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1
Laakso, Liisa. "The politics of international election observation: the case of Zimbabwe in 2000." Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 3 (2002): 437–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x02003993.
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The example of Zimbabwe in 2000 shows that in a context of violent election campaigning, the role of international election observation is an ambiguous one. Unlike earlier elections organised by the Zimbabwean government, international donors wanted to observe its 2000 parliamentary election amidst a deepening crisis. They noted that the elections would not be free and fair in their view. Neighbouring countries with a more positive view joined the observation exercise. The government's discriminatory invitation and accreditation policy, the observers' emphasis on the peacefulness of the polling rather than free and fair elections, and the selective publication of their reports in various media, were affected both by the political agendas of the domestic players and by the governments which sent the observers. The difference between the Western view of the government, which had changed drastically since the 1980s and early 1990s, and the view of neighbouring governments, was crucial and may become significant elsewhere in Africa.
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Ojakorotu, Victor, and Rumbidzai Kamidza. "Look East Policy: The Case of Zimbabwe–China Political and Economic Relations Since 2000." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 74, no. 1 (2018): 17–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974928417749642.
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This article maps the evolution of Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy (LEP) and specifically the bilateral relationship with China through the lens of Zimbabwe’s domestic politics. It argues that political elite in Zimbabwe has a vested interest in a close economic and political relationship with China at the cost of the interests of the people of Zimbabwe. The author establishes that Zimbabwe’s LEP was intended to respond to the economic sanctions imposed on it by Western nations. From the descriptive account of the LEP provided in the article, it appears that the LEP has been successful in doing that by having a broad-based economic and political relationship with China. The author further critiques the impact of Chinese investment in Zimbabwe as detrimental to the interests of the people. Foreign policy is an instrument that governs and protects the interests of governments, nationals, institutions, organisations and entities within the lenses of bilateral relations between the countries concerned. The Zimbabwe–China relations point to the fact that the latter China is politically and economically committed to engage and develop the former. However, at the heart of commitment and development in Zimbabwe lies questions of interests and the nature of the relationship which is affecting development and commitment to take place. Hence, this article argues that the failure of Zimbabwe to yield satisfying results from the bilateral relations lies mostly on the political and economic weaknesses of the Zimbabwean government and leadership. The fact that the LEP is not formally and publicly developed and disseminated to key stakeholders and the general public and that it remains largely an oral secret public policy statement affects the interests of Zimbabwean economy and interested stakeholders. This also reflects a weak foreign policy directive. As long as Zimbabwe continues to deny to engage with other superpowers and global institutions, the LEP will remain doomed as China will continue to manipulate and exploit the relationship knowingly that Zimbabwe has no other friends and partners for development and cooperation.
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Manenji, Tawanda, and Barbra Marufu. "The impact of adopting e-government as a mechanism to enhance accountability as well as transparent conduct within public institutions." Scholedge International Journal of Business Policy & Governance ISSN 2394-3351 3, no. 7 (2016): 84. http://dx.doi.org/10.19085/journal.sijbpg030701.
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<em>This study examines the impact of adopting e-government as a mechanism to enhance accountability as well as transparent conduct within public institutions in Zimbabwe. There is a belief that e-government brings about better change in governance issues through active disclosure of governance information. The research found out that e-government in Zimbabwe though still being nurtured, has better prospects and there is great need for clearly setting and meeting a conducive environment for it to flourish. That is a set of pre-requirements need to be assessed before trying to implement e-government into full swing. Zimbabwe lacks an unanimous e-government strategy across its ministries hence the existence of disparities in e-government adoption within the country – some ministries are more advanced while others only exhibit the first initial stages of e-government. However, the adoption of e-government in Zimbabwe has been hampered by a plethora of challenges ranging from politics, economics, social and technological. Among them include inadequate or weak legislative frameworks guiding and directing e-government implementation, budget constraints, digital divide as well as technological incompetence. The study also makes some recommendations as to how e-government prospects can be fully attained and such remedies among others include the passing of a comprehensive IT policy which cut across all government ministries, embracing Public Private Partnerships in building IT infrastructure, and redefining government’s top priorities and focus much on e-government investment. The paper also notes the effects of poor governance to a country. Zimbabwe’s e-government strategy if managed properly, would also reduce government external debt, improve service delivery, promote economic development, and increase public accountability and transparency within the public sector.</em>
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Hodgkinson, Dan. "POLITICS ON LIBERATION'S FRONTIERS: STUDENT ACTIVIST REFUGEES, INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE, 1965–79." Journal of African History 62, no. 1 (2021): 99–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021853721000268.
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AbstractDuring Zimbabwe's struggle for national liberation, thousands of black African students fled Rhodesia to universities across the world on refugee scholarship schemes. To these young people, university student activism had historically provided a stable route into political relevance and nationalist leadership. But at foreign universities, many of which were vibrant centres for student mobilisations in the 1960s and 1970s and located far from Zimbabwean liberation movements’ organising structures, student refugees were confronted with the dilemma of what their role and future in the liberation struggle was. Through the concept of the ‘frontier’, this article compares the experiences of student activists at universities in Uganda, West Africa, and the UK as they figured out who they were as political agents. For these refugees, I show how political geography mattered. Campus frontiers could lead young people both to the military fronts of Mozambique and Zambia as well as to the highest circles of government in independent Zimbabwe. As such, campus frontiers were central to the history of Zimbabwe's liberation movements and the development of the postcolonial state.
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Maringira, Godfrey. "The Military Post-Mugabe." Journal of Asian and African Studies 56, no. 2 (2021): 176–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909620986586.
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This article argues that, through the coup, the military has become more visible in national politics in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. The current situation under President Mnangagwa marks a qualitative difference with the military under Mugabe’s rule. Currently, in now being more prominent, the military is politics and is the determinant of any political transition that may be forthcoming in Zimbabwe. However, if it deems it necessary, the military accommodates civilian politicians into politics in order to ‘sanitize’ the political landscape in its own interests. Simultaneously, despite their involvement in the coup, ordinary soldiers feel increasingly marginalized under Mnangagwa’s government.
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Cheeseman, Nic, and Blessing-Miles Tendi. "Power-sharing in comparative perspective: the dynamics of ‘unity government’ in Kenya and Zimbabwe." Journal of Modern African Studies 48, no. 2 (2010): 203–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x10000224.
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ABSTRACTThis paper draws on the recent experience of Kenya and Zimbabwe to demonstrate how power-sharing has played out in Africa. Although the two cases share some superficial similarities, variation in the strength and disposition of key veto players generated radically different contexts that shaped the feasibility and impact of unity government. Explaining the number and attitude of veto players requires a comparative analysis of the evolution of civil–military and intra-elite relations. In Zimbabwe, the exclusionary use of violence and rhetoric, together with the militarisation of politics, created far greater barriers to genuine power-sharing, resulting inthe politics of continuity. These veto players were less significant in the Kenyan case, giving rise to a more cohesive outcome in the form ofthe politics of collusion. However, we find that neither mode of power-sharing creates the conditions for effective reform, which leads to a more general conclusion: unity government serves to postpone conflict, rather than to resolve it.
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Rusero, Alexander M., and Emaculate Mvundura. "Post Mugabe Era and Feasibility of Regime Change in Zimbabwe." World Journal of Social Science Research 7, no. 4 (2020): p60. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/wjssr.v7n4p60.
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Barely a year after Zimbabwe’s long serving President Robert Mugabe was ousted through a military coup which replaced him with his erstwhile trusted ally and vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa, the army shot six civilians caught up in the crossfire of protestors alleging ZANU PF electoral theft of the 2018 July 30 polls. Although the military has always been in the background of Zimbabwe’s politics in general and the ruling ZANU PF affairs in particular, the shooting of protestors incident which occurred on the 1st of August 2018 left the world shell-shocked on the prospects of any peaceful change of government or even transfer of power, confirming to all and sundry that Mugabe could have exited the political stage, but the system he presided over for 37 years is still intact, if not even more perfected in the aftermath. This has since rekindled debates on the feasibility of regime change in Zimbabwe and in that context the validity and essence of having an election in the first place if any outcome unfavourable to ZANU PF and its candidate is likely to witness the unleashing of armed soldiers and the subsequent killing of citizens in the process. With the security sector involved in politics in contrast to the old adage that politics lead the gun, it thus comes as a paradox that for the umpteenth time, regime change in Zimbabwe shall remain an elusive dream.
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CHIKONZO, KELVIN. "From Panic to Reconciliation: Protest Theatre and the State in Zimbabwe, 1999–2012." Theatre Research International 41, no. 3 (2016): 218–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0307883316000390.
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Between 1999 and 2008, Zimbabwe was in political and economic crisis. A number of theatre-makers responded by creating several different kinds of protest theatre. They did this to compensate for a media monopoly by the state, to promote active citizen engagement in politics, and to promote political change. This article first surveys developments in protest theatre at this time. It then draws attention to a brand of protest theatre that emerged after the crisis in Zimbabwe, after the formation of a Government of National Unity. Reconciliatory protest theatre, I explain, was concerned with issues of national healing and reconciliation which dominated the post-crisis situation in Zimbabwe. Whilst both the state and protest artists concurred on the fact that the nation ought to be healed and that reconciliation was needed, tensions emerged as to how the processes of healing and reconciliation were to unfold. By looking at two examples in detail, I explain how Zimbabwe's theatre artists viewed this issue, and how the state reacted.
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Masunungure, Eldred, and Hardlife Zvoushe. "An Analysis of the Existing Form of Governance Politics in Zimbabwe and Proposals for a New Kind of Policymaking." African Journal of Inclusive Societies 2, no. 1 (2023): 14–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.59186/si.yifw6fns.
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This article analyses Zimbabwe’s existing governance politics, specifically focusing on the politics of policy making. We argue that the existing form of governance politics in Zimbabwe is characterised by the vertical modality of rule whereby policies are crafted unilaterally at the apex of the party state with little or no input from affected stakeholders – including ordinary citizens - and then fed to citizens who are therefore treated as dispensable policy takers. We further argue that the current forms of politics and policymaking are similarly exclusionary in nature, relying on centralised governance approaches where the central government and the ruling party unilaterally make governance decisions and formulate policy without consulting citizens and other key stakeholders. Finally, we propose the adoption of a ‘distributed problem-solving model’ which acknowledges and prioritises the unique needs and interests of different social groups in governance and policy making.
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Maringira, Godfrey. "Politics, Privileges, and Loyalty in the Zimbabwe National Army." African Studies Review 60, no. 2 (2017): 93–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asr.2017.1.
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Abstract:In postcolonial Africa, the military has become an actor in politics, often in ways that can be described as unprofessional. This paper focuses on the manner in which the Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) has become heavily politicized since independence, directly supporting the regime of President Robert Mugabe while denigrating the opposition political party. The military metamorphosed, to all intents, into an extension of President Mugabe’s political party, the ZANU-PF. I argue that even though the military is expected to subordinate itself to a civilian government, the ZNA is highly unprofessional, in- and outside the army barracks. The ways in which politics came to be mediated by army generals, as “war veterans” serving in the military, directly influenced not only how soldiers who joined the army in postindependence Zimbabwe were promoted and demoted, but how they lived their lives as soldiers in the army barracks. This article is based on fifty-eight life histories of army deserters living in exile in South Africa.
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Takavarasha, Sam, and John Makumbe. "The Effect of Politics on ICT4D." International Journal of E-Politics 3, no. 3 (2012): 40–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jep.2012070103.
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Zimbabwe is the best contemporary example of how politics can affect economic development. Equally as significant, and yet under studied, is the effect of politics on Information and Communication Technologies for development (ICT4D). In this case study of government of Zimbabwe’s five year battle to prevent Econet Wireless from operating a mobile phone network, the authors present the fear for the conviviality of ICTs as a reason why dictatorial states often restrict free use of ICTs and how this can inhibit its role in fostering development. Using a combination of aspects of Thomas Hobbes’ political theory and Sen’s capability approach the authors show how passions like fear for the power of ICTs in private hands and the appetite for proceeds from the telecoms sector fuelled a five year legal battle that was eventually won by Econet. A framework for assessing the motives behind restrictive political action and the concomitant erosion of political freedoms which inhibits free ICT use and investment in the sector is also presented.
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JENKINS, CAROLYN. "The Politics of Economic Policy-Making in Zimbabwe." Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 4 (1997): 575–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x97002589.
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There are two remarkable features of post-independence economic policy-making in Zimbabwe: the very limited nature of the changes made by the new government in 1980, and the complete reversal of policy announced in 1990. It was surprising that a more radical transformation had not been introduced soon after independence, since this had been achieved by a civil war prompted not only by the denial of even basic rights to the majority of the population, but also by an extremely inequitable distribution of economic resources. The volte-face in 1990 was also unexpected, because it required a repudiation of governmental rhetoric at a time when the economy was by no means in a state of crisis, even though under stress. This article attempts to understand these policy shifts.
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Masango, Cleven, and Vannie Naidoo. "An Analysis of Nation Brand Attractiveness: Evidence from Brand Zimbabwe." Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 10, no. 6(J) (2018): 99–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jebs.v10i6(j).2598.
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This paper examines the attractiveness of Brand Zimbabwe based on the factors perceived to impact on national competitiveness. Nation brand attractiveness is a necessary condition for a country to achieve influence and to effectively compete for global resources. Countries can enhance their attractiveness by building on their national brand equity and dealing with negatives around the national brands. The research sought to determine the perception towards Zimbabwe’s global risk and competitiveness; to ascertain the variables that promote competitiveness for Brand Zimbabwe and to contribute to the literature on risk perception and its impact on behaviour towards nation brands. The study followed a mixed approach; a combination of interpretivism and positivism. The research drew 372 respondents from politicians, scholars, the media, civic organisations, government officials, church and international organisations. The research established that Brand Zimbabwe faces glaring threats risks that impact on the country’s international image. The brand is affected by politics and governance together with socio-economic factors. Management and control of nation brand perception are critical for nations to distinguish themselves and to create vantage positions for sustainable performance. The way a country is viewed internationally is a function of how the country deals with factors that threaten its global competitiveness and perception towards the nation brand. Zimbabwe’s quest for foreign direct investment, international visitation and export revenue requires that the country deals with its nation brand image.
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Mutekwe, Paddington, and Kudzaiishe Peter Vanyoro. "Politicising ‘Covid-19’: An analysis of selected ZANU-PF officials’ 2020-2021 media statements on the pandemic in Zimbabwe." Acta Academica 53, no. 2 (2021): 12–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/24150479/aa53i2/2.
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This paper examines the politicisation of Covid-19 in Zimbabwe through discourse analysis of selected media statements released by Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) officials on the Covid-19 pandemic between March 2020 and February 2021. Theoretically, the paper employs Foucault’s theory of biopower to interpret the state-citizen power relations that surfaced in the Zimbabwean government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. It argues that the ZANU-PF-led government used Covid-19 as an excuse to pursue its political interests. This is politics that protected ZANU-PF’s social, political and economic interests by using Covid-19 as an excuse to pulverise various forms of opposition. The argument advanced herein is that while the implementation of the lockdown in Zimbabwe was necessary to save lives, one of its consequences was the protection of self-interests through selective application of lockdown regulations and the passing of laws to silence critics. This resulted in the prohibition of political gatherings, arbitrary arrests, labelling and name-calling of the opposition and the West by ZANU-PF officials who were safeguarding their party’s waning support resulting from their mismanagement of the pandemic.
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Masango, Cleven, and Vannie Naidoo. "An Analysis of Nation Brand Attractiveness: Evidence from Brand Zimbabwe." Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 10, no. 6 (2018): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jebs.v10i6.2598.
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This paper examines the attractiveness of Brand Zimbabwe based on the factors perceived to impact on national competitiveness. Nation brand attractiveness is a necessary condition for a country to achieve influence and to effectively compete for global resources. Countries can enhance their attractiveness by building on their national brand equity and dealing with negatives around the national brands. The research sought to determine the perception towards Zimbabwe’s global risk and competitiveness; to ascertain the variables that promote competitiveness for Brand Zimbabwe and to contribute to the literature on risk perception and its impact on behaviour towards nation brands. The study followed a mixed approach; a combination of interpretivism and positivism. The research drew 372 respondents from politicians, scholars, the media, civic organisations, government officials, church and international organisations. The research established that Brand Zimbabwe faces glaring threats risks that impact on the country’s international image. The brand is affected by politics and governance together with socio-economic factors. Management and control of nation brand perception are critical for nations to distinguish themselves and to create vantage positions for sustainable performance. The way a country is viewed internationally is a function of how the country deals with factors that threaten its global competitiveness and perception towards the nation brand. Zimbabwe’s quest for foreign direct investment, international visitation and export revenue requires that the country deals with its nation brand image.
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Bessant, Leslie, and William A. Masters. "Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe." International Journal of African Historical Studies 29, no. 1 (1996): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/221436.
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Charles Mazhazhate, Tapiwa C Mujakachi, and Shakerod Munuhwa. "Towards Pragmatic Economic Policies: Economic Transformation and Industrialization for Revival of Zimbabwe in the New Dispensation Era." International Journal of Engineering and Management Research 10, no. 5 (2020): 75–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.31033/ijemr.10.5.14.
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Whilst literature has many monetary and economic policies that were enacted before and after the dawn of the New Dispensation in Zimbabwe the country still faces a downward trend in terms of economic recovery. This study reviews the various policies put in place by the government and their impact on socio-economic development of Zimbabwe. A review of Zimbabwe’s economic history shows that the country dropped from being one of the best economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and now ailing and characterised by hyperinflation, agricultural challenges, corruption, very high tax regime, huge domestic and foreign debts, increase in consumer prices and being a chief net importer of most goods or services. The study was underpinned by a case study survey from Singapore’s revival with both qualitative and quantitative instruments used. The study found out that even though the land reform had an impact on economic performance, corruption, party-power politics and absence of an economic institute eroded any necessary contribution to economic transformation and industrialization in Zimbabwe. The study also revealed that the bilateral and multi-lateral agreements that were enacted in the dawn of the new dispensation have not yielded the desired economic revival transformations. The study recommended establishment of an economic institute to direct policy as well as removal of unethical practices in both public and private sectors so as to ensure financial and economic discipline.
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Musemwa, Muchaparara. "Urban Struggles over Water Scarcity in Harare." Daedalus 150, no. 4 (2021): 27–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01871.
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Abstract This essay counters the growing tendency in current scholarship to attribute nearly all the enduring water scarcity problems to climate change. Focusing on Harare, Zimbabwe's capital city, this essay contends that recurrent water crises can only really be understood within the contentious, long, and complex history of water politics in the capital city from the colonial to the postcolonial period. Although the colonial and postcolonial states in Zimbabwe had very different ideological and racial policies, for various reasons, neither was willing nor able to provide adequate supplies of water to the urban poor even as water was abundant in the city's reservoirs. It posits that while the colonial government racialized access to water by restricting its use by urban Africans, the postcolonial government failed to change the colonial patterns of urban water distribution and did little to increase water supplies to keep pace with a swiftly growing urban population and a geographically expanding city.
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Dombo, Sylvester, and Victor M. Gwande. "GATEWAY TO NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL YOUTH SERVICE IN RELATION TO THE AFRICAN YOUTH CHARTER." Commonwealth Youth and Development 14, no. 1 (2017): 65–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.25159/1727-7140/1390.
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This study looks at the uses and abuses of the National Youth Service (NYS) as a vehicle to attain national economic and social development for the youth in Zimbabwe. started in 2001, the NYS has in its short life span attracted both admirers and enemies both locally and externally. Whilst proponents of the NYS argue that it is the best way to integrate the youth fully in all aspects of the economy, in line with the dictates of the African Youth Charter, enemies have argued that the NYS has been nothing but an attempt to sacrifice developmental aspirations on the altar of political expediency. This study looks at the politics surrounding the implementation of the African Youth Charter, particularly article 15, which states that member states should institute NYS programmes to engender community participation and skills development for entry into the labour market. This paper asserts that the NYS in Zimbabwe was implemented before the adoption of the African Youth Charter in 2006 and that this has raised concern among the youth that no attempts have been made to harmonise the two. As a result, instances of the NYS being abused for partisan ends have been rife, leading to calls to rebrand the NYS in line with the provisions of the youth charter. Therefore, besides the issue of perception, this paper argues that lack of resources and discord within the unity government led to the failure by the government to fully implement the African Youth Charter in the Zimbabwean context.
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Gran, Thorvald. "Looking back: Government politics and trust in rural developments in Tanzania and Zimbabwe 1980–1990." Development Southern Africa 35, no. 4 (2018): 450–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0376835x.2018.1461608.
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Dendere, Chipo. "Financing political parties in Africa: the case of Zimbabwe." Journal of Modern African Studies 59, no. 3 (2021): 295–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x21000148.
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AbstractWhat is the impact of access to political party finance – money that parties use to fund their campaign activities – on politics in Africa? While multiparty elections have become more regular in the developing world, many opposition parties are still failing to win elections. This paper argues that poor access to political finance weakens democratic consolidation and negatively impacts the participation of less-resourced candidates who are unable to self-fund. As a result, opposition parties are forced to rely on weak promises of aid from international donors and unreliable state funding. This in-depth analysis of political finance, based on extensive interviews with politicians and government officials in Zimbabwe, political documents, news reports and a review of court cases, reveals that uneven financing has weakened opposition parties and serves as an extra advantage for incumbents.
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Hove, Mediel, and Vincent Chenzi. "‘Prophets of Doom’: The Zimbabwean Christian Community and Contemporary Politics." Insight on Africa 9, no. 2 (2017): 173–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0975087817710054.
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Since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the Christian community was largely silent about Zimbabwe’s economic and political quagmire. However, the country’s growing political and economic turmoil drew the Zimbabwean Christian community into direct confrontation with Mugabe’s administration. The community experienced political awakening after decades of political indifference, passivity and silence. In 2016, several Christian leaders and their denominations publicly challenged the government on several occasions calling for Mugabe to step down and demanded economic reforms. In response, the Mugabe regime employed different tactics to silence and undermine the Christian community.
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Chipuriro, Rejoice. "#BeatThePot: Strategies and Discourses of Women’s Protests in Zimbabwe." Atlantis 44, no. 2 (2024): 14–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1109369ar.
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<p>This paper focuses on strategies deployed by women and discourses of women’s collective action in the #BeatThePot strike which took place alongside popular protests against Mugabe and the failures of ZANU-PF led government in Zimbabwe. Using Judith Butler’s ideas on “bodies in alliance and the politics of the street,” I theorize how women as gendered “bodies congregate, move, speak and strike together as they claim public space into political spaces” (2015, 70). I interrogate women’s use of embodiment as a strategy involving the metaphor of both the “labouring mothering body” and as “bodies that strike,” which demonstrates how women in Zimbabwe confronted violent political, economic, and socio-cultural limits imposed on their bodies. In this strike, women challenged the silencing of women’s public political work and refused to be relegated to the invisible margins of domesticized and undervalued reproductive labour. Thus, through the #BeatThePot protest, I demonstrate how women in Zimbabwe have engaged in body work to a confront violent regime and how they have borne on their bodies violent reprisal through sexual attacks, abductions, incarcerations, torture, and even loss of life. The paper concludes that the feminized body is a site of violent struggle for autonomy and that through collective action women in Zimbabwe have sought to confront and transform the repressive state.</p>
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Makahamadze, Tompson, and Francis Sibanda. "Gratuitous benefit for the ZANU-PF government? Securitisation of COVID-19 and authoritarian politics in Zimbabwe." African Security Review 31, no. 1 (2021): 33–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1982739.
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Roe, Emery M. "More than the politics of decentralization: Local government reform, district development and public administration in Zimbabwe." World Development 23, no. 5 (1995): 833–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750x(95)00008-z.
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Masakure, Clement. "The politicisation of health in Zimbabwe: The case of the cholera epidemic, August 2008-March 2009." New Contree 80 (July 30, 2018): 24. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/nc.v80i0.79.
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In this article the case of the August 2008 to March 2009 cholera epidemic is used to examine the intersections between health and politics in Zimbabwe. The focus is on the different narratives deployed by the mainstream opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change under Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU -PF) to explain the causes of, and responses to the cholera epidemic which emerged in the immediate aftermath of the disputed June 2008 presidential runoff. An analyses of how regional governments, especially South Africa, responded to the cholera outbreak is made. The opposition argued that the epidemic was a clear indicator of government’s mismanagement. On the other hand, public intellectuals aligned to ZANU-PF and government ministers invoked conspiracy theories and blamed external forces for the epidemic. South Africa and the region saw it through a humanitarian crisis lens. In the discussion the varied narratives explaining the causes of the outbreak and responses to the cholera epidemic exposed ongoing internal and external political contestations are noted. The epidemic seems to have become inextricably entangled with discourses revolving around political governance, human rights problems and the struggles over political power between the ruling party and opposition parties.
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Vengeyi, Obvious. "Israelite Prophetic Marks among Zimbabwean Men of God: An Evaluation of the Conduct of Selected Zimbabwean Church Leaders in Recent Politics." Exchange 39, no. 2 (2010): 159–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/016627410x12608581119795.
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AbstractWhat does it mean to be prophetic during political turmoil? Does it mean opposition to the government or opposition to any opposition to the government? This article offers a Biblical theological response to this question as it evaluates the behaviour of the clergymen and church representative bodies in Zimbabwe. Although the immediate context is the violence that engulfed the nation soon after 29 March 2008 election, over the years since 2000, the church has spoken with contradictory voices. There are churches and individual church leaders who openly displayed their allegiance to the government irrespective of all glaring misgivings. On one hand there existed some Christian leaders who opposed whatever the government did, hence they openly clamoured for regime change. While all this was happening, the common man benefitted only confusion as to who really is prophetic, that is who really represents God and the people.
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Chuma, Wallace. "Zimbabwe: The conflictual relations between journalism and politics in the first decade of independence." International Communication Gazette 82, no. 7 (2020): 594–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748048519897489.
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African countries where democracy and majority rule came about through negotiated transitions are often conflicted polities in which elements of the new order exist uneasily with strong currents of the ancien regime. The media in these ‘transitioning’ societies naturally find themselves at the forefront of interpreting and representing these contradictions through deploying both ‘old’ journalistic frames and creating new narratives. In doing so, African journalists mediating this initial phase of the postcolonial transition negotiate a complex terrain: fielding pressures from an array of power centres including the new political elite transforming itself from a liberation movement into a democratic government, corporate hierarchies with strong links to the past, advertisers and media owners. They are also confronted with a plethora of expectations of how they should represent the new order, in part based on who they are, in terms of race, gender and class. This article focuses on the journalism-politics nexus within the first decade of democracy in Zimbabwe, identifying key moments and sites where the matrix of influences (and contradictions) played itself out. It does so through archival research, including selected biographies published by journalists who lived through the contested transition. The results suggest that in Zimbabwe, the structural factors shaping journalism practice rested to a large extent on a set of expectations of a ‘collaborative’ media by the new political elite, which adopted an aggressive stick and carrot approach to enforcing journalistic collaboration. At the same time, it is also clear that journalists were able, from time to time, to subvert or manoeuvre within the ‘system’ to assert their agency, although this was in cases few and far between.
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Kriger, Norma. "ZANU PF politics under Zimbabwe's ‘Power-Sharing’ Government." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 30, no. 1 (2012): 11–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2012.644947.
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Kurebwa, Jeffrey. "The Institution of Traditional Leadership and Local Governance in Zimbabwe." International Journal of Civic Engagement and Social Change 5, no. 1 (2018): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijcesc.2018010101.
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This article describes how traditional leaders play important developmental, administrative and political roles in rural areas, despite modern state structures. They regulate rural life, control access to land, and settle various disputes. They are respected leaders in their communities. The existence of traditional leaders means that both the decentralisation and the strengthening of local governance are not taking place in a vacuum. Documentary sources such as the Constitution of Zimbabwe; the Traditional Leaders Act (2000) and Chiefs and Headmen Act (1982); newspapers and unpublished non-governmental organisations (NGOs) evaluations and reports were used in this article. Traditional leaders have played a pivotal role in ensuring that the ZANU-PF government remains in power since 1980. In principle, traditional leaders should not be drawn into party politics and their role should remain one of the neutral leadership. If the traditional leader assumes a party-political role, one should appoint a substitute to handle their traditional role to avoid a conflict of interest.
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Chibanda, Tawanda William. "THIRD CHIMURENGA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE COMMERCIAL FARMERS UNION IN ZIMBABWE." Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives 5, no. 2 (2020): 36–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.55190/wbyj3702.
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This article focuses on how the white farmers responded to violent take-over of land. Having had a privileged status in society, the white farmers found themselves in a very fragile state as Third Chimurenga began. The violent take-over of land was spearheaded by war veterans. Images of white farmers who were beaten, killed, exiled and driven from their homes became synonymous with land invasions. Such events and acts of eviction became commonly referred to as Jambanja as more and more farmers suffered violent confrontations on their farms. The white farmers were portrayed as being in direct opposition to the government land distribution agenda that had given approval to the invasions and evictions. The article examine the effectiveness of Commercial Farmers Union in responding to the invasions, the new splinter groups and how they responded to the invasions and also the SADC tribunal petition by Mike Campbell. The article will also provide an analysis on how Jambanja spread and how it was carried out. Thus through reading library sources and literature in collections as well as carrying out interviews this article seeks to demonstrate that white farmers tried without much success to resist the sanctioned farm invasions. Ultimately the white farmers lost their prized possession that is the land. The article will highlight the dynamics of land politics in Zimbabwe. Keywords: Commercial Farmers Union, Implications, Jambanja, Land Politics, Third Chimurenga
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Nhapi, Tatenda Goodman, and Jotham Dhemba. "The conundrum of old age and COVID-19 responses in Eswatini and Zimbabwe." International Social Work 63, no. 6 (2020): 842–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020872820944998.
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This article explores domains of challenges in guaranteeing enhanced social functioning for Southern African countries of Zimbabwe and Eswatini in the context of COVID-19. Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and Government of Ewatini (GoE) social protection interventions targeting COVID-impact mitigation for older persons are analysed within the context of resource constraint challenges. Social security programmes initiated by the GoE and GoZ are analysed while noting emerging milestones and gaps. Finally, pathways for the roles of social workers are proposed.
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Tshehla, M. F., and E. Mukudu. "Addressing Constraints for Effective Project Finance for Infrastructure Projects in Emerging Economies – the Case of Zimbabwe." Journal of Construction Business and Management 4, no. 1 (2020): 48–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.15641/jcbm.4.1.806.
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The infrastructure deficit in developing countries is vast and current developmental initiatives fail to meet the requirements. There is a need for housing, clean water, sewerage facilities, transport and telecommunications infrastructure. The development of infrastructure requires large amounts of funding, which could be a project or non-recourse finance. The levels of project finance allocated to developing countries are much smaller compared to the developed world. The purpose of this paper is to determine the critical success factors for accessing project finance for infrastructure development in a developing country, Zimbabwe. This study employed the quantitative approach using a survey questionnaire to address various aspects that are important when lenders advance project finance. The questionnaire was distributed to participating organizations comprised of lenders, borrowers and investors with the higher numbers being borrowers. These organizations include banks in Zimbabwe that offer project finance for infrastructure, Pension funds which invest in infrastructure, Multilateral agencies operating in Zimbabwe, and Municipalities of major cities in Zimbabwe. The interrater reliability of the individual factors was calculated. Also, the aggregate interrater reliability for the different attributes was determined using Cronbach's alpha value. A total of 33 factors under five attributes were identified: governmental, financing, project, special purpose vehicle, and politics and economics were identified as being critical for accessing project finance. These factors were ranked according to their significance index or importance. Only 12 factors were considered as extremely important as critical success factors for project financing in Zimbabwe. The contribution of this study is to provide government, project finance agencies, private sector and other stakeholders interested in infrastructure projects with a list of the most important critical success factors for infrastructure projects in a developing country.
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Kauma, Bryan, and Sandra Swart. "Hunger and power: Politics, food (in)security and the development of small grains in Zimbabwe, 2000-2010." Historia 67, no. 1 (2022): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2309-8392/2022/v67n1a6.
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White maize sadza is the most eaten food in Zimbabwe. Yet, over the decade of the 2000s, its consumption was threatened by drought and consequent acute food shortages. Small grains - sorghum and millet - offered a panacea to looming starvation and civil unrest. Yet, as we argue in this article, its access became rooted increasingly within political contestations between the ruling ZANU PF government, the budding opposition party and ordinary citizens. Using the story of small grains -sorghum and millet - between 2000 and 2010, we trace how food (in)security took a political form, stirring a pot of sometimes violent clashes between political and social contenders. We argue that through 'political grain', various political and social elites were able to amass wealth and power for themselves and grab control of sociopolitical discourse on food security during the crisis years. As the state imposed a series of seemingly well-intentioned and sometimes even widely welcomed food initiatives such as Operation Maguta and BACOSSI, these food security measures were often ad hoc, temporary and - as we argue - actually had an adverse long-term impact on local grain production and food availability. The government worked through key parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to allocate resources and food support to ruling party loyalists. In this period, the ZANU PF regime was concerned primarily with holding on to its waning political power and avenues for personal wealth accumulation at the expense of food security in the country. This paper demonstrates how an anthropogenically-induced 'hunger' effectively prolonged ZANU PF's control of society - but we also show how 'small people' fought back against President Robert Mugabe's 'big men' by embracing the growing and eating of traditional 'small grains'.
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Kauma, Bryan, and Sandra Swart. "Hunger and power: Politics, food (in)security and the development of small grains in Zimbabwe, 2000-2010." Historia 67, no. 1 (2022): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2309-8392/2021/v67n1a6.
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White maize sadza is the most eaten food in Zimbabwe. Yet, over the decade of the 2000s, its consumption was threatened by drought and consequent acute food shortages. Small grains - sorghum and millet - offered a panacea to looming starvation and civil unrest. Yet, as we argue in this article, its access became rooted increasingly within political contestations between the ruling ZANU PF government, the budding opposition party and ordinary citizens. Using the story of small grains -sorghum and millet - between 2000 and 2010, we trace how food (in)security took a political form, stirring a pot of sometimes violent clashes between political and social contenders. We argue that through 'political grain', various political and social elites were able to amass wealth and power for themselves and grab control of sociopolitical discourse on food security during the crisis years. As the state imposed a series of seemingly well-intentioned and sometimes even widely welcomed food initiatives such as Operation Maguta and BACOSSI, these food security measures were often ad hoc, temporary and - as we argue - actually had an adverse long-term impact on local grain production and food availability. The government worked through key parastatals like the Grain Marketing Board and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to allocate resources and food support to ruling party loyalists. In this period, the ZANU PF regime was concerned primarily with holding on to its waning political power and avenues for personal wealth accumulation at the expense of food security in the country. This paper demonstrates how an anthropogenically-induced 'hunger' effectively prolonged ZANU PF's control of society - but we also show how 'small people' fought back against President Robert Mugabe's 'big men' by embracing the growing and eating of traditional 'small grains'.
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Nyathi, Gugulethu Linda, and Helda Risman. "AFRICA’S SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY: DEFENSE DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)." Jurnal Pertahanan: Media Informasi ttg Kajian & Strategi Pertahanan yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nasionalism & Integrity 6, no. 2 (2020): 138. http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v6i2.720.
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<p>Several conflict interventions have been taken place in the DRC, including political and diplomatic efforts. In 1998, the South African Development Cooperation (SADC) intervened through a combination of military and mediation activities. There was a military intervention from three SADC countries - Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, under the auspices of the SADC Allied Forces. Recovery from the conflict that occurred from 2003 up to 2019 has not been smooth. The main cause of the second war was politics. President Laurent Kabila was seeking to expel Rwanda from the government. Rwandan troops supporting the Tutsi invaded and social conflict with ethnic connotations increased. The conflict continued until a transitional government was created to share power among all vice presidents. At that time, it was perceived that a military outcome would not produce the lasting peace required for the reconstruction of the DRC.</p>
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Epprecht, Marc. "The Gay Oral History Project in Zimbabwe: Black Empowerment, Human Rights, and the Research Process." History in Africa 26 (January 1999): 25–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3172136.
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This paper discusses an attempt to apply historical research directly to the development of a culture of human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe. The research concerns sensitive and controversial issues around sexuality, race, and nationalism that are important in and of themselves. What I would like to argue here, however, is that the method used to design and carry out the research project is at least as interesting. This holds true from the point of view of both professional historians like myself and community activists—two perspectives that are often difficult to reconcile in practice. In this project, “ivory tower” and “grassroots” are brought together in a mutually enriching relationship that offers an alternative model to the methods that currently predominate in the production of historical knowledge in southern Africa.Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) is a non-government organization that was founded in 1990. It provides counseling, legal and other support services to men and women struggling with issues of sexuality. It also strives to promote a politics in Zimbabwe that would embrace sexual orientation as a human right. Toward the latter goal it has lobbied government for changes to current laws that discriminate against homosexuals and which expose gay men and women to extortion (so far, in vain). With somewhat more success, it has lobbied the police directly to raise awareness of the extortion issue. GALZ also publishes pamphlets, a newsletter, and other information designed to educate Zimbabweans in general about homosexuality and homophobia. Through these efforts it seeks to challenge popular stereotypes of homosexuals as Westernized perverts who spread diseases and corrupt children. One recent publication included detailed historical research that showed how homosexual practices—including loving and mutual homosexual relationships—have been indigenous to the country throughout recorded history, and probably from time immemorial.
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Love, Alison, and Vincent Munyaradzi Vezha. "No way forward without consensus." Journal of Language and Politics 8, no. 3 (2009): 433–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlp.8.3.06lov.
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This paper discusses a document produced in 2006 by church leaders which claimed to present a “vision” of “a way forward” in the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe. We suggest that the document served rather to reinforce the status quo, specifically the hegemony of Mugabe’s government. We argue that, by insisting that the greatest problem in Zimbabwe is “lack of a national vision”, the document promoted consensus, which resonated with Mugabe’s own position. We suggest that four major strategies were used to achieve this: assertion of the primarily spiritual nature of Zimbabwe’s crisis; insistence on the shared responsibility of all Zimbabweans; obfuscation of agency for the crisis and delegitimization of political opposition as a route to change. Finally, we point out that these strategies failed, as the document in its original form was censored before its launch, illustrating the tendency for President Mugabe to give the impression of opening democratic space, only to close it off.
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Sylvester, Christine. "Zimbabwe's 1985 Elections: a Search for National Mythology." Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 2 (1986): 229–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00006868.
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When Zimbabweans went to the polls in June and July of 1985, they decisively returned the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) to formal power, provided regional support for the Patriotic Front–Zimbabwe African People's Union and, in the case of the white roll, endorsed Ian Smith's Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe. Questions raised in the wake of the elections tended to focus on the changes that the Z.A.N.U.(P.F.) Government could institute in the next three to five years – a one-party system, a complete abrogation of the Lancaster House privileges for whites, a vigorous turn towards Marxism.
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Shaw, William H. "Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: a Study in African Political Thought." Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 3 (1986): 373–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00007084.
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Zimbabwe today is the site of a surprisingly vigorous debate over the one-party state. Some students of Africa might find the issue stale and the conclusion foregone, but Zimbabweans do not look at their political future that way. The first task of this article is to present the arguments of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) in favour of one-party rule and the rebuttals this has provoked. Documenting this debate is worthwhile given various popular misconceptions about Zimbabwean political life; in addition, doing so sheds light on the character of political thinking in Africa. The arguments are also important enough and of sufficient interest to be assessed philosophically, and this is my second task. Since Z.A.N.U.(P.F.) officially embraces a Marxist ideology, I shall, in particular, scrutinise its case for one-party rule from within its own political-theoretical framework. I contend that Marxist theory does not dictate such a system of government, and that viewed from this perspective the arguments for it are flawed and the party's faith in it is problematic.
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Schou, A. "Democratic Local Government and Responsiveness: Lessons from Zimbabwe and Tanzania." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 41, no. 1 (2000): 121–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002071520004100107.
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Bratton, Michael. "The Comrades and the Countryside: The Politics of Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe." World Politics 39, no. 2 (1987): 174–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010439.
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The crisis of food production in Africa demands that social scientists devote attention to the agricultural policies of African governments. Hunger and famine derive not only from natural catastrophe but also from policy decisions that shape the opportunities faced by farmers. The prevailing view among economists is that the administrative determination of agricultural prices in Africa creates disincentives to production. It is now widely accepted that the overvaluation of national currencies encourages food imports, and that the provision of subsidies to urban consumers prevents the payment of attractive prices to rural producers. This pattern of policy choice results, according to some political scientists, from the exertion of influence by prominent social groups, usually an alliance among bureaucratic and industrial elites and urban consumers. The resultant regime of agricultural policies serves to undermine the basic interests of agricultural producers, largely because their voices are only weakly articulated into the policy process.
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Bräutigam, Deborah, Lise Rakner, and Scott Taylor. "Business associations and growth coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 519–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x02004056.
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Why are ‘growth coalitions’ involving business interest groups and governments so rare in Africa? How has democratisation affected the possibilities for growth coalitions? In three cases with varying degrees of democracy – Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – we find that hypotheses about growth coalitions that place importance on the organisation of the business sector are generally borne out. Yet even when the business community is organised in an ‘ideal’ manner, growth coalitions still depend on factors within the state: leadership, ideas, and capacity. Democratisation has a mixed effect. We find that in the case of Zambia, business–state relations did not improve despite a pro-democracy stance by business and the pro-business agenda of the democratic government coming to power in 1991. In Zimbabwe, the erosion of democracy reduced business access to state elites, breaking up a growth coalition that initially showed considerable promise. In Mauritius, the strengthening of democracy has paralleled the deepening of the growth coalition, and both have been reinforced by a strong economy. Our study shows that growth coalitions are possible in Africa; the key lies in determining the conditions under which such coalitions can be sustained in Africa's fragile polities.
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Herbst, Jeffrey. "Societal Demands and Government Choices: Agricultural Producer Price Policy in Zimbabwe." Comparative Politics 20, no. 3 (1988): 265. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421804.
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Dube, Thembani. "Kalanga culture and the nature of resistance against the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 in colonial Zimbabwe." New Contree 81 (December 30, 2018): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/nc.v81i0.71.
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In this article the nature of resistance to the implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (NLHA), popularly known as amagandiya in Bulilimamangwe, in colonial Zimbabwe is explored. It looks at two Kalanga chiefs, Madlambuzi Ncube and Masendu Dube, who were deposed by colonial administrators in the 1950s and replaced by an Ndebele chief, Mpini Ndiweni. It is argued that the implementation of the Act, the demotion of the two Kalanga chiefs and the subsequent imposition of Chief Mpini Ndiweni can be perceived as the imposition of a type of cultural hegemony which was then resisted by the two Kalanga chiefs and their subjects by the reassertion of their own culture and identity in colonial Zimbabwe. It demonstrates how it was not violent or military resistance but rather cultural resistance, which was expressed through various modes, which took the centre stage in challenging both the white colonial government and Ndebele hegemony over the Kalanga. In contributing to the argument over the use of cultural resistance against the NLHA, the article draws from oral interviews which were conducted in Bulilima and Mangwe districts, on archival research and on secondary literature to demonstrate that this cultural resistance drew on a variety of signifiers of Kalanga identity such as Kalanga history, the politics of land, ideas around Kalanga chieftainship, Mwali/Ngwali religion and the possession of cattle.
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Tembo, Simbarashe, and Annie Singh. "Freedom of Assembly in Zimbabwe." African Journal of Legal Studies 15, no. 4 (2023): 486–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17087384-12340098.
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Abstract The past two decades have witnessed a protracted struggle for human rights in Zimbabwe. The adoption of the new constitution in 2013 provided a glimmer of hope for a new constitutional dispensation founded on a human rights culture. To this end, the Constitutional Court duly adopted a rights-based adjudication. This is evidenced by the declaration of unconstitutionality of certain sections of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) in the case of the Democratic Assembly for Restoration and Empowerment (DARE) v Saunyama in 2016. The impugned sections related to freedom of assembly, freedom to demonstrate and freedom to picket government. What may have seemed like a new chapter for human rights was closed when the State enacted legislation in direct conflict with the order of the Court. This article posits that the new legislation, the Maintenance of Public Order Act (MOPO), which replaced POSA is as unconstitutional as its predecessor. It is argued that by enacting MOPO, the State effectively demonstrated that it was determined to shrink the existing human rights in Zimbabwe.
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Burke, Tim. "The Light on the Road to Harare: How David Beach (Partially) Converted a Barbarian." History in Africa 28 (2001): 333–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3172221.
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My first encounter with the late historian David Beach was a non-encounter. I spent most of 1990 and 1991 hoping not to meet him, and by careful planning, I cunningly succeeded in fulfilling this objective. (Albeit with the assistance of the Zimbabwean government, which helpfully closed the University of Zimbabwe during my time there.) It is not that I had heard anything in particular about Beach before arriving. In fact, I was woefully understudied in useful gossip about Zimbabwean scholars. My anxiety about Beach came first from the context of my own graduate studies and second from my anxiety about my own knowledge.Without naming names, I can say that I had come into conflict early in my graduate work with one of the senior professors in my department. Without going into the gory details, it would be fair to say that the conflict was both regretable and inevitable, and as much about style as substance. However, one of the substantive issues on which I found myself perennially at loggerheads with this advisor concerned our fundamentally different sensibilities about the social and political obligations and character of the historical profession. Certainly my declared political sensibilities at that point were frequently loud, superficial, and swaggeringly self-righteous, but our disagreement went far deeper than a matter of different ideological loyalties.This advisor was fond of declaring himself an objective empiricist who approached history without a politics, a scholar who believed that his central responsibility was to pursue intellectual inquiry without suborning that inquiry to any political agenda.
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Zanker, Franzisca Luise, and Khangelani Moyo. "The Corona Virus and Migration Governance in South Africa: Business As Usual?" Africa Spectrum 55, no. 1 (2020): 100–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002039720925826.
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The South African response in dealing with the Corona pandemic needs to speak to the realities of all people living in the country, including migrant and refugee communities. Reflecting on this in light of ongoing research on the political stakes of migration governance, we find that the virus response shows little change in the government agenda when it comes to dealing with refugees and other migrants. Veritably, we see that the pandemic may even be an excuse for pushing through already-aspired to policies. This includes the securitised agenda behind the sudden building of a border fence to close off Zimbabwe and the xenophobic-rhetorical clout behind the lockdown rules about which shops are allowed to remain open. The temporary stay on renewing asylum seekers permits counts as a perfunctory exception. We show that each of these developments very much play into politics as usual.
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CROKE, KEVIN, GUY GROSSMAN, HORACIO A. LARREGUY, and JOHN MARSHALL. "Deliberate Disengagement: How Education Can Decrease Political Participation in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes." American Political Science Review 110, no. 3 (2016): 579–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055416000253.
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A large literature examining advanced and consolidating democracies suggests that education increases political participation. However, in electoral authoritarian regimes, educated voters may instead deliberately disengage. If education increases critical capacities, political awareness, and support for democracy, educated citizens may believe that participation is futile or legitimizes autocrats. We test this argument in Zimbabwe—a paradigmatic electoral authoritarian regime—by exploiting cross-cohort variation in access to education following a major educational reform. We find that educationdecreasespolitical participation, substantially reducing the likelihood that better-educated citizens vote, contact politicians, or attend community meetings. Consistent with deliberate disengagement, education’s negative effect on participation dissipated following 2008’s more competitive election, which (temporarily) initiated unprecedented power sharing. Supporting the mechanisms underpinning our hypothesis, educated citizens experience better economic outcomes, are more interested in politics, and are more supportive of democracy, but are also more likely to criticize the government and support opposition parties.
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Chikoko, Witness, and Philemon Chihiya. "Climate change and vulnerabilities of children in rural Zimbabwe: The case of ward 14 of Bikita District, Zimbabwe." African Journal of Social Work 13, no. 2 (2023): 78–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajsw.v13i2.4.
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The paper interrogates the impact of climate change towards the vulnerabilities of children in rural Zimbabwe. The paper utilised qualitative case study research design so as to generate the empirical evidence for this paper and the Ubuntu or Hunhu philosophy was used as a theory for analysing and, interpreting the lives of these vulnerable children. Research findings suggest that the impact of climate change has been unprecedented on the lives of children in rural Zimbabwe. Some of the impact included; hunger and food insecurity, decrease in school attendance, early or forced marriages, sexual exploitation, gold panning, child labour and abuse, child prostitution, drug use and abuse, the spread of climate change related diseases among others. The paper concludes by lobbying and advocating the Government of Zimbabwe and other key stakeholders to invest more resources on climate proof and adaptation strategies particularly in rural areas.
 How to reference using ASWNet style:
 Chikoko W. and Chihiya P. (2023). Climate change and vulnerabilities of children in rural Zimbabwe: The case of ward 14 of Bikita District, Zimbabwe. African Journal of Social Work, 13(2), 78-86. https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajsw.v13i2.4
 Visit journal website: https://ajsw.africasocialwork.net