des instruments monétaires pour garantir la stabilitéà long terme. Ce chapire a été co-écrit avec Etienne FARVAQUE et Antoine PARENT.Ainsi, cette thèse propose des contributions majeures aux études sur la rotation desélites et les cycles politico-économiques, tout en ouvrant des pistes de rechercheprometteuses<br>This thesis is structured around two main independent themes, each articulated in twoseparate chapters. The first focuses on the economics of elites, with particular attentionto the mechanisms of elite rotation in international organizations and national politicalsystems.The first chapter focuses on the International Monetary Fund International MonetaryFund (IMF), examining the determinants of Executive Board turnover between 2009 and2021. The analysis shows that economic crises, particularly debt crises, have a significantimpact on the tenure of these elites, highlighting the importance of external factors ontheir stability, alongside implicated factors such as professional experience or education.This approach provides a better understanding of the systemic pressures faced by thesetechnocratic elites in crisis environments.The second chapter deals with political elites, with a focus on women's access topower in modern democracies. We have applied a rigorous quantitative methodologybased on an unpublished database of heads of state from 1950 to 2015. The resultsreveal that economic and political crises play a key role in women's accession to power,confirming the existence of the “glass cliff” phenomenon, where women are more oftenappointed in high-risk contexts. This in-depth analysis contributes to the literature ongender and political leadership, highlighting the specific challenges women face in systemsdominated by male structures.The second theme of this thesis focuses on political-economic cycles.The third chapter examines the specific dynamics of cycles in Haiti, a country besetby economic and political instability. The study shows that elections in Haiti are oftenassociated with considerable economic manipulation, exacerbated by a fragile institutionalvenvironment dominated by clientelistic practices. Data analysis shows that money supplyfluctuations and inflation episodes are directly correlated with election periods, illustratingthe failings of the country's fiscal and monetary regulation mechanisms.The fourth chapter focuses on the United Kingdom, analyzing the politico-monetarycycles prior to the Bank of England's independence in 1997. The study reveals thatpre-election manipulation of monetary policy was commonplace, especially under Liberalgovernments. This analysis demonstrates the importance of institutional reforms instabilizing economic cycles, and underlines the need for independent management ofmonetary instruments to guarantee long-term stability.This thesis makes major contributions to the study of elite rotation and political-economiccycles, while opening up promising avenues of research
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Ladmiral, Guillaume. "L’empire des expédients : achat de voix, répression des fraudes électorales et système politique dans le Japon d’avant-guerre (1890-1937)." Thesis, Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018IEPP0005.

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La thèse consiste en un réexamen des traits saillants des systèmes politique et partisan du Japon d’avant-guerre (1890-1937). L’analyse de données quantitatives et qualitatives sur l’achat de voix et les pratiques d’ingérence des gouvernements dans le déroulement des campagnes électorales démontre que la première pratique était massive et généralisée et les secondes systématiques. L’achat de voix massif et généralisé et les pratiques d’ingérence étaient liés par une relation de complémentarité fonctionnelle, l’ingérence consistant le plus communément en la répression partiale des fraudes électorales. Le système partisan s’ordonnait autour de ce binôme d’expédients. Les acteurs collectifs de ce système furent des spécimens du type « parti-cartel, stratarchique, clientélistes et attrape-tout », des partis qui n’activaient pas de clivage sociologique ou idéologique. Le binôme d’expédients structurants eut de nombreuses conséquences systémiques et constitua la plus puissante des modalités de la politisation des rapports sociaux. En conclusion, les résultats de l’examen de la pratique de l’achat de voix dans le Japon d’avant-guerre sont confrontés à ceux que proposent des études de cette pratique en d’autres sociétés, les États-Unis d’Amérique et le Royaume-Uni au XIXe siècle ou, au XXe siècle, des pays d’Amérique Latine et Taiwan<br>This thesis is a reappraisal of salient features of the political and party systems in prewar Japan (1890-1937). Analysis of qualitative and quantitative data on vote buying and governmental interference in electoral campaigns demonstrate that the first practice was massive and generalized; and that the second was systematic. These two practices were tied by a functional relationship since the most common form of governmental interference consisted in a partisan bias in the repression of electoral frauds. The core of electoral politics was a functional set of expedients. The collective actors of this system are characterized as specimens of the “cartel party stratarchic, clientelistic, catch-all” type, many political parties that did not activate any sociological or ideological cleavage. The two electoral expedients bore many systemic consequences and were the most powerful ways of the politicization of social relationships in this society. The concluding chapter is a comparative examination of the characteristics and properties of vote buying in prewar Japan to those of the same practice in other societies, the 19th century United States of America and Britain, or 20th century Latin America and Taiwan
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Wang, Chou-Ming, and 王洲明. "Study on Vote-Buying and Anti Vote-Buying Behavior—Three-in-one, By-Election in 2005." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60200136152277153865.

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Books on the topic "Vote-Buying"

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3.

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Finan, Frederico. Vote-buying and reciprocity. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.

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Morgan, John. Corruption, competition, and contracts: A model of vote buying. International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. Vote Buying in Indonesia: The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery. Springer Nature, 2019.

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Charles, Schaffer Frederic, ed. Elections for sale: The causes and consequences of vote buying. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

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Mutch, Robert E., and Fleet Cooper. Buying the Vote. Audible Studios on Brilliance Audio, 2016.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. Vote Buying in Indonesia. Saint Philip Street Press, 2020.

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Axtell, Fran. Vote Buying: Causes and Consequences. Clanrye International, 2023.

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Joseph, Oliver, and Vasil Vashchanka. Vote Buying: International IDEA Electoral Processes Primer 2. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.31752/idea.2022.61.

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Vote buying is an electoral campaign violation that occurs in many countries, which undermines the integrity of elections and is detrimental to democratic governance. Many factors beyond electoral politics drive vote buying. Such factors influence the ‘supply side’ (political actors’ decisions to engage in vote buying), the ‘demand side’ (voters’ willingness to participate in vote buying) or both. This Primer outlines what vote buying is (and what it is not) and analyses the drivers behind the practice. It provides insights into vote-buying strategies and practices before considering options for policy interventions to effectively counter the practice. It also offers an analytical framework for a strategic approach to support such efforts to stakeholders seeking to gain comparative insights into vote buying and mitigation.
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A Vote sold is a service denied: Reject vote buying now. ActionAid Uganda, 2015.

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Book chapters on the topic "Vote-Buying"

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "The Determinants of Vote Buying: The Profile of Typical Vote ‘Sellers’." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_3.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "Introduction." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_1.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "The Prevalence of Vote Buying in Indonesia: Building an Index." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_2.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "Do Candidates Target Loyalists or Swing Voters? Beyond the Core- Versus Swing-Voter Debate." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_4.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "How Targeting Goes Astray: Explaining the Gap Between Intentions and Outcomes." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_5.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "Vote Brokerage, Personal Networks, and Agency Loss." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_6.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "Does Vote Buying Affect Voting Behaviour? Chasing Winning Margins and the Prisoner’s Dilemma." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_7.

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Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. "Conclusion." In Vote Buying in Indonesia. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6779-3_8.

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Brennan, Jason, and Christopher Freiman. "Vote buying and campaign finance." In The Routledge Handbook of Commodification. Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003188742-15.

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Zollinger, Marie-Laure, Peter B. Rønne, Steve Schneider, Peter Y. A. Ryan, and Wojciech Jamroga. "Intelligo Ut Confido: Understanding, Trust and User Experience in Verifiable Receipt-Free E-Voting." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-72244-8_10.

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AbstractVoting protocols seek to provide integrity and vote privacy in elections. To achieve integrity, procedures have been proposed allowing voters to verify that their vote is correctly counted– however this impacts both the user experience and privacy. In particular, vote verification can lead to vote-buying or coercion, if an attacker can obtain a proof of the cast vote. Thus, some voting protocols provide mechanisms to prevent such receipts.To be effective, such receipt-freeness depends on voters being able to understand and use these mechanisms.In this paper, we present a study with 300 participants to evaluate the voters’ experience and understanding of the receipt-freeness procedures in the Selene scheme in the context of vote-buying. This is the first user study dealing with vote-buying in e-voting. While the usability and trust factors were rated low in the experiments, we found a positive correlation between trust and understanding.
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Conference papers on the topic "Vote-Buying"

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Merino, Louis-Henri, Alaleh Azhir, Haoqian Zhang, et al. "E-Vote Your Conscience: Perceptions of Coercion and Vote Buying, and the Usability of Fake Credentials in Online Voting." In 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/sp54263.2024.00252.

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Parkes, David C., Paul Tylkin, and Lirong Xia. "Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots." In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/529.

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There is increasing interest in promoting participatory democracy, in particular by allowing voting by mail or internet and through random-sample elections. A pernicious concern, though, is that of vote buying, which occurs when a bad actor seeks to buy ballots, paying someone to vote against their own intent. This becomes possible whenever a voter is able to sell evidence of which way she voted. We show how to thwart vote buying through decoy ballots, which are not counted but are indistinguishable from real ballots to a buyer. We show that an Election Authority can significantly reduce the power of vote buying through a small number of optimally distributed decoys, and model societal processes by which decoys could be distributed.
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Ardianto, Hendra. "How to Stop Vote Buying: What did Researchers Say?" In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Indonesian Social and Political Enquiries, ICISPE 2020, 9-10 October 2020, Semarang, Indonesia. EAI, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.9-10-2020.2304718.

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Sage, Manuel, Joshua Campbell, and Yaoyao Fiona Zhao. "Enhancing Battery Storage Energy Arbitrage With Deep Reinforcement Learning and Time-Series Forecasting." In ASME 2024 18th International Conference on Energy Sustainability collocated with the ASME 2024 Heat Transfer Summer Conference and the ASME 2024 Fluids Engineering Division Summer Meeting. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/es2024-130538.

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Abstract Energy arbitrage is one of the most profitable sources of income for battery operators, generating revenues by buying and selling electricity at different prices. Forecasting these revenues is challenging due to the inherent uncertainty of electricity prices. Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) emerged in recent years as a promising tool, able to cope with uncertainty by training on large quantities of historical data. However, without access to future electricity prices, DRL agents can only react to the currently observed price and not learn to plan battery dispatch. Therefore, in this study, we combine DRL with time-series forecasting methods from deep learning to enhance the performance on energy arbitrage. We conduct a case study using price data from Alberta, Canada that is characterized by irregular price spikes and highly non-stationary. This data is challenging to forecast even when state-of-the-art deep learning models consisting of convolutional layers, recurrent layers, and attention modules are deployed. Our results show that energy arbitrage with DRL-enabled battery control still significantly benefits from these imperfect predictions, but only if predictors for several horizons are combined. Grouping multiple predictions for the next 24-hour window, accumulated rewards increased by 60% for deep Q-networks (DQN) compared to the experiments without forecasts. We hypothesize that multiple predictors, despite their imperfections, convey useful information regarding the future development of electricity prices through a “majority vote” principle, enabling the DRL agent to learn more profitable control policies.
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Reports on the topic "Vote-Buying"

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Finan, Frederico, and Laura Schechter. Vote-Buying and Reciprocity. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17411.

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Hanusch, Marek, Philip Keefer, and Razvan Vlaicu. Vote Buying or Campaign Promises?: Electoral Strategies When Party Credibility is Limited. Inter-American Development Bank, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011751.

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What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences of this decision, in a setting where party credibility can vary. When parties are less credible they spend more on vote buying and target vote buying more heavily toward groups that do not believe campaign promises. When political credibility is sufficiently low, some voter groups are targeted only with vote buying and not with promises of post-electoral transfers. Stronger electoral competition reduces rent seeking but increases vote buying. Incumbents may have an advantage in undertaking vote buying; the paper finds that in a dynamic setting the prospect of a future incumbency advantage increases current vote buying.
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Keefer, Philip, Julien Labonne, and Cesi Cruz. Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying. Inter-American Development Bank, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011746.

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Results from a new experiment shed light on the effects of voter informationon vote buying and incumbent advantage. The treatment provided voters with information about a major spending program and the proposed allocations and promises of mayoral candidates just prior to municipal elections. It left voters more knowledgeable about candidates' proposed policies and increased the salience of spending, but did not affect vote shares and turnout. Treated voters were more likely to be targeted for vote buying. We develop a model of vote buying that accounts for these results. The information raised voter expectations regarding incumbent performance, especially in incumbent strongholds. Incumbents increased vote buying in response. Consistent with this explanation, both knowledge and vote buying impacts were higher in municipalities with dominant incumbents. Our findings show that, in a political environment where vote buying is the currency of electoral mobilization, incumbent efforts to increase voter welfare may take the form of greater vote buying.
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Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Julien Labonne. Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying. Inter-American Development Bank, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0000493.

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Hanusch, Marek, Philip Keefer, and Razvan Vlaicu. Research Insights: What Explains Vote Buying in Elections? Inter-American Development Bank, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002094.

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Blattman, Christopher, Horacio Larreguy, Benjamin Marx, and Otis Reid. Eat Widely, Vote Wisely? Lessons from a Campaign Against Vote Buying in Uganda. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26293.

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Leight, Jessica, Dana Foarta, Rohini Pande, and Laura Ralston. Value for Money? Community Targeting in Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24194.

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Hanusch, Marek, Philip Keefer, and Razvan Vlaicu. Vote Buying or Campaign Promises?: Electoral Strategies When Party Credibility is Limited. Inter-American Development Bank, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0000498.

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Vlaicu, Razvan. Research Insights: Can Governance Factors Explain Persistent Inequality in Latin America? Inter-American Development Bank, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013043.

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Governance factors on both the demand side (e.g., low voter trust) and supply side (e.g., vote buying) have limited the extent of redistributive policies in Latin America. Countries with stronger democracies have adopted more redistributive policies, even though post-tax inequality remains high in all the regions democracies. Electoral participation has risen in the more democratic countries, while economically motivated protests have increased in weakly institutionalized settings.
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