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1
Hughes, Christopher W. "Japan's Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine." Asia Policy 4, no. 1 (2007): 199–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/asp.2007.0041.
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Edström, Bert. "The Yoshida doctrine and the unipolar world." Japan Forum 16, no. 1 (2004): 63–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0955580032000189339.
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Ma, Yunpeng, Shisong Zhu, and Chunhong Chen. "The Formation of the Leading Role of Communist Ideology in the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea." Vestnik NSU. Series: History and Philology 23, no. 4 (2024): 151–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1818-7919-2024-23-4-151-162.
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The formation of the ideology and leadership role of the Korean Communist Party took place in the conditions of overcoming the negative influence of the Yoshida doctrine. Korean communists attributed the failure of both the Korean national liberation movement and the early communist movement to the influence of the Yoshida Doctrine. Bourgeois nationalists concentrated their efforts on searching for a “powerful power” that they could rely on in the struggle for independence. However, they did not consider the Korean people as a subject in this struggle. This fact determined the defeat of the bourgeois nationalist movement and contributed to the preservation of foreign domination. Korean communists waged an ideological struggle against the Yoshida Doctrine, striving for an ideological theory of self-determination. This became the source and foundation of the future “Juche ideology” – the basic principle of North Korean socialism associated with political independence and economic self-sufficiency. Only under the leadership of the working class and its political parties was it possible to formulate the correct strategies and tactics, carry out the armed struggle for independence in an organized manner, overcome the fragmentation and spontaneity of the struggle and achieve victory in the struggle for national independence. In the process of fighting for the complete elimination of the “Yoshida Doctrine” in their minds, the Korean communists, represented by Kim Il Sung, created their own political party and determined the main principle of the struggle: to consider the people as the main force of it. The creation of a political party and the determination of the status of the people as the main subject became the main and direct sources of the Korean “Juche ideology”.
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Chai, Sun-Ki. "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization." International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 389–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081897550401.
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Japan's level of defense expenditure relative to the size of its economy has long been uniquely low among the major industrialized countries. As of 1995, Japan's expenditures stood at 0.96 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Even adding to this the approximately 0.3 percent of GDP devoted to pensions for retired personnel, the level of spending is considerably less than that of major Western states such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, as well as industrialized Asian states such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. Furthermore, these relative magnitudes have remained reasonably stable over the past few decades.
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Filippov, Dmitry A. "Prime minister Hatoyama Yukio's (2009–2010) views on Japan's foreign policy in the context of the search for a new grand strategy." East Asia: Facts and Analytics, no. 4 (December 26, 2023): 78–90. https://doi.org/10.24412/2686-7702-2023-4-78-90.
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The article examines the views of Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009–2010) on Japan’s foreign policy and its role in the international community. Hatoyama’s views and rhetoric are analysed within the context of Japan’s political elites’ longstanding search for alternatives to the Yoshida doctrine, which underpinned Japan’s grand strategy throughout the Cold War. While Hatoyama’s attempts to modify Japan’s diplomatic approach have often been considered incoherent or naive, the article argues that, drawing partially from the concepts regarding Japan’s role on the international stage that were introduced in the 1990s, Prime Minister consistently advocated development of a new strategy. Its parameters were different from both the Yoshida doctrine and the emerging course towards a more robust security policy, which was fully implemented under the second administration of Abe Shinzo (2012–2020). This strategy was based on Japan’s proactive role in upholding global stability through non- military means, reducing its dependence on the US, deepening integration in East Asia, and achieving friendly ties with China.
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Kallender, Paul, and Christopher W. Hughes. "Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan’s Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine." Asian Security 15, no. 2 (2018): 180–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1439017.
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Filippov, Dmitry D. "The Views of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio on Japan’s Foreign Policy Within the Context of the Search for a New Grand Strategy." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 3 (July 19, 2024): 199–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s0130386424030155.
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At present, security environment in East Asia is becoming increasingly fraught, characterised by the growing strategic rivalry between the US and China. Meanwhile, Japan is faced with the challenge of formulating such a foreign policy approach that would both ensure its national security and avoid further escalating the US-China conflict. In these circumstances, it is of interest to examine the views of Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009–2010) on Japan’s foreign policy and its role in the international community. This article analyses Hatoyama’s attitudes and rhetoric within the context of Japanese political elites’ longstanding search for alternatives to the Yoshida Doctrine, which underpinned Japan’s grand strategy throughout the Cold War. While the Prime Minister’s attempts to modify Japanese diplomatic approach have often been considered incoherent or “naïve”, the author argues that, drawing partially from the concepts pertaining to Japan’s role on the international stage that were introduced in the 1990s, Hatoyama consistently advocated the formulation of a new strategy. While admitting that some of Hatoyama’s proposals were not well-thought-out and went beyond the political mainstream, the author posits that he pursued the same goal as previous Japanese leaders, namely achieving balance in Japan’s relations with the US and China. The parameters of Hatoyama’s strategy were different from both the Yoshida Doctrine and the emerging course towards a more robust security policy, which was fully implemented under the second administration of Abe Shinzo (2012–2020). This strategy was based on Japan’s proactive role in upholding global stability through non-military means, reducing its dependence on the US, deepening integration in East Asia, and achieving friendly ties with China. The objectives of this article are to analyse Hatoyama’s political philosophy, identify the similarities and differences between it and other key contemporary foreign policy initiatives, as well as examine the Prime Minister’s approach towards foreign-policy making. The sources include Hatoyama’s speeches and writings as well as a range of academic literature devoted to analysing his foreign policy with an emphasis on the works of Japanese scholars.
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Harašta, Jakub. "Michal Kolmaš: National Identity and Japanese Revisionism." Czech Journal of International Relations 56, no. 2 (2021): 109–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.32422/cjir.55.
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Over the course of the twentieth century, Japan has experienced a radicalshift in its self-perception. After World War II, Japan embraced a peacefuland anti-militarist identity, which was based on its war-prohibitingConstitution and the foreign policy of the Yoshida doctrine. For most of thetwentieth century, this identity was unusually stable. In the last couple ofdecades, however, Japan’s self-perception and foreign policy seem to havechanged. Tokyo has conducted a number of foreign policy actions as well assymbolic internal gestures that would have been unthinkable a few decadesago and that symbolize a new and more confident Japan. Japanesepoliticians – including Prime Minister Abe Shinzō – have adopted a newdiscourse depicting pacifism as a hindrance, rather than asset, to Japan’sforeign policy. Does that mean that “Japan is back”? In order to betterunderstand the dynamics of contemporary Japan, Kolmaš joins up the dotsbetween national identity theory and Japanese revisionism. The book showsthat while political elites and a portion of the Japanese public call for re-articulation of Japan’s peaceful identity, there are still societal andinstitutional forces that prevent this change from entirely materializing.
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Harašta, Jakub. "Michal Kolmaš: National Identity and Japanese Revisionism." Mezinárodní vztahy 56, no. 2 (2021): 109–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.32422/mv-cjir.1777.
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Over the course of the twentieth century, Japan has experienced a radical shift in its self-perception. After World War II, Japan embraced a peaceful and anti-militarist identity, which was based on its war-prohibiting Constitution and the foreign policy of the Yoshida doctrine. For most of the twentieth century, this identity was unusually stable. In the last couple of decades, however, Japan’s self-perception and foreign policy seem to have changed. Tokyo has conducted a number of foreign policy actions as well as symbolic internal gestures that would have been unthinkable a few decades ago and that symbolize a new and more confident Japan. Japanese politicians – including Prime Minister Abe Shinzō – have adopted a new discourse depicting pacifism as a hindrance, rather than asset, to Japan’s foreign policy. Does that mean that “Japan is back”? In order to better understand the dynamics of contemporary Japan, Kolmaš joins up the dots between national identity theory and Japanese revisionism. The book shows that while political elites and a portion of the Japanese public call for re-articulation of Japan’s peaceful identity, there are still societal and institutional forces that prevent this change from entirely materializing.
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Vidal, Lluc. "Japón y el nuevo orden internacional: la inevitable transformación de su diplomacia." Notes Internacionals CIDOB, no. 307 (June 25, 2024): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.24241/notesint.2024/307/es.
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La evolución de la política exterior japonesa desde la doctrina Yoshida hasta las doctrinas Abe y Kishida refleja un proceso de normalización que busca adaptar la diplomacia del país a las nuevas realidades internacionales, dejando atrás el pacifismo adoptado tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, pero sin incurrir en el militarismo. Las reformas impulsadas por los gabinetes de Abe y Kishida han fortalecido las capacidades defensivas de Japón y han promovido su participación más activa en la seguridad global, especialmente en la región del Indopacífico. Esta normalización de Japón responde al pragmatismo de sus élites políticas, que buscan asegurar la autonomía y la influencia del país en un orden internacional liberal en crisis.
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Моренчук, Андрій, та Марія Завадська. "ЗМІНИ В БЕЗПЕКОВІЙ ПОЛІТИЦІ ЯПОНСЬКОГО УРЯДУ Ф. КІШІДИ В КОНТЕКСТІ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ". Міжнародні відносини, суспільні комунікації та регіональні студії, № 3 (20) (1 листопада 2024): 158–72. https://doi.org/10.29038/2524-2679-2024-03-158-172.
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The article analyzes the features of Japan’s security policy. It is noted that tradi- tionally, after World War II, the country relied on US defense resources, adhering to the Yoshida Doctrine. This made it possible to focus on socio-economic issues and reduce military spending. However, Japan’s security situation has changed since the end of the Cold War, when the country sought to increase its contribu- tion to regional and global security. At the beginning of the 21st century, growing military threats from China and North Korea forced Japan to step up its defense efforts. The government of Sh. Abe initiated a number of reforms: the National Security Council was established, the «National Security Strategy» was adopted, and defense capabilities were modernized. Japan has also focused on building new security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. Changes in security policy have covered a variety of issues, including the gradual militarization of the re- mote southwestern islands and cyber security. The final break with the pacifist traditions of foreign policy was performed due to the government of F. Kishida, and the key event that provoked these drastic changes was the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine in February 2022. Key changes proposed by Japan’s new national security strategy include: doubling the defense budget over the next five years; development of counterattack capabilities; expanding into new areas such as space; creation of the Permanent Joint Staff to coordinate the command of the armed forces; strategic emphasis on the southwestern islands, which are under the greatest threat in the context of the situation around Taiwan; increasing the country’s defense capability and readiness to conduct military operations. The «National Defense Strategy of Japan», adopted in 2022, takes into account the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war and aims to respond to «new ways of waging war». In accordance with this, the government’s efforts to make gradual changes in the Self-Defense Forces are focused on seven main areas: strengthe- ning defense capabilities; complex air defense; development of unmanned tech- nologies; means of electronic security; possibilities of mobile deployment and protection of the civilian population; operational headquarters and intelligence centers; increasing the fighting capacity of the personnel of the Self-Defense Forces. Strategic communications with NATO and other defense alliances also play an important role in Japan’s security policy.
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Castillo Iglesias, Just. "La política exterior de seguridad japonesa (2001-2022). Condicionantes para el reajuste estratégico ante un contexto incierto." Revista de Pensamiento Estratégico y Seguridad CISDE 9, no. 1 (2024): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.54988/cisde.2024.1.1309.
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<p>En las dos últimas décadas, la política exterior de seguridad de Japón ha experimentado una notable transformación. Mediante reajustes graduales, Tokio ha dejado atrás la política de bajo perfil articulada sobre la base de la doctrina Yoshida, para adoptar un papel más proactivo, basado en valores, y más apoyado en la seguridad colectiva. Bajo un enfoque basado en el realismo neoclásico, este artículo analiza los cambios implementados por los distintos gobiernos desde Koizumi hasta Kishida. El análisis destaca el papel clave de factores domésticos, como las preferencias y percepciones de los líderes sobre el entorno regional, o las actitudes de la sociedad japonesa hacia la Constitución y el pacifismo, a la hora de explicar el alcance y la profundidad de los reajustes adoptados.</p>
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Hoshiro, Hiroyuki. "Deconstructing the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’." Japanese Journal of Political Science, February 8, 2022, 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109922000019.
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Abstract There is a consensus that the post-war Japanese foreign policy is based on the Yoshida Doctrine or Yoshida Line, which refers to the strategies of former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who relied upon US military security, and maintained limited defense forces while focusing on economic recovery and growth. This paper reconsidered the Yoshida Doctrine, referencing multiple related arguments and evidence, reaching a conclusion that post-war Japanese foreign policy should not be called the Yoshida Doctrine or Yoshida Line. The Yoshida Doctrine is an analytical concept created by researchers in the 1980s to justify Japanese foreign policy. This was done in response to the domestic and foreign criticism of low-level military spending, despite the flourishing economy. The Yoshida Doctrine differs from other foreign policy doctrines and has no merit for being called a doctrine. Furthermore, the ideas supporting this doctrine are not based on definitive proof; rather, they merely represent Yoshida's image, and a spurious correlation, drawn between limited defense spending and high-economic growth. The analysis carried out in this study reveals that the Yoshida Doctrine is fundamentally flawed. As a result, this study insists that it is necessary to abandon the Yoshida Doctrine as a base for future research on Japanese diplomacy.
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"Japan's evolving foreign policy doctrine: from Yoshida to Miyazawa." Choice Reviews Online 37, no. 05 (2000): 37–3021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.37-3021.
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Hughes, Christopher W. "An ‘Abe Doctrine’ as Japan's Grand Strategy: New Dynamism or Dead-End?" Asia-Pacific Journal 13, no. 50 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1017/s1557466015017970.
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Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's stunning return to power in the December 2012 landslide election victory, and the consolidation of his leadership in a repeat victory in December 2014, has heralded the resurgence for Japan of a more assertive, high-profile, and high-risk, foreign and security policy. However, as Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’ suggests, Abe's status as an arch-‘revisionist’ ideologue, combined with the track record of his first administration in 2006-2007, made clear that he would move aggressively to shift Japan towards a more radical external agenda—characterized by a defense posture less fettered by past anti-militaristic constraints, a more fully integrated US-Japan alliance, and an emphasis on ‘value-oriented’ diplomacy with East Asian states and beyond. Indeed, Abe's diplomatic agenda has been so distinctive and forcefully articulated in past years that it might be labeled as a doctrine capable of rivaling, and even of displacing, the doctrine of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru that has famously charted Japan's entire postwar international trajectory. In contrast to Abe's more muscular international agenda, the so-called ‘Yoshida Doctrine’, forged in the aftermath of total defeat in the Pacific War, has long emphasized for Japan the need for a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy, a highly constrained defense posture, reliance but not over-dependence on the US-Japan security treaty, and the expedient rebuilding of economic and diplomatic ties with East Asian neighbors.
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Hughes, Christopher W. "An ‘Abe Doctrine’ as Japan's Grand Strategy: New Dynamism or Dead-End?" Asia-Pacific Journal 13, no. 50 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1017/s1557466015017982.
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Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's stunning return to power in the December 2012 landslide election victory, and the consolidation of his leadership in a repeat victory in December 2014, has heralded the resurgence for Japan of a more assertive, high-profile, and high-risk, foreign and security policy. However, as Japan's Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’ suggests, Abe's status as an arch-‘revisionist’ ideologue, combined with the track record of his first administration in 2006-2007, made clear that he would move aggressively to shift Japan towards a more radical external agenda—characterized by a defense posture less fettered by past anti-militaristic constraints, a more fully integrated US-Japan alliance, and an emphasis on ‘value-oriented’ diplomacy with East Asian states and beyond. Indeed, Abe's diplomatic agenda has been so distinctive and forcefully articulated in past years that it might be labeled as a doctrine capable of rivaling, and even of displacing, the doctrine of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru that has famously charted Japan's entire postwar international trajectory. In contrast to Abe's more muscular international agenda, the so-called ‘Yoshida Doctrine’, forged in the aftermath of total defeat in the Pacific War, has long emphasized for Japan the need for a pragmatic and low-profile foreign policy, a highly constrained defense posture, reliance but not over-dependence on the US-Japan security treaty, and the expedient rebuilding of economic and diplomatic ties with East Asian neighbors.
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Sari, Suniyyah Puspita, and Ulya Fatimatuzzahra. "Pengaruh Perang Dunia Kedua Terhadap Kemajuan Jepang pasca Perang Dingin." ADALAH 5, no. 5 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/adalah.v5i5.22737.
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The end of World War II led to several changes to the global world order, including japan. The often inferior eastern country motivated Japan to make some progress for its country in World War II, but its defeat led to its misfortune as well as its fortune as a superpower in the field of industrial technology. The economy is the most targeted by the Japanese state in building the progress of the country, especially in the field of science and industrial technology. Post-World War II Japan also experienced changes in Japan's post-World War II Foreign Policy, stemming from several doctrines produced by its Prime Minister, such as the Yoshida Doctrine which focused on economic development, then there was the Fukuda Doctrine which focused on Japanese foreign policy to Southeast Asia. Japan's progress in competing with other western countries, is also supported by the principle of group work and the delivery of a number of academics who are ready to serve their country.
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Purbantina, Adiasri Putri. "Dari Yoshida Doctrine ke Fukuda Doctrine: Politik Luar Negeri Jepang di Asia Tenggara Pasca-Perang Dunia II." Global and Policy Journal of International Relations 1, no. 01 (2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.33005/jgp.v1i01.2009.
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"EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S PACIFIST TO REALIST DIPLOMACY: FROM YOSHIDA SHIGERU TO FUMIO KISHIDA." International Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 2 (2023): 57–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/ijeas.vol12no2.5.
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The paper seeks to answer two questions. What are the newer security policies promoted by Japan and are they significant in empowering Tokyo to become an international security and foreign policy leader? In order to answer these questions, the paper examined the implementation of realism diplomacy through actions taken in the past as well as present. Findings suggests that for decades, the Yoshida Doctrine was the basis for Japan’s foreign policy when the state’s priority was economic prosperity and security. However, the severity of the current security environment surrounding Japan desperately needs a different set of foreign policies and diplomacy. The transformation started during Shinzo Abe’s administration which has now been continued by Fumio Kishida, albeit with slight changes here and there. Kishida’s values based realism policies are aimed at protecting Japan as well as transforming the state into a key global player and contributor in security issues. Strengthening defence capabilities, enhancing multilaterism and improving relations with neighbours have indeed transformed Japan into a more responsible, capable and respected global player. Having said that, Kishida does face numerous challenges internally in sustaining his policy priorities.
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Manurung, Hendra. "Japan – U.S. Relations under the Abe Doctrine: Shifting Policy in East Asia Regional Stability." Journal of International Studies, January 12, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32890/jis.13.2017.7984.
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Reelection of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister provides a favorable climate for both Donald Trump’s first presidential visit to Japan and an improvement of Chinese-Japanese-U.S. bilateral relations. In the 22 October 2017 ballot, Abe’s dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito, secured a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives, the lower house of Japan’s bicameral legislature. The coalition already holds a supermajority, required for amending the constitution, in the upper house. It justified Abe for calling the national elections a year earlier than needed to secure a public mandate for addressing the growing North Korean threat and to validate popular support for deepening national economic reforms, which have had recent success in boosting Japan’s growth rate and the stock market. Still the outcome gave Abe a mandate for his policies. However, his stewardship was unclear as several other factors contributed to LDP’s overwhelming victory. At the structural level, Japan’s first past the post-electoral system tends to amplify electoral wins in comparison to proportional representation systems. Abe’s foreign and security policies highly charged with ideological revisionism contain the potential to shift Japan onto a new international trajectory in East Asia. Its degree of articulation and energy makes for a doctrine capable of displacing the Yoshida Doctrine that has been Japan’s dominant grand strategy in the post-war period. Abe will remain pragmatic and not challenge the status quo. However, Abe has already begun to introduce radical policies that appear to transform national security, US-Japan alliance ties and relations with China and East Asia. The Abe Doctrine is dynamic but high risk. Abe’s revisionism contains fundamental contradictions that may ultimately limit national effectiveness.
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Miller, Simon. "Japan's Pacificism as National Identity and a 'Normal' Security Option." University of Queensland Law Journal 42, no. 3 (2023). http://dx.doi.org/10.38127/uqlj.v42i3.8551.
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Japan faces its most serious and complex defence environment since the end of World War II. The country holds two significant security concerns: first, and critically, China’s burgeoning military, increasingly aggressive diplomacy, and destabilising actions around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea; second, North Korea’s continued unpredictable rhetoric and actions in its nuclear arming program and ballistic missile testing. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy proposes two unprecedented policy ideas to counter these threats: first, to significantly increase Japan’s defence budget; second, to acquire counterstrike long-range missile capabilities in response to an attack. Nonetheless, despite these security issues and policy developments, this article argues that formal amendment of the peace clause in art 9 of the Japanese Constitution remains unlikely. To understand the improbability of constitutional amendment, this article first explores Japan’s constitutional pacifism under the post-World War II Yoshida Doctrine and the US–Japan cornerstone security alliance, as well as the context of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile threat and the emotive issue of abductions of Japanese citizens. The article then turns to Japan’s historic imperial relationship with China as an avenue to understand contemporary relations, including the key issues of trade and its link to security, and the Senkaku Islands sovereignty dispute. It concludes that formal constitutional amendment of the peace clause remains unlikely in the short to medium term.