Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Deleuze, Gilles (1925-1995) – Science politique"

Au delà des différences de terminologie et de background culturel, on essaye ici de montrer que le physicien quantique David Bohm (Wilkes-Barre 1917 – Londre 1992) et le philosophe poststructuraliste Gilles Deleuze (Paris 1925 – Paris 1995) ont visé un but de pensée commun: remplacer l’image classique (mécaniste) de la réalité, encore dominante à notre époque, par une métaphysique finalement en accord avec les concepts et les résultats de la relativité, de la mécanique quantique et de la biologie contemporaine. Pour cesdeux penseurs, le monde des choses bien individuées dans l’espace et le temps, et ordonnées selon des relations mécaniques de cause et d’effet, n’est rien d’autre que l’expression momentanée d’une “Totalité indivise en devenir” qui en constitue le véritable fondement ontologique. Par le moyen de cette nouvelle métaphysique, le monde de l’expérience quotidienne et de la science classique apparaît comme la manifestation explicite ou développée de l’ordre implicite que la totalité indivise contient virtuellement en elle à des niveaux d’enveloppementet d’imbrication toujours plus profonds. Le monde explicite (de la science classique et de l’expérience quotidienne) est le résultat d’un processus de répétition, ralentissement et stabilisation temporelle, déclenché par l’interaction de nos instruments de mesure – appareils techniques, organes sensoriels et moteurs, formes a priori et catégories de l’entendement – avec une totalité mouvante dont le sujet pensant et observant représente un reflet momentané et partial plutôt qu’un fragment solitaire et autonome. En critiquant l’image classique de la correspondance/adéquation entre l’être et la pensée, Bohm et Deleuze montrent enfin que la pensée qui veut saisir cette Totalité en devenirinteragit inévitablement avec elle, en la modifiant, en la recréant, en l’accomplissant dans une direction plutôt qu’une autre. La pensée ressemble ainsi à une danse qui essaye de s’harmoniser avec le flux universel qui l’engendre et l’emporte dans un seul mouvement avec la matière.

This article starts with the presumption that Russian film director Andrei Tarkovsky (1932–1986) created a new conception of cinematic time. This impact on the theory of modern cinema was examined by philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) in his book Cinema 2: The Time-Image (in French: Cinéma 2, L’Image-Temps, 1985). The article asks the question: what were the conceptual and social circumstances for everyday time to be implemented in a specific movie? As an example, it takes the film Andrei Rubliov (director Andrei Tarkovsky, 1969), which underwent protracted critique and compulsory shortening. The article asks the question: what is the meaning and significance of the cuts made when passing from the first version of The Passion according to Andrei (in Russian: Strasti po Andreyu, director Tarkovsky, 1966) to the final Andrei Rubliov? What is the meaning of the cuts made to the scenes of violence and nudity? The research conclusions are: the impatience of the critics who demanded that the long scenes in The Passion according to Andrei be shortened speaks not about defects in the film, nor about the inability of Tarkovsky to calculate time, but rather about the inability of observers to grasp Tarkovky’s new conception of cinematic time. According to Deleuze, in his attempt to transfer into cinema the slow speed of everyday life, Tarkovsky created a feature of modern cinema, and made a turn from movement towards time; time in this particular movie is already made visible.

Abstract The rhizome is like the poem. The growth power of nature and the possibilities of culture simultaneously and reciprocally. It stretches from biological cell and level of particles to our universal dreams and thoughts about and with life. The rhizome as poem is thus a picture and image of the importance of context and movement, production of constant importance for each/other. The picture breaks all patterns always and always creates new, as points and lines affectively collapsing into each/other for each/other. The rhizome as poem — and the consciousness about the preliminarity of processes across preliminary boundaries, opens up for translations and interpretations beyond known vocabularies and in unfinished channels. It possibilizes the realization of more - than - human concepts such as the dissolution of subjectivity turning my identity into a collective: I contain multitudes and sing myself.1 Knowledge creation and meaning making are thus connected with what situated knowledges makes possible and mobilize, and is about community, not isolated individuals; it is about productive connections and unexpected openings in which every concept is ‘trapped’ in experience. Informatically we are data subjects of an algorithmic nature. I oxymoronically and indirectly therefore ask how we can become materially identifiable subjects and what would it take to move from a mechanistic approach to education to a more machinic one? Further, are the abstractions one attempts to move from imitation to imagination abstract enough? I poem with the speculative process philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Félix Guattari (1930–1992) to think the future, theory and practice in Environmental Education other. Taking part in polysemantic ambiguity becomes attractive as condition to side with the child and it might turn into a strong source of energy for learning and change, trans-scientific collaboration and sustainability. The rhizome is my cosmic writing machine, research design and model.

‘Bitzer,’ said Thomas Gradgrind. ‘Your definition of a horse.’‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth.’ Thus (and much more) Bitzer.‘Now girl number twenty,’ said Mr. Gradgrind. ‘You know what a horse is.’— Charles Dickens, Hard Times (1854)Dickens’s famous pedant, Thomas Gradgrind, was not an anomaly. He is the pedagogical manifestation of the rise of quantification in modernism that was the necessary adjunct to massive urbanisation and industrialisation. His classroom caricatures the dominant epistemic modality of modern global democracies, our unwavering trust in numbers, “data”, and reproductive predictability. This brief quotation from Hard Times both presents and parodies the 19th century’s displacement of what were previously more commonly living and heterogeneous existential encounters with events and things. The world had not yet been made predictably repetitive through industrialisation, standardisation, law, and ubiquitous codes of construction. Theirs was much more a world of unique events and not the homogenised and orthodox iteration of standardised knowledge. Horses and, by extension, all entities and events gradually were displaced by their rote definitions: individuals of a so-called natural kind were reduced to identicals. Further, these mechanical standardisations were and still are underwritten by mapping them into a numerical and extensive characterisation. On top of standardised objects and procedures appeared assigned numerical equivalents which lent standardisation the seemingly apodictic certainty of deductive demonstrations. The algebraic becomes the socially enforced criterion for the previously more sensory, qualitative, and experiential encounters with becoming that were more likely in pre-industrial life. Here too, we see that the function of this reproductive protocol is not just notational but is the sine qua non for, in Althusser’s famous phrase, the manufacture of citizens as “subject subjects”, those concrete individuals who are educated to understand themselves ideologically in an imaginary relation with their real position in any society’s self-reproduction. Here, however, ideology performs that operation through that nominally least political of cognitive modes, the supposed friend of classical Marxism’s social science, the mathematical. The historical onset of this social and political reproductive hegemony, this uniform supplanting of time’s ineluctable differencing with the parasite of its associated model, can partial be found in the formation of metrics. Before the 19th century, the measures of space and time were local. Units of length and weight varied not just between nations but often by municipality. These parochial standards reflected indigenous traditions, actualities, personalities, and needs. This variation in measurement standards suggested that every exchange or judgment of kind and value relied upon the specificity of that instance. Every evaluation of an instance required perceptual acuity and not the banality of enumeration constituted by commodification and the accounting practices intrinsic to centralised governance. This variability in measure was complicated by similar variability in the currencies of the day. Thus, barter presented the participants with complexities and engagements of skills and discrete observation completely alien to the modern purchase of duplicate consumer objects with stable currencies. Almost nothing of life was iterative: every exchange was, more or less, an anomaly. However, in 1790, immediately following the French Revolution and as a central manifestation of its movement to rational democratisation, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand proposed a metrical system to the French National Assembly. The units of this metric system, based originally on observable features of nature, are now formally codified in all scientific practice by seven physical constants. Further, they are ubiquitous now in almost all public exchanges between individuals, corporations, and states. These units form a coherent and extensible structure whose elements and rules are subject to seemingly lossless symbolic exchange in a mathematic coherence aided by their conformity to decimal representation. From 1960, their basic contemporary form was established as the International System of Units (SI). Since then, all but three of the countries of the world (Myanmar, Liberia, and the United States), regardless of political organisation and individual history, have adopted these standards for commerce and general measurement. The uniformity and rational advantage of this system is easily demonstrable in just the absurd variation in the numeric bases of the Imperial / British system which uses base 16 for ounces/pounds, base 12 for inches/feet, base three for feet/yards, base 180 for degrees between freezing and cooling, 43,560 square feet per acre, eights for division of inches, etc. Even with its abiding antagonism to the French, Britain officially adopted the metric system as was required by its admission to the EU in 1973. The United States is the last great holdout in the public use of the metric system even though SI has long been the standard wanted by the federal government. At first, the move toward U.S. adoption was promising. Following France and rejecting England’s practice, America was founded on a decimal currency system in 1792. In 1793, Jefferson requested a copy of the standard kilogram from France in a first attempt to move to the metric system: however, the ship carrying the copy was captured by pirates. Indeed, The Metric Conversion Act of 1975 expressed a more serious national intention to adopt SI, but after some abortive efforts, the nation fell back into the more archaic measurements dominant since before its revolution. However, the central point remains that while the U.S. is unique in its public measurement standard among dominant powers, it is equally committed to the hegemonic application of a numerical rendition of events.The massive importance of this underlying uniformity is that it supplies the central global mechanism whereby the world’s chaotic variation is continuously parsed and supplanted into comparable, intelligible, and predictable units that understand individuating difference as anomaly. Difference, then, is understood in this method not as qualitative and intensive, which it necessarily is, but quantitative and extensive. Like Gradgrind’s “horse”, the living and unique thing is rendered through the Apollonian dream of standardisation and enumeration. While differencing is the only inherent quality of time’s chaotic flow, accounting and management requite iteration. To order the reproduction of modern society, the unique individuating differences that render an object as “this one”, what the Medieval logicians called haecceities, are only seen as “accidental” and “non-essential” deviations. This is not just odd but illogical since these very differences allow events to be individuated items so to appear as countable at all. As Leibniz’s principle, the indiscernibility of identicals, suggests, the application of the metrical same to different occasions is inherently paradoxical: if each unit were truly the same, there could only be one. As the etymology of “anomaly” suggests, it is that which is unexpected, irregular, out of line, or, going back to the Greek, nomos, at variance with the law. However, as the only “law” that always is at hand is the so-called “Second Law of Thermodynamics”, the inconsistently consistent roiling of entropy, the evident theoretical question might be, “how is anomaly possible when regularity itself is impossible?” The answer lies not in events “themselves” but exactly in the deductive valorisations projected by that most durable invention of the French Revolution adumbrated above, the metric system. This seemingly innocuous system has formed the reproductive and iterative bias of modern post-industrial perceptual homogenisation. Metrical modeling allows – indeed, requires – that one mistake the metrical changeling for the experiential event it replaces. Gilles Deleuze, that most powerful French metaphysician (1925-1995) offers some theories to understand the seminal production (not reproduction) of disparity that is intrinsic to time and to distinguish it from its homogenised representation. For him, and his sometime co-author, Felix Guattari, time’s “chaosmosis” is the host constantly parasitised by its symbolic model. This problem, however, of standardisation in the face of time’s originality, is obscured by its very ubiquity; we must first denaturalise the seemingly self-evident metrical concept of countable and uniform units.A central disagreement in ancient Greece was between the proponents of physis (often translated as “nature” but etymologically indicative of growth and becoming, process and not fixed form) and nomos (law or custom). This is one of the first ethical and so political debates in Western philosophy. For Heraclitus and other pre-Socratics, the emphatic character of nature was change, its differencing dynamism, its processual but not iterative character. In anticipation of Hume, Sophists disparaged nomos (νόμος) as simply the habituated application of synthetic law and custom to the fluidity of natural phenomena. The historical winners of this debate, Plato and the scientific attitudes of regularity and taxonomy characteristic of his best pupil, Aristotle, have dominated ever since, but not without opponents.In the modern era, anti-enlightenment figures such as Hamann, Herder, and the Schlegel brothers gave theoretical voice to romanticism’s repudiation of the paradoxical impulses of the democratic state for regulation and uniformity that Talleyrand’s “revolutionary” metrical proposal personified. They saw the correlationalism (as adumbrated by Meillassoux) between thought and thing based upon their hypothetical equitability as a betrayal of the dynamic physis that experience presented. Variable infinity might come either from the character of God or nature or, as famously in Spinoza’s Ethics, both (“deus sive natura”). In any case, the plenum of nature was never iterative. This rejection of metrical regularity finds its synoptic expression in Nietzsche. As a classicist, Nietzsche supplies the bridge between the pre-Socratics and the “post-structuralists”. His early mobilisation of the Apollonian, the dream of regularity embodied in the sun god, and the Dionysian, the drunken but inarticulate inexpression of the universe’s changing manifold, gives voice to a new resistance to the already dominate metrical system. His is a new spin of the mythic representatives of Nomos and physis. For him, this pair, however, are not – as they are often mischaracterised – in dialectical dialogue. To place them into the thesis / antithesis formulation would be to give them the very binary character that they cannot share and to, tacitly, place both under Apollo’s procedure of analysis. Their modalities are not antithetical but mutually exclusive. To represent the chaotic and non-iterative processes of becoming, of physis, under the rubric of a common metrics, nomos, is to mistake the parasite for the host. In its structural hubris, the ideological placebo of metrical knowing thinks it non-reductively captures the multiplicity it only interpellates. In short, the polyvalent, fluid, and inductive phenomena that empiricists try to render are, in their intrinsic character, unavailable to deductive method except, first, under the reductive equivalence (the Gradgrind pedagogy) of metrical modeling. This incompatibility of physis and nomos was made manifest by David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) just before the cooptation of the 18th century’s democratic revolutions by “representative” governments. There, Hume displays the Apollonian dream’s inability to accurately and non-reductively capture a phenomenon in the wild, free from the stringent requirements of synthetic reproduction. His argument in Book I is succinct.Now as we call every thing custom, which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a certain truth, that all the belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv'd solely from that origin. (Part 3, Section 8)There is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it; ... even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. (Part 3, Section 12)The rest of mankind ... are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. (Part 4, Section 6)In sum, then, nomos is nothing but habit, a Pavlovian response codified into a symbolic representation and, pragmatically, into a reproductive protocol specifically ordered to exclude anomaly, the inherent chaotic variation that is the hallmark of physis. The Apollonian dream that there can be an adequate metric of unrestricted natural phenomena in their full, open, turbulent, and manifold becoming is just that, a dream. Order, not chaos, is the anomaly. Of course, Kant felt he had overcome this unacceptable challenge to rational application to induction after Hume woke him from his “dogmatic slumber”. But what is perhaps one of the most important assertions of the critiques may be only an evasion of Hume’s radical empiricism: “there are only two ways we can account for the necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make experience possible. The former supposition does not hold of the categories (nor of pure sensible intuition) ... . There remains ... only the second—a system ... of the epigenesis of pure reason” (B167). Unless “necessary agreement” means the dictatorial and unrelenting insistence in a symbolic model of perception of the equivalence of concept and appearance, this assertion appears circular. This “reading” of Kant’s evasion of the very Humean crux, the necessary inequivalence of a metric or concept to the metered or defined, is manifest in Nietzsche.In his early “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (1873), Nietzsche suggests that there is no possible equivalence between a concept and its objects, or, to use Frege’s vocabulary, between sense or reference. We speak of a "snake" [see “horse” in Dickens]: this designation touches only upon its ability to twist itself and could therefore also fit a worm. What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided preferences, first for this, then for that property of a thing! The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages. The "thing in itself" (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the boldest metaphors.The literal is always already a reductive—as opposed to literature’s sometimes expansive agency—metaphorisation of events as “one of those” (a token of “its” type). The “necessary” equivalence in nomos is uncovered but demanded. The same is reproduced by the habitual projection of certain “essential qualities” at the expense of all those others residing in every experiential multiplicity. Only in this prison of nomos can anomaly appear: otherwise all experience would appear as it is, anomalous. With this paradoxical metaphor of the straight and equal, Nietzsche inverts the paradigm of scientific expression. He reveals as a repressive social and political obligation the symbolic assertion homology where actually none can be. Supposed equality and measurement all transpire within an Apollonian “dream within a dream”. The concept captures not the manifold of chaotic experience but supplies its placebo instead by an analytic tautology worthy of Gradgrind. The equivalence of event and definition is always nothing but a symbolic iteration. Such nominal equivalence is nothing more than shifting events into a symbolic frame where they can be commodified, owned, and controlled in pursuit of that tertiary equivalence which has become the primary repressive modality of modern societies: money. This article has attempted, with absurd rapidity, to hint why some ubiquitous concepts, which are generally considered self-evident and philosophically unassailable, are open not only to metaphysical, political, and ethical challenge, but are existentially unjustified. All this was done to defend the smaller thesis that the concept of anomaly is itself a reflection of a global misrepresentation of the chaos of becoming. This global substitution expresses a conservative model and measure of the world in the place of the world’s intrinsic heterogenesis, a misrepresentation convenient for those who control the representational powers of governance. In conclusion, let us look, again too briefly, at a philosopher who neither accepts this normative world picture of regularity nor surrenders to Nietzschean irony, Gilles Deleuze.Throughout his career, Deleuze uses the word “pure” with senses antithetical to so-called common sense and, even more, Kant. In its traditional concept, pure means an entity or substance whose essence is not mixed or adulterated with any other substance or material, uncontaminated by physical pollution, clean and immaculate. The pure is that which is itself itself. To insure intelligibility, that which is elemental, alphabetic, must be what it is itself and no other. This discrete character forms the necessary, if often tacit, precondition to any analysis and decomposition of beings into their delimited “parts” that are subject to measurement and measured disaggregation. Any entity available for structural decomposition, then, must be pictured as constituted exhaustively by extensive ones, measurable units, its metrically available components. Dualism having established as its primary axiomatic hypothesis the separability of extension and thought must now overcome that very separation with an adequacy, a one to one correspondence, between a supposedly neatly measurable world and ideological hegemony that presents itself as rational governance. Thus, what is needed is not only a purity of substance but a matching purity of reason, and it is this clarification of thought, then, which, as indicated above, is the central concern of Kant’s influential and grand opus, The Critique of Pure Reason.Deleuze heard a repressed alternative to the purity of the measured self-same and equivalent that, as he said about Plato, “rumbled” under the metaphysics of analysis. This was the dark tradition he teased out of the Stoics, Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Nicholas d’Autrecourt, Spinoza, Meinong, Bergson, Nietzsche, and McLuhan. This is not the purity of identity, A = A, of metrical uniformity and its shadow, anomaly. Rather than repressing, Deleuze revels in the perverse purity of differencing, difference constituted by becoming without the Apollonian imposition of normalcy or definitional identity. One cannot say “difference in itself” because its ontology, its genesis, is not that of anything itself but exactly the impossibility of such a manner of constitution: universal anomaly. No thing or idea can be iterative, separate, or discrete.In his Difference and Repetition, the idea of the purely same is undone: the Ding an sich is a paradox. While the dogmatic image of thought portrays the possibility of the purely self-same, Deleuze never does. His notions of individuation without individuals, of modulation without models, of simulacra without originals, always finds a reflection in his attitudes toward, not language as logical structure, but what necessarily forms the differential making of events, the heterogenesis of ontological symptoms. His theory has none of the categories of Pierce’s triadic construction: not the arbitrary of symbols, the “self-representation” of icons, or even the causal relation of indices. His “signs” are symptoms: the non-representational consequences of the forces that are concurrently producing them. Events, then, are the symptoms of the heterogenetic forces that produce, not reproduce them. To measure them is to export them into a representational modality that is ontologically inapplicable as they are not themselves themselves but the consequences of the ongoing differences of their genesis. Thus, the temperature associated with a fever is neither the body nor the disease.Every event, then, is a diaphora, the pure consequent of the multiplicity of the forces it cannot resemble, an original dynamic anomaly without standard. This term, diaphora, appears at the conclusion of that dialogue some consider Plato’s best, the Theaetetus. There we find perhaps the most important discussion of knowledge in Western metaphysics, which in its final moments attempts to understand how knowledge can be “True Judgement with an Account” (201d-210a). Following this idea leads to a theory, usually known as the “Dream of Socrates”, which posits two kinds of existents, complexes and simples, and proposes that “an account” means “an account of the complexes that analyses them into their simple components … the primary elements (prôta stoikheia)” of which we and everything else are composed (201e2). This—it will be noticed—suggests the ancient heritage of Kant’s own attempted purification of mereological (part/whole relations) nested elementals. He attempts the coordination of pure speculative reason to pure practical reason and, thus, attempts to supply the root of measurement and scientific regularity. However, as adumbrated by the Platonic dialogue, the attempted decompositions, speculative and pragmatic, lead to an impasse, an aporia, as the rational is based upon a correspondence and not the self-synthesis of the diaphorae by their own dynamic disequilibrium. Thus the dialogue ends inconclusively; Socrates rejects the solution, which is the problem itself, and leaves to meet his accusers and quaff his hemlock. The proposal in this article is that the diaphorae are all that exists in Deleuze’s world and indeed any world, including ours. Nor is this production decomposable into pure measured and defined elementals, as such decomposition is indeed exactly opposite what differential production is doing. For Deleuze, what exists is disparate conjunction. But in intensive conjunction the same cannot be the same except in so far as it differs. The diaphorae of events are irremediably asymmetric to their inputs: the actual does not resemble the virtual matrix that is its cause. Indeed, any recourse to those supposedly disaggregate inputs, the supposedly intelligible constituents of the measured image, will always but repeat the problematic of metrical representation at another remove. This is not, however, the traditional postmodern trap of infinite meta-shifting, as the diaphoric always is in each instance the very presentation that is sought. Heterogenesis can never be undone, but it can be affirmed. In a heterogenetic monism, what was the insoluble problem of correspondence in dualism is now its paradoxical solution: the problematic per se. What manifests in becoming is not, nor can be, an object or thought as separate or even separable, measured in units of the self-same. Dogmatic thought habitually translates intensity, the differential medium of chaosmosis, into the nominally same or similar so as to suit the Apollonian illusions of “correlational adequacy”. However, as the measured cannot be other than a calculation’s placebo, the correlation is but the shadow of a shadow. Every diaphora is an event born of an active conjunction of differential forces that give rise to this, their product, an interference pattern. Whatever we know and are is not the correlation of pure entities and thoughts subject to measured analysis but the confused and chaotic confluence of the specific, material, aleatory, differential, and unrepresentable forces under which we subsist not as ourselves but as the always changing product of our milieu. In short, only anomaly without a nominal becomes, and we should view any assertion that maps experience into the “objective” modality of the same, self-evident, and normal as a political prestidigitation motivated, not by “truth”, but by established political interest. ReferencesDella Volpe, Galvano. Logic as a Positive Science. London: NLB, 1980.Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia UP, 1994.———. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester. New York: Columbia UP, 1990.Guenon, René. The Reign of Quantity. New York: Penguin, 1972.Hawley, K. "Identity and Indiscernibility." Mind 118 (2009): 101-9.Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon, 2014.Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1929.Meillassoux, Quentin. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Trans. Ray Brassier. New York: Continuum, 2008.Naddaf, Gerard. The Greek Concept of Nature. Albany: SUNY, 2005. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy. Trans. Douglas Smith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008.———. “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” Trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Viking, 1976.Welch, Kathleen Ethel. "Keywords from Classical Rhetoric: The Example of Physis." Rhetoric Society Quarterly 17.2 (1987): 193–204.

Cette these interroge l'implication des usagers dans l'organisation des services publics (en particulier dans le cadre d es politiques sociales et de l'action publique en matiere d'insertion). La premiere partie est consacree a une theorie de l'implication (les formes d'engagements et de participation). Les deuxieme et troisieme parties developpent une analyse des politiques d'insertion (le revenu minimum d'insertion) et cherche a montrer l'importance que l'implication de l'usager revet dans la mise en oeuvre de ces politiques. Cette reflexion sur l'implication est etroitement associee a une interrogation sur les nouvelles realites du pouvoir comment les politiques publiques reussissent-elles a mobiliser l'implication des usagers? cette theorie de l'implication essaye de faire converger la theorie du pouvoir de michel foucault et la problematique de la subjectivite telle que la developpent gilles deleuze et felix guattari
This thesis discusses the users' involvement into the organization of public services (especially within the framework of social and rehabilitation policies). The first part deals with a theory of involvement - forms of commitment and participation. The second and third parts offer an analysis of rehabilitation policies (revenu minimum d'insertion, "the minimum rehabilitation income") and intend to show the importance of users' involvement in the enforcement of these policies. These reflexions on involvement are closely associated to the questionning of the new realities of power. How do the public policies manage to obtain users' involvement? this involvement theory intends to realize a convergence of michel foucault's theory of power and gilles deleuze and felix guattari's own theory of subjectivity

Cette thèse porte sur la philosophie pratique de Gilles Deleuze. Elle en suit l'élaboration au moyen d'un fil directeur fourni par la tâche que Deleuze, dans une lecture croisée de Spinoza et de Nietzsche, assigne à la philosophie : être "une méthode d'explication des modes d'existence immanents". Une telle méthode récuse, sur le plan pratique, tout appel à des valeurs transcendantes, et sur le plan théorique, tout recours à des universaux de contemplation ou de réflexion. Elle se veut au contraire sélective et créatrice, la création de ses instruments d'évaluation étant tributaire des systèmes de forces déterminés où elle s'engage de façon chaque fois singulière. Le point nodal de ce programme tient dans la mise en place du concept d'agencement, comme fonction d'analyse des modes d'existence. Cette fonction est analytique en deux sens : en un sens clinique informé par la psychanalyse, elle soutient un diagnostic des positions collectives de désir déterminées par les systèmes de signes et les modes de production sociale de subjectivité ; en un sens objectif, elle vise la découpe et la description d'une unité réelle paradoxale qui est individualité d'un devenir. La construction de cette fonction d'agencement, mais aussi la tension entre ces pôles subjectif et objectif, mobilisent d'une part une discussion critique de Deleuze avec les sciences humaines et sociales de son temps : la psychanalyse, l'ethnologie, la linguistique, les recherches marxistes en sciences sociales. Elle se répercute d'autre part sur la compréhension de trois objets majeurs de la philosophie politique : l'Etat, le mode de production capitaliste, la guerre

Nous abordons dans ce travail le concept d’immanence dans l’œuvre de Gilles Deleuze. Notre hypothèse est qu’il s’agit d’une notion ontologique, noologique, politique et éthique qui constitue le noyau de son projet philosophique. La dimension ontologique renvoie à la réélaboration de la thèse scotiste de l’univocité de l’être et à la compréhension de l’immanence spinoziste comme « panthéisme expressif ». La dimension noologique envisage l’immanence comme un « plan » dans le cadre de la conception deleuzienne de la pensée et de la philosophie, présentée comme un point de litige par rapport à l’approche de l’immanence posée en termes de « fonds » de François Jullien. D’un point de vue politique, l’idée d’« axiomatique post historique » désigne le fonctionnement de l’immanence capitaliste, dont le caractère de « fin de l’histoire » est mis en jeu avec la thèse de Kojève. L’aspect éthique s’articule selon trois axes autour de l’idée d’« immanence pratique ». Tout d’abord, nous analysons des postulats qui constituent le croisement entre Nietzsche et Spinoza (valorisation du corps, définition de l’éthique comme éthologie, apologie de la joie). En second, nous abordons le nihilisme, conçu comme un effet de positions de transcendance. Il excède le cadre nietzschéen et devient « ressentiment » face à l’évènement, en se rachetant grâce à l’amor fati, et renvoie à la « perte du monde », dont l’issue est possible par la « croyance en ce monde-ci ». Troisièmement, dans l’horizon vitaliste, nous travaillons la question du désir comme principe immanent d’une expérimentation prudente et le « corps sans organes » comme « plan d’immanence » du désir
This thesis deals with the concept of immanence in the work of Gilles Deleuze. It is maintained in our hypothesis that it is an ontological, noological, political and ethical notion what constitutes the nucleus of his philosophical project. The ontological dimension refers to the re-elaboration of Duns Scott’s thesis on the univocity of being and the comprehension of Spinoza’s immanence as “expressive pantheism”. The noological aspect focuses on immanence as a “plane”, within Deleuze’s frame of conception of thought and philosophy, and sets a counterpoint with François Jullien concerning his approach to immanence in terms of “depth”. From the political point of view, the idea of “post-historical axiomatics” implies the functioning of capitalist immanence, which feature of “end of history” is connected to Kojève’s thesis. Furthermore, the essential layouts of politics of immanence as from the pledge of becoming-minor are deployed. The ethical aspect articulates three axes around the idea of “practical immanence”. First, it analyses the statements that conform the intertwining between Nietzsche and Spinoza (valorization of the body, definition of ethics as ethology, apology of joy). Second, it tackles nihilism, recognized as an effect of transcendent positions, which goes beyond Nietzsche’s realm and turns into “resentment” towards the event, which is acquitted by means of amor fati. It also becomes “loss of the world”, which vent consists on the “belief in this world”. Third, within the vitalist structure, the determination of desire as an immanent principle of a prudent experimentation and the “body without organs” as “plane of immanence” of desire are probed

Ontologie et politique dans la conception du lien social chez Deleuze et Guattari se déterminent mutuellement jusque dans leur inscription dans une logique du « et », inclusive et empiriste. Si l’inscription de l’Evénement comme dette dans le Socius se fait par l’affect, c’est que la société comme l’être ne saurait être que molairement rendue transcendante à l’égard des forces sociales et vitales. L’auto-praxis est le mode opératoire de production des conditions d’expression sociale de différences servant à agencer instincts et institutions – un acte « connecteur » hasardeux constituant « un acte fondateur » différentiel dont la violence instituante est « libératrice et inventive ». Ainsi, en société de contrôle, « désirer, c’est être capable d’agencer » sa praxis d’une manière instituante produisant une subjectivité larvaire en heccéité. Inclusif, le lien social est une affaire de création et d’organisation de territoires et non une affaire d’administration et de gouvernement. Rapporté à la dette, ce « et » s’inscrit dans la construction institutionnelle de la réalité sociale en s’inscrivant à même le Socius. Si la socialisation engage la problématisation de l’expression des différences jusque dans la subjectivité et l’habitus, c’est que la société se définit aussi par ses lignes de fuite tracées par les devenirs minoritaires et non par ses seules contradictions de classes. Ainsi la différence peut se faire , en se faisant instituante jusque dans les déguisements et les hésitations que revêtent les habitus lors de leurs retraductions disjonctives. L’imitation créatrice sera leur mode opératoire de reconduction et le nomadisme leur socialité adéquate.

Deux philosophes : Foucault et Deleuze, deux contemporains au parcours singulier, dont la rencontre et la reconnaissance mutuelle éclaire d’une lumière chatoyante la pensée, de l’un et de l'autre. La lecture croisée des textes de Foucault et de Deleuze permet de repérer comment des concepts, voire des pratiques émigrent et se transforment de l'un à l'autre, de l'un vers l'autre. L'asymétrie de leurs publications respectives met en relief des convergences et des divergences sur les questions de notre actualité, au travers de combats communs, théoriques et politiques, en particulier sur la question des rapports entre politique et pratiques de subjectivation. La genèse du sujet de désir et le corps et ses plaisirs, pris entre assujettissement et désasujettissement, ouvrent un questionnement sur ce que peut-être une vie asubjective, êthopoiétique, alêthurgique bref, philosophique. Deux philosophies de l'événement, sans que le devenir deleuzien coïncide avec l'approche généalogique et archéologique foucaldienne, qui ont en partage l'acuité de la critique, pour une nouvelle image de la pensée et une résurgence de l'interrogation éthique, après la « mort de l'homme » et « la mort de Dieu »
Foucault and Deleuze: two philosophers, two contemporaries with an unusual career whose meeting and mutual acknoledgement throws a glimmering ligth on each other's thinking. By comparing Foucault's and Deleuze's texts, one can find out how concepts –even philosophical practices– pass and transform from one to the other. Their asymmetrical respective publications put into relief perspectives on topical questions theoretical and political common commitments, particulary on the issue of relationships between politics and subjectivization practices; How the subject came into being through desire, and how the body harnesses its pleasures –caught between subjection to and desubjection from – give rise to an array of questions about what a life that would be free from the concept of subject, êthopoiétique, alêthurgique, in a word, a philosophical life can be. Two philosophers concerned with the event – even though Deleuze's notion of transformation does not coincide with Foucault's genealogical and archeological approach – who share the same sharp sense of criticism in order to provide a new vision of thought and foster the resurgence of an ethical questioning after the “dead of man” and the “dead of God”

L’objectif est d’interroger le rapport entre l'art et la politique pour en dégager des concepts qui saisissent les transformations complexes résultant de ces deux champs. Cette thèse s’éloigne de la tâche qui consiste à tracer les limites entre les champs artistiques et politiques afin de les rattacher à la conceptualisation d’un ‘au milieu’ ambigu, d’où émergent les contours distincts de ces deux champs. Cette thèse élabore des concepts se trouvant dans la philosophie du cinéma de Deleuze, composant un montage philosophique à partir de quatre perspectives disjonctives : un « plan lointain », un « gros plan », un « découpage affectif » et un « plan subjectif». Cela nous mène d’une présentation initiale de la scène historique de notre enquête influencée par Platon et Kant aux trois images du « au milieu » : le cadre supplémentaire, le pli différentiel et l’élément intermédiaire du jugement. À travers une lecture rapprochée des textes de Danto, Derrida, Nancy, Deleuze, Arendt et Malabou parmi d’autres, nous construisons une image indirecte et fragmentée du « au milieu » qui souligne sa plasticité caractéristique. On notera alors: (i) des formes politiques et artistiques distinctes émergentes ; (ii) des formes des sens et de la sensation dotées et détruites pour configurer le monde ; et (iii) nous, comme sujets molaires, donnons nous-mêmes forme par le jugement, nous soulignons une plasticité du « au milieu » artistique et politique à multiple facettes. À travers une alternance rythmique entre les images de cadre, pli et jugement, cette thèse présente une image fidèle et non-réductive du rapport fragmenté entre l’art et la politique
This thesis looks at the relationship between art and politics with the aim of producing concepts that embrace the complex transformations that arise in between the two fields. In this, it shifts its focus from the task of delineating artistic and political fields in order to relate them, towards the conceptualisation of the ambiguous ‘in-between,’ from which the contours of each field emerge. The thesis extends concepts found in Deleuze’s philosophy of film, by composing a philosophical montage of four disjunctive aspects on the problem: a ‘long shot’, a ‘close-up’, an affective ‘cross-cutting’ and a subjective ‘point-of-view shot. ’ This leads us from an initial presentation of the historical scene of our investigation marked by the influence of Plato and Kant, to three images of the in-between: the supplementary frame, the differential fold and the intermediary member of judgement. Through intensive readings of texts by Danto, Derrida, Nancy, Deleuze, Arendt and Malabou, among others, we construct an indirect image of the fragmented in-between that highlights its characteristic plasticity. As a site from which: (i) distinct artistic and political forms emerge; (ii) forms of sense and sensation are endowed and destroyed to configure the world; and (iii) we as molar subjects give ourselves form through judgment, the plasticity of the artistic and political in-between is shown to be multi-faceted. Through a rhythmic alternation between images of frame, fold and judgment, this thesis presents a faithful and non-reductive image of the fragmented relationship between art and politics

Le problème que cette thèse se propose d’aborder est celui d’un décalage entre la philosophie du cinéma de Gilles Deleuze et la condition de l’image cinématographique contemporaine, qui, depuis l’analyse de Deleuze, a été radicalement modifiée par le numérique. Mon argument principal est qu’une relation productive entre cette philosophie et les cultures contemporaines de l’écran est en effet possible et potentiellement très utile, à condition que nous puissions relire et étendre certains concepts-clés de la pensée deleuzienne. Dans ce contexte, à partir d'un concept utilisé dans Cinéma II : l’image-temps (1985), je soutiens que les images numériques peuvent engendrer des relations uniques avec un « dehors » - une présence non articulée au-delà du cadre, qui sert à fonder et à problématiser la pensée. Le « dehors » - développé à partir de la philosophie littéraire de Maurice Blanchot - constitue une condition génétique de la pensée, selon laquelle le penseur est confronté à ce qui est fondamentalement impensé, un terrain inconnu auquel la pensée doit répondre par des solutions novatrices et créatives. Je soutiens que ce modèle de pensée nous éloigne des habitudes et des orthodoxies, nous obligeant à nous ouvrir radicalement à la contingence et au changement - un mouvement à la mesure, de ce que je qualifierais, d’orientation politique fondamentale de la philosophie de Deleuze
The problem this thesis intends to address is that of a certain disconnect between the cinematic philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the condition of the contemporary moving-image, which, in the years since Deleuze wrote on film, has been radically altered by its transformation into digital format(s). It is my central contention that a productive relationship between this philosophy and contemporary screen cultures is indeed possible, and potentially of great value, provided we can reread and extend certain key Deleuzian concepts.Pursuant to this goal, drawing on a concept deployed throughout Deleuze’s Cinema II: The Time-Image (1985), I argue that digital images can engender certain unique relations with an “outside” –an unarticulated presence beyond the frame, which serves to unground and problematise thought. The “outside” –developed from the literary philosophy of Maurice Blanchot– constitutes a genetic condition of thought, which sees the thinker confronted with that which is fundamentally un-thought, an unrecognisable terrain to which she must respond with creative, novel solutions. This model of thought, I argue, impels us away from habitudes and orthodoxies, forcing us to become radically open to contingency and change –a movement commensurate with what I will claim is the fundamental political orientation of Deleuze’s philosophy

Nous proposons une analyse de l’œuvre du philosophe français Gilles Deleuze (1935-1995) à partir de deux concepts qui nous permettent d’en tracer un parcours problématique : « capitalisme » et « rapports humains ». Le premier de ces concepts nous d’effectuer une analyse du régime de fonctionnement de la forme sociale qui nous est contemporaine. Même si « capitalisme » recueille l’héritage de la théorie de Karl Marx (Allemagne, 1818-1883), il implique néanmoins des profondes différences de racine ontologique. En effet, là où Marx utilise l’ontologie dialectique de Georg Hegel (Allemagne, 1770-1831), Deleuze abordera le problème d’un point de vue plus adéquat à son ontologie de la différence : celui qui l’offre son interprétation (assez hétérodoxe) de la philosophie de Gottfried Leibniz (Allemagne, 1646-1716). Nous analyserons les profondes conséquences que ce changement représente. Cependant, les concepts leibniziens, qu’au moment de la description du milieu présent lui étaient si efficaces, doivent être abandonnés à l’heure de tracer une philosophie constructive. En effet, les limitations du point de vue leibnizien (réquisit de convergence des séries, de compossibilité, de choix divine, du principe du Meilleur) empêchent toute modification de l’état de choses. Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire d’encadrer le « rapport différentiel » leibnizien dans une ontologie plus large : celle que Deleuze construit à partir de Baruch Spinoza (Pays-Bas, 1632-1677). Cette ontologie nous permettra identifier la différence entre le rapport historiquement contingent du capitalisme du rapport qui nous constitue, nous, les humains : ce que nous nommerons « rapports humains ». Ce qui convient a ces rapports sera le critère pour la constitution d’un nouveau régime de fonctionnement social qui, au lieu d’être fondé dans des passions tristes qui nous asservissent, soit fondé dans les affects actifs qui permettent l’épanouissement de notre puissance
We aim to interpret the work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1935-1995) basing our analysis on two concepts that will allow us to trace a problematic itinerary: “capitalism” and “human relations”. The first of these concepts will let us carry out an analysis of the regime of functioning of the contemporary social form. Even if “capitalism” embraces the heritage of Karl Marx’s (Germany, 1818-1883) theory, it implies nevertheless deep differences of ontological root. It’s where Marx utilises the dialectical ontology of Georg Hegel (Germany, 1770-1831) that Deleuze will take the problem from a stand point more adequate to his ontology of difference: the one provided by his interpretation (heterodox enough) of the philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz (Germany, 1646-1716). We will examine the deep consequences of this replacement. However, the concepts of Leibniz, that where very efficient when it came to describing our world, must be abandoned when working on a constructive philosophy. The limitations of the point of view of Leibniz (requisite of converging series, of composibility, of divine choice, of the principle of the Best) block all modifications of the state of the matter. To do so, it is necessary to fit Leibniz’s “differential relation” into the larger frame of the ontology of Baruch de Spinoza (Holland, 1632-1677). This ontology will permit us to identify the difference between the historically contingent relation of capitalism and the relation that constitutes us, humans: what we will call “human relations”. What is adequate to these relations will be the criteria for the constitution of a new regime of social functioning that, instead of being based on the affects of sadness that imply our bondage, may be based in the active affections that allow the fulfilment of our power

Esta investigación presenta una lectura de los efectos políticos de la idea de geofilosofía concebida por Deleuze y Guattari. La perspectiva que guía esta tesis radica en la relación de inmanencia y ciudad propuesta en ¿Qué es la filosofía? Allí se defiende que la ciudad crea y ofrece, desde su emergencia en Grecia, un medio inmanencia y heterogeneidad radical beneficioso para el pensamiento filosófico y la política. Pero, si la ciudad aparece para la filosofía como medio o atmósfera que hace posible la heterogeneidad y el conflicto, al mismo tiempo, como para el pensamiento de Platón o sus herederos, el conflicto y la heterogeneidad se presentan como los elementos que deben ser controlados, domesticados o expulsados de la ciudad perfecta para alcanzar el orden superior. Considerando lo anterior, decidimos mantener en pie esas dos ideas u posiciones contrarias para analizar tres momentos históricos: Mundo griego; Renacimiento y modernidad; Mundo contemporáneo. Por un lado, el desarrollo de nuestra investigación intenta comprender y explicar el control de la heterogeneidad a través de la concepción y práctica de la idea de Organismo en filosofía and arquitectura-urbanismo. Por otro lado, intentamos hacer visible la expresión del conflicto en la ciudad como un devenir singular de la inmanencia
Ce travail de recherche présente l'étude des enjeux politiques de l'idée de géophilosophie conçue par Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari. La clé de lecture qui nous permet de comprendre la dimension politique de celle-ci, nous la trouvons dans la relation "immanence et cité", rapport proposé spécifiquement dans la dernière collaboration des deux penseurs "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ?". Chez Deleuze et Guattari, depuis sa naissance en Grèce, la cité offre un milieu inédit pour la pensée et la vie libre des citoyens. Afin de comprendre la valeur de ce milieu qui fait que la philosophie devient "géophilosophie", différentes disciplines sont étudiées : politique, histoire, philosophie, architecture, etc. La synthèse de cette étude peut se lire ainsi : si la cité émerge en tant que milieu ou atmosphère pour la philosophie, c'est parce que celle-ci rend possible l'hétérogénéité et le conflit tant pour la pensée que pour la vie pratique ou citoyenne. Cependant, en même temps, le conflit et l'hétérogénéité apparaissent aux yeux de la métaphysique (qui naît avec Platon) sous la figure de la menace qui doit être contenue ou bien expulsée de la cité afin de conserver l'ordre de la parole et des mouvements des âmes des individus, c'est-à-dire l'ordre qui doit régner dans l'espace de la "cité politique". A partir de ces remarques, nous analysons trois moments historiques : le monde grec, la Renaissance et la modernité, le monde contemporain. Le but est de comprendre la tension existant entre l' "ordre-organisme" et le "conflit-hétérogénéité". Spécifiquement, le fait qu'essaie de rendre compréhensible notre recherche, c'est d'une part le contrôle de l'hétérogénéité à travers le discours et la mise en place de l'organisme au moment de penser et planifier la cité et, d'autre part, l'expression du conflit en tant que devenir de l'immanence
This research presents a lecture of the political challenges of the idea of geophilosophy conceived by Deleuze and Guattari. The perspective that guides this thesis is lead by the relationship of "immanence and city" presented in "What is philosophy?" - the last piece of collaborative work by the two philosophers. In their own words, the city creates and offers a medium to the philosophical thought, a sort of "environment" or "atmosphere" since being developed in Greece, a radical immanence and heterogeneity through it a common place. Given this, to understand the value of this medium that converts philosophy in geophilosophy, multiple references will be presented and analysed. We can synthesize this approach in the following words: if the city appears for philosophy as a medium or atmosphere, it is because those make possible both heterogeneity and conflict, the fundamental elements of thought and citizen praxis. But at the same time, in front of Plato's Metaphysics, the conflict and heterogeneity emerges as a menace that must be controlled, domesticated or expelled of the perfect city to reach the conservation of the order of words and the order of movements of the souls of the individuals, the superior order that must govern the city. We decide to take this argument between these two approaches of the city and conflict to analyse three moments in history: the Greek world, the Renaissance and Modernity, and finally the contemporary world. The reason for this is found in what we think is important to be remarked: the tension between "order-organism" and "conflict-heterogeneity". Our research tries to understand and explain on the one hand the control of heterogeneity through the conception and practice of organism in philosophy and urbanism, on the other hand, the expression of conflict a singular becoming of immanence