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Journal articles on the topic 'Market equilibrium'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Chen, Sheng, and Antonio J. Conejo. "Strategic-Agent Equilibria in the Operation of Natural Gas and Power Markets." Energies 13, no. 4 (2020): 868. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en13040868.

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We consider strategic gas/power producers and strategic gas/power consumers operating in both gas and power markets. We build a flexible multi-period complementarity model to characterize day-ahead equilibria in those markets. This model is an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints that characterizes the market behavior of all market agents. Using a realistic case study, we analyze equilibria under perfect and oligopolistic competition. We also analyze equilibria under different levels of information disclosure regarding market outcomes. We study as well equilibria under different ow

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Lahiri, Somdeb. "Voluntary Provision of a Public Good in a Strategic Market Game." Recherches économiques de Louvain 79, no. 4 (2013): 45–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800001949.

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SummaryThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the mutual compatibility of voluntary provision of public good and strategic behavior of consumers in the market for private goods. We study the existence of equilibrium private provision of a public good within general strategic equilibrium framework with a finite number of players. The mechanism for the provision of public good follows the one due to Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and the trading mechanism for private goods follows the strategic market game with wash sales due to Dubey and Shubik (1986). The new result of the paper is th

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W., G. "A Market Equilibrium." Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1999): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001088049904000106.

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Lock, Edwin, Benjamin Patrick Evans, Eleonora Kreacic, et al. "Decentralized Convergence to Equilibrium Prices in Trading Networks." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 39, no. 13 (2025): 14002–10. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33532.

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We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that fully-substitutable preferences guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria which can be centrally computed. Our motivation comes from the fact that prices in markets such as over-the-counter markets and used car markets arise from decentralized negotiation among agents, which has left open an important question as to whether equilibrium prices can emerge from

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Hernández, Fé Fernández, and Efraín Sánchez González. "Smoking, Health Market Equilibrium and Fiscal Policy." Journal of Clinical and Laboratory Research 3, no. 3 (2021): 01–04. http://dx.doi.org/10.31579/2768-0487/036.

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Introduction: The application of and effective fiscal policy for the smoking control in the health context begins understanding the smoking impact over the health market equilibrium. Objective: To describe the basic relation between the health market equilibrium and the application of a fiscal policy for the appropriate smoking control. Materials and methods: Was made a descriptive research about the basic relation between the health market equilibrium and the application of a fiscal policy for the appropriate smoking control. As teoric methods were used the descriptive, the comparative and th

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Dickson, Alex, and Ian A. MacKenzie. "Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions." Environmental and Resource Economics 82, no. 1 (2022): 227–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-022-00673-2.

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AbstractThis article investigates cap-and-trade markets in the presence of both political and market distortions. We create a model where dominant firms have the ability to rent seek for a share of pollution permits as well as influence the market equilibrium with their choice of permit exchange because of market power. We derive the equilibrium and show the interaction of these two distortions has consequences for the resulting marginal inefficiency—the extent to which a re-allocation of permits between firms can reduce equilibrium abatement costs. We find that if the regulator is not very re

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Ma, Le, Richard Reed, and Xiaohua Jin. "Identify the equilibrium of residential construction output." Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 25, no. 1 (2018): 21–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ecam-06-2016-0148.

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Purpose Due to the complicated nature of houses, the driving factors of the residential construction output can be investigated from different perspectives of interests. However, little research has provided an insight of the trend of the residential construction output from a cross-disciplinary perspective. The purpose of this paper is to identify the long-run equilibrium types of residential construction output, including external equilibrium, solo-market equilibrium and dual-market equilibrium. Design/methodology/approach A vector error correction model is applied into longitudinal data in

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MA, Le, Chunlu LIU, and Richard REED. "THE IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION AND PROPERTY PRICES ON RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION OUTPUTS: AN INTER-MARKET EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH." International Journal of Strategic Property Management 21, no. 3 (2017): 296–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/1648715x.2016.1255675.

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Research into the links between construction output and broader economic development has provided valuable references for inducing theoretical, empirical and policy implications. However, the impact of the construction and property markets on the construction output have not been fully addressed yet. This research argues an inter-market equilibrium between residential construction output and the related markets in terms of construction and property prices. Implementing the panel error correction model, longitudinal data of Australian capital cities is used to identify the inter-market equilibr

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HU, YING, PETER IMKELLER, and MATTHIAS MÜLLER. "PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET COMPLETION." International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 08, no. 04 (2005): 483–508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219024905003098.

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We consider financial markets with agents exposed to an external source of risk which cannot be hedged through investments on the capital market alone. The sources of risk we think of may be weather and climate. Therefore we face a typical example of an incomplete financial market. We design a model of a market on which the external risk becomes tradable. In a first step we complete the market by introducing an extra security which valuates the external risk through a process parameter describing its market price. If this parameter is fixed, risk has a price and every agent can maximize the ex

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Geraskin, Mikhail. "Game-theoretic analysis of Stackelberg oligopoly with arbitrary rank reflexive behavior of agents." Kybernetes 46, no. 06 (2017): 1052–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-12-2016-0351.

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Purpose This paper aims to consider the problem of determining the equilibriums on oligopoly market in case of Stackelberg leader (leaders) and reflexive behavior of market agents. Design/methodology/approach This paper includes economic and mathematical modeling, optimization methods and game theory. Findings This paper explains models of reflexive games on oligopoly market, taking into account the diversity of agents’ reasoning about strategies of environing and equilibrium mechanisms for coincidence or opposition of agents’ reflexive reasoning on the same rank of reflection. Research limita

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Cheng, Harrison H. C. "Asset market equilibrium in infinite dimensional complete markets." Journal of Mathematical Economics 20, no. 1 (1991): 137–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(91)90022-l.

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Feldman, Michal, Galia Shabtai, and Aner Wolfenfeld. "Two-Price Equilibrium." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, no. 5 (2022): 5008–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432.

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Walrasian equilibrium is a prominent market equilibrium notion, but rarely exists in markets with indivisible items. We introduce a new market equilibrium notion, called two-price equilibrium (2PE). A 2PE is a relaxation of Walrasian equilibrium, where instead of a single price per item, every item has two prices: one for the item's owner and a (possibly) higher one for all other buyers. Thus, a 2PE is given by a tuple (S,p_high,p_low) of an allocation S and two price vectors p_high,p_low, where every buyer i is maximally happy with her bundle S_i, given prices p_low for items in S_i and price

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Echenique, Federico, Antonio Miralles, and Jun Zhang. "Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium." American Economic Review 111, no. 11 (2021): 3699–732. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201769.

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We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium pr

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Chavas, Jean‐Paul, and Thomas L. Cox. "On Market Equilibrium Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79, no. 2 (1997): 500–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244147.

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15

Tribe, Keith. "Market Structure and Equilibrium." History of Political Economy 48, no. 3 (2016): 547–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-3638767.

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Flåm, Sjur Didrik. "Monotonicity and Market Equilibrium." Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 24, no. 3 (2016): 403–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11228-016-0372-9.

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Islam, Nazrul. "Multiple Equilibrium in the Government Service Labor Market: The Possibilities for Bangladesh." Journal of Bangladesh Studies 3, no. 1 (2001): 25–37. https://doi.org/10.1163/27715086-00301004.

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This paper shows that multiple equilibria are possible in the government service labor market. Broadly, these equilibria may be classified into two categories, namely “good” and “bad.” Unfortunately, it seems that Bangladesh has fallen into and become stuck with the “bad” equilibrium. One main reason for this outcome has been the rigidity of the government pay scale in presence of private and international pay scales. This bad equilibrium is harming the country’s growth prospects in many different ways. Bangladesh needs to put an end to this “bad” equilibrium and move to a “good” equilibrium t

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18

Houba, Harold, and Françeska Tomori. "Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets." Games 14, no. 4 (2023): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g14040054.

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Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable strategic manipulation of water to the downstream supplier. To incorporate backward induction, we propose the Stackelberg social equilibrium concept. We prove the existence of Stackelberg social equilibrium in duopoly water markets with an upstream–downstream river structure and derive it in the example

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Kroer, Christian, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka, and Nicolas E. Stier-Moses. "Computing Large Market Equilibria Using Abstractions." Operations Research 70, no. 1 (2022): 329–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2163.

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Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example, in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information, often the valuation of every buyer for every item, and computing power. In “Computing Large Market Equilibria Using Abstractions,” the authors study abstraction methods for ameliorating these issues. The basic abstraction idea is as follows. First, construct a coarsened abstraction of a given market, then solve for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and finally, lift the prices and allocations back to the

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Carletti, Elena, and Agnese Leonello. "Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises*." Review of Finance 23, no. 5 (2018): 855–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfy026.

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Abstract We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and trade loans on the interbank market to deal with liquidity shocks. Two types of equilibria emerge, depending on the degree of credit market competition and the level of aggregate liquidity risk. In one equilibrium, all banks keep enough reserves and remain solvent. In the other, some banks default with positive probability. The latter equilibrium exists when competition is weak and large liquidity shocks are unlikely. The model delivers several implications concerning the relationship between competition, aggregate credi

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Goering, Gregory E., Michael K. Pippenger, and R. Kelley Pace. "Factor market effects upon product market equilibrium." Managerial and Decision Economics 20, no. 1 (1999): 37–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-1468(199902)20:1<37::aid-mde913>3.0.co;2-3.

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Chiara D’Errico, Maria. "Competition in the Italian electricity market: The unforeseen social welfare losses of reform." ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, no. 2 (May 2021): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/efe2020-002004.

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The worldwide wave of reforms investing power industry has created new challenges to both supply demand side management. After deregulation, electric utilities restructured their opera-tions from vertically integrated mechanisms to open market systems in order to establish a new competitive sector. Reform has involved also the Italian power sector, but competition, as lar-gely shown by the empirical literature particularly in the first years of reform, has been far to be reached, and the electricity markets has been characterized by conditions of oligopoly and exercise of market power. This pa

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Zhang, Junlin, Dong Mo, and Xiqun (Michael) Chen. "Analyzing Ride-Sourcing Market Equilibrium and Its Transitions with Heterogeneous Users." Journal of Advanced Transportation 2022 (April 30, 2022): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5894250.

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With the justification of a comprehensive matching function approach, this study analyzes the ride-sourcing market with heterogeneous users. A single origin-destination (O-D) ride-sourcing market model is first developed. The model fills the major research gap to extend general user heterogeneity modeling from the transit market to the two-sided ride-sourcing market. Sufficient conditions that guarantee a unique market equilibrium are given. Equilibrium market operation with a profit-maximizing platform is explored. Equilibrium transitions with respect to the changes in different exogenous mar

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CHEN, JIANGUO, and LLOYD P. BLENMAN. "EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS OF FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKET EXPRESSED IN A SIMPLE GEOMETRIC STRUCTURE." International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 08, no. 07 (2005): 915–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021902490500330x.

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The paper focuses on the market equilibrium conditions in forward exchange quotes. By careful analysis of the market arbitrage conditions, market supply and demand, we construct the equilibrium ranges for bid and ask forward quotes separately. We present our analysis in a bid-ask cost structure setting, and directly tie the equilibrium and arbitrage conditions to specific trading strategies. We conclude that in equilibrium there will be no chance for one-way-arbitrage in foreign exchange and securities markets, provided that non-reversed traders are active and set the arbitrage boundaries. The

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Raoufinia, Marjan, Vahid Baradaran, and Reza Shahrjerdi. "A dynamic differential oligopoly game with sticky price and advertising." Kybernetes 48, no. 3 (2019): 586–611. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-02-2018-0067.

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PurposeThe purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents.Design/methodology/approachTo consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some signific

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Feng, Yankai. "Sponsored-Link Auction and Market Segmentation in Two-Sided Markets." Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 43, no. 1 (2023): 208–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/43/20232163.

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This paper investigates how the sponsored-link auction for multiple positions influence the market structure under a duopoly setting. We utilize a model of position auction with con-sumer search in a duopoly setting and derive the consumer distribution, advertiser bidding, and market equilibrium in this game. We discover that there exists a segmentation equilibri-um, in which a platform consists of high and low quality advertisers and consumers, while the other is composed of medium quality agents. The results regarding the agents' distribu-tion could bring valuable insights for regulatory pol

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Scholl, Maarten P., Anisoara Calinescu, and J. Doyne Farmer. "How market ecology explains market malfunction." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 26 (2021): e2015574118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2015574118.

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Standard approaches to the theory of financial markets are based on equilibrium and efficiency. Here we develop an alternative based on concepts and methods developed by biologists, in which the wealth invested in a financial strategy is like the abundance of a species. We study a toy model of a market consisting of value investors, trend followers, and noise traders. We show that the average returns of strategies are strongly density dependent; that is, they depend on the wealth invested in each strategy at any given time. In the absence of noise, the market would slowly evolve toward an effi

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Dzhabarova, Yulia, Stanimir Kabaivanov, Margarita Ruseva, and Boyan Zlatanov. "Existence, Uniqueness and Stability of Market Equilibrium in Oligopoly Markets." Administrative Sciences 10, no. 3 (2020): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/admsci10030070.

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In this paper we build a pragmatic model on competition in oligopoly markets. To achieve this goal, we use an approach based on studying the response functions of each market participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot and Bertrand industrial structures with a unified formal method. In contrast to the restrictive theoretical constructs of duopoly equilibrium, our study is able to account for real-world limitations like minimal sustainable production levels and exclusive access to certain resources. We prove and demonstrate that by using carefully constructed response functions

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Lieli, Robert P., and Augusto Nieto-Barthaburu. "On the Possibility of Informative Equilibria in Futures Markets with Feedback." Journal of the European Economic Association 18, no. 3 (2019): 1521–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz019.

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AbstractWe study the existence of equilibria and the information content of prices in futures markets where the probability of future payoffs can be altered by an intervening agent who acts in response to the market price, hence creating a feedback effect. We focus on the market with the simplest possible structure: traders betting on the occurrence of a future event by buying or selling Arrow-Debreu securities (one dollar claims contingent on a binary outcome). We find that in the presence of feedback: (i) a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist; (ii) the market price may decline in

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Kabaivanov, Stanimir, Vasil Zhelinski, and Boyan Zlatanov. "Coupled Fixed Points for Hardy–Rogers Type of Maps and Their Applications in the Investigations of Market Equilibrium in Duopoly Markets for Non-Differentiable, Nonlinear Response Functions." Symmetry 14, no. 3 (2022): 605. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym14030605.

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In this paper we generalize Hardy–Rogers maps in the context of coupled fixed points. We comment on the symmetry of some of the coefficients involved in the Hardy–Rogers condition, and thus, we deduce a simpler formula. We generalize, with the help of the obtained main theorem, some known results about existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium in duopoly markets. As a consequence, we ascertain that the equilibrium production should be equal for both market participants provided that they have symmetric response functions. With the help of the main theorem, we investigate and enrich some r

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Chen, Yiling, Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, et al. "Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker." Algorithmica 58, no. 4 (2009): 930–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9323-2.

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Soelistianingsih, Lana. "Keterkaitan Pasar Valuta Asing dan Saham di Indonesia dengan Beberapa Negara Mitra Utama: 1998-2009." Jurnal Ekonomi dan Pembangunan Indonesia 10, no. 2 (2010): 85–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.21002/jepi.v10i2.113.

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Using co-integration, the results show that the movement of Indonesian foreign exchange market and capital market has moved to long—run equilibrium with other currencies and indices from partner countries, while the short-run equilibrium between markets have been proved by using VECM. The Indonesian case supports portfolio balance approach introduced by Frankel. The increasing of IHSG attracts capital inflows and makes the demand for domesfic currency higher, and IDR becomes appreciation. Indonesian market has strong linkages with Asian regional markets especially with Hong Kong market, while

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Schäfer, Sebastian, and Lisa Altvater. "A Capacity Market for the Transition towards Renewable-Based Electricity Generation with Enhanced Political Feasibility." Energies 14, no. 18 (2021): 5889. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en14185889.

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There is a debate if electricity markets on the basis of energy-only markets ensure a sufficient generation capacity. Various capacity mechanisms are discussed to tackle this potential problem. Capacity auctions with reliability options are seen as one market-based solution. Assuming a perfect energy-only market, this mechanism leads to an equilibrium with an optimal capacity mix. This optimum is missed if there are distorted price signals at the electricity market. This is a serious problem since, despite substantial cost reductions, renewable-based electricity generation still depends on sub

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Gao, Yuan, and Christian Kroer. "Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets: Equilibrium, Duality and Optimization." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 6 (2021): 5432–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16684.

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This paper considers a linear Fisher market with n buyers and a continuum of items. In order to compute market equilibria, we introduce (infinite-dimensional) convex programs over Banach spaces, thereby generalizing the Eisenberg-Gale convex program and its dual. Regarding the new convex programs, we establish existence of optimal solutions, KKT conditions, as well as strong duality. All these properties are established via non-standard arguments, which circumvent the limitations of duality theory in optimization over infinite-dimensional vector spaces. Furthermore, we show that there exists a

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Schumacher, Heiner, Kerstin Gerling, and Michal Kowalik. "Entrepreneurial Risk Choice and Credit Market Equilibria." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 15, no. 3 (2015): 1455–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0160.

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Abstract We analyze under what conditions competitive credit markets are efficient in providing loans to entrepreneurs who can start a new project after failure. An entrepreneur of uncertain talent chooses the riskiness of her project. If banks privately observe the entrepreneur’s risk choices, two equilibria coexist: (1) an inefficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur realizes a low-risk project and has no access to finance after failure and (2) a more efficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur first realizes high-risk projects and then, after continuous failures, a low-risk project

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Bakari, Yuliana, Agustinus Moonti, and Riskawati Olabu. "Are the Markets Vertically Integrated?: Evidence on Shallot Marketing Channels in Gorontalo Province, Indonesia." Journal of International Conference Proceedings 7, no. 1 (2024): 311–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.32535/jicp.v7i1.3242.

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The vertical market integration of the shallot market system in Gorontalo Province is a method that can be used to estimate the price movements at each level of marketing (farmers, marketing agents, and consumers), thereby facilitating long-run and short-run equilibrium. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the vertical market integration formed between marketing channels for the shallot market in Gorontalo Province. The Engel-Granger cointegration method was used to analyze long-run equilibrium, while ECM (Error Correction Models) was utilized for short-run equilibrium estimation. The cointe

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FOLEY, DUNCAN K. "A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY." New Mathematics and Natural Computation 08, no. 01 (2012): 95–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793005712400054.

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The problem of the computability of Walrasian competitive equilibrium is considered from the point of view of concepts of approximate equilibrium. Neither the market-clearing nor Negishi approaches to the proof of existence of Walrasian competitive equilibrium give rise to adequately robust notions of approximate equilibrium. This explains the non-computability of Walrasian competitive equilibrium. The problem lies in the economic conception of markets, in particular the inconsistent treatment of information underlying the Walrasian definition. When trade takes place at disequilibrium prices d

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Chun, Rodney M. "PRIVATIZATION TRANSFERS AND CREDIT MARKET FRICTIONS." Macroeconomic Dynamics 6, no. 3 (2002): 357–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100500000286.

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This paper examines an economy in which output is produced by state-owned enterprises and private firms. Private-capital formation requires intermediation that is subject to a credit market friction. In this environment, I look at the effects of a privatization policy that transfers state-owned capital to the private sector. Multiple steady-state equilibria are possible. When these arise, the low-wage equilibrium features a relatively inefficient financial system and privatization transfers help to increase the aggregate capital stock by reducing the severity of the credit market frictions. On

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Healy, Paul J. "Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market." American Economic Review 97, no. 5 (2007): 1751–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.5.1751.

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Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New exp

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MacDonald, Glenn M. "Job Mobility in Market Equilibrium." Review of Economic Studies 55, no. 1 (1988): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2297535.

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Wernerfelt, Birger. "Brand Loyalty and Market Equilibrium." Marketing Science 10, no. 3 (1991): 229–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mksc.10.3.229.

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Gorelov, M. A. "Competitive equilibrium on financial market." Automation and Remote Control 71, no. 6 (2010): 1247–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s0005117910060251.

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Villar, Antonio. "Equilibrium in semimonotone market games." Optimization 47, no. 1-2 (2000): 235–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02331930008844478.

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Vieira, Pedro Cosme Costa. "Market equilibrium with FSS search." Applied Economics Letters 11, no. 5 (2004): 323–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350485042000221616.

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Mazalov, V., A. Lukyanenko, and S. Luukkainen. "Equilibrium in cloud computing market." Performance Evaluation 92 (October 2015): 40–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.peva.2015.07.002.

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Fukiharu, T. "Asset market equilibrium: A simulation." Mathematics and Computers in Simulation 79, no. 9 (2009): 2819–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.matcom.2008.11.009.

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Wihlborg, Clas. "Arbitrage, equilibrium and market efficiency." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 15, no. 2 (1991): 297–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(91)90034-u.

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Hwang, Yan-An, and Mau-Hsiang Shih. "Equilibrium in a Market Game." Economic Theory 31, no. 2 (2006): 387–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0098-2.

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FERNÁNDEZ-BLANCO, JAVIER. "LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH REHIRING." International Economic Review 54, no. 3 (2013): 885–914. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12021.

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Dunaev, B. B., and L. V. Kirilenko. "Deflationary Regulation of Market Equilibrium." Cybernetics and Systems Analysis 54, no. 2 (2018): 258–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10559-018-0027-y.

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