Journal articles on the topic 'Weinberger Doctrine'

The U.S. Army's recent embrace of counterinsurgency warfare and nation building complicates theories of military politics. For decades, critics declared the army too risk averse, too parochial, and too insulated to change, often thwarting civilian demands for greater flexibility. How should we understand these recent, unexpected changes? In this article I synthesize insights from historical institutionalism and American political development to derive a micropolitical perspective on institutional change. This approach advances two components as necessary before an institution transforms. First, mid-level agents shift the unofficial discourses through which they understand and describe the institution's core missions and capabilities. These slow and often subtle changes create a mismatch between the mid-level actors and the institution's paradigm. This erosion of institutional order provides an opportunity to reformers. The second component of transformation is the work of these reformers to forge coalitions with elites inside and outside government and press institutional leaders for change. In the rest of the article, I demonstrate the efficacy of the micropolitical approach by investigating how the army developed its AirLand Battle doctrine after the Vietnam War. My analysis of recently declassified correspondence, oral-history interviews, and the writings of officers and experts shows how mid-level officers and external reformers were able to shift the discourses of army leaders and develop an institutional paradigm that endured for decades. Indeed, AirLand Battle influenced the Weinberger criteria for deploying American troops, and it shaped U.S. conduct during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This suggests a research program that could demonstrate why and how the U.S. Army's way of war changed during the 2000s, as well as how durable this transformation will be.

The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 was the most comprehensive and important defense reorganization legislation since its initial establishment in 1947. It has administrated the way the United States has organized, planned, and conducted military operations for the last thirty years. Despite this, a strong opposition movement organized primarily by Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, almost endangred the adoption of the mentioned above law. This opposition also included members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prominent Senators and Congressman, and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger.
 A ten year retrospective of the Act’s passage at the National Defense University (NDU) in 1999 detailed its six most significant achievements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an individual, was designated the principal military advisor to the President and other senior officials. The Chairman was assigned new responsibilities in the areas of strategic planning, logistics, net assessments, joint doctrine, and joint programs and budgets. A Vice Chairman position, outranking the other chiefs was created to assist the Chairman and act as the Chairman in his or her absence. The Joint Staff was expanded beyond 400 members and placed directly under the control of the Chairman. The power and influence of the deployed unified commanders was also increased by providing them authority over subordinate commands in their areas of responsibility, especially regarding joint training, force organization, and force employment. Finally, the Joint Specialty Officer program was mandated. This program was designed to ensure the services assigned some of their highest quality officers to joint duty.”1 Nearly all in attendance at the 1999 NDU event concluded that passage of the legislation was a universal good.
 The subject of the article is the influence of international US military campaigns on the adoption of Goldwater-Nichols Act.
 This article tends to examine the background which led to the adoption of Goldwater Nichols Act, the opposition of the Marines and Navy against the aforementioned Act. The goal is to analyze the main changes brought in by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and their impact on the development of the US military. The phenomena concern “Joint Forces” and the increase of effective cooperation between the departments. The key provisions, which strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense and outlined its role in the chain of command, will be evaluated.
 Keywords: Goldwater-Nichols Act, reorganization, conflict, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, unified commanders

The Vietnam War killed and wounded many soldiers and civilians. US foreign policy began to shift after the War’s, end including discussions on the level of power to be used for future wars or conflicts. The United States experienced considerable anxiety over its failures in Vietnam, which was coined the Vietnam Syndrome by the media and various political sciences scholars. The Gulf War, the first serious use of US military power after the Vietnam War, began with discussions about the suitable use of force and how the Vietnam War Syndrome could be overcome. While the Vietnam War was a huge failure for the United States, it also paved the way for new discussions on US foreign policy dealing with appropriate use of force, including last resort uses and US vital interests. These discussions are considered as the corner stone for the US success in the Gulf War.
 This study will briefly explain the effects and consequences of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War as well as analyse US foreign policy discussions between the Vietnam War and the Gulf War. While examining US foreign policy and the US intervention in the Gulf War, this research will mainly focus on the Shultz doctrine and the Weinberger doctrine. This study will show that the Vietnam War started many discussions on the use of force and its application in future wars that were part of the US Gulf War military strategy. Even though the United States experienced failure in the Vietnam War, the lessons taken helped to govern future conflicts and the most important clues were seen in the Gulf War.