Journal articles on the topic 'Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation'

Zambia has in the recent past witnessed an increase in economic activities which has led to an increased energy demand. This increased demand for energy has overshot the hydroelectric power generating capacity. Consequently, the national power utility company, the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) instituted nationwide load shedding schedules that last up to 12 hours daily. This development has potentially far reaching social and economic effects on the lives and operations of poor urban residents and small scale business enterprises (SMEs) that routinely depend on stable access to electricity. With a focus on two low income residential areas, namely Ng’ombe and Kalingalinga residential areas, this study explored how residents and SMEs of the capital city, Lusaka have been affected by the recent spate of load shedding in the city. A total of 200 households and 14 SMEs from Ng’ombe and Kalingalinga were interviewed. Results show that load shedding, which occurs daily in the two study sites has caused massive disruptions to the daily lives and operations of the households and small businesses respectively. Over time, the load shedding phenomena has gotten worse and become a major political issue, reflecting the hardships for households and businesses in Zambia. On this basis, this study recommends that the government provides subsidies on alternative energy appliances such as portable diesel solar generators for small business enterprises and more favourable electric tariff rates for business that shift their manufacturing activities to night time so as to reduce demand for electricity during peak periods.

The cost of China Power Grid Company's purchasing power is influenced by the relationship between supply and demand of the industry chain, the impact of price fluctuations in the power purchase market, while, the terminal sales price is controlled by the government, not reflecting the supply and demand changes, which makes the income space of power grid corporation uncertainty, therefore, their operation is facing with risk. The paper constructs electricity purchasing and selling risk control optimization model for power Grid Corporation after considering users demand elasticity, electricity distribution in the contract market and real-time market, the compensation cost for users blackout based on the analysis for the influencing factors of Power Grid Corporation and the revenue calculation model.

Abstract Water supply systems that operate intermittently rather than continuously are highly complex. This arises from the interaction of large numbers of internal and external factors that produce major consequences for system operation and management. Handling these problems requires understanding, and to some extent eliminating, their causes. In this paper, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company, Zambia, is used as a case study that shows how poor governance, demographic and economic dynamics, hydrologic regime change, poor system management and operation, unplanned system extensions, limited skilled manpower, poor electricity supply and lack of customer awareness all contribute to sustaining intermittent water supply. Interdisciplinary approaches are recommended to explore interplays between governance, climate change and technical factors when developing solutions to intermittent supplies.

Power outages have negatively impacted the economy of Zambia through declining gross domestic product, loss of jobs and increased mortality rates. This case study provides some of the most crucial solutions to Zambia’s electricity supply deficit which include Yardstick competition and other alternative sources.

The mining industry in Zambia is energy-intensive, with hydro energy providing the required energy. But other sources of energy may need to be added, because hydro energy is subject to good rain patterns, threatened by the spectre of climate change, as already indicated by the current prolonged hours of load shedding by state-owned , Zambia Electricity Supply Company. This research looks at state-of-art mining technologies and collaborative business processes that leverage on the expected ramp in copper and cobalt (Cu-Co) global demand post-Covid-19, to help design resilient business systems by manufacturing, source goods and services within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region to lower Cu-Co production costs, and maximise profits through shared resources and bilateral trade agreements. With evidence, projection and predictions by global leaders in the Cu-Co industry, this study evaluates the preparedness and resilience of the Zambian mining industry for sustainable energy supply, environmental sustainability, and suggests some possible business collaborations within the SADC region to share the following resources: metal refineries, transportation of goods and services, expertise and energy supplies within SADC, to enhance business sustainability. The study shows that the resilience of Cu-Co business in resource-rich nations like Zambia is complex and is heavily influenced by investment decisions, stakeholder interests, copper ore grades and extractive process types, reliable power supply, and socio-economic and political issues. The significance of this study is that it proposes some business collaborations within SADC that can increase energy reliability and supply, Cu-Co production, increase business resilience, improve global competitiveness and sustainability by exploring energy efficiency and generation-mix strategy. Highlights A sustainable energy analysis for Zambia. Establishing the role of mine multi-national enterprises concerning environmental sustainability. Proposing copper business resilience collaborations within SADC. Developing a mining business resilience and sustainability model for sustainable power supply, high production, profitability and global competitiveness.

This paper aims at understanding how Zambia’s electricity system would be affected by droughts (due to a dry year) and how the system’s adaptive capacity could be improved. Hydropower currently supplies 99% of the total electricity in Zambia, and concerns have been raised because many climate change studies project increased occurrences of dry years in the Southern Africa region. Different economic and climatic scenarios were explored to understand their impact on the development of Zambia’s power generation system, and what policies and strategies could be adopted to mitigate these impacts on security of supply and average generation costs, which directly affect the electricity price. The results show that a dry year has significant impact on the average generating cost since hydropower continues to dominate the system. Diversifying the system does not improve the adaptive capacity of the system but only increases the average cost of generating electricity in an average year. The most cost effective way of increasing the system’s adaptive capacity is by importing electricity and gradually increasing share of renewable and coal technologies in the system. Further research on how electricity trade in Southern Africa could be enhanced, should be done.

Bioenergy can play an important role in achieving the agreed United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, thereby advancing climate goals, food security, better land use, and sustainable energy for all. In this study, we assess the surplus agricultural residues availability for bioelectricity in six least developed countries (LDCs) in Asia and Africa, namely Bangladesh, Lao-PDR, and Nepal in Asia; and Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zambia in Africa, respectively. The surplus agricultural residues have been estimated using residue-to-product ratio (RPR), agricultural residues lost in the collection, transportation and storage, and their alternative applications. We use a linear regression model to project the economic potential of bioelectricity. The contribution of bioelectricity for meeting the LDCs’ electricity requirements is estimated in a time frame between 2017 and 2030. Our results reveal that the surplus biomass feedstock available from the agriculture sector could provide the total current electricity demand in Malawi alone, followed by Nepal (45%), Bangladesh (29%), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao-PDR) (29%), Ethiopia (27%), and Zambia (13%). This study also explores the complementarity and synergies of bioelectricity, SDG7, and their interlinkages with other SDGs. Findings from the study show that providing access to sustainable energy in the LDCs to meet the SDG7 by 2030 might be a challenge due to limited access to technology, infrastructure, and finance. Site-specific investigations on how much agricultural residues could be extracted in an environmentally benign manner for bioelectricity and increased investment in the bioenergy sector are key potential solutions in a myriad of options required to harness the full energy potential in the LDCs.

From as early as the 1880s until today, electrical power has served as a useful medium for ushering an urban industrial era throughout the world. This article examines the process of electrification in a colonial setting—Calcutta, the capital of British India till 1911. Access to electricity depended upon economics and technological advances, as well as a combination of local community and regional characteristics such as location, landscape, demographics, politics and culture. Western techno-scientific discourse occupied an extremely important place in the colonization of India. It is known that Western technology and ideas manipulated various technological projects in the colony, including electrification. Was there something unique about Calcutta and its plan that led to the electrification of a colonial metropolis almost simultaneously with other Western industrial nations? By the middle of the twentieth century, electricity, with its elaborate infrastructure of wires, generation stations and poles, emerged as the industrial era’s most prominent symbol of progress in Calcutta. The Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd (CESC), with its head office in London, played the most vital role, debating and resolving various technical questions, such as load factor, fuel sources, operating generation stations and electricity supply to industry, traction and population centres. This article, based on extensive archival research, shows how, despite colonial derivatives, the resulting electrical systems were locally initiated and customized to the needs and characteristics of the region.

Wood fuel, charcoal, and firewood comprise over 70 percent of the national energy consumption in Zambia, as only about 25 percent of the population has access to electricity. Replacing charcoal braziers with cookstoves using sawdust pellets can support sustainable energy provision in urban Zambia while reducing deforestation on the countryside. However, acceptability of pellet cookstoves remains low, while the demand for wood fuel is increasing. The study investigated the acceptability of pellet cookstoves, in view of governmental policies, in the Matero-George compound, Lusaka. Qualitative approaches were applied, and respondents were households, and officers at the Departments of Energy and Forestry, and at Lusaka City Council. Factors shaping the stoves’ acceptability included their convenience, possibility of reusing pellets, their long-term cost advantages, and the perceived health benefits of pellets. The barriers included limited supply of pellets, combustible pellet cookstoves, stove size, maintenance costs, cooking traditions, and government policies for dissemination, sensitisation, and communication about pellet stoves. This study demonstrated that implementation of pellet cookstoves at the local level depends on a multitude of contextual factors, and confirms the need for relevant policy instruments if such energy consumption is to be accepted.

This paper examines the energy consumption, supply and resources of some of the countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 2005, the base year for this analysis. The region is rich in energy resources and currently enjoys relatively stable and affordable electricity. Except in the case of Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa, final energy demand is dominated by the residential sector in the form of biomass. Energy consumption or final energy demand in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe is projected to 2030 using a Long Range Energy Alternatives Plan-ning (LEAP) model in a ‘business as usual’ scenario, the other countries being left out because of poor quality data. The projections are carried out by relating historic sectoral GDP and population growth in each country to energy demand and then using the historical link and the projections of these drivers to project energy demand. The analysis under this ‘business as usual’ scenario seems to indicate that we can expect to see a large increase in consumption in these countries, especially in the form of biomass and electricity. In both cases, supply is a concern. Having established what the present resources are; what some of the supply elements are currently in place; what the base-year demand is; and some basic relationships between demand and socio-economic drivers, this paper sets the stage for further studies that include the future energy supply; regional trade; and scenario analysis using indicators of sustainable development for the region. However, further analysis of the regional energy system, is only valuable if it is supported by good data. A reliable energy balance is needed for the countries not modelled here, and in the case of the modelled countries, better data is also needed, especially in the use biomass.

As Korea aims to increase the extent to which renewable energy sources (RES) account for up to 20% of the total power generated in the country by 2030, the feasibility of this target is a major concern. This concern largely results from the Korean power system possessing unique characteristics, such as its electrical isolation and high density. To achieve the RES target, the reliable operation of the power system must coexist with an increased share of RES power generation. This study proposes a method to evaluate the penetration limit of RES in the Korean power system considering the existing plans for the long-term electricity supply and demand, as well as its operational requirements. The Korea electric power corporation (KEPCO) planning database of the Korean power system for the next 15 years was employed to determine the penetration limit of RES considering the reliability criteria, including the minimum power generation of conventional sources, primary frequency control requirement, 10-min reserve requirement, and frequency stability.

In April 1998 the New Zealand Government announced a reform package for the electricity industry. This package was designed to create the competition promised since deregulation first began in 1987. The 1998 reforms had two main aspects: first, the split of the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ), New Zealand's dominant state-owned enterprise (SOE) generator, into three competitive units; second, a rule business (the ownership split) that local power companies could not own both a lines business (the local distribution wires) and a generation or retail.The ownership split caused a revolution in the industry. Effectively, small community-owned companies were forced to sell their retail and generation businesses to larger companies or to the State, in the form of the ECNZ "babies". The Government believed that the ownership split would facilitate retail competition and deliver lower domestic power prices. This article asks whether the Government was right – whether the ownership split was necessary, or able, to reduce domestic power prices. It concludes that the ownership split was a staggering mistake. The Government's reasoning was based on inconclusive evidence, inadequate research, and contained major logical flaws. The Government rejected unanimous policy advice warning against the split. Since the split, average domestic power prices have risen by almost four per cent. A major factor is the demise of community-owned supply companies which had offered unique advantages to consumers.The root of this disaster was ideological bias. The Government did not understand the electricity industry but treated it as an abstract economic construct. This article documents the way in which ideology led the Government to wreak havoc on an industry in order to cure problems which did not exist.

Thirty one years after its discovery in Queensland's remote Adavale Basin, the Gilmore Field has been put into commercial production, supplying fuel gas to Australia's first independent power plant wholly dedicated to feed a state electricity grid.Gilmore Field is located in PL-65 in Central Queensland. It is a deep, high pressure gasfield which produces dry gas. The gas is primarily methane with up to 21 per cent nitrogen. Three of the five wells in the field currently produce into gas gathering and processing facilities. Gas is piped 240 km to Barcaldine to fuel a Frame-6 gas turbine, generating 37 MW in a peak loading power-station, which operates 14 hours per day, 5 days per week. Further development in Gilmore Field is planned.Numerous development plans have been proposed for Gilmore Field, since its discovery in 1964, but none were successful due to uncertainties on reserves and remoteness. The recent relaxation of state control on utilities and an increase in local demand for electricity created a niche for development of the field.Energy Equity Corporation Ltd (EEC) was responsible for the entire development project which consists of gas gathering and field facilities, a 240 km gas pipeline, power plant and the electricity supply contract. This allowed various aspects of the project to be interactively designed to suit the field's capacity and was an important part of the successful development.As part of the development, the geology was re-evaluated and the field was extensively tested. This resulted in a clearer understanding of the reservoir parameters and a revision of the Devonian stratigraphy of the Adavale Basin. The main producing horizon is the Lissoy Sandstone, a transgressive marine sequence deposited as a strandline over alluvial sandstones of the Log Creek Formation. Reservoir quality is controlled by facies and diagenesis. The productive reservoir consists of near-shore sandstone facies which have developed inter-granular porosity through dissolution of early marine cements. Other facies of the Lissoy Sandstone and the Log Creek Formation are host to low deliverability reserves.

PURPOSE The eastern corridor of Africa is affected by a high burden of esophageal cancer (EC), with > 90% of patients presenting with advanced disease. Self-expanding metal stents (SEMS) have been previously reported as safe and effective for palliation of malignant dysphagia in resource-limited settings; however, access is limited throughout Eastern Africa. METHODS In response to demand for palliative interventions for patients with dysphagia because of EC, the African Esophageal Cancer Consortium (AfrECC) partnered with the Clinton Health Access Initiative to improve access to SEMS in Eastern Africa. We undertook a stepwise implementation approach to (1) identify barriers to SEMS access, (2) conduct a market analysis, (3) select an industry partner, (4) establish regulatory and procurement processes, (5) develop endoscopic training resources, (6) create a medical device registry, and (7) establish principles of accountability. RESULTS Following an evaluation of market demand and potential SEMS manufacturers, Boston Scientific Corporation announced its commitment to launch an access program to provide esophageal SEMS to patients in Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia at a subsidized price. Parallel regulatory and procurement processes were established in each participating country. Endoscopy training courses were designed and conducted, using the Training-of-Trainers model. A device registry was created to centralize data for quality control and to monitor channels of SEMS distribution. Principles of accountability were developed to guide the sustainability of this endeavor. CONCLUSION The AfrECC Stent Access Initiative is an example of a multisector partnership formed to provide an innovative solution to align regional needs with a supply chain for a high-priority medical device.

Probable Maximum Precipitation is defined as the greatest depth of precipitation which is possible for a given time and duration over a given size storm area under known meteorological conditions. This concept has been used as design criterion of major flood control measures such as spillways of large dams worldwide. It is essential for the generation of Probable Maximum Flood. This paper represents the results of PMP analysis for Bakun Dam Area which has a catchment area of 14,750 km2. Three sets of results were produced, i.e. by statistical method (with frequency factors from World Meteorological Organization manual and National Hydraulic Research Institute of Malaysia in Technical Research Publication No. 1 (TRP 1)) for duration of 1 hour, 8 hours, 24 hours and daily and by experimental method for production of daily PMP. The results were compared with each other and the one made by Sarawak Electricity Supply Corporation on Bakun Dam construction. The set of PMP values results from substitution of Km developed by NAHRIM was concluded to be the most reliable results as daily PMP (276mm) was consistent with the one (280mm) produced by SESCO. However, 6 days PMP value (950mm) done by SESCO was recommended as the Bakun Dam Area cover huge catchment area which higher duration of PMP value should be applied .

Study level/applicability This case is suitable for undergraduates, MBA students and students from business administration departments in the teaching of human resources management and performance management. Case overview Luodian Electric Power Construction Corporation Group (LEPCC Group) is a state owned enterprise transformed from a construction unit of Luopu Power Supply Bureau (LPSB), a governmental organization in charge of all the electricity supply in Luopu City. The general manager of LEPCC, Gu Ming tried to set up a modern market-oriented management system for LEPCC. Unfortunately the problems that had accumulated in the past two decades during which LEPCC was a governmental organization made his reforms very difficult. The first headache for Gu Ming was the performance appraisal reform in LEPCC. The existing performance appraisal system seemed to have at least three problems in practice: unclear appraisal objectives, an improper assessment system, a different appraisal standard for similar positions. What should Gu Ming do to build a proper performance appraisal system to help the fast-growing LEPCC Group to make LEPCC a competitive market-oriented player? Expected learning outcomes The first objective of this case is to enable students to understand that the issues of working performance are issues of people first, rather than issues of the management system. If the management focuses on the system instead of on the staff of the company to design the performance management system, the system will be fruitless and inefficient. The second objective is to cultivate students' capability to apply the basic theories of human resource management and the knowledge of performance appraisal in case analysis and practical management. This case, seemingly about performance appraisal, is in fact about the organizational structure and processes of the organization. Reform should start with organizational analysis, job analysis and job descriptions. Only when all these have been done correctly, can the performance management system be designed more reasonably, scientifically and efficiently. Supplementary materials Teaching notes are available; please consult your librarian for access.

In the scorching and sultry heat of a Mumbai summer Prem Yadav, the Director of Pratham Info Tech Foundation (referred to as the Foundation), Mumbai, India and his team were busy teaching basic computer skills to students attending a school for children raised in poor households. These children were stumbling at every stage. Classrooms were very small and congested. Electricity supply was erratic. Software products were available only in English and were not compatible with the hardware. Schools and teachers were unenthusiastic if not wary of the additional burden put on them. This was the situation in spite of the fact that for four years since 1998, Prem and his team had tried everything to integrate Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in 54 Municipal Corporation schools, (schools run by the civic body that governs the city) started mainly for unprivileged children. The team enjoyed moderate success, but the overall impact was small. Uses of ICT in education were perceived to be an add-on support, rather than an effective toolbox to bring consistency and equality in providing quality education and empowerment to underprivileged children. Information technology had led to decisive and sweeping changes in other fields like healthcare, e-governance, logistics, and manufacturing. Yet so far ICT had very limited success in the field of education especially at pre-primary and secondary school levels (i.e., from standard 1st to 8th). On the one hand, India was emerging as a knowledge based economy by exporting IT and IT based services to the world, and, on the other hand, most of the population belonging to the low income group did not have any access to learn basic knowledge and skills related to IT. Prem was convinced that this digital gap needed to be closed as early as possible; otherwise India would risk leaving a large section of the population far behind. He knew that it was not the technology per se, but the implementation of the technology at the grass roots level that was more important.

Recently, the application of blockchain to the setting, management, and trading of the energy system has formed an innovative technology and has attracted a lot of attention from industry, academia, and research. In this study, we use patent analysis technology to explore the development trends of the energy system with blockchain technology. During the patent analysis process, this study makes corresponding analysis charts, such as patent application numbers over time, patent application numbers for main leading countries, applicants, patent citations, international patent classification (IPC), and life cycle. Relative research and design (R&D) capability of the top ten applicants is estimated and the cluster map of the technology is obtained. The technical features of the top five IPC patent applications are related to the cluster map to show the development of energy blockchain technology. Through this paper, first, the basics of the blockchain and patent analysis are illustrated and, moreover, the reason why and how blockchain technology can be combined with the energy system is also briefly described and analyzed. The results of the patent analysis of energy blockchain technology indicate that the United States leads the way, accounting for more than half of the global total. It is also interesting to note that the participants are not from traditional specific fields, but included electric power manufacturers, computer software companies, e-commerce companies, and even many new companies devoted to blockchain technology. Walmart Apollo, LLC and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) have the highest number of patent applications. However, Walmart Apollo, LLC ranks first with a greater number of inventors of 36, an activity year of 2 years, and a relative R&D capability of 100%. IBM ranks second with an activity year of 3 years and a research and development capability of 91%. Among various applicants, IBM and LO3 energy started earlier in this field, and their patent output is also more prominent. The IPC is mainly concentrated in G06Q 50/06, which belongs to the technical field of the setting and management of the energy system including electricity, gas, or water supply. Currently, most projects are in the early development stages, and research on key areas is still ongoing to improve the required scalability, decentralization, and security. Thus, energy blockchain technology is still in the growth period, and there is still considerable room for development of the patent in the later period. Moreover, it is suggested that the novel communication module such as the combination of the consortium blockchain and the private blockchain cold also provide their own advantages to achieve the purpose of improving system performance and efficiency.

Jersey Oil and Gas Unearths Wengen Prospect The Greater Buchan Area (GBA) now has four drill-ready prospects to add to discoveries already slated for development. In a new subsurface evaluation, Jersey Oil & Gas, a British-independent North Sea-focused upstream oil and gas company, has uncovered a new prospect, named Wengen, to complement its Verbier Deep, Cortina NE, and Zermatt drill-ready prospects. The four are estimated to host some 222 million bbl of P50 prospective resources, all in the immediate vicinity of Jersey’s planned GBA production facility. The consolidated Greater Buchan venture comprises Buchan field (80 million bbl), Verbier (c25 million bbl), J2 (c20 million), and Glenn (14 million). The new prospect, located in License P2170, is directly west of the Tweedsmuir field and should host some 62 million bbl of potential resources (P50), with the probabilistic range set at 31 million bbl at P90 (higher confidence) and 162 mil-lion for P10 (lower confidence). Probability of geological success is 22% for the prospect. Contractor Rockflow previously estimated the recoverable resources in the GBA at 94.7 million bbl, including the parts within P2170. In late November, Jersey announced it is taking full ownership of License P2170, which hosts most of the Verbier discovery, as part of the GBA. In March, Jersey told investors the project is fully funded and that it intends to take the project to potential industry partners via a farm-out process. An exploratory drilling campaign is being planned for 2022. Jordan Finds “Promising” Gas Reserves Near Iraq Border Jordan’s majority state-owned National Petroleum Company (NPC) has discovered “promising” natural gas in the Risha gas field along its eastern border with Iraq. Risha makes up nearly 5% of the kingdom’s consumption of natural gas of around 350 MMcf/D for power generation, Jordanian officials said. The flow of new gas supplies will raise the productivity of the gas field and help Jordan cut dependence on oil imports to fuel its power sector and industries. The country, which now imports over 93% of its total energy supplies, is burdened by a $3.5-billion annual bill, comprising almost 8% of Jordan’s GDP. Although British supermajor BP abandoned the eastern desert area in 2014 after investing over $240 million, Jordanian exploration has stepped up since 2019, boosting quantities by at least 70%, Mohammad al Khasawneh, head of NPC, said. An ambitious 10-year energy plan unveiled in 2019 aims to secure nearly half of the country’s electricity generation from local energy sources com-pared to a current 15%, according to Iraq Energy Minister Hala Zawati. The plan is meant to diversify local energy sources by expanding investments in renewable and oil shale to reduce costly foreign fuel imports, Zawati added. ExxonMobil Discovers Hydrocarbons Offshore Suriname ExxonMobil and Petronas have discovered several hydrocarbon-bearing sandstone zones with good reservoir qualities in the Campanian section of the Sloanea-1 exploration well on Block 52 offshore Suriname, adding to ExxonMobil’s finds in the Guyana-Suriname basin. The well was drilled by operator Petronas. ExxonMobil said in November that it is prioritizing near-term capital spending on advantaged assets with the highest potential future value. Maersk Drilling reported in early July that it had secured the Maersk Developer from Petronas subsidiary PSEPBV in a $20.4-million one-well exploration con-tract offshore Suriname. The semisubmersible rig drilled the Suriname-Guyana basin well to a total depth of 15,682 ft. “We are pleased with the positive results of the well,” Emeliana Rice-Oxley, Petronas’ vice president of upstream exploration, said. “It will provide the drive for Petronas to continue exploring in Suriname, which is one of our focus basins in the Americas.” Block 52 covers an area of 1.2 million acres and is located approximately 75 miles offshore north of Paramaribo. The water depths on Block 52 range from 160 to 3,600 ft. ExxonMobil E&P Suriname BV, an affiliate of ExxonMobil, holds 50% interest in Block 52. PSEPBV is operator and holds 50% interest. CNOOC Starts Production on Penglai 25-6 Oil Field Area 3 Project China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced on 14 December that its Bohai Sea Project - the Penglai 25-6 oil field area 3 - has started production ahead of schedule. The biggest offshore oil field and the second biggest oil field in China, the Penglai is located in the south central Bohai Sea, with average water depth of about 27 m. In addition to fully utilizing the existing processing facilities of Penglai oil fields, the project has built a new wellhead platform and plans 58 development wells, including 38 production wells and 20 water-injection wells. The project is expected to reach its peak production of approximately 11,511 B/D of crude oil in 2023. Six successful appraisal wells were also drilled, which confirmed the presence of hydrocarbons in reservoirs located with-in Miocene, Lower Minghuazhen, and Guantao sandstones. The Penglai 19-3 oil field is located in Block 11/05 of Bohai Bay, approximately 235 km southeast of Tanggu. The production-sharing contract for block 11/05 was signed between CNOOC and ConocoPhillips China (COPC) in December 1994; the field was discovered jointly by CNOOC and COPC in 1999. The oil field was developed in two phases. Phase I production started in December 2002; production from the wellhead platform C, which is tied back temporarily to the production facilities of Phase I, began in June 2007. Since June 2020, CNOOC has announced five production startups: the Jinzhou 25-1 oilfield 6/11 area project, the Liuhua 16-2 oilfield/ 20-2 oil-field joint development project, the Nan-bao 35-2 oilfield S1 area project, the Luda 21-2/16-3 regional development project, and the Qinhuangdao 33-1S oilfield phase-I project. In Q3 2020, CNOOC achieved a total net production of 131.2 million BOE, which the company said represented an increase of 5.1% year over year. Production from China was said to have increased by 10.4% year over year to 88.6 million BOE. In November, CNOOC revealed that the Liuhua 29-1 gas field had begun production; in September, the company said the Bozhong 19-6 condensate gas field pilot area development project had also begun. Operator CNOOC holds 51% interest while COPC holds 49% interest in the Penglai 25-6 oilfield area 3 project. Equinor’s Snorre Expansion Project Starts Ahead of Schedule, Below Cost Work began in December on the Snorre Expansion Project in the southern part of the Norwegian Sea. This increased-oil-recovery project will add almost 200 million bbl of recoverable oil reserves and help extend the productive life of the Snorre field through 2040. The expansion project is proposed in blocks 34/4 and 34/7 of the Tampen area, approximately 124 miles west of Florø in the Norwegian North Sea. “I am proud that we have managed to achieve safe startup of the Snorre Expansion Project ahead of schedule in such a challenging year as 2020. In addition, the project is set to be delivered more than NOK 1 billion below the cost estimate in the plan for development and operation,” Geir Tungesvik, Equinor’s executive vice president for technology, projects, and drilling, said. Originally scheduled to come onstream in the first quarter of 2021, the project comprises 24 new wells divided into six subsea templates, drilled to recover the new volumes. Bundles connecting the new wells to the platform have been installed, in addition to new risers. The project also includes a new module and modifications on Snorre A. In December 2017, Equinor submitted a modified plan for development and operation of the field. With the expansion, the recovery factor will increase from 46 to 51%, representing significant value for a field with 2 billion bbl of recoverable oil reserves. Wind power will supply about 35% of the power requirement for the Snorre and Gullfaks fields. The Hywind Tampen project, featuring 11 floating wind turbines, should start up in Q3 2022. The investments in the expansion project total NOK 19.5 billion (2020 value). The project has had substantial spin-off effects for the supply industry in Norway, particularly in eastern Norway and in Rogaland. The Snorre field partnership comprises Equinor (operator) 33.27%, Petoro 30%, Vår Energi 18.55%, Idemitsu 9.6%, and Wintershall Dea 8.57%. Petrobras To Sell Entire Stake in Onshore Field of Sergipe Petrobras on 11 December signed a contract with Energizzi Energias do Brasil to sell its entire stake in the onshore field of Rabo Branco, located south of the Carmópolis field in the Sergipe-Alagoas Basin, Sergipe state. The Rabo Branco field is part of the BT-SEAL-13 concession. The $1.5-million sale is in line with Petrobras’ strategy to cut costs and improve its capital allocation, to focus its resources increasingly on deep and ultradeep waters. The average oil production of the field, from January to October 2020, was 138 B/D. Energizzi Energias do Brasil will own 50% stake in the Rabo Branco field; operator Produção de Óleo e Gás (Petrom) holds the remaining 50%. On 10 December, Petrobras closed the divestiture of its full ownership in four onshore fields at the Tucano Basin site in the state of Bahia. Petrobras sold its entire interest to Eagle Exploração de Óleo e Gás (Eagle). Petrobras earned $2.571 million from this sale, in addition to the $602,000 that the company received at the time of signing the sale contract, for a total of $3.173 million. BP, Reliance Announce First Gas From Asia’s Deepest Project Oil-to-telecom conglomerate Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) and BP have started production from India’s first ultradeepwater gas project, the first of three such projects in the KG D6 block. The R Cluster gas field is located off the east coast of India, about 60 km from the existing KG D6 control-and-riser platform (CRP), and comprises a subsea production system tied back to the CRP via a subsea pipeline. It is the deepest offshore gas field in Asia at a depth greater than 2000 m. The companies’ next project, the Satellites Cluster, is expected to come on stream this year, followed by the MJ project in 2022. These projects will utilize the existing hub infrastructure in the KG D6 block. “Growing India’s own production of cleaner-burning gas to meet a significant portion of its energy demand, these three new KG D6 projects will support the country’s drive to shape and improve its future energy mix,” BP Chief Executive Bernard Looney said. The R Cluster field is expected to reach plateau gas production of about 12.9 million standard cubic meters per day (MMscm/D) in 2021. Peak gas production from the three fields should be 30 MMscm/D (1 Bcf/D) by 2023, about 25% of India’s domestic production, and will help reduce the country’s dependence on imported gas. RIL is the operator of KG D6 with a 66.67% interest; BP holds a 33.33% participating interest.

Creating ICT access in the rural areas of Africa is a complex challenge. In these areas, telecommunications infrastructure is provided at a very high cost that may not be justified by the resulting use and effects of the telecommunications network. Affordable access to ICTs in rural areas can be frustrated at the supply as well as the demand end of the service-provision chain. To supply ICTs and related services in rural areas, the main challenge is the high level of capital and operating expenditures incurred by service providers. On the demand side, rural adoption of ICTs in developing countries is curtailed by low availability of complementary public services, such as electricity and education, and by the relative scarcity of locally relevant content. This paper highlight the various aspects of the challenges of setting up a First Mile project in rural Zambia. It takes a rather unique angle in that it introduces the perspectives on the value of academic interventions in a manner that not only addresses some of the complex issues but also accommodates cultural adjustment. The paper introduces the rural internet project in Macha, rural Zambia and demonstrates the impact of such an initiative on setting up not only connectivity in a rural community but also dealing with the challenges that come with this.

Non-technical summaryThe El Niño event in 2015/2016 was one of the strongest since at least 1950. Through surveys and interviews with key informants, we found businesses in the capital cities of Zambia, Botswana and Kenya experienced major disruption to their activities from El Niño related hydroelectric load shedding, water supply disruption and flooding, respectively. Yet, during the 2015/2016 El Niño, fluctuations in precipitation were not extreme considering the strength of the El Niño event. Results therefore highlight that even fairly moderate precipitation anomalies can contribute to major disruption to economic activity. Addressing the risk of disruption – and supporting the private sector to adapt – is a development priority.

Christopher Frank Kearton went up to Oxford in 1929 from a grammar school to read chemistry. On graduating in 1933 he joined ICI and began a career in industry which left its mark across a swathe of sectors which, if not unique, has been emulated by few. Chemicals, nuclear, man-made fibres, textiles, oil and gas were all industries in which he played a major part. Nor were his efforts confined to these. He took on a succession of public appointments, serving causes as diverse as the reorganization of the railways, the generation and supply of electricity, the Industrial Reorganization Corporation and the establishment of the British National Oil Corporation. When these efforts were recognized in 1970 by the award of a life peerage he was still deeply involved in activities related to both industry and the academic world. It was, therefore, some years before he played an active part in the work of the Upper House. When he did he soon became an indefatigable member of a number of select committees. Throughout his life his restless energy and ambition, coupled with a formidable memory, meant that he was no stranger to controversy. But few would deny that his objectives were always in what he saw to be the national interest.

The nuclear power plant is required to supply a substantial amount of electricity for a densely populated country like Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh has attached to a commitment to implement the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, and so Bangladesh will be the 33rd nuclear power-producing country after the successful construction of this plant. Bangladesh has planned to construct two power units (Rooppur-1 & Rooppur-2) with a capacity of 1200 MW, each of and is expected to go into operation in 2023. Russian Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation is constructing this nuclear power plant, which is the generation-3+ VVER-1200 model. But the main concern is how a third world country like Bangladesh can handle the tons of radioactive waste of RNNP. Radioactive waste i.e., a variety of solids, liquids, and gases which are produced during the generation of nuclear energy in a nuclear reactor. Depending on activity content, solid and liquid waste are disposed of in near-surface or deep geological facilities, and gaseous waste is dissolved by following some filtering process. If not properly disposed of or recycled, irradiation from radioactive waste will cause major problems for the environment. Various stages should be required for the removal of a tremendous amount of radioactive waste in a cost-effective way. This paper mainly delineates the proximate of radioactive waste management of RNNP and gives an account of (1) Radioactivity and radiation level, (2) Classification, (3) Treatment of solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive waste, (4) Reprocessing and packaging, (5) Storage and (6) Disposal.

There is a moment in Al Gore’s 2006 documentary An Inconvenient Truth devised to expose the sheer audacity of fossil fuel lobby groups in the United States. In their attempts to address significant scientific consensus and growing public concern over climate change, these groups are resorting to what Gore’s film suggests are grotesque distortions of fact. A particular example highlighted in the film is the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s (CPE—a lobby group funded by ExxonMobil) “pro” energy industry advertisement: “Carbon dioxide”, the ad states. “They call it pollution, we call it life.” While on the one hand employing rhetoric against the “inconvenient truth” that carbon dioxide emissions are ratcheting up the Earth’s temperature, these advertisements also pose a question – though perhaps unintended – that is worth addressing. Where does life reside? This is not an issue of essentialism, but relates to the claims, materials and technologies through which life as a political object emerges. The danger of entertaining the vested interests of polluting industry in a discussion of climate change and its biopolitics is countered by an imperative to acknowledge the ways in which multiple positions in the climate change debate invoke and appeal to ‘life’ as the bottom line, or inviolable interest, of their political, social or economic work. In doing so, other questions come to the fore that a politics of climate change framed in terms of moral positions or competing values will tend to overlook. These questions concern the manifold practices of life that constitute the contemporary terrain of the political, and the actors and instruments put in this employ. Who speaks for life? And who or what produces it? Climate change as a matter of concern (Latour) has gathered and generated a host of experts, communities, narratives and technical devices all invested in the administration of life. It is, as Malcom Bull argues, “the paradigmatic issue of the new politics,” a politics which “draws people towards the public realm and makes life itself subject to the caprices of state and market” (2). This paper seeks to highlight the politics of life that have emerged around climate change as a public issue. It will argue that these politics appear in incremental and multiple ways that situate an array of actors and interests as active in both contesting and generating the terms of life: what life is and how we come to know it. This way of thinking about climate change debates opposes a prevalent moralistic framework that reads the practices and discourses of debate in terms of oppositional positions alone. While sympathies may flow in varying directions, especially when it comes to such a highly charged and massively consequential issue as climate change, there is little insight to be had from charging the CPE (for example) with manipulating consumers, or misrepresenting well-known facts. Where new and more productive understandings open up is in relation to the fields through which these gathering actors play out their claims to the project of life. These fields, from the state, to the corporation, to the domestic sphere, reveal a complex network of strategies and devices that seek to secure life in constantly renovated terms. Life Politics Biopolitical scholarship in the wake of Foucault has challenged life as a pre-given uncritical category, and sought to highlight the means through which it is put under question and constituted through varying and composing assemblages of practitioners and practices. Such work regards the project of human well-being as highly complex and technical, and has undertaken to document this empirically through close attention to the everyday ecologies in which humans are enmeshed. This is a political and theoretical project in itself, situating political processes in micro, as well as macro, registers, including daily life as a site of (self) management and governance. Rabinow and Rose refer to biopolitical circuits that draw together and inter-relate the multiple sites and scales operative in the administration of life. These involve not just technologies, rationalities and regimes of authority and control, but also politics “from below” in the form of rights claims and community formation and agitation (198). Active in these circuits, too, are corporate and non-state interests for whom the pursuit of maximising life’s qualities and capabilities has become a concern through which “market relations and shareholder value” are negotiated (Rabinow and Rose 211). As many biopolitical scholars argue, biopower—the strategies through which biopolitics are enacted—is characteristic of the “disciplinary neo-liberalism” that has come to define the modern state, and through which the conduct of conduct is practiced (Di Muzio 305). Foucault’s concept of governmentality describes the devolution of state-based disciplinarity and sovereignty to a host of non-state actors, rationalities and strategies of governing, including the self-managing subject, not in opposition to the state, but contributing to its form. According to Bratich, Packer and McCarthy, everyday life is thus “saturated with governmental techniques” (18) in which we are all enrolled. Unlike regimes of biopolitics identified with what Agamben terms “thanopolitics”—the exercise of biopower “which ultimately rests on the power of some to threaten the death of others” (Rabinow and Rose 198), such as the Nazi’s National Socialism and other eugenic campaigns—governmental arts in the service of “vitalist” biopolitics (Rose 1) are increasingly diffused amongst all those with an “interest” in sustaining life, from organisations to individuals. The integration of techniques of self-governance which ask the individual to work on themselves and their own dispositions with State functions has broadened the base by which life is governed, and foregrounded an unsettled terrain of life claims. Rose argues that medical science is at the forefront of these contemporary biopolitics, and to this effect “has […] been fully engaged in the ethical questions of how we should live—of what kinds of creatures we are, of the kinds of obligations that we have to ourselves and to others, of the kinds of techniques we can and should use to improve ourselves” (20). Asking individuals to self-identify through their medical histories and bodily specificities, medical cultures are also shaping new political arrangements, as communities connected by shared genetics or physical conditions, for instance, emerge, evolve and agitate according to the latest medical knowledge. Yet it is not just medicine that provokes ethical work and new political forms. The environment is a key site for life politics that entails a multi-faceted discourse of obligations and entitlements, across fields and scales of engagement. Calculating Environments In line with neo-liberal logic, environmental discourse concerned with ameliorating climate change has increasingly focused upon the individual as an agent of self-monitoring, to both facilitate government agendas at a distance, and to “self-fashion” in the mode of the autonomous subject, securing against external risks (Ong 501). Climate change is commonly represented as such a risk, to both human and non-human life. A recent letter published by the Royal Australasian College of Physicians in two leading British medical journals, named climate change as the “biggest global health threat of the twenty-first century” (Morton). As I have argued elsewhere (Potter), security is central to dominant cultures of environmental governance in the West; these cultures tie sustainability goals to various and interrelated regimes of monitoring which attach to concepts of what Clark and Stevenson call “the good ecological citizen” (238). Citizenship is thus practiced through strategies of governmentality which call on individuals to invest not just in their own well-being, but in the broader project of life. Calculation is a primary technique through which modern environmental governance is enacted; calculative strategies are seen to mediate risk, according to Foucault, and consequently to “assure living” (Elden 575). Rationalised schemes for self-monitoring are proliferating under climate change and the project of environmentalism more broadly, something which critics of neo-liberalism have identified as symptomatic of the privatisation of politics that liberal governmentality has fostered. As we have seen in Australia, an evolving policy emphasis on individual practices and the domestic sphere as crucial sites of environmental action – for instance, the introduction of domestic water restrictions, and the phasing out of energy-inefficient light bulbs in the home—provides a leading discourse of ethico-political responsibility. The rise of carbon dioxide counting is symptomatic of this culture, and indicates the distributed fields of life management in contemporary governmentality. Carbon dioxide, as the CPE is keen to point out, is crucial to life, but it is also—in too large an amount—a force of destruction. Its management, in vitalist terms, is thus established as an effort to protect life in the face of death. The concept of “carbon footprinting” has been promoted by governments, NGOs, industry and individuals as a way of securing this goal, and a host of calculative techniques and strategies are employed to this end, across a spectrum of activities and contexts all framed in the interests of life. The footprinting measure seeks to secure living via self-policed limits, which also—in classic biopolitical form—shift previously private practices into a public realm of count-ability and accountability. The carbon footprint, like its associates the ecological footprint and the water footprint, has developed as a multi-faceted tool of citizenship beyond the traditional boundaries of the state. Suggesting an ecological conception of territory and of our relationships and responsibilities to this, the footprint, as a measure of resource use and emissions relative to the Earth’s capacities to absorb these, calculates and visualises the “specific qualities” (Elden 575) that, in a spatialised understanding of security, constitute and define this territory. The carbon footprint’s relatively simple remit of measuring carbon emissions per unit of assessment—be that the individual, the corporation, or the nation—belies the ways in which life is formatted and produced through its calculations. A tangled set of devices, practices and discourses is employed to make carbon and thus life calculable and manageable. Treading Lightly The old environmental adage to “tread lightly upon the Earth” has been literalised in the metaphor of the footprint, which attempts both to symbolise environmental practice and to directly translate data in order to meaningfully communicate necessary boundaries for our living. The World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Report 2008 exemplifies the growing popularity of the footprint as a political and poetic hook: speaking in terms of our “ecological overshoot,” and the move from “ecological credit to ecological deficit”, the report urges an attendance to our “global footprint” which “now exceeds the world’s capacity to regenerate by about 30 per cent” (1). Angela Crombie’s A Lighter Footprint, an instruction manual for sustainable living, is one of a host of media through which individuals are educated in modes of footprint calculation and management. She presents a range of techniques, including carbon offsetting, shifting to sustainable modes of transport, eating and buying differently, recycling and conserving water, to mediate our carbon dioxide output, and to “show […] politicians how easy it is” (13). Governments however, need no persuading from citizens that carbon calculation is an exercise to be harnessed. As governments around the world move (slowly) to address climate change, policies that instrumentalise carbon dioxide emission and reduction via an auditing of credits and deficits have come to the fore—for example, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and the Chicago Climate Exchange. In Australia, we have the currently-under-debate Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, a part of which is the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme (AETS) that will introduce a system of “carbon credits” and trading in a market-based model of supply and demand. This initiative will put a price on carbon dioxide emissions, and cap the amount of emissions any one polluter can produce without purchasing further credits. In readiness for the scheme, business initiatives are forming to take advantage of this new carbon market. Industries in carbon auditing and off-setting services are consolidating; hectares of trees, already active in the carbon sequestration market, are being cultivated as “carbon sinks” and key sites of compliance for polluters under the AETS. Governments are also planning to turn their tracts of forested public land into carbon credits worth billions of dollars (Arup 7). The attachment of emission measures to goods and services requires a range of calculative experts, and the implementation of new marketing and branding strategies, aimed at conveying the carbon “health” of a product. The introduction of “food mile” labelling (the amount of carbon dioxide emitted in the transportation of the food from source to consumer) in certain supermarkets in the United Kingdom is an example of this. Carbon risk analysis and management programs are being introduced across businesses in readiness for the forthcoming “carbon economy”. As one flyer selling “a suite of carbon related services” explains, “early action will give you the edge in understanding and mitigating the risks, and puts you in a prime position to capitalise on the rewards” (MGI Business Solutions Worldwide). In addition, lobby groups are working to ensure exclusions from or the free allocation of permits within the proposed AETS, with degrees of compulsion applied to different industries – the Federal Government, for instance, will provide a $3.9 billion compensation package for the electric power sector when the AETS commences, to enable their “adjustment” to this carbon regime. Performing Life Noortje Mares provides a further means of thinking through the politics of life in the context of climate change by complicating the distinction between public and private interest. Her study of “green living experiments” describes the rise of carbon calculation in the home in recent years, and the implementation of technologies such as the smart electricity meter that provides a constantly updating display of data relating to amounts and cost of energy consumed and the carbon dioxide emitted in the routines of domestic life. Her research tracks the entry of these personal calculative regimes into public life via internet forums such as blogs, where individuals notate or discuss their experiences of pursing low-carbon lifestyles. On the one hand, these calculative practices of living and their public representation can be read as evidencing the pervasive neo-liberal governmentality at work in contemporary environmental practice, where individuals are encouraged to scrupulously monitor their domestic cultures. The rise of auditing as a technology of self, and more broadly as a technique of public accountability, has come under fire for its “immunity-granting role” (Charkiewicz 79), where internal audits become substituted for external compliance and regulation. Mares challenges this reading, however, by demonstrating the ways in which green living experiments “transform everyday material practices into practices of public involvement” that (118) don’t resolve or pin down relations between the individual, the non-human environment, and the social, or reveal a mappable flow of actions and effects between the public realm and the home. The empirical modes of publicity that these individuals employ, “the careful recording of measurements and the reliable descriptions of sensory observation, so as to enable ‘virtual witnessing’ by wider audiences”, open up to much more complex understandings than one of calculative self-discipline at work. As “instrument[s] of public involvement” (120), the experiments that Mares describe locate the politics of life in the embodied socio-material entanglements of the domestic sphere, in arrangements of humans and non-human technologies. Such arrangements, she suggests, are ontologically productive in that they introduce “not only new knowledge, but also new entities […] to society” (119), and as such these experiments and the modes of calculation they employ become active in the composition of reality. Recent work in economic sociology and cultural studies has similarly contended that calculation, far from either a naturalised or thoroughly abstract process, relies upon a host of devices, relations, and techniques: that is, as Gay Hawkins explains, calculative processes “have to be enacted” (108). Environmental governmentality in the service of securing life is a networked practice that draws in a host of actors, not a top-down imposition. The institution of carbon economies and carbon emissions as a new register of public accountability, brings alternative ways to calculate the world into being, and consequently re-calibrates life as it emerges from these heterogeneous arrangements. All That Gathers Latour writes that we come to know a matter of concern by all the things that gather around it (Latour). This includes the human, as well as the non-human actors, policies, practices and technologies that are put to work in the making of our realities. Climate change is routinely represented as a threat to life, with predicted (and occurring) species extinction, growing numbers of climate change refugees, dispossessed from uninhabitable lands, and the rise of diseases and extreme weather scenarios that put human life in peril. There is no doubt, of course, that climate change does mean death for some: indeed, there are thanopolitical overtones in inequitable relations between the fall-out of impacts from major polluting nations on poorer countries, or those much more susceptible to rising sea levels. Biosocial equity, as Bull points out, is a “matter of being equally alive and equally dead” (2). Yet in the biopolitical project of assuring living, life is burgeoning around the problem of climate change. The critique of neo-liberalism as a blanketing system that subjects all aspects of life to market logic, and in which the cynical techniques of industry seek to appropriate ethico-political stances for their own material ends, are insufficient responses to what is actually unfolding in the messy terrain of climate change and its biopolitics. What this paper has attempted to show is that there is no particular purchase on life that can be had by any one actor who gathers around this concern. Varying interests, ambitions, and intentions, without moral hierarchy, stake their claim in life as a constantly constituting site in which they participate, and from this perspective, the ways in which we understand life to be both produced and managed expand. This is to refuse either an opposition or a conflation between the market and nature, or the market and life. It is also to argue that we cannot essentialise human-ness in the climate change debate. For while human relations with animals, plants and weathers may make us what we are, so too do our relations with (in a much less romantic view) non-human things, technologies, schemes, and even markets—from carbon auditing services, to the label on a tin on the supermarket shelf. As these intersect and entangle, the project of life, in the new politics of climate change, is far from straightforward. References An Inconvenient Truth. Dir. Davis Guggenheim. Village Roadshow, 2006. Arup, Tom. “Victoria Makes Enormous Carbon Stocktake in Bid for Offset Billions.” The Age 24 Sep. 2009: 7. Bratich, Jack Z., Jeremy Packer, and Cameron McCarthy. “Governing the Present.” Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmentality. Ed. Bratich, Packer and McCarthy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 3-21. Bull, Malcolm. “Globalization and Biopolitics.” New Left Review 45 (2007): 12 May 2009 . < http://newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2675 >. 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