Relevant bibliographies by topics / Weighted Voting Games

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Book chapters
  4. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Weighted Voting Games'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 6 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Weighted Voting Games"

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Aziz, H., Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, and M. Paterson. "False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 40 (January 20, 2011): 57–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.3166.

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Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A player's power in such games is usually not directly proportional to his weight, and is measured by a power index, the most prominent among which are the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index.In this paper, we investigate by how much a player can change his power, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik index or the Banzhaf index, by means of a false-name manipulation, i.
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Sened, Itai. "Equilibria in Weighted Voting Games with Sidepayments." Journal of Theoretical Politics 7, no. 3 (1995): 283–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692895007003003.

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Zuckerman, Michael, Piotr Faliszewski, Yoram Bachrach, and Edith Elkind. "Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games." Artificial Intelligence 180-181 (April 2012): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2011.12.003.

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Boratyn, Daria, Werner Kirsch, Wojciech Słomczyński, Dariusz Stolicki, and Karol Życzkowski. "Average weights and power in weighted voting games." Mathematical Social Sciences 108 (November 2020): 90–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.04.002.

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Mash, Moshe, Roy Fairstein, Yoram Bachrach, Kobi Gal, and Yair Zick. "Human-computer Coalition Formation in Weighted Voting Games." ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology 11, no. 6 (2020): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3408294.

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Kurz, Sascha. "On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games." Annals of Operations Research 196, no. 1 (2012): 361–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1108-3.

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Elkind, Edith, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, and Michael Wooldridge. "On the computational complexity of weighted voting games." Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 56, no. 2 (2009): 109–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-009-9162-5.

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Guerci, Eric, Nobuyuki Hanaki, and Naoki Watanabe. "Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment." Theory and Decision 83, no. 1 (2017): 131–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9588-x.

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Kim, Heemin. "The strongly stable core in weighted voting games." Public Choice 84, no. 1-2 (1995): 77–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01047802.

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Fishburn, Peter C., and Steven J. Brams. "Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games." Social Choice and Welfare 13, no. 4 (1996): 397–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050039.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Weighted Voting Games"

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Lasisi, Ramoni Olaoluwa. "Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games." DigitalCommons@USU, 2013. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/1771.

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Weighted voting games are classic cooperative games which provide compact representation for coalition formation models in human societies and multiagent systems. As useful as weighted voting games are in modeling cooperation among players, they are, however, not immune from the vulnerability of manipulations (i.e., dishonest behaviors) by strategic players that may be present in the games. With the possibility of manipulations, it becomes difficult to establish or maintain trust, and, more importantly, it becomes difficult to assure fairness in such games. For these reasons, we conduct carefu
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Lindner, Ines. "Power measures in large weighted voting games asymptotic properties and numerical methods /." [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=972400516.

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Zhang, Ping. "Theoretical and experimental approaches to institutional design : applications to IPO auctions and weighted voting games." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2006. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/10163/.

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Multiple solutions often exist in both non-cooperative and cooperative games. In this thesis we use game theoretical arguments and experiments to examine multiplicity in two different areas, namely uniform price auctions and weighted voting games. In the second chapter we develop a theoretical model of IPO auctions and show that when demand is discrete the tacit collusion equilibrium is obtained under a stricter condition than in the continuous format. There also exists a continuum of equilibria where investors with a higher expected valuation bid more aggressively, and as a result the market
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Strauss, Aaron B. 1980. "Applying integer programming techniques to find minimum integer weights of voting games." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/18019.

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Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2003.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-76).<br>Using concepts from computer science and mathematics I develop three algorithms to find the minimum integer weights for voting games. Games with up to at least 17 players can be solved in a reasonable amount of time. First, coalitions are mapped to constraints, reducing the problem to constraint optimization. The optimization techniques used are Gomory's all-integer simplex algorithm and a variant of the popular integer progr
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Lindner, Ines [Verfasser]. "Power measures in large weighted voting games : asymptotic properties and numerical methods / vorgelegt von Ines Lindner." 2004. http://d-nb.info/972400516/34.

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Book chapters on the topic "Weighted Voting Games"

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Bachrach, Yoram, and Nisarg Shah. "Reliability Weighted Voting Games." In Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_4.

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Hof, Frits, Walter Kern, Sascha Kurz, and Daniël Paulusma. "Simple Games Versus Weighted Voting Games." In Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_7.

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Schofield, Norman. "Bargaining in Weighted Majority Voting Games." In International Studies in Economics and Econometrics. Springer Netherlands, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3607-2_2.

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Bachrach, Yoram, Yuval Filmus, Joel Oren, and Yair Zick. "Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights." In Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_14.

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Bhattacherjee, Sanjay, and Palash Sarkar. "Correlation and Inequality in Weighted Majority Voting Games." In Deprivation, Inequality and Polarization. Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7944-4_9.

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Lasisi, Ramoni O., and Vicki H. Allan. "Manipulation of Weighted Voting Games via Annexation and Merging." In Communications in Computer and Information Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36907-0_24.

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Dasgupta, Prithviraj, and Ke Cheng. "Robust Multi-robot Team Formations Using Weighted Voting Games." In Springer Tracts in Advanced Robotics. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32723-0_27.

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Lasisi, Ramoni O. "Merging in Weighted Voting Games with Multiple Strategic Agents." In Proceedings of the Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2020, Volume 1. Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63128-4_8.

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Bremer, Jörg, and Sebastian Lehnhoff. "Decentralized Surplus Distribution Estimation with Weighted k-Majority Voting Games." In Communications in Computer and Information Science. Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60285-1_28.

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Lasisi, Ramoni O., and Vicki H. Allan. "Manipulation of Weighted Voting Games and the Effect of Quota." In Communications in Computer and Information Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29966-7_27.

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Conference papers on the topic "Weighted Voting Games"

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Fatima, Shaheen, Michael Wooldridge, and Nicholas R. Jennings. "Automated analysis of weighted voting games." In the 13th International Conference. ACM Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2378104.2378107.

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Aziz, Haris, Mike Paterson, and Dennis Leech. "Efficient Algorithm for Designing Weighted Voting Games." In 2007 IEEE International Multitopic Conference (INMIC). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/inmic.2007.4557718.

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Elkind, Edith, and Dmitrii Pasechnik. "Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games." In Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973068.37.

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"A SEARCH-BASED APPROACH TO ANNEXATION AND MERGING IN WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES." In International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. SciTePress - Science and and Technology Publications, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0003741300440053.

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Eid, Shereif. "The Power Index at Infinity: Weighted Voting in Sequential Infinite Anonymous Games." In 13th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010178504750482.

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Gafni, Yotam, Ron Lavi, and Moshe Tennenholtz. "Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/30.

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Weighted voting games are applicable to a wide variety of multi-agent settings. They enable the formalization of power indices which quantify the coalitional power of players. We take a novel approach to the study of the power of big vs.~small players in these games. We model small (big) players as having single (multiple) votes. The aggregate relative power of big players is measured w.r.t.~their votes proportion. For this ratio, we show small constant worst-case bounds for the Shapley-Shubik and the Deegan-Packel indices. In sharp contrast, this ratio is unbounded for the Banzhaf index. As a
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"Experimental Evaluation of the Effects of Manipulation by Merging in Weighted Voting Games." In International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. SciTePress - Science and and Technology Publications, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0004229401960203.

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Zick, Yair, Kobi Gal, Yoram Bachrach, and Moshe Mash. "How to Form Winning Coalitions in Mixed Human-Computer Settings." In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/66.

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Despite the prevalence of weighted voting in the real world, there has been relatively little work studying real people's behavior in such settings. This paper proposes a new negotiation game, based on the weighted voting paradigm in cooperative games, where players need to form coalitions and agree on how to share the gains. We show that solution concepts from cooperative game theory (in particular, an extension of the Deegan-Packel Index) provide a good prediction of people's decisions to join a given coalition. With this insight in mind, we design an agent that combines predictive analytics
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"ANNEXATIONS AND MERGING IN WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES - The Extent of Susceptibility of Power Indices." In 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. SciTePress - Science and and Technology Publications, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0003177201240133.

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Lau, Billy Pik Lik, Ashutosh Kumar Singh, and Terence Peng Lian Tan. "Weighted voting game based algorithm for joining a microscopic coalition." In TENCON 2013 - 2013 IEEE Region 10 Conference. IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tencon.2013.6718491.

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