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Journal articles on the topic 'Voting Theory'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 6 September 2023

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1

Bonner, John, and Peter J. Coughlin. "Probabilistic Voting Theory." Economic Journal 103, no. 420 (1993): 1334. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2234270.

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2

Young, H. P. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting." American Political Science Review 82, no. 4 (1988): 1231–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961757.

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Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative. Nevertheless, Condorcet did propose a novel and statistically correct rule for finding the most likely

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3

Nurmi, Hannu. "Voting Theory: Сui Bono?" Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 91, № 4 (2018): 106–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2018-91-4-106-121.

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4

Lehtinen, Aki. "A welfarist critique of social choice theory: interpersonal comparisons in the theory of voting." Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 8, no. 2 (2015): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v8i2.200.

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This paper provides a philosophical critique of social choice theory insofar as it deals with the normative evaluation of voting and voting rules. I will argue that the very method of evaluating voting rules in terms of whether they satisfy various conditions is deeply problematic because introducing strategic behaviour leads to a violation of any condition that makes a difference between voting rules. I also argue that it is legitimate to make interpersonal comparisons of utilities in voting theory. Combining a realistic account of voters’ behaviour with a utilitarian evaluation of the outcom

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5

Myerson, Roger B., and Robert J. Weber. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria." American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (1993): 102–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938959.

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A voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate, acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory, generate an election result that justifies their perceptions. Voting equilibria always exist, and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system. We compare equilibria under the plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda system. We consider a candidate-positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restric

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6

Myatt, David P. "A Theory of Protest Voting." Economic Journal 127, no. 603 (2016): 1527–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12333.

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7

Roberts, Fred, and Alexis Tsoukiás. "Voting theory and preference modeling." Mathematical Social Sciences 57, no. 3 (2009): 289–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.12.005.

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8

Saari, Donald G. "Unsettling aspects of voting theory." Economic Theory 22, no. 3 (2003): 529–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0332-5.

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9

Vieille, Nicolas. "Random Walks and Voting Theory." Mathematics of Operations Research 29, no. 1 (2004): 106–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1030.0052.

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10

Jurado, Jhenica Mae L., Jo Marj D. Villacorta, and Peter Jeff C. Camaro, M.A. "Economic Voting Theory in the Philippines." Journal of Economics, Finance and Accounting Studies 4, no. 1 (2022): 184–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.32996/jefas.2022.4.1.12.

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The study examined how the performance of the politicians influences the voters’ decisions in the elections. The researchers modified Reed’s (1994) performance-based voting model to evaluate the performance of the politicians during their term in office. Since the model is a repeated election framework, the researchers focused on the senatorial elections during the Arroyo to Duterte administration (2004-2019) in the Philippines. The framework was used to determine whether the prospective or retrospective voting theories occurred in the elections and was able to compute for the value of the off

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11

Latimer, Trevor. "Plural voting and political equality: A thought experiment in democratic theory." European Journal of Political Theory 17, no. 1 (2015): 65–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885115591344.

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I demonstrate that a set of well-known objections defeat John Stuart Mill’s plural voting proposal, but do not defeat plural voting as such. I adopt the following as a working definition of political equality: a voting system is egalitarian if and only if departures from a baseline of equally weighted votes are normatively permissible. I develop an alternative proposal, called procedural plural voting, which allocates plural votes procedurally, via the free choices of the electorate, rather than according to a substantive standard of competence. The alternative avoids standards objections to M

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12

Hugh-Jones, David. "Sophisticated Voting on Competing Ballot Measures: Spatial Theory and Evidence." British Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (2010): 399–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123410000025.

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Are voters sophisticated? Rational choice theories of voting assume they are. Students of voting behaviour are more doubtful. This article examines voting in a particularly demanding setting: direct democratic elections in which two competing proposals are on the ballot. It develops a spatial model of voting and proposal qualification with competing proposals. If voters are naïve, then competing proposals can be used to block the direct democratic route to change, but, if voters vote strategically, competing proposals can bring outcomes closer to the median voter. Voting intention data from Ca

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13

McCune, David, and Lori McCune. "“How Can We Compare Different Voting Methods?” A Voting Theory Project." PRIMUS 29, no. 5 (2019): 487–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10511970.2018.1489924.

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14

Rabinowitz, George, and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. "A Directional Theory of Issue Voting." American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989): 93–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1956436.

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From Stokes's (1963) early critique on, it has been clear to empirical researchers that the traditional spatial theory of elections is seriously flawed. Yet fully a quarter century later, that theory remains the dominant paradigm for understanding mass-elite linkage in politics. We present an alternative spatial theory of elections that we argue has greater empirical verisimilitude.Based on the ideas of symbolic politics, the directional theory assumes that most people have a diffuse preference for a certain direction of policy-making and that people vary in the intensity with which they hold

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15

Berg, S., and D. Lepelley. "On probability models in voting theory." Statistica Neerlandica 48, no. 2 (1994): 133–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9574.1994.tb01438.x.

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16

Lewis-Beck, Michael Steven, and Richard Nadeau. "Economic voting theory: Testing new dimensions." Electoral Studies 30, no. 2 (2011): 288–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.001.

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17

Rogers, Jonathan. "A communotropic theory of economic voting." Electoral Studies 36 (December 2014): 107–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.08.004.

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18

Diskin, Abraham, and Moshe Koppel. "Voting power: an information theory approach." Social Choice and Welfare 34, no. 1 (2009): 105–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0390-8.

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19

Glazer, Amihai. "AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES." Economic Inquiry 30, no. 4 (1992): 733–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01294.x.

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20

Kleiner, Andreas, and Benny Moldovanu. "Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 4 (2022): 583–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200147.

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We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a “left-right” axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting process, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophisticated voting. Based on inference results and revealed preference arguments, we illustrate the empi

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21

Feddersen, Timothy J. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting." Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 99–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533004773563458.

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Given the extensive evidence of apparently strategic voter behavior, it is unsettling that there is not a canonical rational choice model of voting in elections with costs to vote. But while a canonical model does not yet exist, the literature appears to be converging toward a “group-based” model of turnout, in which group members participate in elections either because they are directly coordinated and rewarded by leaders as in “mobilization” models or because they believe themselves to be ethically obliged to act in a manner that is consistent with the group's interest as in “ethical agent”

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22

Savadogo, Zoïnabo, and Blaise Somé. "Voting method based on approval voting and arithmetic mean." International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research 9, no. 1 (2020): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.14419/ijamr.v9i1.30129.

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Voting plays a vital role in any society. Indeed the votes involve decision making especially and the more in the decision of group. Thanks to the opinions expressed by a group of people, an opinion representing the preference of the group is determined. But most often some voting methods seem to distance the result from a vote of the general opinion. The study of voting methods is based on the theory of social choice. For several years, in the literature on the theory of social choice, many theorists have contributed trying to find a representative voting method.It seems that there is no tota

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23

Schofield, Peter, and Peter Reeves. "Does the factor theory of satisfaction explain political voting behaviour?" European Journal of Marketing 49, no. 5/6 (2015): 968–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ejm-08-2014-0524.

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Purpose – This paper aims to explain voter perceptions and voting behaviour in the 2010 UK General Election on the basis of this theory, by evaluating the differential impact of government performance on key political issues defined as hierarchical voter satisfaction factor types. The validity of the three-factor theory of satisfaction in explaining consumer decision-making for products and services is well-established. Design/methodology/approach – British Election Survey (2010) data are used to test the relative influence of hierarchical voter satisfaction factor types in predicting the perc

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24

Gainous, Jason, and Keith Wagner. "The Electronic Ballot Box: A Rational Voting Model for Class, Age, and Racial Bias." American Review of Politics 28 (April 1, 2007): 19–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2007.28.0.19-35.

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This research creates a theoretical framework for understanding the effect of Internet voting on the electorate. Based on standard Downsian rational choice voting theory, we claim that Internet voting lowers the cost of voting for certain voting demographics based upon race, age, and income. We further contend that this electoral advantage may crystallize the growing turnout disparity between demographic groups. The theory is tested using Bayesian inferential methods with data from the Internet turnout in the 2000 Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary merged with demographic data obtained fr

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25

JESSEE, STEPHEN A. "Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election." American Political Science Review 103, no. 01 (2009): 59–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000305540909008x.

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The theory of spatial voting has played a large role in the development of important results across many areas of political science. Directly testing the foundational assumptions of spatial voting theory, however, has not been possible with existing data. Using a novel survey design, this article obtains estimates of voter ideology on the same scale as candidate positions. The results of this scaling demonstrate that voters possess meaningful ideologies and, furthermore, that these beliefs are strongly related to the sorts of policy proposals considered in Congress. These ideology estimates ar

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26

Lapatinas, Athanasios. "Understanding Voting Behaviour in Complex Political Systems." Mathematical Economics Letters 2, no. 3-4 (2014): 59–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mel-2014-0001.

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AbstractWe suggest in this paper that voting in political systems can be profitably analysed using complex system analysis. We discuss how we can capture the complexity of voting behaviour by applying graph theory in networks and we develop a simplified theoretical model of voting choice adopting the basic heuristics of the behavioural decision theory. We feel that such a complex systems approach provides a superior basis for understanding voting behaviour compared to standard political economy analysis.

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27

Savadogo, Zoinabo, Abdoulaye Compaore, and Pegdwinde Ousseni Fabrice Ouedraogo. "Voting Method Based on an Average Gap Assessment." European Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics 12, no. 3 (2019): 1176–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.29020/nybg.ejpam.v12i3.3452.

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The theory of social choice is the study of voting methods. In the literature manystudies have been conducted for the development of a fair voting system, that is to say a voting method that allows to aggregate the individual preferences in a collective preference representing in the most possible faithfull way individual preferences. Yet some voting methods do not allow to obtain a consensus. So there are a lot of paradoxes in electoral systems and related results in the theory of social choice are also paradoxical. This is the case, for example, with Arrow’s theorem showing that no voting me

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28

Ploeg, Frederick Van Der, James M. Enelow, and J. Melvin Hinich. "The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction." Economic Journal 95, no. 378 (1985): 509. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2233238.

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29

Ward, Hugh, J. M. Enelow, and M. J. Hinich. "Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting." British Journal of Sociology 44, no. 1 (1993): 152. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/591691.

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30

Rabinowitz, George, James M. Enelow, and Melvin J. Hinich. "Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting." Contemporary Sociology 20, no. 5 (1991): 736. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2072226.

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31

Bonner, John, James M. Enelow, and Melvin J. Hinich. "Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting." Economic Journal 101, no. 408 (1991): 1300. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2234450.

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32

Daugherty, Zajj, Alexander K. Eustis, Gregory Minton, and Michael E. Orrison. "Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation Theory." American Mathematical Monthly 116, no. 8 (2009): 667–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.4169/193009709x460796.

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33

McKelvey, Richard D., and John W. Patty. "A theory of voting in large elections." Games and Economic Behavior 57, no. 1 (2006): 155–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.003.

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34

Hennessy, Michael, Michael X. Delli Carpini, Michael B. Blank, Kenneth Winneg, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. "USING PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY TO PREDICT VOTING INTENTIONS." Journal of Community Psychology 43, no. 4 (2015): 466–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jcop.21697.

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35

Lau, Richard R., and David P. Redlawsk. "Voting Correctly." American Political Science Review 91, no. 3 (1997): 585–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2952076.

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The average voter falls far short of the prescriptions of classic democratic theory in terms of interest, knowledge, and participation in politics. We suggest a more realistic standard: Citizens fulfill their democratic duties if, most of the time, they vote “correctly.” Relying on an operationalization of correct voting based on fully informed interests, we present experimental data showing that, most of the time, people do indeed manage to vote correctly. We also show that voters' determinations of their correct vote choices can be predicted reasonably well with widely available survey data.

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36

Riza Chakim, Mochamad Heru, Aliyah, M. Adhit Dwi Yuda, Rifqi Fahrudin, and Dwi Apriliasari. "Secure and Transparent Elections: Exploring Decentralized Electronic Voting on P2P Blockchain." ADI Journal on Recent Innovation (AJRI) 5, no. 1Sp (2023): 54–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.34306/ajri.v5i1sp.959.

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Voting is one of the methods used by humans to determine decisions in a case. Along with the development of technology, conventional voting also follows the transformation in the adaptation of the current digital era. There is an electronic version of this voting which is often called e-voting (electronic voting). Of course, the application of technology in voting will raise public opinion about concerns about maintaining network privacy and security in e-voting. Of course, security problems can be overcome with technology that is currently being utilized optimally in various fields of life, n

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37

Thomas, Brook. "Voting Rights." J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists 9, no. 2 (2021): 265–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jnc.2021.0025.

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38

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., Richard Nadeau, and Martial Foucault. "The Compleat Economic Voter: New Theory and British Evidence." British Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (2012): 241–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123412000440.

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Almost all the prolific work done on economic voting has been based on the classic reward–punishment model, which treats the economy as a valence issue. The economy is a valence issue, but it is much more than that. This article explores two other dimensions of economic voting – position and patrimony. Investigating a 2010 British survey containing relevant measures on these three dimensions, the authors estimate their impact on vote intention, using a carefully specified system of equations. According to the evidence reported, each dimension of economic voting has its own independent effect.

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39

Persson, Mikael, Peter Esaiasson, and Mikael Gilljam. "The effects of direct voting and deliberation on legitimacy beliefs: an experimental study of small group decision-making." European Political Science Review 5, no. 3 (2012): 381–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773912000173.

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In democratic theory, two frequently occurring ideas are that deliberation and direct voting in referendums can increase perceived legitimacy of democratic procedures. To evaluate this claim, we conducted a controlled field experiment in which 215 high school students participated by being subject to a decision on a collective issue. The decision was made either by direct voting or as a non-voting procedure (decision made by the teacher). Additionally, we manipulated the opportunities for deliberation prior to the decision. Our primary finding is that both voting and deliberation significantly

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40

Young, Peyton. "Optimal Voting Rules." Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 1 (1995): 51–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.9.1.51.

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Modern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters’ opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms.

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41

Wang, Yujie. "Game Theory Survey: Voting Methods of Preferential Ballot." Journal of Physics: Conference Series 2386, no. 1 (2022): 012001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2386/1/012001.

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Abstract This paper is a survey focuses on seven basic Voting Methods for Preferential Ballots. The purpose is to give a pellucid illustration of these Methods in consideration of Game Theory, and understand their intrinsic and associative properties. In order to understand these Methods and their efficacy, multiple techniques, such as Mathematical Modeling and Computer Programming, are used for evaluation and comparison. The ultimate goal is to find a Voting Methods which elect the most democratic winner.

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42

Winter, Eyal. "Voting and Vetoing." American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 813–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2945844.

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The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are gi

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43

Bartholdi, Laurent, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, and Leeat Yariv. "Equitable Voting Rules." Econometrica 89, no. 2 (2021): 563–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta17032.

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May's theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce technique

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44

Hudelson, Richard. "A Note on the Empirical Adequacy of the Expressive Theory of Voting Behavior." Economics and Philosophy 3, no. 1 (1987): 127–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267100002777.

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In their article, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky (1985, p. 199) present an alternative to market theories of voting behavior. Contrary to market theories which view the voter as acting to maximize the expected self-interest, the alternative view sees voting as fundamentally an act of self-expression: “Voting, like speech, is an expressive activity providing an outlet for one's moral sentiments. We suggest that it is the expressive return to a vote that frequently determines the behavior of individuals in large-number electorates.”

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45

Zhang, Shengliang, Yuan Chen, Xiaodong Li, and Guowei Dou. "Determinants of voting avoidance On mobile social media: evidence from WeChat in China." Kybernetes 49, no. 5 (2019): 1445–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-10-2018-0571.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to use role expectation theory to identify potential determinants of user voting avoidance on mobile social media. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected through a survey of 602 WeChat users, and the proposed model was analysed using structural equation modelling. Findings Results indicate that user voting avoidance was positively influenced by unfair competition, perceived inauthenticity, perceived information insecurity, over-consumption of renqing (a unique Chinese human relation) and organisation placement in the context of mobile social media.

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46

Avgerou, Chrisanthi, Silvia Masiero, and Angeliki Poulymenakou. "Trusting e-voting amid experiences of electoral malpractice: The case of Indian elections." Journal of Information Technology 34, no. 3 (2019): 263–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0268396218816199.

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This article constructs explanatory theory on trust in e-voting, a term that refers to the use of stand-alone IT artefacts in voting stations. We study e-voting as a techno-organisational arrangement embedded in the process of elections and the broader socio-economic context of a country. Following a critical realist approach, we apply retroduction and retrodiction principles to build theory by complementing existing studies of e-voting with insights from an in-depth case study of elections in India. First, we seek evidence of trust in e-voting in the responses of the public to the announcemen

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47

Rapeli, Lauri, Mikko Mattila, and Achillefs Papageorgiou. "Breaking a habit: The impact of health on turnout and party choice." Party Politics 26, no. 2 (2018): 133–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817753060.

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Turnout and party choice are widely held to be habitual, but little attention has been paid to factors that disrupt the pattern. Good health is an important determinant of political behaviour and a key component in the quality of life. Based on the developmental theory of turnout, we hypothesize that declining health lowers voting propensity over the life course. We employ issue ownership theory to assume that declining health increases the likelihood of voting for leftist parties. Using the British Household Panel Survey data, we show how deteriorating health significantly lowers the propensi

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48

Debashis Chakrabarti and Amaresh Jha. "Structural Analysis of Voting Intention of Indian Electors in the Framework of Theory of Planned Behaviour." ijpmonline 1, no. 1 (2022): 16–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.26524/ijpm.1.3.

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Is voting a planned behaviour? If so, does the theory of planned behaviour apply to voting intention? This study uses structural equation modelling as a method to analyse the responses of voters to re-test the theory of planned behaviour in the context of Indian elections. The researchers assume that attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control of electors is positively related to voting intention. The participants in the survey are the Indian electors who exercised their right to elect during the 2014 & 2019 Loksabha (Parliamentary) elections in India. The findings provide

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49

La Barbera, Francesco, and Icek Ajzen. "Understanding support for European integration across generations: A study guided by the theory of planned behavior." Europe’s Journal of Psychology 16, no. 3 (2020): 437–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v16i3.1844.

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Recent events, such as failed constitutional referenda, low voting turnout in the European Union parliamentary elections, and the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom call for a better understanding of people’s voting behavior in relation to the EU. The current study is the first attempt to use the theory of planned behavior to explore the antecedents of voting for EU integration in an Italian convenience sample (N = 441) of varying age. A structural equation model of voting intentions showed an excellent fit to the data, both for the whole sample and for subsamples of young vs. old pa

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50

Buisseret, Peter, and Carlo Prato. "Voting behavior under proportional representation." Journal of Theoretical Politics 32, no. 1 (2020): 96–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892342.

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Understanding voter preferences in proportional representation (PR) systems is an essential first step towards understanding candidate selection and behavior. We unearth conceptual challenges of constructing a theory of sincere voting in PR elections. Using a rich but tractable framework, we propose a foundational theory of voting behavior in list PR systems. We show how voters’ expectations about the election outcome shape the relative salience of different candidates on a party’s ballot and ultimately determine their induced preferences over a party’s list. Our framework shows how voters all

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