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1

Grosset, Luca, and Elena Sartori. "Mean-Field Modeling of Green Technology Adoption: A Competition for Incentives." Mathematics 13, no. 5 (2025): 691. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13050691.

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This paper investigates the role of fiscal incentives in promoting the transition to a green economy using a dynamic mean-field game framework. By modeling firms as representative agents undergoing an environmentally sustainable transition, we analyze two distinct types of incentive structure: fixed incentives and incentives based on the average behavior of firms. The findings underscore the importance of balancing incentive structures to avoid economic inefficiencies and ensure a smooth ecological transition.
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2

Chaoliang, Zheng, Gelegjamts Adilbish, and Chen Shuyang. "CEO Equity Incentives and Digital Transformation Performance: Resource Misallocation Risk Through the Lens of Dynamic Capabilities Theory." Journal of Statistics and Economics 2, no. 1 (2025): 71–78. https://doi.org/10.62517/jse.202511109.

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In the wave of enterprise digital transformation, CEO equity incentives are widely used to promote the transformation process. However, this measure may bring the risk of resource mismatch. Based on the dynamic capability theory, this paper takes the listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2015 to 2023 as samples and empirically explores the relationship between CEO equity incentives and the risk of resource mismatch in digital transformation. The study finds that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO equity incentives and the risk of resource mismat
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3

Shin, Dongsoo, and Roland Strausz. "Delegation and dynamic incentives." RAND Journal of Economics 45, no. 3 (2014): 495–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12059.

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4

Bird, Daniel, and Alexander Frug. "Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 4 (2019): 111–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170025.

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We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, beneficial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (beneficial for the agent, costly for the principal) can be forbidden by the principal. We ask how rewards should be used and which investments incentivized. We identify the unique optimal mechanism and analyze the dynamic investment and compensation policies. When all rewards are identical, the unique optimal way to provide incentives is by a “carte b
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5

Shapiro, D. A. "Microfinance and dynamic incentives." Journal of Development Economics 115 (July 2015): 73–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.03.002.

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6

Şabac, Florin. "Dynamic incentives and retirement." Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, no. 1 (2008): 172–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.12.002.

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7

Yan, Qian, and Hong Yan Liu. "Design Mechanism on Dynamic Incentive Machnism Considering Special Talents of the Manager." Advanced Materials Research 664 (February 2013): 1191–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.664.1191.

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Suppose the firm's output is influenced by the agent’s effort level observable and the ability unobservable, researching the optimal level of incentives under the two levels of incentives associated. Study found that corporate client based on the first period of corporate performance, the agents ability to judge the case, risk aversion, the variance of the degree of capacity, the degree of attention of the principal agents the ability have an impact on the agents first and second of the optimal incentive level. In addition, of the optimal incentive level in first period is correlated with the
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8

Wong, Tak-Yuen. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking." Management Science 65, no. 9 (2019): 4032–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.3009.

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I study a continuous-time principal–agent model in which a multitasking agent engages in unobserved risk-taking. Risk-taking creates short-term profits but also increases the chance of large losses. The optimal contract incentivizes excessive risk-taking when the agent has insufficient skin in the game. Moreover, if the low effort is not too value-destroying and the private benefit of shirking is low enough, the principal can eliminate risk-taking by implementing the low effort. However, with variable project scale, addressing the risk-taking incentives by downsizing projects is not optimal. T
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9

Dutta, Sunil, and Qintao Fan. "Earnings Management and Dynamic Incentives." Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting 1, no. 2 (2016): 361–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/108.00000009.

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10

Singh, Vijeta, and Puja Padhi. "Dynamic Incentives and Microfinance Borrowers." Journal of Land and Rural Studies 5, no. 1 (2017): 67–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321024916677609.

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In recent years microfinance has been recognised as one of the policy mechanisms to achieve the goal of financial inclusion. Different lending models have been appropriated in microfinance sector to provide micro-loans to microfinance borrowers and their likely socio-economic impact on microfinance borrowers varies across different lending models. In case of microfinance, credit contracts between lenders and borrowers are designed in such a manner that borrowers’ initial loans are smaller but increases with each loan cycle over a period of time, termed as progressive lending.2 The present stud
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11

Barrera, Jorge, and Alfredo Garcia. "Dynamic Incentives for Congestion Control." IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 60, no. 2 (2015): 299–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tac.2014.2348197.

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12

Indjejikian, Raffi, and Dhananjay Nanda. "Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting." Journal of Accounting and Economics 27, no. 2 (1999): 177–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00009-9.

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13

Meyer, Margaret A., and John Vickers. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 3 (1997): 547–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/262082.

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14

Ghatak, M., M. Morelli, and T. Sjostrom. "Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives." Review of Economic Studies 68, no. 4 (2001): 781–810. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00190.

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15

Wong, Tsz-Ning, and Lily Ling Yang. "Dynamic expert incentives in teams." Games and Economic Behavior 125 (January 2021): 27–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.005.

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16

Jun, Byoung, and Xavier Vives. "Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly." Journal of Economic Theory 116, no. 2 (2004): 249–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.005.

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17

Boyer, Marcel, and Jacques Robert. "Organizational inertia and dynamic incentives." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 59, no. 3 (2006): 324–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.06.024.

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18

Li, Hongye. "Analysis of the Impact of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance." Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 30 (April 19, 2024): 131–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/5xrg2931.

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Equity incentive is a long-term incentive mechanism implemented by enterprises to motivate and retain core talents, and is one of the most commonly used methods to motivate employees. Equity incentives have been developed from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present day to form a relatively complete and mature system, and their dynamic evolution and key role in corporate governance (employee loyalty), executive compensation, and investor decision-making make them of far-reaching research significance. Also, the equity incentives of enterprises play a crucial role in their develop
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19

Yanıkkaya, H., and K. Altay. "An Empirical Analysis of the Impacts of Investment Incentives on Provincial Economic Growth in Turkey." Economy of Regions 19, no. 3 (2023): 909–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.17059/ekon.reg.2023-3-22.

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There are significant differences between governments in the context of the objectives of incentive policies. However, they are generally focused on macroeconomic purposes such as eliminating regional inequalities and increasing investment level, employment, industrialisation and therefore raising economic growth. In Turkey, The New Investment Incentive System, which has been implemented since 2012, essentially aimed to mitigate interregional inequalities. This study investigates the impact of investment incentives on provincial per capita growth of 81 provinces for the years 2004-2017. Our da
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20

Bawazir, Abdullah Abdulaziz, Rudzi Binti Munap, Ali Nasser Al-Tahitah, Ahmad Syukri Jamaludin, Loo Veen Win, and Joshua Deon Gomez. "Unveiling the interplay of financial and moral incentives in elevating employee performance within healthcare organizations: A Klang Valley, Malaysia exploration." Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 8, no. 10 (2024): 4586. http://dx.doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i10.4586.

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In today’s rapidly evolving organizational landscape, understanding the dynamics of employee incentives is crucial for fostering high performance. This research delves into the intricate interplay between moral and financial incentives and their repercussions on employee performance within the dynamic context of healthcare organizations. Drawing upon a comprehensive analysis of 226 respondents from three healthcare organizations in Klang Valley, Peninsular Malaysia, the study employs a quantitative approach to explore the relationships between independent variables (career growth, recognition,
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21

Klein, Arnd Heinrich, and Armin Schmutzler. "Incentives and motivation in dynamic contests." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 189 (September 2021): 194–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.023.

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22

Kaarbøe, Oddvar M., and Trond E. Olsen. "Distorted Performance Measures and Dynamic Incentives." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 17, no. 1 (2008): 149–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00174.x.

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23

Chan, William, Pascal Courty, and Li Hao. "Suspense: Dynamic Incentives in Sports Contests." Economic Journal 119, no. 534 (2008): 24–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02204.x.

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24

Szydlowski, Martin. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking." Theoretical Economics 14, no. 3 (2019): 813–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2858.

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I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous‐time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to a net present value (NPV) criterion can occur on the path of the contract. As past performance increases, the firm chooses projects that require higher pay–performance sensitivity. When the continuation value is large, investment projects are chosen more efficiently, and project choice depends more on the NPV and less on the incentive costs. I imp
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25

Agarwal, Nikhil, Itai Ashlagi, Paulo Somaini, and Daniel Waldinger. "Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms." AEA Papers and Proceedings 108 (May 1, 2018): 341–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181079.

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Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoretical results to show that the welfare effects of a mechanism depend on the interaction between dynamic incentives and heterogeneity in preferences. We show evidence suggesting that patient decisions on the deceased donor kidney wait list respond to dynamic incentives. Therefore, an empirical approach to dynamic m
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26

Rubel, Olivier, and Ashutosh Prasad. "Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation." Marketing Science 35, no. 4 (2016): 676–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2015.0953.

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27

Kumar K, Naveen. "Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending." SAGE Open 2, no. 2 (2012): 215824401244428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244012444280.

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28

Klein, Arnd Heinrich, and Armin Schmutzler. "Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments." Games and Economic Behavior 103 (May 2017): 199–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.006.

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29

Antinolfi, Gaetano, and Francesco Carli. "Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default." Journal of Economic Theory 159 (September 2015): 105–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.011.

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30

Feltham, Gerald, Raffi Indjejikian, and Dhananjay Nanda. "Dynamic incentives and dual-purpose accounting." Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, no. 3 (2006): 417–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.04.007.

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31

Pavlov, O. V. "Dynamic game task of executors incentives in projects for the development of new production in continuous time." Information Technology and Nanotechnology, no. 2416 (2019): 209–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.18287/1613-0073-2019-2416-209-218.

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The article explores the incentive problem of executors of the new products development project at the industrial enterprise in continuous time. In the process of developing new products, the learning curve effect manifests itself, which leads to a reduction in labor intensity, depending on the cumulative volume of production. The project for the new products development is considered as a managed hierarchical dynamic system, consisting of a project management board (principal) and executors (agents). The interaction of project participants is formalized as a hierarchical differential game. To
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32

Sun, Hongfei. "MONEY, MARKETS, AND DYNAMIC CREDIT." Macroeconomic Dynamics 15, S1 (2010): 42–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100510000556.

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This paper presents an integrated theory of money and dynamic credit. I study financial intermediation when both the intermediary and individuals have private information. I show that money is essential to solving two-sided incentive problems under the dynamic credit arrangement. First, requiring settlement with money can induce market trades that generate information-revealing prices to discipline the intermediary. Second, it is optimal for the intermediary to issue money that can record its own history of being used in settlements, and to require that settlements be made with only money that
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33

Wang, Song, Yang Zhao, Lanfeng Liu, and Fuhua Huang. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Multitask Cooperation in Logistics Supply Chain." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (March 5, 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6683240.

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This paper studies the incentive mechanism of multitask cooperation in logistics service supply chain (LSSC) by building a dynamic incentive model. Research shows the following: (1) the implicit reputation in dynamic cooperation can effectively improve system incentive effectiveness; (2) the difference in the contribution of different logistics cooperation to the performance of the LSSC has a significant impact on the incentive effect; (3) when two kinds of cooperation tasks have complementary relationships, both the LSP’s choice of logistics tasks and the incentives will simultaneously act on
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34

Han, Haikun, Juqin Shen, Bo Liu, and Han Han. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects." SAGE Open 12, no. 4 (2022): 215824402211332. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/21582440221133280.

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Large-scale projects play an important role in social and economic development. Recently, large-scale projects are becoming more complex with more uncertainties and risks during the construction, which leads to more complex and extensive management problems. In a large-scale project, there is a principal-agent relationship between the contractor and owner. The contractor may take moral hazard behavior to pursue his/her own interests due to the information asymmetry and conflict of interest, which could damage to the public and owner’s interests. Based on the principal-agent theory, a dynamic i
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35

Liu, Rain Wuyu, Taylor Ann Foerster, and Jie Zhuang. "Bagging a Greener Future: Social Norms Appeals and Financial Incentives in Promoting Reusable Bags Among Grocery Shoppers." Sustainability 17, no. 9 (2025): 4157. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17094157.

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This research examined the persuasive impact of social norms and financial incentive messaging for encouraging reusable bag use. In an online experiment with a nationally representative sample from the U.S. (n = 753), participants were randomly exposed to static or dynamic descriptive/injunctive norms, discounts/surcharges, combinations, or a control message. Intentions to bring reusable bags when grocery shopping, along with other key demographic and psychological variables, were assessed. ANCOVA results demonstrate the main effects of the messages. Planned contrasts revealed that injunctive
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36

Zhai, Jing, and Haiyan Wang. "Exploring and Modeling the Incentive Strategies of New Energy Ship Application in Yangtze River." Applied Sciences 15, no. 8 (2025): 4587. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15084587.

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The application of new energy ships (NESs) in the Yangtze River is one of the important ways to promote the low-carbon development of Yangtze River shipping, but at present, the enthusiasm of shipping enterprises for it is not high enough. To improve the current situation, the impact of incentive strategies on the NES application is a problem worth studying. We aim to explore an incentive model based on the dynamic evolutionary relationship between the NES application of shipping enterprises and the government’s incentive decision. Theoretical derivations show that there are three possible equ
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37

Schuler, Julia, and Sibylle Brunner. "Dynamic Activity-Related Incentives for Physical Activity." Advances in Physical Education 02, no. 01 (2012): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ape.2012.21001.

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38

Ruckes, Martin, and Thomas Rønde. "Dynamic Incentives in Organizations: Success and Inertia." Manchester School 83, no. 4 (2014): 475–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/manc.12075.

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39

Christensen, Peter O., Gerald A. Feltham, and Florin Şabac. "Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment." Journal of Accounting and Economics 35, no. 3 (2003): 423–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(03)00040-5.

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40

Casas-Arce, Pablo, and F. Asís Martínez-Jerez. "Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives." Management Science 55, no. 8 (2009): 1306–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1021.

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41

Fernandez-Ruiz, Jorge. "Debt and incentives in a dynamic context." Journal of International Economics 41, no. 1-2 (1996): 139–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(95)01419-5.

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42

Ahn, Ji-Young. "Top Executives’ Pay For Long-Run Performance And Corporate Governance." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 32, no. 2 (2016): 661. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v32i2.9602.

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This study examines the possibility that the quality of corporate governance has effects on the dynamic relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Building on the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance and corporate governance literature, we find that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to provide high powered long-run incentives to CEOs, indicating CEO incentive contracts can be replaced by the role of external corporate control when the external control mechanism is not functioning effectively from the optimal contracting view. Overall, the findings im
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43

Zhang, Lihua, Qingyu Lu, Rui Huang, Shihong Chen, Qianqian Yang, and Jinguang Gu. "A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Smart Grid Data Sharing Based on Evolutionary Game Theory." Energies 16, no. 24 (2023): 8125. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en16248125.

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With the increasing popularization and application of the smart grid, the harm of the data silo issue in the smart grid is more and more prominent. Therefore, it is especially critical to promote data interoperability and sharing in the smart grid. Existing data-sharing schemes generally lack effective incentive mechanisms, and data holders are reluctant to share data due to privacy and security issues. Because of the above issues, a dynamic incentive mechanism for smart grid data sharing based on evolutionary game theory is proposed. Firstly, several basic assumptions about the evolutionary g
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44

Manoli, Day, and Andrea Weber. "Nonparametric Evidence on the Effects of Financial Incentives on Retirement Decisions." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8, no. 4 (2016): 160–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140209.

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This paper presents new evidence on the effects of retirement benefits on labor force participation decisions. The analysis is based on a mandated rule for employer-provided retirement benefits in Austria that creates discontinuities in the incentives for workers to delay retirement. The paper presents graphical evidence on labor supply responses and develops a conceptual framework that accounts for the dynamic incentive structure and for adjustment frictions. Using bunching methods, a semi-elasticity of participation is estimated, which ranges from 0.1 to 0.3 and is highest for incentives tar
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45

Ely, Jeffrey C., George Georgiadis, and Luis Rayo. "Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard." Econometrica 93, no. 2 (2025): 597–621. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta21871.

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We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all‐or‐nothing) measure of performance, and show that hiding information from the agent can be an optimal way to motivate effort. Using a novel approach to incentive compatibility, we derive a two‐phase solution that begins with a “silent phase” where the agent is given no feedback and is asked to work non‐stop, and ends with a “full‐transparency phase” where the agent stops working as soon as a performance threshold is met. Hiding information leads to greater effort, but an ignorant agen
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46

Li, Yang, Hongtao Song, Yunlong Zhao, Nianmin Yao, and Nianbin Wang. "Anonymous Data Reporting Strategy with Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Participatory Sensing." Security and Communication Networks 2021 (June 1, 2021): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518168.

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Participatory sensing is often used in environmental or personal data monitoring, wherein a number of participants collect data using their mobile intelligent devices for earning the incentives. However, a lot of additional information is submitted along with the data, such as the participant’s location, IP and incentives. This multimodal information implicitly links to the participant’s identity and exposes the participant’s privacy. In order to solve the issue of these multimodal information associating with participants’ identities, this paper proposes a protocol to ensure anonymous data re
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47

Sinenko, Olga A. "Modeling the policy of Tax Incentives for Sustainable Development of the Region: The Case of the Far Eastern Federal District of Russia." Journal of Tax Reform 10, no. 2 (2024): 312–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/jtr.2024.10.2.171.

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The article is devoted to the problem of tax incentives for sustainable development in the Russian Far East – a vast region dealing with significant demographic and environmental challenges. To solve this problem, the study applied methods of mathematical modeling. We built a hybrid mathematical model of the Far East development based on the principles of agent-based and system-dynamic approaches, implemented in AnyLogic 8.0 simulation modelling program. The model’s accuracy was confirmed by comparing its predictions with actual data from 2010 to 2021. The result of the study is the constructi
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48

Li, Huimin, Limin Su, Jian Zuo, Xianbo Zhao, Ruidong Chang, and Fuqiang Wang. "INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED PAYMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PPP PROJECTS: COUPLING OF REPUTATION AND RATCHET EFFECTS." International Journal of Strategic Property Management 26, no. 1 (2022): 35–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/ijspm.2022.15969.

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The performance-based payment PPP model has been widely used in the infrastructure projects. However, the ratchet effect derived from performance-based reputation incentives has been largely overlooked. To overcome this shortcoming, ratchet effect is considered in the performance-based payment incentive process. A multi-period dynamic incentive mechanism is developed by coupling the reputation and ratchet effect. The main results show that: (1) Under the coupling of reputation and ratchet effects, the optimal incentive coefficient in the last performance assessment period is always greater tha
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49

Shang, Rongxuan, and Jianing Mi. "An Evolutionary Game Analysis of AI Health Assistant Adoption in Smart Elderly Care." Systems 13, no. 7 (2025): 610. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems13070610.

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AI-powered health assistants offer promising opportunities to enhance health management among older adults. However, real-world uptake remains limited, not only due to individual hesitation, but also because of complex interactions among users, platforms, and public policies. This study investigates the dynamic behavioral mechanisms behind adoption in aging populations using a tripartite evolutionary game model. Based on replicator dynamics, the model simulates the strategic behaviors of older adults, platforms, and government. It identifies evolutionarily stable strategies, examines convergen
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50

Sinenko, Olga. "Modeling Tax Incentives for Sustainable Development of Territories." Bulletin of Baikal State University 33, no. 3 (2023): 466–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2500-2759.2023.33(3).466-474.

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One of the key tasks of the modern development of Russian regions is to change the negative socio-economic trends and ensure the transition to a sustainable development trajectory, including using tax instruments. The purpose of the work is to study the possibility of using the synthesis of system-dynamic and agent-based modeling to justify the policy of tax incentives for the sustainable development of the territory. The essence of the research procedure is a comparative analysis of modeling methods in the context of the problems of tax incentives for the sustainable development of the region
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