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Journal articles on the topic 'Costly theory'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 28 May 2022

Last updated: 30 July 2025

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1

Sun, Shan, Michal Johanis, and Jan Rychtář. "Costly signalling theory and dishonest signalling." Theoretical Ecology 13, no. 1 (2019): 85–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12080-019-0429-0.

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2

Daniel, Kent D., and David Hirshleifer. "A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding*." Review of Finance 22, no. 5 (2018): 1631–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfy009.

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3

Mehra, Rajnish, Facundo Piguillem, and Edward C. Prescott. "Costly financial intermediation in neoclassical growth theory." Quantitative Economics 2, no. 1 (2011): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/qe40.

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4

Karni, Edi. "Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions." Games and Economic Behavior 50, no. 1 (2005): 28–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.12.001.

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5

Halpern, Joseph Y., and Rafael Pass. "Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation." Journal of Economic Theory 156 (March 2015): 246–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.007.

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McNamara, Patrick, and Reka Szent-Imrey. "Costly Signaling Theory of REM Sleep and Dreams." Evolutionary Psychology 5, no. 1 (2007): 147470490700500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/147470490700500103.

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7

Lafontaine, Francine, and Margaret E. Slade. "Retail contracting and costly monitoring: Theory and evidence." European Economic Review 40, no. 3-5 (1996): 923–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00101-8.

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8

Makuck, Peter. "Costly Habits." Hudson Review 48, no. 2 (1995): 240. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3851815.

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9

Weingarten, Oliver. "Costly Signaling in Ancient Chinese Narratives." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 55, no. 2 (2024): 147–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/jinh_a_02036.

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Abstract Seemingly reckless, wasteful, or self-harming actions depicted in narrative sources are embedded in the philosophical and political discourse of Warring States and early imperial China (around the third to the first century bce). Signaling theory unveils the underlying rationality of many such acts by demonstrating how they allow actors with conflicting interests to pursue their goals while reducing costs compared to alternative scenarios. Ancient Chinese thinkers did not discuss signaling theory in the abstract; they were, however, keenly aware of the underlying mechanisms, at times

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10

Name-Correa, Alvaro J., and Huseyin Yildirim. "A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations." American Economic Review 103, no. 2 (2013): 1091–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.2.1091.

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We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors. We fully characterize the solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fund-raising costs. It is optimal for the fund-raiser to target only the “net contributors”––donors who would give more than their solicitation costs. We show that as the income inequality increases, so does the level of the public good, despite a (potentially) non-monotonic fund-raising strategy. This implies that costly fund-raising can provide a novel explanation for the non-neutrality of income redistributions and government

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11

Biernaskie, Jay M., Alan Grafen, and Jennifer C. Perry. "The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1790 (2014): 20140876. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.0876.

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Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such ‘honest’ signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index

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12

Pyysiäinen, Ilkka. "Religion is neither costly nor beneficial." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, no. 6 (2004): 746. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x04380179.

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Some forms of religion may in some cases alleviate existential anxieties and help maintain morality; yet religion can also persist without serving any such functions. Atran & Norenzayan (A&N) are unclear about the importance of these functions for a theory of the recurrence of religious beliefs and behaviors.

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13

HOPPE, HEIDRUN C., BENNY MOLDOVANU, and ANER SELA. "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals." Review of Economic Studies 76, no. 1 (2009): 253–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x.

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14

Meacham, Frazer, Aaron Perlmutter, and Carl T. Bergstrom. "Honest signalling with costly gambles." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 10, no. 87 (2013): 20130469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2013.0469.

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Costly signalling theory is commonly invoked as an explanation for how honest communication can be stable when interests conflict. However, the signal costs predicted by costly signalling models often turn out to be unrealistically high. These models generally assume that signal cost is determinate. Here, we consider the case where signal cost is instead stochastic. We examine both discrete and continuous signalling games and show that, under reasonable assumptions, stochasticity in signal costs can decrease the average cost at equilibrium for all individuals. This effect of stochasticity for

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15

Cronk, Lee. "The application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: some thoughts and clarifications." Social Science Information 44, no. 4 (2005): 603–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018405058203.

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Animal signaling theory has recently become popular among anthropologists as a way to study human communication. One aspect of animal signaling theory, often known as costly signaling or handicap theory, has been used particularly often. This article makes four points regarding these developments: (1) signaling theory is broader than existing studies may make it seem; (2) costly signaling theory has roots in the social as well as the biological sciences; (3) not all honest signals are costly and not all costs borne by signalers serve to ensure honesty; and (4) hard-to-fake signals are favored

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16

McGuire, Kelly R., William R. Hildebrandt, and Kimberly L. Carpenter. "Costly Signaling and the Ascendance of No-Can-Do Archaeology: A Reply to Codding and Jones." American Antiquity 72, no. 2 (2007): 358–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40035819.

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While providing a review of some of the ethnographic literature surrounding hunting and Costly Signaling Theory, Codding and Jones offer no alternative framework for how this emerging theoretical approach might be applied to the archaeological record. In their view, Costly Signaling Theory lies beyond the pale of current archaeological inquiry, or at least our conception of it. We respond to this characterization by providing a specific methodological approach, combined with several additional applications, that answer Codding and Jones's call for greater linkage between the theory and the arc

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17

Galpin, Neal. "Cash holdings, costly financing and the q theory of returns." Accounting & Finance 60, S1 (2018): 1149–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12406.

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18

Murray, Michael, and Lyn Moore. "Costly Signaling and the Origin of Religion." Journal of Cognition and Culture 9, no. 3-4 (2009): 225–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156770909x12489459066264.

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AbstractCostly signaling theories of religion contend that religious belief and behaviors function as costly signals of cooperative intent. Such signals are evolvable because they allow likely cooperators to find one another, while excluding potential cheats or free riders that would be unwilling (or unable) to pay the price associated with sending the signal. As a result, under the right conditions, religious costly signaling can emerge as an evolutionary stable strategy. However, reliability certifying costly signaling can evolve and stabilize only when certain necessary conditions are satis

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19

Hødnebø, Tone, and Anthony Barnett. "IT'S COSTLY to keep the world intact." World Literature Today 85, no. 1 (2011): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wlt.2011.0128.

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20

Koenig, Harold G. "Costly signaling theory is not the only pathway to self-control." Religion, Brain & Behavior 7, no. 3 (2016): 248–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2153599x.2016.1156557.

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21

Toda, Koji, and Natsuki Sugibayashi. "Reliable Confession of Love from the viewpoint of Costly Signaling Theory." Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 86 (2022): 2PM—009—PC—2PM—009—PC. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.86.0_2pm-009-pc.

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22

Zollman, Kevin J. S., Carl T. Bergstrom, and Simon M. Huttegger. "Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280, no. 1750 (2013): 20121878. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.1878.

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Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.

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23

Legros, Patrick, and Andrew F. Newman. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 2 (2013): 725–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs075.

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Abstract This article presents a perfectly competitive model of firm boundary decisions and study their interplay with product demand, technology, and welfare. Integration is privately costly but is effective at coordinating production decisions; nonintegration is less costly but coordinates relatively poorly. Output price influences the choice of ownership structure: integration increases with the price level. At the same time, ownership affects output, because integration is more productive than nonintegration. For a generic set of demand functions, equilibrium delivers heterogeneity of owne

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24

Pfattheicher, Stefan, and Johannes Keller. "Vigilant Self–regulation and Costly Punishment in Public Goods Situations." European Journal of Personality 27, no. 4 (2013): 346–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.1909.

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Applying regulatory focus theory to the context of social dilemma situations, the present research demonstrates that individual differences in vigilant, prevention–focused self–regulation predict the tendency to invest private resources to punish uncooperative interaction partners (costly punishment), a behaviour that typically has strong positive effects on the collective level of cooperation. Analyses further support the distinctiveness of the vigilance system proposed in regulatory focus theory (prevention focus) in comparison with general defensive inhibitory tendencies (measured with Carv

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25

Van Eyghen, Hans. "Debunking Divine Command Theory." Religions 14, no. 10 (2023): 1252. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14101252.

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The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this paper, I look at a number of evolutionary and cognitive explanations (supernatural punishment theory, big gods theory, moral dyad, and costly signaling) that purport to explain why people hold beliefs concerning a close connection between God and morality. I assess whether any of these theories provide a reason for epistemic concern.

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26

Son, Ji-Min. "The Aesthetics of Jean-Marie Schaeffer and the Theory of Costly Signaling." Journal of Aesthetics & Science of Art 69 (June 30, 2023): 140–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.17527/jasa.69.0.06.

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27

Berger, Ulrich, and Hannelore De Silva. "Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information." PLOS ONE 16, no. 6 (2021): e0253344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253344.

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Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obt

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28

Farrell, Anne M., Jonathan H. Grenier, and Justin Leiby. "Scoundrels or Stars? Theory and Evidence on the Quality of Workers in Online Labor Markets." Accounting Review 92, no. 1 (2016): 93–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51447.

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ABSTRACT Online labor markets allow rapid recruitment of large numbers of workers for very low pay. Although online workers are often used as research participants, there is little evidence that they are motivated to make costly choices to forgo wealth or leisure that are often central to addressing accounting research questions. Thus, we investigate the validity of using online workers as a proxy for non-experts when accounting research designs use more demanding tasks than these workers typically complete. Three experiments examine the costly choices of online workers relative to student res

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29

Johnson, Tim. "The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (2012): 31–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000926.

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AbstractCostly punishment's scarcity “in the wild” does not belie strong reciprocity theory as Guala claims. In the presence of strong reciprocators, strategic defectors will cooperate and sanctioning will not occur. Accordingly, natural field experiments are necessary to assess a “wide” reading of costly punishment experiments. One such field experiment exists, and it supports the hypothesis that costly punishment promotes cooperation.

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30

Palmer, Jack A., and Linda K. Palmer. "Predicting Altruistic Behaviour by the Benefactor-Beneficiary Relationship." Evolutionary Psychology 20, no. 3 (2022): 147470492211229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14747049221122920.

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The evolution of altruism—costly behaviour by an individual (the benefactor) that benefits another individual (the beneficiary)—has been theorized as a function of kinship, reciprocity potential, shared group membership, and costly signalling. These benefactor-beneficiary relationships have predictive value for real-life altruistic acts. J. A. Palmer designed the Costly Signals Questionnaire (CSQ) to measure participants’ level of support for altruistic acts performed under the varying conditions of (1) close kin, (2) person who can reciprocate, (3) group co-members, and (4) anonymous stranger

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31

Feddersen, Timothy, and Alvaro Sandroni. "A Theory of Participation in Elections." American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (2006): 1271–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.4.1271.

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We analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal. Ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so. Unlike previous duty-based models of participation, in our model an ethical agent's obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents. Our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior.

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32

Roberts, Gilbert. "Honest signaling of cooperative intentions." Behavioral Ecology 31, no. 4 (2020): 922–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/araa035.

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Abstract Trust can transform conflicting interests into cooperation. But how can individuals know when to trust others? Here, I develop the theory that reputation building may signal cooperative intent, or “trustworthiness.” I model a simple representation of this theory in which individuals 1) optionally invest in a reputation by performing costly helpful behavior (“signaling”); 2) optionally use others’ reputations when choosing a partner; and 3) optionally cooperate with that partner. In evolutionary simulations, high levels of reputation building, of choosing partners based on reputation,

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33

Farrell, Anne M., Joshua O. Goh, and Brian J. White. "The Effect of Performance-Based Incentive Contracts on System 1 and System 2 Processing in Affective Decision Contexts: fMRI and Behavioral Evidence." Accounting Review 89, no. 6 (2014): 1979–2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50852.

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ABSTRACT Managers may rely on emotional reactions to a setting to the detriment of economic considerations (“System 1 processing”), resulting in decisions that are costly for firms. While economic theory prescribes performance-based incentives to align goals and induce effort, psychology theory suggests that the salience of emotions is difficult to overcome without also inducing more deliberate consideration of both emotional and economic factors (“System 2 processing”). We link these perspectives by investigating whether performance-based incentives mitigate the costly influence of emotion by

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34

Sosis, Richard, and Eric R. Bressler. "Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion." Cross-Cultural Research 37, no. 2 (2003): 211–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1069397103037002003.

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35

Schosser, Josef, and Jochen Wilhelm. "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts." Economic Theory Bulletin 6, no. 2 (2018): 129–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0137-8.

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36

Quint, Daniel, and Kenneth Hendricks. "A Theory of Indicative Bidding." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, no. 2 (2018): 118–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160290.

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When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids—nonbinding preliminary bids—to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly increasing strategies, with bidders “pooling” over a finite number of bids. The equilibrium helps the seller select high value bidders with higher likelihood, although the highest value bidders are not always selected. When the number of potential bidders is large, revenue and total s

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37

Mokos, Judit, and István Scheuring. "Altruism, costly signaling, and withholding information in a sport charity campaign." Evolution, Mind and Behaviour 17, no. 1 (2019): 10–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/2050.2019.00007.

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Are more generous altruists more likely to signal their altruism? According to the theory of costly signaling, altruists signal their altruism in order to enhance their reputations; this theory predicts that above-average altruists will be most likely to signal their altruism. However, previous empirical research has found that average altruists are more likely to signal their altruism than above- and below-average altruists, suggesting adherence to an egalitarian norm. Studies of real-life of altruism, reputation management, and signaling are rare. Here, we examined a sport charity database t

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38

Rapaport, Lisa G., Catherine E. Paul, and Patrick Gerard. "Hwæt!: adaptive benefits of public displays of generosity and bravery in Beowulf." Behaviour 153, no. 9-11 (2016): 1331–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568539x-00003348.

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Costly signalling — along with other adaptive mechanisms, including reciprocity and kin selection — supports altruism in human societies. Because literary works can reflect the lives, motivations and ideals of real cultures, the same adaptive forces governing the actions of actual persons may drive the interactions depicted in these stories. Based on this reasoning, we analysed the interactions in the Old-English poemBeowulf, asking whether the beneficent behaviour exhibited by the characters functions as costly signalling or as exchange-based interactions. We found that both mechanisms play a

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39

Codding, Brian F., and Terry L. Jones. "Man the Showoff? Or the Ascendance of a Just-so-Story: A Comment on Recent Applications of Costly Signaling Theory in American Archaeology." American Antiquity 72, no. 2 (2007): 349–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40035818.

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In several recent, and highly provocative papers, McGuire and Hildebrandt (Hildebrandt and McGuire 2002, 2003; McGuire and Hildebrandt 2005) have helped introduce costly signaling theory into American archaeology. While their efforts are commendable, we feel that their reinterpretations of western North American prehistory overstate the likely influence of costly signaling on the archaeological record. Only by overlooking a considerable body of ethnographic literature that indicates a more limited role for signaling are they able to characterize Great Basin and California hunters as motivated

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40

Hoefler, Chad D., Matthew H. Persons, and Ann L. Rypstra. "Evolutionarily costly courtship displays in a wolf spider: a test of viability indicator theory." Behavioral Ecology 19, no. 5 (2008): 974–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/arn055.

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41

Gittins, Rhiannon, and Paul Pettitt. "Is Palaeolithic cave art consistent with costly signalling theory? Lascaux as a test case." World Archaeology 49, no. 4 (2017): 466–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00438243.2017.1386590.

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42

Jacklin, Charles J., and Edward Henry Robbins. "Costly information production and optimal capital structuring: Theory and implications for finance and accounting." Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 1, no. 2 (1991): 153–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02409669.

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43

Chukarin, Denis K. "FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT: THEORY QUESTIONS." EKONOMIKA I UPRAVLENIE: PROBLEMY, RESHENIYA 4/8, no. 145 (2024): 12–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.36871/ek.up.p.r.2024.04.08.002.

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The current international tax system, which is based on separate accounting for corporate affiliates trading at arm’s length prices, is increasingly viewed as prone to abuse. Multinational enterprises have become adept at manipulating the rules of the current system to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax (or no-tax) jurisdictions. At the same time, each country’s law sets corporate income tax rates as well as bases, which may be eroded by tax incentives provided via legislation or ministerial discretion. These laws are further overlaid by a network of bilateral tax treaties, which alter the

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44

Ruxton, Graeme D., David M. Wilkinson, H. Martin Schaefer, and Thomas N. Sherratt. "Why fruit rots: theoretical support for Janzen's theory of microbe–macrobe competition." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1782 (2014): 20133320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.3320.

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We present a formal model of Janzen's influential theory that competition for resources between microbes and vertebrates causes microbes to be selected to make these resources unpalatable to vertebrates. That is, fruit rots, seeds mould and meat spoils, in part, because microbes gain a selective advantage if they can alter the properties of these resources to avoid losing the resources to vertebrate consumers. A previous model had failed to find circumstances in which such a costly spoilage trait could flourish; here, we present a simple analytic model of a general situation where costly micro

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Galle, Jillian E. "Costly Signaling and Gendered Social Strategies among Slaves in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake: An Archaeological Perspective." American Antiquity 75, no. 1 (2010): 19–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.7183/0002-7316.75.1.19.

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Evolutionary approaches to agency offer some of the most promising frameworks for identifying individual agents and their archaeological correlates. Agency theory calls attention to the individual as the fundamental feature of human relations, and evolutionary theory provides historically situated models that allow archaeologists to precisely investigate the complex behavioral strategies that underlie artifact patterns. The following paper offers one such model. Using data from 41 slave-site occupations from eighteenth-century Virginia, I explore how and why enslaved African Americans actively

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46

Xia, Xin Tao, Bao Ji Shi, Yan Yan Meng, and Ming Qiu. "The Advances of the Prediction of the Performance and Reliability of Rolling Bearings with Poor Information." Advanced Materials Research 1014 (July 2014): 94–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.1014.94.

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For costly and dangerous experiments, growing attention has been paid to the study of the performance and reliability of rolling bearings with poor information. The existing reliability theory relying on the classical statistical theory and Bayesian theory will become ineffective if the probability distribution is unknown. In view of this, the developments of studies on forecasting methods for the performance and reliability of rolling bearings with poor information are summarized in this article.

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Kertzer, Joshua D., Brian C. Rathbun, and Nina Srinivasan Rathbun. "The Price of Peace: Motivated Reasoning and Costly Signaling in International Relations." International Organization 74, no. 1 (2019): 95–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818319000328.

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AbstractCanonical models of costly signaling in international relations (IR) tend to assume costly signals speak for themselves: a signal's costliness is typically understood to be a function of the signal, not the perceptions of the recipient. Integrating the study of signaling in IR with research on motivated skepticism and asymmetric updating from political psychology, we show that individuals’ tendencies to embrace information consistent with their overarching belief systems (and dismiss information inconsistent with it) has important implications for how signals are interpreted. We test o

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48

Popken, Randall. "Edwin Hopkins and the Costly Labor of Composition Teaching." College Composition and Communication 55, no. 4 (2004): 618. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4140665.

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Popken, Randall. "Edwin Hopkins and the Costly Labor of Composition Teaching." College Composition & Communication 55, no. 4 (2004): 618–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.58680/ccc20042777.

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Using a “historical case study” of Edwin M. Hopkins, this article explores what Bruce Horner calls the “material social conditions” of teaching writing early in the twentieth century. It shows how Hopkins’s own attitude and response to the demands of being a writing teacher serve as a backdrop for understanding his local and national crusade to improve labor conditions for faculty.

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50

Olsson, Mats, Erik Wapstra, Thomas Madsen, Beata Ujvari, and Carl Rugfelt. "Costly parasite resistance: a genotype-dependent handicap in sand lizards?" Biology Letters 1, no. 3 (2005): 375–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2005.0339.

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Male sand lizards ( Lacerta agilis ) with a specific restriction fragment length polymorphism fragment in their major histocompatibility complex (MHC) genotype (‘O-males’) are more resistant to ectoparasites (a tick, Ixodes ricinus ) than are males that lack this fragment (‘NO-males’). However, emerging evidence suggests that such adaptive immune responses are costly, here manifested by reduced body condition and a compromised defence against secondary infections by haemoprotid parasites that use the ticks as vectors. Subsequent to tick encounter, O-males suffer from a higher leucocyte–erythro

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