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Journal articles on the topic 'Epistemology of belief'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 3 June 2025

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Chernyak, Alexey Z. "Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 4 (2021): 77–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158462.

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The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualit

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Kostina, Alina O. "Epistemology of Belief." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 2 (2020): 231–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057233.

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The following article discovers current trends of contemporary epistemology, related to epistemic agent and his/her activities. A number of issues raised here describe internal experience of the agent, such as (in)voluntary nature of belief formation, trust in one’s faculties of perception, correspondence of formed beliefs to evidence, demarcation between purely epistemic and pragmatic rationality. Another part of the issues is related to external experiences of the agent. The most crucial among them are: blameworthiness of the agent’s belief system, limited intake of testimonial knowledge as

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Bishop, Michael A. "The Autonomy of Social Epistemology." Episteme 2, no. 1 (2005): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.65.

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Social epistemology is autonomous: When applied to the same evidential situations, the principles of social rationality and the principles of individual rationality sometimes recommend inconsistent beliefs. If we stipulate that reasoning rationally from justified beliefs to a true belief is normally sufficient for knowledge, the autonomy thesis implies that some knowledge is essentially social. When the principles of social and individual rationality are applied to justified evidence and recommend inconsistent beliefs and the belief endorsed by social rationality is true, then that true belief

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4

Smith, Nicholas. "How To Hang A Door: Picking Hinges for Quasi-Fideism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13, no. 1 (2021): 51–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v13i1.3059.

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Abstract: In the epistemology of the late Wittgenstein, a central place is given to the notion of the hinge: an arational commitment that provides a foundation of some sort for the rest of our beliefs. Quasi-fideism is an approach to the epistemology of religion that argues that religious belief is on an epistemic par with other sorts of belief inasmuch as religious and non-religious beliefs all rely on hinges. I consider in this paper what it takes to find the appropriate hinge for a quasi-fideist approach to the epistemology of religion.

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Gilbert, Margaret. "Collective Epistemology." Episteme 1, no. 2 (2004): 95–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.2.95.

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Philosophical epistemology is concerned with knowledge and related phenomena such as belief. In order to have a general label for such phenomena I shall refer to them as cognitive states. Differing accounts of a variety of cognitive states have been produced. For instance, according to one venerable – if debated – account of knowledge, it is justified true belief. Belief has been contrasted with acceptance, though the belief-acceptance contrast has been drawn in a variety of different ways.

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Antognazza, Maria Rosa. "KNOWLEDGE AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF." Think 20, no. 58 (2021): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147717562100004x.

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ABSTRACTIntroductions to epistemology routinely define knowledge as a kind of belief which meets certain criteria. In the first two sections of this article, I discuss this account and its application to religious epistemology by the influential movement known as Reformed Epistemology. In the last section, I argue that the controversial consequences drawn from this account by Reformed Epistemology offer one of the best illustrations of the untenability of a conception of knowledge as a kind of belief. I conclude by sketching an alternative account of cognition which also provides a different f

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Da Silva, Ronaldo Miguel. "EPISTEMOLOGIA DO TESTEMUNHO: críticas à refutação do reducionismo local quanto ao desempenho justificacional do testemunho." Cadernos do PET Filosofia 5, no. 9 (2015): 17–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/cadpetfil.v5i9.3131.

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A epistemologia do testemunho tem reacendido forte interesse entre a classe dos atuais epistemólogos. Tem sido redescoberta a sua indispensabilidade epistêmica e reassumida a posição de que o testemunho é uma fonte de crenças penetrante e natural, no qual muitas das crenças nele fundamentadas constituem conhecimento e estão justificadas. Reducionistas e antirreducionistas se alternam, repetidamente, para explicar o papel epistêmico do testemunho na justificação da crença testemunhal, gerando um acirrado debate na epistemologia contemporânea. Advogada do Reducionismo local, Elizabeth Fricker re

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Christensen, David. "Introduction: The Epistemology of Disagreement." Episteme 6, no. 3 (2009): 231–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360009000677.

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One of the most salient features of forming beliefs in a social context is that people end up disagreeing with one another. This is not just an obvious fact about belief-formation; it raises interesting normative questions, especially when people become aware of the opinions of others. How should my beliefs be affected by the knowledge that others hold contrary beliefs? In some cases, the answer seems easy. If I have reason to think that my friend is much better informed than I am, her dissent will often require substantial revision in my belief. If I have reason to think she's mentally derang

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9

Goodman, Jeremy, and Bernhard Salow. "Epistemology Normalized." Philosophical Review 132, no. 1 (2023): 89–145. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10123787.

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We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one’s evidence. The guiding idea is that, if a possibility is sufficiently less normal than one’s actual situation, then one can know that that possibility does not obtain. This explains how people can have inductive knowledge that goes beyond what is strictly entailed by their evidence. We motivate the framework by showing how it illuminates knowledge about the future, knowledge of lawful regularities, knowledge about parameters measured u

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10

Tilley, Terrence W. "Reformed Epistemology in a Jamesian Perspective." Horizons 19, no. 1 (1992): 84–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0360966900025676.

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AbstractThis essay argues that the reformed epistemologists (William Alston, Alvin Plantinga) have not (yet) sustained claims in religious epistemology significantly more extensive than William James did in the Varieties. It argues that even if reformed epistemologists show that religious belief can have a positive epistemic status, their approach may finally lead to relativism (given that religious traditions generate contradictory religious beliefs) because it offers no method for finding which, if any, concrete religious beliefs might be preferable to hold or in which religious practices on

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11

Pritchard, Duncan. "Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 3 (2018): 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i3.2605.

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It is argued that standard accounts of the epistemology of religious commitmentfail to be properly sensitive to certain important features of the nature of religious conviction. Once one takes these features of religious conviction seriously, then it becomes clear that we are not to conceive of the epistemology of religious conviction along completely rational lines.But the moral to extract from this is not fideism, or even a more moderate proposal (such as reformed epistemology) that casts the epistemic standing of basic religious beliefs along nonrational lines. Rather, one needs to recognis

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Bazac, Ana. "Knowledge, Opinion, Belief: The Dialectical Challenging." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 69, no. 1 (2024): 7–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2024.1.01.

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This paper is written in the continental tradition – facing the analytic one – and advocates the knowledge first thesis, reviewing the entailment thesis (where believing is knowing, because to know entails to believe). It starts from the ancient distinction between knowledge and opinion and develops criteria for distinguishing knowledge, opinion and belief. The demonstration necessarily arrives to the kinds of beliefs and thus, to the relationships between knowledge and these kinds. While the distinction of kinds of beliefs leads to the understanding of why the knowledge belief problem did app

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Vidarte, Vicente Sanfélix, and Chon Tejedor. "Experience and Religious Belief." Wittgenstein-Studien 10, no. 1 (2019): 279–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0017.

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AbstractIn this paper, we defend the view that, although Wittgenstein does not present an epistemology of religion in the sense of the term most commonly found in traditional philosophical texts, he does explore a different understanding of religious epistemology – one that aligns the religious attitude with a particular form of know-how.

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JEFFREYS, DEREK S. "HOW REFORMED IS REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY? ALVIN PLANTINGA AND CALVIN'S ‘SENSUS DIVINITATIS’." Religious Studies 33, no. 4 (1997): 419–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441259700406x.

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In his recent two volumes on epistemology, Alvin Plantinga surveys contemporary theories of knowledge thoroughly, and carefully defends an externalist epistemology. He promises that in a third volume, Warranted Christian Belief, he will present John Calvin's sensus divinitatis as an epistemic module akin to sense perception, a priori knowledge, induction, testimony and other epistemic modules. Plantinga defines the sensus divinitatis as a ‘many sided disposition to accept belief in God (or propositions that immediately and obviously entail the existence of God) in a variety of circumstances’.

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15

Morton, Adam. "Saving Belief from (Internalist) Epistemology." Facta Philosophica 5, no. 2 (2003): 277–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/factaphil20035216.

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16

Fanselow, Ryan. "Self-Evidence and Disagreement in Ethics." Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5, no. 3 (2017): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v5i3.56.

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Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to know why I am justified in holding a moral belief. In a typical case, I will respond by citing a further moral belief that justifies it. A regress arises because, in order for this further belief to justify anything, it too must be justified. According to a traditional position in moral epistemology, moral foundationalism, the regress comes to an end with some moral beliefs. Moral foundationalism is an attractive position because it promises to answer the regress problem. However, it inherits the

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Hong, ByungSun. "Discussion and Remaining Issues Surrounding ‘basic beliefs’ in Epistemology." Korean Society of Human and Nature 6, no. 1 (2025): 323–47. https://doi.org/10.54913/hn.2025.6.1.323.

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A basic belief is a faith that starts from justification, and therefore it must be justifiable by maintaining the basic belief without having a reason for the basic belief. Thus, what J. L. Pollock presents is a more relaxed proposal than maintaining the firm incorrigibility that must always be adhered to in traditional foundation theories. It is a new proposal that immediately uses the expression ‘prima facie justified’ to set out negative justification as opposed to positive justification. This applies the method of self-justification by presuming that beliefs by direct perception are true i

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18

Ibrahim, Salim M. "The Epistemology of Religion." Koya University Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 6, no. 1 (2023): 235–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.14500/kujhss.v6n1y2023.pp235-241.

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Entertaining a proposition normally exposes our mind to a range of psychic states, ranging from involuntary to voluntary states, depending on the irresistibility of the proposition in question. There are some propositions which are too certain to entertain without believing them, and some too vague, too suspicious to hold without some degree of doubt. Normally, we relate to any matter we consider in one of these three different propositional attitudes: (dis)belief, acceptance (or rejection) or suspension of judgment. Though religion cannot be confined solely to acceptance of or a belief in the

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19

Santos, Arthur Henrique Soares dos. "Reformed Evidentialism and Epistemic Responsibility." Revista Atlantika 2, no. 2 (2024): 01–10. https://doi.org/10.69577/2965-6257.2024.16.

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The Reformed Epistemology, developed by Alvin Plantinga, seeks to argue that belief in God can be considered properly basic in terms of justification and warrant. Plantinga claims that a theistic believer does not need evidential reasons for their belief in God. However, some may argue that due to the lack of evidence, Reformed Epistemology could be considered epistemically irresponsible. This objection, grounded on Clifford's evidentialism, claims that a responsible epistemology is deeply related to sufficient evidence, and Plantinga's epistemology does not care with sufficient evidence about

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20

Kawall, Jason. "Autonomy, Agency, and the Value of Enduring Beliefs." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 1 (2010): 107–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0083.

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There has been much recent interest in questions of value in epistemology (for a thorough overview of this work, see Pritchard 2007), and in what follows I argue that epistemologists concerned with the value of true beliefs and knowledge would do well to devote attention to the enduring nature of beliefs, and in particular to the essential role that they play in constituting agents themselves.I begin by considering an analogy commonly drawn by epistemologists between acts in the domain of ethics and beliefs in the domain of epistemology, and argue that it is fl awed in important respects. I pr

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MCNABB, TYLER DALTON. "Warranted religion: answering objections to Alvin Plantinga's epistemology." Religious Studies 51, no. 4 (2014): 477–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441251400033x.

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AbstractAlvin Plantinga over the decades has developed a particular theory of warrant that would allow certain beliefs to be warranted, even if one lacked propositional arguments or evidence for them. One such belief that Plantinga focuses on is belief in God. There have been, however, numerous objections both to Plantinga's theory of warrant and to the religious application that he makes of it. In this article I address an objection from both of these categories. I first tackle an objection that attempts to show that proper function isn't a necessary condition for warrant. After tackling this

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22

Schellenberg, John L. "The Epistemology of Modest Atheism." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7, no. 1 (2015): 51–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v7i1.129.

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Distinguishing between the old atheism, the new atheism, and modest atheism, and also between belief and acceptance, and belief and acceptance tokens and types, I defend the disjunctive view that either modest atheistic belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, is today epistemically justified in the context of philosophical inquiry. Central to my defence is a deductive version of the hiddenness argument and an emphasis on the early stage of philosophical inquiry that we presently occupy.

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23

Stump, Eleonore. "Faith and Goodness." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 25 (March 1989): 167–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00011317.

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Recent work on the subject of faith has tended to focus on the epistemology of religious belief, considering such issues as whether beliefs held in faith are rational and how they may be justified. Richard Swinburne, for example, has developed an intricate explanation of the relationship between the propositions of faith and the evidence for them. Alvin Plantinga, on the other hand, has maintained that belief in God may be properly basic, that is, that a belief that God exists can be part of the foundation of a rational noetic structure. This sort of work has been useful in drawing attention t

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Bondy, Patrick. "Revisiting Anti-Luck Epistemology." Southwest Philosophy Review 35, no. 1 (2019): 107–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201935111.

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According to anti-luck approaches to the analysis of knowledge, knowledge is analyzed as unlucky true belief, or unlucky justified true belief. According to virtue epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is true belief which a subject has acquired or maintained because of the exercise of a relevant cognitive ability. ALE and VE both appear to have difficulty handling some intuitive cases where subjects have or lack knowledge, so Pritchard (2012) proposed that we should take an anti-luck condition and a success-from-ability condition as independent necessary conditions on knowledge. Recently

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Prokic, Uros. "Contemporary Epistemology of Nationalism:." Conatus 8, no. 1 (2023): 285–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/cjp.31074.

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This inquiry examines the structure of knowledge of nationalism. While numerous studies on nationalism focus on the nature and defining elements of nations, this research explores nationalism discourse from a purely epistemological viewpoint and asks two overarching questions: what are the constitutive beliefs in these various theories and how are they structured? The first section outlines a contemporary foundationalist argument and analyzes two widely accepted theories of nationalism from this theory of knowledge. The study finds that the linear constraints of a foundationalist approach, res

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Campbell, Lucy. "An epistemology for practical knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 2 (2018): 159–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1341073.

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AbstractAnscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-ti

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Hendricks, Vincent F. "METHODOLOGY IN EPISTEMOLOGY." DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY 34, no. 1 (1999): 43–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300_0340104.

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28

Townsend, Leo. "The Epistemology of Collective Testimony." Journal of Social Ontology 6, no. 2 (2020): 187–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2019-0044.

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Abstract In this paper, I explore what gives collective testimony its epistemic credentials, through a critical discussion of three competing accounts of the epistemology of collective testimony. According to the first view, collective testimony inherits its epistemic credentials from the beliefs the testimony expresses—where this can be seen either as the beliefs of all or some of the group’s members, or as the beliefs of group itself. The second view denies any necessary connection to belief, claiming instead that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the reliability

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JANTZEN, GRACE. "EPISTEMOLOGY, RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF." Modern Theology 3, no. 4 (1987): 277–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0025.1987.tb00144.x.

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30

Wedgwood, Ralph. "A PROBABILISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEF." Philosophical Issues 28, no. 1 (2018): 374–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12130.

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31

Hansson, Sven Ove. "Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision*." Philosophical Studies 128, no. 1 (2006): 93–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4058-7.

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32

Veber, Michael. "The Epistemology of Belief - Hamid Vahid." Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 241 (2010): 871–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.673_7.x.

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33

Murphy, Dominic. "Delusions, Modernist Epistemology and Irrational Belief." Mind & Language 28, no. 1 (2013): 113–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/mila.12012.

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34

Williams, Daniel. "Identity-Defining Beliefs on Social Media." Philosophical Topics 50, no. 2 (2022): 41–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202250216.

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When membership of a community depends on commitment to shared beliefs, the community is a belief-based coalition, and the beliefs are identity-defining beliefs. Belief-based coalitions are pervasive features of human social life and routinely drive motivated cognition and epistemically dysfunctional group dynamics. Despite this, they remain surprisingly undertheorized in social epistemology. This article (i) clarifies the properties of belief-based coalitions and identity-defining beliefs, (ii) explains why they often incentivize and coordinate epistemically dysfunctional forms of communicati

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Maciel, Veronica de Sousa. "ALSTON’S DOXASTIC PRACTICE APPROACH AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF EMOTIONAL RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE." Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião 9, no. 1 (2023): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/2358-82842022e43147.

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The aim of this article is to inquire whether the beliefs based on religious emotions are reliable in epistemological terms. In order to accomplish this, we will address William Alston’s doxastic practice approach, which examines the possibility of a belief being justified through the reliability of a belief-forming mechanism, the doxastic practices. The attempt to be made here is to apply Alston's approach to a possible emotion doxastic practice. Also inspired by Rudolf Otto’s thesis about the non-rational in religious experience, inquiring if that non-rational are emotions. We aim to underst

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Demin, T. S., and K. G. Frolov. "Machines and Human Epistemology." Discourse 8, no. 2 (2022): 17–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.32603/2412-8562-2022-8-2-17-27.

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Introduction. The article analyzes the structure of the epistemology of knowledge of weak artificial intelligence in comparison with the structure of human knowledge. The article was written within the framework of one of the most demanded branch sections of philosophy – the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The novelty of the research is based on the idea of applying the analysis of knowledge developed within the framework of analytical epistemology to the field of artificial intelligence.Methodology and sources. The article is written in the framework of analytical tradition in philosop

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Nwosimiri, Ovett. "Ifá Divination System as an Embodiment of both the Internalist and Externalist bases of Justification in African Epistemology." Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 9, no. 1 (2020): 79–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ft.v9i1.6.

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An essential part of the concept of knowledge is the belief that the basic premises for knowledge must be justified. This means that for a knowledgeclaim to be true, there is a need for its justification. In African epistemology, the justification of beliefs and epistemic claims has mostly been considered from an externalist perspective such that justification appears to be one dimensional. Since epistemic claims can be justified using either the internalist or externalist perspective, this paper aims at showing that there are internalism and externalism in African epistemology and that Ifá di

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Ballantyne, Nathan. "Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 4 (2011): 485–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0041.

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Two common theses in contemporary epistemology are that ‘knowledge excludes luck’ and that knowledge depends on ‘purely epistemic’ factors. In this essay, I shall argue as follows: given some plausible assumptions, ‘anti-luck epistemology,’ which is committed to the fi rst thesis, implies the falsity of the second thesis. That is, I will argue that anti-luck epistemology leads to what has been called ‘pragmatic encroachment’ on knowledge. Anti-luck epistemologists hoping to resist encroachment must accept a controversial thesis about true beliefora dubious claim about luck and value and intere

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Mathiesen, Kay. "The Epistemic Features of Group Belief." Episteme 2, no. 3 (2006): 161–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.161.

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ABSTRACTRecently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifically, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's influential “plural subject” account of group

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Joyce, James M., and Brian Weatherson. "Accuracy and the Imps." Logos & Episteme 10, no. 3 (2019): 263–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910325.

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Recently several authors have argued that accuracy-first epistemology ends up licensing problematic epistemic bribes. They charge that it is better, given the accuracy-first approach, to deliberately form one false belief if this will lead to forming many other true beliefs. We argue that this is not a consequence of the accuracy-first view. If one forms one false belief and a number of other true beliefs, then one is committed to many other false propositions, e.g., the conjunction of that false belief with any of the true beliefs. Once we properly account for all the falsehoods that are adop

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Supriyanto. "Justification Theory of Internalism VS Externalism." International Journal of Social Science And Human Research 06, no. 02 (2023): 1200–1204. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7652371.

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Claims about the truth are often still based on each person's point of view. Thus, the question arises what makes a belief true? Belief (belief) is an attitude towards a certain statement, as a relationship between the subject and the prepoisisi. There are several types of beliefs, (1) Dispositional belief, which is a preposition that we can but not accept or consider, (2) occurent belief, an acceptance of that proposition. In this study, two patterns of belief were found, namely internalist and externalism. The two stand in dichotomously different spaces. The debate between the two in con

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Angelova-Elchinova, Madelaine. "Norms of Belief and Non-Propositional Primal Beliefs." Balkan Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2024): 117–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bjp202416215.

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Traditional normative theories of belief in epistemology presume that belief-forming includes a reflective component and a mental agency component. Beliefs are regarded as conscious doxastic attitudes with propositional contents. Let’s call this view the Transcendental View about Belief (TVB). First, I argue that reputed norms of belief as the truth norm, the knowledge norm and the rationality norm all incorporate TVB. Further, I argue that the empirical evidence concerning belief-forming collected in the last two decades by Rüdiger Seitz, Hans-Ferdinant Angel, Raymond Paloutzian and their col

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Tilley, Terrence W. "Religious Pluralism as a Problem for ‘Practical’ Religious Epistemology." Religious Studies 30, no. 2 (1994): 161–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500001451.

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After being dismissed for decades in philosophical theology, experiential arguments for the justification of religious belief, including belief in God, have again come to centre stage. One of the most thorough of these is William Alston's recent study, Perceiving God. Alston's purpose is to show that it is rational for someone to participate in what he calls Christian Mystical Practice (CMP) because CMP ‘is a socially established doxastic practice that is not demonstrably unreliable or otherwise disqualified for rational acceptance’ and to hold beliefs which that participation reliably generat

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Gamache, Joseph. "Aquinas and Contemporary Epistemology." International Philosophical Quarterly 58, no. 2 (2018): 157–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq2018329107.

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Whether and how truth is a norm of belief is a contentious issue in contemporary epistemology. In this paper I retrieve Aquinas’s conception of truth in order to advance a new answer to the question of what grounds the truth-norm. I begin by contrasting the two dominant contemporary accounts of this grounding, showing ways in which each succeeds and fails. Unlike the currently dominant accounts, my account seeks to ground the truth-norm in the nature of truth, as opposed to the nature of belief. Ultimately I argue that Aquinas’s conception of truth furnishes us with an account of the grounding

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Thune, Michael. "Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement." Philosophy Compass 5, no. 8 (2010): 712–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00314.x.

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Appleby, Peter C. "Reformed epistemology, rationality and belief in God." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 24, no. 3 (1988): 129–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00138721.

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Dietrich, Franz, and Christian List. "Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology." Synthese 190, no. 5 (2013): 787–808. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0224-6.

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Narița, Ionel. "Belief and Knowledge." SAECULUM 53, no. 1 (2022): 119–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/saec-2022-0012.

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Abstract There are possible two kinds of relationships between belief and knowledge: 1) belief is a necessary condition to knowledge; 2) belief and knowledge are contrary. While the first relation is held by the classical analysis of knowledge, the second one comes from the Kantian epistemology. In this work, we argue for the first solution, establishing the conditions for a belief to be knowledge.

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Miracchi, Lisa. "When Evidence Isn't Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-first Virtue Epistemology." Episteme 16, no. 4 (2019): 413–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.34.

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AbstractI motivate and develop a novel account of the epistemic assessability of suspension as a development of my knowledge-first, virtue-epistemological research program. First, I extend an argument of Ernest Sosa's for the claim that evidentialism cannot adequately account for the epistemic assessability of suspension. This includes a kind of knowledge-first evidentialism of the sort advocated by Timothy Williamson. I agree with Sosa that the reasons why evidentialism fails motivate a virtue-epistemological approach, but argue that my knowledge-first account is preferable to his view. Accor

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DE RIDDER, JEROEN. "Religious exclusivism unlimited." Religious Studies 47, no. 4 (2010): 449–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000570.

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AbstractLike David Silver before them, Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune argue that the facts of religious pluralism present an insurmountable challenge to the rationality of basic exclusive religious belief as construed by Reformed Epistemology. I will show that their argument is unsuccessful. First, their claim that the facts of religious pluralism make it necessary for the religious exclusivist to support her exclusive beliefs with significant reasons is one that the reformed epistemologist has the resources to reject. Secondly, they fail to demonstrate that it is impossible for basic religiou

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