Relevant bibliographies by topics / Win Maximization vs. Profit Maximization

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Academic literature on the topic 'Win Maximization vs. Profit Maximization'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Win Maximization vs. Profit Maximization"

1

Osokin, N. A. "Win vs. Profit maximization: optimal strategy for managing organizational performance of russian football clubs." Strategic decisions and risk management, no. 2 (July 15, 2018): 86–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.17747/2078-8886-2018-2-86-91.

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The cause-effect relationships between performance dimensions were assessed using a multivariate linear regression. The author analyzes the strategic behavior of Russian football clubs using the profit/win maximization classification. The causality tests allowed the author to form a conceptual model of the main performance dimensions of professional football clubs in Russia. The results help better understand the managerial pitfalls in Russian club football. The article contributes to the literature on organizational performance of professional football clubs by focusing on the Russian context, which has not been done previously. The findings of the paper confront the managerial fallacies of Russian club football and broaden the understanding of club football management practices in general.
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Garcia-del-Barrio, Pedro, and Stefan Szymanski. "Goal! Profit Maximization Versus Win Maximization in Soccer." Review of Industrial Organization 34, no. 1 (2009): 45–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-009-9203-6.

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3

Prinz, Aloys L. "Indirect Evolution and Aggregate-Taking Behavior in a Football League: Utility Maximization, Profit Maximization, and Success." Games 10, no. 2 (2019): 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10020022.

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An evolutionary model of European football was applied to analyze a two-stage indirect evolution game in which teams choose their utility function in the first stage, and their optimal talent investments in the second stage. Given the second-stage optimal aggregate-taking strategy (ATS) of talent investment, it was shown that teams may choose a mix of profit or win maximization as their objective, where the former is of considerably higher relevance with linear weights for profits, and is more successful in the utility function. With linear weights for profit and win maximization, maximizing profits is the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of teams. The results change if quadratic weights for profits and wins are employed. With increasing talent productivity, win maximization dominates in the static and in the dynamic versions of the model. As a consequence, it is an open question whether the commercialization of football (and other sports) leagues will lead to more profit or win maximization.
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Terrien, Mickael, Nicolas Scelles, Stephen Morrow, Lionel Maltese, and Christophe Durand. "The win/profit maximization debate: strategic adaptation as the answer?" Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal 7, no. 2 (2017): 121–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sbm-10-2016-0064.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to highlight the heterogeneity of the organizational aims within the professional football teams in Ligue 1. Second, to understand why some teams swing from a win orientation towards a soft budget constraint from year to year, and vice versa. Design/methodology/approach Financial data from annual reports for the period 2005/2015 was collected for the 35 Ligue 1 clubs. To define the degree of compliance with the intended strategy for those clubs, an efficiency analysis was conducted thanks to the data envelopment analysis method. This measure of performance was supplemented with the identification of productivity and demand shocks to identify whether clubs suffered from such shock or changed their strategy. It enables to precise the nature of the evolution in the utility function, with regards to the gap between expectation and actual performance. Findings The paper suggests that a team can switch from one orientation to another from year to year due to the uncertain nature of the sports industry. The club director’s utility function could also be maximized under inter temporal budget function in order to adjust the weight between win and profit according to the opportunities in the environment. Originality/value The paper sheds new light on the win/profit maximization. The theoretical model provides an assessment of the weight between win and profit in Ligue 1 and then identifies a new explanation for persistent losses in the sports industry.
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Hwang, Yu, Issac Sim, Young Sun, Heung-Jae Lee, and Jin Kim. "Game-Theory Modeling for Social Welfare Maximization in Smart Grids." Energies 11, no. 9 (2018): 2315. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en11092315.

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In this paper, we study the Stackelberg game-based evolutionary game with two players, generators and energy users (EUs), for monetary profit maximization in real-time price (RTP) demand response (DR) systems. We propose two energy strategies, generator’s best-pricing and power-generation strategy and demand’s best electricity-usage strategy, which maximize the profit of generators and EUs, respectively, rather than maximizing the conventional unified profit of the generator and EUs. As a win–win strategy to reach the social-welfare maximization, the generators acquire the optimal power consumption calculated by the EUs, and the EUs obtain the optimal electricity price calculated by the generators to update their own energy parameters to achieve profit maximization over time, whenever the generators and the EUs execute their energy strategy in the proposed Stackelberg game structure. In the problem formulation, we newly formulate a generator profit function containing the additional parameter of the electricity usage of EUs to reflect the influence by the parameter. The simulation results show that the proposed energy strategies can effectively improve the profit of the generators to 45% compared to the beseline scheme, and reduce the electricity charge of the EUs by 15.6% on average. Furthermore, we confirmed the proposed algorithm can contribute to stabilization of power generation and peak-to-average ratio (PAR) reduction, which is one of the goals of DR.
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Suvakovic, Djordje,, and Goran Radosavljevic. "Monopsony in the labor market: Profit vs. Wage maximization." Ekonomski anali 52, no. 173 (2007): 7–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka0773007s.

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This paper compares the efficiency of profit- and wage-maximizing (PM and WM) monopsony in the labor market. We show that, both locally and globally, a PM monopsony may well be dominated by its WM twin, where the local and global dominance are defined with respect to a single (inverse) labor supply function and a single family of such functions. This family is always divided in the two disjoint (sub)families of the PM and WM dominance. We also analyze some major factors that explain the size of these (sub)families. .
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7

Fung, K. K., Sri Harsha Kolar, and Pavan R. Karnam. "Profit Versus Efficiency Maximization (Single vs. Discriminating Pricing)—Flash Animation." Journal of Economic Education 37, no. 4 (2006): 484. http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/jece.37.4.484-484.

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8

D’Souza, Márcia Figueredo, Gerlando Augusto Sampaio Franco de Lima, Daniel N. Jones, and Jessica R. Carré. "Do I win, does the company win, or do we both win? Moderate traits of the Dark Triad and profit maximization." Revista Contabilidade & Finanças 30, no. 79 (2019): 123–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x201806020.

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ABSTRACT This article analyzes the relationship between the maximization of personal and company gains and the moderate traits of the Dark Triad. The relevance of choosing this topic lies in investigating the attitude of executives who exhibit characteristics of a moderate intensity between the strong and weak traits. It is proven that the vision and charisma of narcissistic individuals, the strategy and tactics of Machiavellian individuals, and the creativity and good strategic thinking of psychopathic individuals are differentiating characteristics that enhance successful and integrative leadership and that are far from the more accentuated and opportunistic attitudes related to the strong traits, whose practices involve dishonest actions for personal gain. This evidence creates the possibility for strengthening the research in the accounting area, especially on the behavioral approach, in order to promote its interface with psychology and clarify how personality, values, and experiences influence managers’ choices when conducting business and how workers and companies are impacted by these decisions. The study is empirical-theoretical and involves 263 managers, adopting a survey as its data collection strategy and applying a self-reporting type questionnaire. The data analysis approaches included descriptive statistics, correlations, tests of means, and logistic regressions. In this study, managers with moderate psychopathic traits showed a lower tendency to maximize profit by manipulating results. An opposite tendency was revealed for those with moderate Machiavellian traits. The combined effect of the three Dark Triad traits was significant and positive, revealing opportunistic profit maximization. These findings contribute to future studies that aim to systematically analyze moderate levels of the triad and corroborate the findings that have revealed the common characteristics of manipulation, callousness, and dishonesty when investigating the interactive effect between the traits in question.
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9

Hamill, Allan S., Susan E. Weaver, Peter H. Sikkema, Clarence J. Swanton, Francois J. Tardif, and Gabrielle M. Ferguson. "Benefits and Risks of Economic vs. Efficacious Approaches to Weed Management in Corn and Soybean." Weed Technology 18, no. 3 (2004): 723–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1614/wt-03-166r.

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A 3-yr study was conducted on nine farms across southern Ontario to evaluate the risks and benefits of different approaches to weed management in corn and soybean. Weed control decisions were based on field scouting and recommendations from the Ontario version of HADSS™, the herbicide application decision support system. Treatments were selected to maximize profit (economic threshold approach) or to maximize yield (highest treatment efficacy). Reduced rates of the high efficacy treatment for each field also were included. Weed density before and after treatment, crop yields, weed seed return, and the effect of weed control decisions on weed density 1 yr after treatment were assessed. Crop yield varied among years and farms but was not affected by weed control treatment. Weed control at 28 d after treatment (DAT) was often lower and weed density, biomass, and seed production 70 DAT were often higher with the profit maximization approach compared with the yield maximization approach. However, weed density 1 yr later, after each cooperator had applied a general weed control program, did not vary significantly among the previous year's weed control treatments. Reduced rates of the high efficacy treatments did not lead to increased weed problems the next year, despite lower weed control and increased weed seed production in some years. During the 3 yr of the study, weed control costs with the profit maximization approach were approximately Can$45/ha less than with the yield maximization approach.
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Otaki, Atsushi, Kiyohiko Hattori, and Keiki Takadama. "Toward Strategic Human Skill Development Through Human and Agent Interaction: Improving Negotiation Skill by Interacting with Bargaining Agent." Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 14, no. 7 (2010): 831–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/jaciii.2010.p0831.

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This paper focuses on developing human skills through interaction between a human player and a computer agent, and explores its strategic method through experiments on the bargaining games where human players negotiate with computer agents. Specifically, human players negotiate with three types of agents: (a) strong/weak attitude agents making aggressive/defensive proposals in advantageous/disadvantageous situations; (b) fair agents making fair proposals; and (c) the “human-like” agents making mutually agreeable proposals as the number of games increases. Analysis of the human subject experiments has revealed the three major implications: (1) human players negotiating with the strong/weak attitude agents obtain the largest profit overall; (2) human players negotiating with “human-like” agents win many games; and (3) no relationship exists between profit maximization and a win of the games.
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