Journal articles on the topic 'Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army'

AbstractThis article examines the role of traditional leaders during Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. Contrary to the generalisations that traditional leaders and their subordinates were either absolutely supportive of the liberation war or were against it supporting the Smith regime, this paper uses the case of Buhera District to demonstrate that traditional leaders and their subordinates contributed in various ways to Zimbabwe’s war of liberation. Guided by a combination of primary and secondary sources, the article argues that traditional leaders were in a dilemma because they were victims of the contending forces. However, they employed various survival tactics as they faced equally dangerous conflicting forces who put them in complex, ambiguous and contradictory relationships. The article concludes that the strategies and tactics employed by the Rhodesian Security Forces and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army guerrillas had debilitating effects on traditional leaders and their subordinates during the liberation war.

ABSTRACT Robert Mugabe resigned as Zimbabwe’s president in November 2017, following a military action called Operation Restore Legacy. This article examines the motivations and dynamics of Operation Restore Legacy, which it characterizes as a coup by military generals that had significant commonalities with historical coups in Africa. This characterization, which is informed by the accounts of coup participants and a reading of the literature, challenges interpretations of the coup as ‘a non-coup-coup’, ‘very Zimbabwean’, or ‘special’. The article argues that the coup was a vote of no confidence in Mugabe’s leadership, which succeeded because soldiers from Zimbabwe’s 1970s independence war subscribed to the coup’s stated ideal to restore liberation struggle principles in the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front party as well as party members who had been sidelined. Liberation war veterans held decisive army and air force command posts when the coup occurred. The article’s emphasis on liberation struggle principles as a crucial determinant of the coup’s success is a counterpoint to game theoretic approaches to coup dynamics that disregard political beliefs as a consequential factor in the realization of coups. In respect of motivations, the article advances interrelating motives and contends that the coup’s catalyst was Mugabe’s refusal to meet his generals on 13 November 2017, for vital talks on widening differences between both parties. Sealing off dialogue catalyzed the coup.

This article examines the Rhodesian Defence Regiment’s role in the Rhodesian Security Forces’ counterinsurgency efforts against the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army guerrillas. It argues that the two guerrilla armies successfully used sabotage targeting installations of strategic and economic significance to Rhodesia. This compelled the Rhodesian regime to change its policy of restricting the conscription of Coloured and Asian minorities into the Rhodesian Security Forces to undertake combat duties beyond defensive roles. However, the Rhodesian Defence Regiment largely failed to serve its key duty of countering the guerrilla tactic of sabotage against all major installations and centres of strategic and economic importance. The article concludes that the failure was due to the many challenges the majority members, Coloureds and Asians, that constituted the Rhodesian Defence Regiment faced, including discrimination and mistrust. These challenges derailed the Rhodesian Defence Regiment operations and partly contributed to the overall end of the Ian Smith regime.

This article is a critical reflection on possibilities for social transformation and democratisation that can be possibly realised through collaborations between young people in civil society, African traditional religion and the Christian movement in contemporary contexts. In this context the focus on young people as key agents of change is informed by the frequent observation that young people are often the major perpetrators (and victims) of political violence and yet the least beneficiaries from the political spoils. The article analyses a project in the use of applied theatre to address political violence and torture that was conducted by the University of Zimbabwe's Department of Theatre Arts and Amani Trust some time between October 2001 and March 2002. The article uses that project to investigate and to illustrate some of the opportunities that can be harnessed by religious arms of civil society to strengthen peace in disadvantaged rural communities, such as we find in contemporary Zimbabwe, and which often bear the brunt of social unrest in times of political uncertainty. The study approaches time as a social construct that determines human agency and decision-making in order to adopt the biblical concept of ‘kairos’ or the ‘kairotic’ moment. The ‘kairotic’ moment referred to in this paper is the period between 1999 and 2008 when the Zimbabwean polity faced one of its severest national crises following protracted political contestation. This resulted in unprecedented levels of political intolerance, and state-sanctioned violence and torture in the country’s post-independence history. This level of political violence was perhaps second only to the infamous Gukurahundi massacres, which took place in the Midlands and Matebeleland provinces during the mid-1980s. We also view the kairotic moment as a critical moment for making a fundamental decision. It is full of both promise and danger, so much so that whether the moment ‘reaps’ hope or danger depends on how the moment is seized. We ask: Did civil society seize the moment to reap hope? In other words, we analyse whether various arms of Zimbabwean civil society took advantage of the ‘pregnant’ or kairotic moment to liberate itself. The authors adopt existing discourses on civil society and liberation theology to argue that whenever the time is ripe for meaningful intervention, there in fact exist immense opportunities for different branches of civil society domiciled in both traditional African and modern Christian religions to harness applied theatre in the service of peace and democratisation in the face of political adversity and uncertainty.

This article makes historical sense of the recent signs of the metamorphosis of nationalism into nativism in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The central thesis of the article is that the resurgence of Afro-radicalism and nativism in post-settler and post-apartheid societies partly reflected deep-rooted antinomies of black liberation thought and partly current ideological conundrums linked to the limits of both the African national project and global liberal democracy. Dismissals and sententious approaches towards nativism do not help in understanding the current issues in Zimbabwe and South Africa. There is the need to revisit the issues of imaginings of the African liberation agenda together with issues of the resolution of the national question, teleology of the liberation, ownership of strategic resources, knowledge production, control of public discourse, imaginations of the nation and visions of citizenship and democracy. Making sense of nativism provides an oblique entry into an interrogation of the current status of the African national project in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

"The paper aims to shed light on the particularities of two national liberation movements - turned political parties and how they embraced their new role after the liberation struggle had ended and majority rule had been obtained. South Africa’s ANC and Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF are analyzed in an attempt to ultimately underline why democracy was approached distinctively by the too. We also bring some arguments as to why South Africa failed to stop ZANU-PF’s descent into autocracy, amidst internal and international pressures to intervene. After a short historical background of the two NLMs, we discuss the links between them, the particular political and social conditions which shaped their behaviours and the commonalities and differences in said behaviours. We argue that, as long as the democratic principles identified with ZANU-PF’s struggle for the empowerment of a new elite, the former were pursued; when the two no longer overlapped, stronghold politics and policies took primacy. We also argue that faced with similar contestation as ZANU-PF, the ANC might chose to sacrifice democracy for the sake of regime survival. Keywords: party-politics, international relations, regional influence, democracy, colonialism, discourse "

The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) had been involved in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist campaigns since the 1920s and in the late 1950s, its members were instrumental in the founding of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM). In the 1960s and 1970s, this extended to support for the national liberation movement in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, the CPGB threw its support behind the Soviet-backed Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), instead of their rival, the Chinese-backed Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). When both groups entered into a short-term military and political alliance in 1976, the Patriotic Front, this posed a possible problem for the Communist Party and the AAM, but publicly these British organisations proclaimed solidarity with newly created PF. However this expression of solidarity and internationalist links quickly untangled after the 1980 elections, which were convincingly won by ZANU-PF and left the CPGB's traditional allies, ZAPU, with a small share of seats in the national parliament. This article explores the contours of the relationship between the CPGB, the broader Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain and its links with the organisations in Zimbabwe during the war of national liberation, examining the opportunities and limits presented by this campaign of anti-imperial solidarity.

AbstractAfrican theologies are most often classified as either theologies of inculturation, or of liberation. Canaan Banana was one of few African theologians who combine authentic indigenization and liberation in their thought. The author, who knew Rev. Banana personally, based his analysis on Banana's writings and on interpretations by other scholars. Banana's theology was influenced by his ecumenical leadership as a Methodist minister, studies in the United States, involvement in the liberation struggle, and national leadership as the first President of Zimbabwe. Banana's liberation perspective, in contrast to those of most South African black theologians, dealt with issues of class rather than of color. His political theology, articulated when he was president of Zimbabwe, focused on the relation of socialism and Christianity. For him liberation involved struggle and even armed struggle. In his last decade former President Banana began to articulate a prophetic "Combat Theology." Banana stimulated a heated discussion on biblical hermeneutics in southern Africa by proposing deletion from the Bible of passages used to justify oppression. Believing that God is revealed also through creation and African culture, he found creative myths and images of Jesus in the cultures of his own Shona and Ndebele peoples. His contribution is a theology that can help Christianity to be both indigenous and socially relevant in 21st century Africa.

The overwhelmingly dominant regional power of southern Africa, South Africa, attempts to contain the political, economic, and military interdependence of neighboring states, irrespective of ideological preference. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) founded in 1980, is the response of the other states in the region to South Africa’s ambitions to maintain regional hegemony. Its nine member state are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and an independent Namibia is expected to join. The specific objectives of SADCC, as stated in the 1980 Lusaka Declaration, are the reduction of economic dependence in general (not only on South Africa); the forging of links to create a genuinely meaningful and equitable system of regional integration; the mobilization of resources to support national, interstate, and regional policies; and concerted action to secure international cooperation for the purpose of economic liberation.

AbstractDuring Zimbabwe's struggle for national liberation, thousands of black African students fled Rhodesia to universities across the world on refugee scholarship schemes. To these young people, university student activism had historically provided a stable route into political relevance and nationalist leadership. But at foreign universities, many of which were vibrant centres for student mobilisations in the 1960s and 1970s and located far from Zimbabwean liberation movements’ organising structures, student refugees were confronted with the dilemma of what their role and future in the liberation struggle was. Through the concept of the ‘frontier’, this article compares the experiences of student activists at universities in Uganda, West Africa, and the UK as they figured out who they were as political agents. For these refugees, I show how political geography mattered. Campus frontiers could lead young people both to the military fronts of Mozambique and Zambia as well as to the highest circles of government in independent Zimbabwe. As such, campus frontiers were central to the history of Zimbabwe's liberation movements and the development of the postcolonial state.

Located in the small town of Alice in South Africa's Eastern Cape Province, the University of Fort Hare (UFH) was established in 1916 and for many years was the only institution of higher education in sub-equatorial Africa which was open to black students. Therefore, among Fort Hare's alumni are well-known African nationalists and politicians such as Oliver Tambo and Govan Mbeki of the African National Congress (ANC); Robert Sobukwe, who founded the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC); Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); Eluid Mathu, who was the first African member of the Kenya Legislative Council,;President Robert Mugabe and Herbert Chitepo of Zimbabwe; Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle of Lesotho; former Prime Minister Fwanyanga Mulikita of Uganda; and many others. While Fort Hare was taken over by the apartheid government in 1959 and incorporated into a network of ethnic universities within the homeland system, from the 1960s to early 1990s various banned liberation movements were active on campus and students periodically clashed with security forces. As a result, “[i]t is thus not surprising that with its venerable history of resistance and struggle, the UFH was chosen to be the repository of most of the archives of the Liberation Front.”

Given the 2017 coup in Zimbabwe, a rare event in Southern Africa but sadly common in the rest of the continent, this paper discusses the beginnings of the politicization of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) during the 1980s. At the end of the country’s war for independence in 1980, the ZDF formed as an amalgamation of former Rhodesian state military personnel and insurgents from the liberation movements of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Personnel from ZANU came to dominate Zimbabwe’s new military given the lack of a specific agreement over the integration process, their numerical superiority, and ZANU’s electoral success that gave it political power. During the ZDF integration exercise of the early 1980s, British advisors attempted to create a Western-style force but acted pragmatically while North Korean instructors helped create an overtly ZANU affiliated brigade and party militia. In addition, South African destabilization and the rapid departure of former Rhodesian officers gave way to the accelerated promotion of former insurgents mostly affiliated with the ZANU government. Lastly, the further ZANU-ization of the ZDF occurred within the context of operations in southwestern Zimbabwe where it eliminated ZAPU as an opposition political movement and committed atrocities, and in Mozambique where Zimbabwean troops cooperated with allies from overtly politicized armies of neighboring states

AbstractStudies of southern Africa's liberation movements have turned attention to the great importance of their transnational lives, but have rarely focused on the effects of the military training Cold War-era allies provided in sites across the globe. This is a significant omission in the history of these movements: training turns civilians into soldiers and creates armies with not only military but also social and political effects, as scholarship on conventional militaries has long emphasized. Liberation movement armies were however different in that they were not subordinated to a single state, instead receiving training under the flexible rubric of international solidarity in a host of foreign sites and in interaction with a great variety of military traditions. The training provided in this context produced multiple “military imaginaries” within liberation movement armies, at once creating deep tensions and enabling innovation. The article is based on oral histories of Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) veterans trained by Cuban and Soviet instructors in Angola in the late 1970s. These soldiers emerged from the Angolan camps with a military imaginary they summed up in the Cuban exhortation “Adelante!” (Forward!). Forty years later, they stressed how different their training had made them from other ZIPRA cadres, in terms of their military strategy, mastery of advanced Soviet weaponry, and aggressive disposition, as well as their “revolutionary” performance of politics and masculinity in modes of address, salute, and drill. Such military imaginaries powerfully shaped the southern African battlefield. They offer novel insight into the distinctive institutions, identities, and memories forged through Cold War-era military exchanges.

The development of contemporary South Africa political economy occurred within the context of a global capitalist order characterized by increasingly unequal political and economic relations between and within countries. Before liberation in 1994, many people across the world actively supported the struggle against apartheid, with South Africa’s neighbouring states paying the highest price. The ‘sovereignty’ of the apartheid state was challenged by three processes: first, economic, cultural and sporting sanctions called for by Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress and other liberation movements, which from the 1960s-80s were increasingly effective in forcing change; second, solidaristic foreign governments including Sweden’s and the USSR’s provided material support to overthrowing the Pretoria Regime; and third, military defeat in Angola and the liberation of neighbouring Mozambique (1975), Zimbabwe (1980) and Namibia (1990) signalled the inevitability of change. But that state nevertheless maintained sufficient strength - e.g. defaulting on foreign debt and imposing exchange controls in 1985 - to ensure a transition to democracy that was largely determined by local forces. Since 1994, the shrinkage of sovereignty means the foreign influences of global capitalism amplify local socio-economic contradictions in a manner destructive to the vast majority of citizens. This is evident when considering economic, ecological, geopolitical and societal considerations.

Zimbabwe Peoples’ Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was the armed wing of Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) which waged the war to liberate Zimbabwe. It operated from its bases in Zambia between 1964 and 1980. Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK) was ANC’s armed wing which sought to liberate South Africa from minority rule. Both forces (MK and ZIPRA) worked side by side until the attainment of independence by Zimbabwe when ANC guerrillas were sent back to Zambia by the new Zimbabwean government. This paper argues that the failure of ZIPRA and Umkhonto Wesizwe to deploy larger numbers of guerrillas to the war front in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) and South Africa was mainly caused by bio-physical challenges. ZAPU and ANC guerrillas faced the difficult task of crossing the Zambezi River and then walking through the sparsely vegetated areas, game reserves and parks until they reached villages deep in the country. Rhodesian and South African Defense Forces found it relatively easy to disrupt guerrilla movements along these routes. Even after entering into Rhodesia, ANC guerrillas had environmental challenges in crossing to South Africa. As such, they could not effectively launch protracted rural guerrilla warfare. Studies on ZIPRA and ANC guerrilla warfare have tended to ignore these environmental problems across inhospitable territories. For the ANC, surveillance along Limpopo River and in Kruger National Park acted more as impediments than conduits. ANC also had to cope with almost all challenges which confronted ZIPRA guerrillas such as the Zambezi, Lake Kariba and various parks which Rhodesians always used as a first line of defense but had a geographically difficult task in South Africa where the environment was not attractive for a guerrilla warfare.

In most Russian and international studies, including African ones, their authors portray African women that reside in areas affected by civil wars and conflicts as victims of violence, robbery, forced labor, etc. At the same time, it is rarely taken into account that in most national liberation movements and rebel groups the number of women fighters constituted and still constitutes 10-30% of their rank and file. Moreover, many women became field commanders, chiefs of intelligence, or were responsible for the supply of weapons and ammunition. The present authors provide a new interpretation of the participation and role of women in the confrontation between armed anti-government factions and the central government. It is noted that in recent decades, not only in Africa, but also in other parts of the world, the trend towards “feminization of the militarization process” has become extremely noticeable. Many women, along with men, participate in acts of violence, including against the civilian population, and thus contribute to the destabilization of the internal political situation. Women most actively participated in hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The present paper looks into reasons and consequences of women’s involvement in insurgencies. It is pointed out that while during the years of the national liberation struggle women were motivated by the overarching goal of achieving independence, in later conflicts many of them fought to expand their political and economic rights and opportunities, i.e., to achieve gender equality. In addition to joining “armed groups” for ideological reasons, women tried to prove that they were “no worse than men”; others joined the ranks of the insurgents to protect themselves and other women from violence or death, i.e., they followed a kind of “survival strategy”. Particular attention is paid to suicide bombers, who have been increasingly used by the Islamist organization Boko Haram in recent years. The authors also consider the conditions in which demobilized women-combatants find themselves. The authors conclude that as the level of women’s involvement in African conflicts is constantly growing, it ceases to be an anomaly and to some extent reflects the “successes” achieved by the “fair sex” in the struggle for equality, although the negative consequences of this participation prevail over the positive ones.

SUMMARYUsing ordinary least squares regression techniques this paper demonstrates, for the first time, that the classic association of war and disease substantially accounts for the presently observed geographical distribution of reported clinical AIDS cases in Uganda. Both the spread of HIV 1 infection in the 1980s, and the subsequent development of AIDS to its 1990 spatial pattern, are shown to be significantly and positively correlated with ethnic patterns of recruitment into the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) after the overthrow of Idi Amin some 10 years earlier in 1979. This correlation reflects the estimated mean incubation period of 8–10 years for HIV 1 and underlines the need for cognizance of historical factors which may have influenced current patterns of AIDS seen in Central Africa. The findings may have important implications for AIDS forecasting and control in African countries which have recently experienced war. The results are compared with parallel analyses of other HIV hypotheses advanced to account for the reported geographical distribution of AIDS in Uganda.

Purpose Success and failure in mediation are widely understood to determine whether a state will receive positive or negative reputation outcomes from undertaking a mediation role in an international conflict. Research from mediation in domestic settings contradicts this view, finding that peer mediators in school and community settings received positive mediator outcomes from undertaking their role, even when they failed to facilitate an agreement between disputants. This paper aims to test this assumption and argues that mediation success and failure are only weakly correlated with observable reputation outcomes for mediating states and proposes an alternative explanatory framework. Design/methodology/approach The hypothesis was inductively generated through a comparative analysis of single-state mediation attempts selected from the Uppsala Conflict Database Project MILC data set. The cases selected were South Africa’s mediation attempts in Côte d’Ivoire from 2004 to 2005 and Comoros from 2003 to 2004, and Mexico’s mediation attempts in Colombia (National Liberation Army) in 2004 and Guatemala (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) between 1994 and 1996. To contextualise the findings and develop the explanatory framework, South African mediation attempts in Burundi and the DRC are discussed in the closing sections of the paper. Findings This paper finds that mediation success and failure are only weakly correlated with mediator outcomes. Mediator outcomes are explained by the activity level of the mediating state in providing mediation services; the positive intention of the mediator to assist in resolving the conflict; the scale of the conflict mediated; the severity of spill over effects from the conflict in question; the regional importance of the conflict; the proximity of the government which a mediating state looks to develop relations with to the conflict; the importance of the mediation attempt within the peace process; the level of contestation of the mediation attempt, meaning the extent to which mediation attempts are themselves sites of regional or global international power politics; and the success or failure of the mediation attempt. Originality/value An explanatory framework for state mediator outcomes in which the outcome of a mediation attempt for the third-party state is not determined solely, or even primarily, by mediation success or failure bridges mediation research applying to international and domestic issue areas and provides additional information for policy makers regarding the costs and benefits of committing their state to processes of mediation in conflicts with low probabilities of resolution. This is particularly important for state policy makers, given that mediation is successful on average in only one out of every three attempts.

In the liberation of Zimbabwe, the contribution of two liberation fronts, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), cannot be ignored. However, documentation relating to the contribution made by ZPRA in the liberation struggle is scarce. Future generations have to know and understand the role played by ZPRA; and thus, there is a need for memory in the form of documents to highlight the role and contribution of ZPRA. The ZPRA Trust has highlighted the need to document its role in the liberation of Zimbabwe. This study, therefore, sought to find out what documentation exists on ZPRA’s contribution to the liberation of Zimbabwe, what documentation gaps exist on ZPRA’s contribution to the liberation struggle, and how ZPRA intends to fill gaps in its archives or memory. It also sought to find out what challenges stand in ZPRA’s way as it seeks to document its contribution to the liberation struggle, and where ZPRA’s liberation documentation and archives are. The ZPRA Trust is the unit of analysis for this study; as it is responsible for the administration of ZPRA’s affairs. This study was qualitative in nature, and a case study research design was applied. Purposive sampling was used as ZPRA cadres who lead the ZPRA Trust made up the population of the study

Much of what we know about Zimbabwe's liberation war heroes and heroines is associated with the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)'s recognition of individuals who defended its hold on power. However, of late, an upsurge in factionalism in the party has resulted in increasing reference to heroism as a means to exert factional dominance. An understanding of how this has been done can be used to explain ZANU-PF factional dynamics. Current studies call for the study of factionalism to focus on intra-party group dynamics instead of the traditional organisation forms of factions. It is in this context that this study argues that survival or fall of factions within (ZANU-PF) is framed around issues of heroism that is around one's perceived contribution or non-contribution to the liberation struggle. This article demonstrates this growing phenomenon in ZANU-PF veteran leaders whose status has been reshaped by new political moments as factionalism intensified. Inlight of rising factionalism, we argue that, war hero/heroine status in ZANU-PF is not permanent, but is highly shaped by obtaining factional political moments.

This article is an attempt to trace the impact of the US factor on the Russian African relations during the last years of B. Obama’s administration rule and at the initial stage of D. Trump presidency (2015–2018). The comparative assessment of Moscow and Washington African policy is made. The author demonstrates distinctions and continuity in the activities of the two US administrations in Africa. D. Trump has not included Africa in the list of his foreign policy priorities. Washington however has no intention to withdraw from the Black continent. There, as everywhere, “the American leadership” remains the invariable aim. In the 21th century, the Russia Federation policy in Africa has become much more active. Guided by the concept of multipolar world and in view of its current potential, economic in particular, Moscow has no intention to compete with the USA and other foreign actors for the overwhelming influence in Africa. Its tasks are pragmatic and realistic. In Africa, as globally, the US policy towards Russia is hostile. However the author is of the opinion that Washington does not consider Russia as a serious threaten for its positions and plans in Africa. The new National security strategy of the United States of America approved in December 2018 is full of antirussian outbursts, but in a section, dealing with the US priorities in Africa, Russia is not mentioned. The main American enemies there are international terrorists and China. Hence, no tough confrontation between the two parties – so far. Therefore rivalry there is confined to competition. The article is focused on visits in March 2018 of the Russian foreign minister S. Lavrov to Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia and of then US Secretary of State R.Tillerson to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Chad and Nigeria. The situation around some most sensitive US-Russia points of intersection in Africa – such as Egypt, Libya and South Africa Republic – is analyzed. The development of Cairo’s bilateral relations with Washington and Moscow is reviewed. It is noted that cooperation between Russia and Egypt is of mutual benefit and that the two countries need each other. But of this cooperation has its limits as the USA remains the main foreign partner of Egypt. The conclusion is that Russia has taken a course for a gradual restoration of its positions in Libya after the overthrow of M. Kaddafi. Moscow’s contribution to the settlement of the political crisis in the country is explored. Constructive contacts have been established with all major participants of this process. Special attention is paid to the National Libyan Army Commander, Field-Marshal H. Haftar. The United States preferences the head of the Government of national accord F. Sarraj. The attempts to interfere into Russia – South Africa using the resignation of president J. Zuma who firmly stood for friendship with Moscow have failed. The new president S. Ramaphosa has confirmed the policy of strong bilateral cooperation.

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 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