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1

Stephanson, A. "Offensive Realism." boundary 2 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2000): 181–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/01903659-27-1-181.

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Muradov, I. "THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON UKRAINE CRISIS: NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE." Epistemological Studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences 1, no. 1-2 (August 11, 2017): 107–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/341811.

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This article introduces a new perspective to address the relationship between NATO enlargement policy and Ukraine Crisis. To simplify ongoing discussion on this subject, this particular research study utilizes two stripes of neorealism: offensive and defensive realism. Proponents of enlargement policy have been put into the offensive realists’ side whereas opponents of it are placed in defensive realist camp. This article argues that each of these paradigms pose danger for Ukraine Crisis. Therefore, it adopts a middle way between offensive and defensive realism in terms of Ukraine issue.
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Johnson, Dominic D. P., and Bradley A. Thayer. "The evolution of offensive realism." Politics and the Life Sciences 35, no. 1 (2016): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pls.2016.6.

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Offensive realism, a theory of international relations, holds that states are disposed to competition and conflict because they are self-interested, power maximizing, and fearful of other states. Moreover, it argues that states are obliged to behave this way because doing so favors survival in the international system. Debate continues as to whether modern states actually do, or should, behave in this way, but we are struck by a different question. In this article, we ask whether the three core assumptions about behavior in offensive realism—self-help, power maximization, and outgroup fear—have any basis in scientific knowledge about human behavioral evolution. We find that these precise traits are not only evolutionarily adaptive but also empirically common across the animal kingdom, especially in primate and human societies. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that states behave as offensive realists predict not just because of anarchy in the modern international system but also because of the legacy of our evolution. In short, offensive realism may really be describing the nature of the human species more than the nature of the international system. If our hypothesis is correct, then evolutionary theory offers the following: (1) a novel ultimate cause of offensive realist behavior; (2) an extension of offensive realism to any domain in which humans compete for power; and (3) an explanation for why individual leaders themselves, and not just states, seek power. However, a key insight from evolution is that the primacy of self-help, power maximization, and outgroup fear does not necessarily condemn individuals or groups to competition and conflict; rather, these traits can in themselves give rise to cooperation and alliances.
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4

Grafov, Dmitry. "Offensive versus Defensive Realism." Contemporary Arab Affairs 12, no. 3 (September 2019): 21–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/caa.2019.123002.

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This article approaches Russia’s strategy of countering the United States indirectly by way of intermediate states. It is concerned with the reasons why Russia decided to engage in the Syrian conflict in 2015 and, from this perspective, the real goals of Russia’s policy in the region. These questions cannot be considered without taking account of how they are linked with the all-out confrontation between Russia and the West in Ukraine. The Syrian conflict merely represents an external platform for Russia in countering the United States. Russia is testing her own power to force the United States out of Syria and seeks any opportunity to demonstrate American vulnerability. There is a triangle of interests for the key regional actors—Turkey, Iran, and Russia—that oppose US interests. The rising confrontation with Washington in Syria triggered Moscow to seek ways of using other potential rivals of the United States, given that there are numerous areas of tension and conflict with Washington beyond the Middle East. The author’s analysis of the actors’ behavior is based on the “security dilemma” and the “balance of power” approaches. There are well-known disputes between “defensive” and “offensive” realism in the theory of international politics concerning which of these approaches is more reliable and reasonable when considering costs and results, as well as the risk of tensions spiraling out of control (“security spiral”). The aim of this research is to make a comparison between America’s offensive strategy with Russia’s defensive approach and evaluate the efficiency of both policies. Following a particular scholarly approach, this article presumes that Moscow acquires power via the indirect, “low-cost strategies,” using any opportunity available to counterbalance US power via other countries. It is concluded that offensive or defensive behavior depends on the situation and available resources. The United States has sufficient resources to implement an offensive strategy, and Washington may raise the stakes in confrontation. Russia’s defense approach of a “buck-passing” strategy is more efficient, but Moscow suffers from a lack of resources and chooses indirect countering, using any means necessary to counterbalance US power in Syria and beyond.
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Schmidt, Brian C. "Realism as tragedy." Review of International Studies 30, no. 3 (July 2004): 427–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210504006151.

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In 1948, Hans J. Morgenthau wrote his classic text, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, that was largely responsible for establishing realism as the prevailing theory in the field of International Relations (IR). In 1979, Kenneth N. Waltz wrote an immensely influential book, Theory of International Politics, that resulted in a new structural version of realism – neorealism – becoming the dominant theory in IR. John J. Mearsheimer, who is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, has written a profoundly important book that rightfully deserves a prominent place along with Morgenthau and Waltz in the canon of realist thought about international politics. Mearsheimer's clearly written book puts forth a new structural theory of realism that he terms offensive realism. This version of realism argues that the observable patterns of behaviour among all of the great powers throughout history, most notably their ubiquitous power-seeking, can be explained by the fact that they exist in a condition of anarchy in which there is no higher source of authority above them. While sharing many of the same basic assumptions with neorealism, offensive realism, as elucidated by Mearsheimer, provides a fundamentally different account of the essential dynamics of international politics than that which Waltz and his students have been offering for the last twenty years or so.
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Jyalita, Vincentia Vahistha Hirrya. "Defensive Realism’s Perspective on Rising China’s Behavior as A Status Quo State." Jurnal Sentris 2, no. 1 (May 7, 2021): 73–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.26593/sentris.v2i1.4621.73-86.

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China’s rise through rapid development especially in the economic sector have prompted debates on whether it seeks to overtake the United States (U.S.) and strive for domination. However, China insists that it has no such intentions since it benefits from the current system and wishes to pursue peaceful development. This paper will analyze why China is not seeking to displace the U.S. and alter the international order despite claims from offensive realism that states are revisionist as they pursue domination to guarantee its survival under anarchy. This paper argues that defensive realism can better explain the case and that China is a status quo state unlike claims from offensive realism. The writer conducted the study with defensive realism’s perspective and utilized indicators from Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, and Kai He to determine whether China is a status quo state. The results show that defensive realism can fill the gap left by offensive realism and that China is indeed a status quo state. Kebangkitan China yang ditandai dengan perkembangan pesat, terutama dalam bidang ekonomi, telah memicu perdebatan tentang apakah China berusaha untuk mengambil alih kekuasaan Amerika Serikat (A.S.) dan mendominasi tatanan global. Namun, China bersikeras dalam mengklaim bahwa tidak ada niat seperti itu karena mendapatkan keuntungan dari sistem saat ini dan lebih ingin mengejar pembangunan secara damai. Artikel ini akan menganalisis mengapa China tidak berusaha untuk menggantikan A.S. maupun mengubah tatanan global, meskipun ada klaim dari offensive realism bahwa setiap negara adalah revisionist karena mereka memperluas kekuasaannya untuk menjamin kelangsungan hidupnya di bawah sistem dunia yang anarki. Dalam artikel ini, penulis berpendapat bahwa defensive realism dapat menjelaskan kasus ini dengan lebih baik dan China adalah negara status quo tidak seperti klaim dari offensive realism. Penulis melakukan studi dengan perspektif defensive realism dan menggunakan indikator dari Steve Chan, Weixing Hu, dan Kai He untuk menentukan apakah China merupakan negara status quo. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa defensive realism dapat mengisi kekosongan yang ditinggalkan oleh offensive realism dan bahwa China memang negara status quo.
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Ghazala Yasmin Jalil. "China’s Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism." Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (April 24, 2019): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.53532/ss.039.01.00118.

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China’s rise has been the greatest development of the 21st century. It has emerged as the second largest economy in the world, a country with a modern army and nuclear weapons. China’s rise has come to be seen as a major threat by the West and especially the US. Most scholarly debates predict that it will lead to a conflict between China and the US. Set in this context, this paper takes John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, which predicts intense competition and conflict between China and the US and examines China’s behaviour as a rising power against it. The paper finds that far from being an aggressive, hegemonic and a revisionist state, China is a status quo power that aims to preserve its position in the international system rather than upset it. The paper argues that China’s behaviour displays elements of defensive rather than offensive realism.
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RENDALL, MATTHEW. "Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe." Review of International Studies 32, no. 3 (July 2006): 523–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210506007145.

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Why do great powers expand? Offensive realist John Mearsheimer claims that states wage an eternal struggle for power, and that those strong enough to seek regional hegemony nearly always do. Mearsheimer’s evidence, however, displays a selection bias. Examining four crises between 1814 and 1840, I show that the balance of power restrained Russia, Prussia and France. Yet all three also exercised self-restraint; Russia, in particular, passed up chances to bid for hegemony in 1815 and to topple Ottoman Turkey in 1829. Defensive realism gives a better account of the Concert of Europe, because it combines structural realism with non-realist theories of state preferences.
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설인효 and 이택선. "Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism and North East Asian Regional Order in the 21st Century: The Debates Between Defensive and Offensive realism and the Reexamination of Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism." Dispute Resolution Studies Review 10, no. 2 (August 2012): 123–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.16958/drsr.2012.10.2.123.

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Ahn, Byung-Joon. "South Korea: ‘Offensive Realism’ vs. ‘Wounded Nationalism’." Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 3 (December 1, 2005): 686–700. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260500501037.

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Montgomery, Evan Braden. "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty." International Security 31, no. 2 (October 2006): 151–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.151.

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In the debate between offensive and defensive realism, a central issue is whether major powers can overcome the uncertainty that drives the security dilemma. Whereas offensive realists maintain that states cannot know others' motives and intentions, defensive realists argue that states can reveal their preferences by altering their military posture. Defensive realists have, how- ever, presented an incomplete account of the constraints and opportunities associated with military reassurance. To demonstrate its motives, a security- seeking state must take actions that will often increase its vulnerability to potential aggressors. Although offense-defense variables have been invoked to address the constraint of vulnerability, the conditions usually considered most favorable for reassurance—differentiation between offense and defense and an advantage for the latter—make it no easier to achieve. A defensive advantage makes reassurance difficult by encouraging all states to adopt defensive capa- bilities and by requiring large concessions to reveal benign motives. Only when offense and defense are differentiated and the balance between them is neutral can states reveal their motives without also endangering their security. These arguments are illustrated with three empirical examples: the Anglo- German naval race, Nikita Khrushchev's troop cuts, and Mikhail Gorbachev's arms limitation and arms control policies.
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Kirshner, Jonathan. "The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China." European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (August 17, 2010): 53–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066110373949.

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13

Myšička, Stanislav. "Offensive Realism and the Future of China's Rise*." Pacific Focus 36, no. 1 (April 2021): 63–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12179.

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Munawar Hussain Panhwar and Ronaque Ali Behan. "Offensive Realism: The US Strategies to Contain Iran." Progressive Research Journal of Arts & Humanities (PRJAH) 3, no. 1 (March 3, 2021): 92–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.51872/prjah.vol3.iss1.85.

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The Islamic Revolution, as one of the greatest political developments in thetwentieth century - caused a radical change in the Iranian political system.Consequently, it has posed a tough challenge for the American politics inprotecting its significant interests in the region. Since then, the US hasemployed multiple methods to contain the growing influence of Iran which hasleft the tremendous impact on its interests in the region. Similar, approacheshave been used against many other countries of the world where the Americaninterests have been affected. Thus, understanding the US tools and strategiesused against the Islamic Republic of Iran would help independent countriesbetter to confront with the similar problems. This research tries to respondthis question that what were the US strategies to control and contain theIslamic Republic in the last four decades? Mearsheimer's offensive realismhas been used to answer that question. The offensive realist approach hasbeen extensively discussed to find out the similar patterns in the US strategytowards Iran. The results of this article clearly point to the several USstrategies to control the power and maintain an influence of the IslamicRepublic of Iran in the Middle East which has posed the potential challengesto the American interests in the said region.
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Jin-Ha, Kim. "North Korea’s Offensive Realism and the Strategy of Nationalism." Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (March 31, 2020): 41–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.46226/jss.2020.03.27.1.41.

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16

Araszkiewicz, Adam. "The Concept of China’s Peaceful Rise and Offensive Realism." Przegląd Strategiczny, no. 14 (December 29, 2021): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ps.2021.1.17.

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This article aims at adressing several research issues. Firstly, to present offensive realism as a proper research tool to analyse US-China rivalry. Secondly, the author discusses the theory of “China’s peaceful rise” and I argues that it smoothly overlapped with the US strategy of liberal hegemony. Thirdly, He presents and defends the argument that China does not rise peacefully. Fourthly, the author claims that China wants to became a regional hegemon in South-East Asia and the USA according to offensive realism cannot let it happen. Last but not least the author considers the arguments that are frequently used to support the theory of “China’s peaceful rise” and explains why they fail to depict the current and predict the future nature of US-China relations. In this article the author employed the following research methods: historical, descriptive and decision making methods.
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Kleinschmidt, Jochen. "Offensive realism, differentiation theory, and the war in Ukraine." International Politics 56, no. 4 (April 26, 2018): 427–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0150-4.

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Popescu, Ionut. "American Grand Strategy and the Rise of Offensive Realism." Political Science Quarterly 134, no. 3 (September 2019): 375–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/polq.12960.

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Dolatabadi, Ali Bagheri, and Reza Rezaei. "ERDOĞAN'S ENDLESS DREAMS." World Affairs 185, no. 1 (February 10, 2022): 114–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00438200211066134.

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After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power in 2002, Turkey's Middle East policy underwent a radical change. Erdoğan's readings of the Arab Spring events are a vivid example of Turkey's new foreign policy. In the last months of 2019 and 2020, Turkey took two other important steps that have attracted the attention of the international community: engagement in Operation Peace Spring in northern Syria without UN Security Council authorization, and steps to reach an agreement with the Libyan government on oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean in tandem with sending troops to Libya. Turkey's recent actions, which violate international law and UN resolutions, raise several questions: what changes have taken place in Turkey's foreign policy? What are its core drivers and main components? And what results will the new policy deliver in the future? We argue that Turkey's behavior conforms to the principles of offensive realism. The shift in Turkey's foreign policy and the trend toward offensive realism are rooted in the 2011 Arab Spring and subsequent events in the Middle East. The failed coup of 2016 accelerated these changes and pushed them in new directions. Turkey is now seriously aiming to maximize its power, particularly in the politico-military field, which could increase tensions in the sensitive region. We submit that Turkey cannot be guided by offensive realism in the long term, however.
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Grafov, Dmitry. "THE OUTLOOK ON THE TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS." Eastern Analytics, no. 2 (2021): 64–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2227-5568-2021-02-064-089.

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The article is attempt to evaluate the foreign policy of Turkey from the key paradigms of international relations: liberalism, constructivism, realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism. Turkish military power actively involved in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Caucasus with the intention to alter the existing power distribution. This may be considered as signs of the offensive realism strategy. Offensive realism asserts that states willing to use force to advance their own interests, and the survival in the international system requires to maximize power. Defensive neorealism holds that aggressive expansion collides with the interests of other states and their desire to ensure their own security in the first place. According to the balance of power theory, the expansion and maximization of power reduces the security of an offensive state by countering a coalition of balancing states. But in the case of Turkey, there are no signs of emerging a counterbalance coalition, and this is «know-how» of Erdogan’s policy. From the liberal perspective, also, there are no signs of countering of the internal and external liberal determinants (Turkish civil society, NATO’s policy, affairs with liberal allies) of Turkey’s foreign policy. The deadlock of joining Turkey to the EU and abolition of Ataturk’s secular and republican guidelines are signs of failure of liberal approach to Erdogan’s foreign policy. Turkey’s offensive policy, ignited nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, means the inability of international institutional cooperation to overcome anarchy and power maximizing instinct. From the constructivist perspective, the social structure affects the decision- making process. And this is confirmed in Turkey. Expansionism and resentment of historical injustice towards Turkey are necessary to strengthen Erdogan’s power and legitimize it. Constructivist approach may explain the meaning Turkish, Turkic and Neo- Ottoman identities. Identities and interests mutually constitute and effect foreign- policy behavior. And Erdogan shapes identities in the state and beyond on the basis of the interests of the of the power. Neoclassical realism approach may be useful in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy too. It underlines importance of a state’s domestic arrangements, particularly decisionmakers’ perceptions. And, of course, Erdogan’s perception is crucial for foreign policy. Perceptions usually tend to follow the actual distribution of power, but in the case of Erdogan’s aggressive policy, there is a risk of misjudgment, when long-term trends are hidden behind short-term perceptions. The main emphasis of article is on attempts to determine Erdogan’s strategy and examine it from the standpoint of offensive (realism) / defensive (neoralism) approach of international relations, and evaluate its effectiveness. Erdogan has created a multipolar balancing structure of foreign relations, in which Turkish rivals restrain each other. This structure is similar to a pentahedron with Turkey in the center and its main rivals- partners on the tops. Erdogan, shifting closer to one top or another one, can effectively bargain using threats with other rivals.
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Lilly, Carol S. "Amoral Realism or Immoral Obfuscation?" Slavic Review 55, no. 4 (1996): 749–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2501234.

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In his article, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Robert Hayden combines comparative history, political commentary, and amoral realism. In the process, he presents a number of arguments with which it is difficult to disagree, but also many that are provocative and, indeed, offensive. Because Hayden makes so many arguments in this piece (both primary, secondary, and parenthetical; explicit and implicit; open and disguised) my critique will not follow the organization of his paper. Rather, it will challenge Hayden's article on three counts: 1) its factual accuracy; 2) its lack of reference to existing literature on the topic; and 3) the logic, validity, and moral consequences of its arguments.
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LOBELL, STEVEN. "WAR IS POLITICS: OFFENSIVE REALISM, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND SECURITY STRATEGIES." Security Studies 12, no. 2 (December 1, 2002): 165–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0963-640291906825.

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Pashakhanlou, Arash Heydarian. "Back to the Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism." International Relations 27, no. 2 (June 2013): 202–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117812455353.

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Valeriano, Brandon. "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Testing Aggressive Power Politics Models." International Interactions 35, no. 2 (May 20, 2009): 179–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050620902864493.

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Labs, Eric J. "Beyond victory: Offensive realism and the expansion of war aims." Security Studies 6, no. 4 (June 1997): 1–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429321.

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Hu, Zhenshuo. "The Indo-Pacific Strategy from the Perspective of Offensive Realism." Journal of Research in Social Science and Humanities 1, no. 1 (November 2022): 36–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.56397/jrssh.2022.11.05.

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The Indo-Pacific strategy marks a shift in U.S. policy toward China from engagement to containment. The new goal of above policy is to comprehensively use various means to prevent China’s further rise and continue to maintain U.S. comparative advantage. However, the U.S. has been in trouble in recent years in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, unable to focus on China’s rise. Therefore, uniting Japan, India, and Australia to share the responsibility and obligation to balance China among the so-called G4 will not only meet the strategic needs of dealing with China’s threat, but also reduce the pressure of U.S. global strategic contraction. For Japan, India and Australia, in the face of an increasingly aggressive China, all three countries feel the need to seek the support and help of the United States, a major power outside the region, to maintain regional balance of power and balance. From the theoretical perspective of offensive realism, the Indo-Pacific strategy embodies the policy preferences of the four countries for establishing a balance of power and shirking responsibility in the process of maintaining the balance of regional power structures. However, like the theoretical flaws of offensive realism, the Indo-Pacific strategy has limitations and potential risks that may have a negative impact on the effective development of the strategy.
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Ahmed, Zubir Rasool. "بنەمای پەیوەندییەکانی هەرێمی کوردستان و وڵاتە یەکگرتووەکانی ئەمریکا." Twejer 3, no. 3 (December 2020): 337–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.31918/twejer.2033.9.

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The relation between the U.S and Kurds has always been problematic. The main question of this study is to address what type of relations are between KRG and U.S? Is there a specific U.S policy towards KRG? To answer these questions, we have depended on the theory of Structural Realism, especially the concept of Offensive Realism which has been developed by John Mearsheimer on the one hand, and the English school on the other hand. Offensive realism can be helpful to understand the behaviour of great powers, such as the U.S., and English school to understand international community and international order. It has been concluded that, so far there is no direct U.S policy or strategy towards the KRG. The U.S interaction with the KRG has always been identified by specific interested and indirect (third) issue. Therefore, it is important to know that the U.S- KRG relation throughout its history has always been linked to another issue, especially the domestic changes in Iraq and regional developments in the Levan and Persian Gulf. The U.S has always followed its realistic approach in its relations with KRG, in particular in protecting the regional state system and international order.
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Blazevic, Jason J. "The Taiwan Dilemma: China, Japan, and the Strait Dynamic." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39, no. 4 (December 2010): 143–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261003900406.

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Many Chinese and Japanese authorities believe Taiwan is essential to their respective states' national security due to the island's geographic centrality and beneficial proximity to nearby and distant sea lanes. Of further importance is Taiwan's immediacy to territorial and resource disputes between China and Japan. This article focuses on the security concerns and strategies of both states and applies realism, its tenets of defensive and offensive realism, and neoliberalism in order to better comprehend those concerns and strategies and also provide probable solutions.
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Kirshner, Jonathan. "Offensive realism, thucydides traps, and the tragedy of unforced errors: classical realism and US–China relations." China International Strategy Review 1, no. 1 (June 2019): 51–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42533-019-00013-y.

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LAYNE, CHRISTOPHER. "THE “POSTER CHILD FOR OFFENSIVE REALISM”: AMERICA AS A GLOBAL HEGEMON." Security Studies 12, no. 2 (December 1, 2002): 120–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0963-640291906816.

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Karagiannis, Emmanuel. "The 2008 Russian–Georgian war via the lens of Offensive Realism." European Security 22, no. 1 (October 23, 2012): 74–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2012.698265.

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Hayat, Muhammad Umer, Asefa Khilji, and Farrukh Shehzad. "American Conduct towards North Korea: Realist Analysis of Clinton and Bush Administration." Global Political Review V, no. III (September 30, 2020): 68–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2020(v-iii).07.

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North Korea tends to be a state of the 21st century that redefines realism in the contemporary era while concentrating on protecting its sovereignty by making self-help the primary concern. US-North Korea bilateral relations face fluctuations. North Korean intentions have progressed from the Realism thought, now willing to attain security maximization along with maximizing its power based on the notions of defensive and offensive realism. The supremacy of North Korea does not quench as the Nuclear might in Northeast Asia; it aims to attack mainland USA with its developed technology. The study concentrates on the Clinton and Bush administration as a special reference. Recognizing the North Korean nuclear program would be intolerable for the International Community as it goes against all norms set by the powerful states for the world.
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ELMAN, COLIN. "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony." American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 563–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404041358.

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John Mearsheimer suggests that, whenever possible, great powers are constrained to seek regional hegemony, the safest feasible situation for a state. This objective is hard to achieve because other great powers want to block the attempt, but it is doable because buck-passing and other hurdles make balancing inefficient. Contra Mearsheimer, I argue that it is the absence of balancers, not balancing inefficiencies, that best explains when states can hope to dominate their neighborhoods. Regional hegemony is only achievable when it is easy. I use property space techniques to develop an extended version of offensive realism that clarifies why states will sometimes prefer not to block a hegemonic bid. In particular, I argue that local considerations will often prevent a continental great power from responding to a rising state in another region. I test my argument by process tracing the U.S. purchase of Louisiana and show that France's decision to sell is best explained by its pursuit of its own territorial ambitions. My extended version of offensive realism suggests that its single success story of the last 200 years, U.S. dominance of North America, provides no encouragement to contemporary states contemplating a bid for regional hegemony.
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Ban, Kil-joo. "Offensive Maritimeism in East Asian Waters : Offensive Realism Theory and Maritime Strategies of Four Major Powers in Northeast Asia." Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 2 (July 31, 2020): 103–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.46226/jss.2020.07.27.1.103.

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35

Snyder, Glenn H. "Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay." International Security 27, no. 1 (July 2002): 149–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/016228802320231253.

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36

Filary-Szczepanik, Mateusz Z. "Power and Narcists – Ideal Types of States Based on Their Sources of National Power, Extraction Capability and Foreign Policy Behaviour." Teoria Polityki 6 (October 19, 2022): 147–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/25440845tp.22.004.16004.

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This paper aims at problematizing this distinction between status quo and revisionist/imperialist states by creating a typology of four kind of states: imperialist, status quo, young and old narcist state. The text will proceed in three sections that: 1) problematises the contemporary realist theorising; 2) reconstructs Morgenthau’s notions of sources of national and political power, ideal types of foreign policy and the character of political community and its interest; 3) presents the four ideal types of states. This typology, based on analyticist metatheory and deeply inspired by Hans Morgenthau’s thought, aims at solving problems with neorealist, and neoclassical realist theorising. Based on such non-positivist metatheory, and thus closer to the classical realist roots, it omits the offensive/defensive neorealist assumption about states motivation. By explicitly combining the three historically bound qualities of states –their sources of national power, extraction capability and foreign policy behaviour it transcends the problems with weak causal linkages between state level variables present in neoclassical realism. Hence, it exemplifies the approach to general theory-building that is practically viable for explicitly exerting normative judgement, also from the perspective non great power state actors – the consistent weakness of mainstream, contemporary realist theorising.
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37

Grafov, Dmitriy. "Qatari diplomatic crisis in terms of "defensive" and "offensive" realism of foreign relations." США ܀ Канада: Экономика, политика, культура, no. 2 (2019): 38–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032120680003764-4.

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38

Lande, Eivind. "Between Offensive and Defensive Realism – The Japanese Abe Government’s Security Policy toward China." Asian Security 14, no. 2 (May 30, 2017): 172–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1323882.

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39

Hamilton, Eric J., and Brian C. Rathbun. "Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism." Security Studies 22, no. 3 (July 2013): 436–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816125.

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40

Hongyu, Gu, Zong Wei, and Ding Yu. "On U. S. Hegemony over the Communications Industry from the Perspective of Offensive Realism." Asia Social Science Academy 3, no. 1 (April 30, 2021): 147–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.51600/jass.2021.3.1.147.

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41

Li, Ningxin. "Saudi Arabian-Led Intervention in Yemen Conflicts." Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 11, no. 1 (January 15, 2023): 46–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.37745/gjahss.2013/vol11n14664.

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The conflict in Yemen started as a civil war, which was perpetuated by various conflicting groups’ attempts to address and compete for political, economic, and social influence in Yemen (Byers & Stewart, n.d.). However, the Saudi Arabian-led intervention has escalated the local conflicts and transformed the conflicts in Yemen into a significant regional and global competition between different countries and regional sects (Byers & Stewart, n.d.). The main goals of this research are to protect children’s rights and safety, as well as prevent armed conflicts in Yemen. The author will analyze the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemeni conflicts by using social identity theory, the theory of structural violence, and the theory of offensive realism. Social identity theory provides a notion that conflicts between groups might be caused by favoritism towards in-group members and marginalization towards out-group members (Turner & Tajfel, 1986). The theory of structural violence explains the interrelationships among structural inequality, poverty, and violence in society (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). The theory of offensive realism illustrates the political, economic, and territorial factors that attracted different nations and sects to participate in the Saudi Arabian-led intervention of the Yemeni conflicts (Lobell, 2010). Moreover, the author will introduce interest-based mediation to conflicting parties to allow them to explore alternatives for making peace (Moore, 1987). The integrated analyses of theories and intervention practice will enhance the understanding of this conflicting case, as well as provide a comprehensive understanding about parties’ interests and the importance of protecting children’s rights in the conflicts.
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42

Khlopov, O. "The Russia-NATO ralations and the European security system in the context of the concepts of neorealism." National Security and Strategic Planning 2021, no. 1 (May 5, 2021): 5–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.37468/2307-1400-2021-1-5-13.

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The article gives the analysis of relations between NATO and Russia in the context of the formation of European security system in the post-bipolar period based on the concepts of defensive and offensive realism, which largely clarify the nature of the political crisis and a return to rivalry for spheres of influence in the post-Soviet space. Analyzing the redistribution of power in the system of international relations, the author argues that the NATO countries and the United States should take into account the historical characteristics and location of Russia, her national interests, the strengthening of her international positions, and concern about security problems at her borders. On the basis of the concept of neorealism, conclusions are drawn about the problems of the European security system and the growing uncertainty in world politics. The author points out to the need for the West to understand the content of Russia's foreign policy, which proceeds from defensive preferences of realism and the search for institutional mechanisms of cooperation.
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43

Zubov, V. V. "The German Doctrine of “Realpolitik” Through the Prism of Modern World Politics." Humanities and Social Sciences. Bulletin of the Financial University 12, no. 1 (February 9, 2022): 100–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2022-12-1-100-107.

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The proposed paper examines the problem of updating the German doctrine “Realpolitik” in relation to contemporary world politics. The presentation of the material follows a theoretical and methodological line, associated with the designation of the main approaches to “real politics” that were present in the history of political thought. Secondly, it compares the realistic direction of political science analysis with the normative-value paradigm and a practice-oriented line, associated with an appeal to the current world political agenda and the characteristics of those directions that have political realism as a fundamental principle. When referring to real-world politics, the author concluded that realism is especially relevant in the following areas: reducing the nuclear arsenal and weakening the missile potential, preventing the deployment of strategic offensive weapons and the deployment of armed forces of competing militarypolitical blocs in border areas, the fight against international terrorism, as well as preventing the consequences of the new coronavirus pandemic.
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44

Blazevic, Jason J. "Navigating the Security Dilemma: China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 4 (December 2012): 79–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341203100404.

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Competition and conflict in the South China Sea involves many nations due to its resources and vital sea lanes. However, it is China which increasingly serves as a common denominator of intensifying anxiety for its South China Sea maritime neighbours due to the aggressive scope of its claims to the sea and its islands. Among those states, Vietnam is most affected as it is first in the path of Chinese ambitions – ambitions which authorities fear would give China significant tactical military and economic advantage. For China, there are similar fears over threats to the sea lanes and sea bed resources. Leaders of both states also perceive their diplomatic and martial actions in the sea in historical terms as well. However, enforcement actions taken by either state may lead to a worsening security dilemma in which reactive security strategies could dangerously destabilise relations. This article discusses the motivations and strategies of both states as well as the consequences of such and applies realism, its tenets of defensive and offensive realism, and neoliberalism to examine their security concerns and perceptions. The article further proposes that the most valuable insights can be provided by defensive realism and neoliberalism, which together can encourage security, cooperation and conciliation in order to best promote the improvement of relations.
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45

Grafov, Dmitry B. "The Turkish Art of Offensive-Balancing from the Perspective of Neorealism." Contemporary Arab Affairs 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2022): 72–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/caa.2022.15.2.72.

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In his foreign policy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reconsidered commitments to the United States and NATO allies that limit his political ambitions. Turkey’s military power is actively involved in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the South Caucasus in an attempt to alter the existing regional orders. Offensive realism, as a branch of neorealism, asserts that states are willing to use force to advance their own interests, and that their survival in the international system requires a maximization of power. Defensive neorealism holds that aggressive expansion clashes with the interests of other states and their desire to ensure their own security. According to the balance of power theory, the expansion and maximization of power reduces the security of an offensive state by countering a coalition of balancing states. At the same time, Turkish foreign policy strongly supports the formation of an Islamist, neo-patrimonialist, populist, and security-obsessed ruling bloc representing the resentment of Turkish society of the historical injustices committed by the West. This article attempts to determine Erdoğan’s strategy, examines it from the standpoint of the offensive/defensive approach of neorealism, and evaluates its effectiveness. Erdoğan has created a multi-polar balancing structure of foreign relations in which Turkish rivals restrain each other. This structure is similar to a pentahedron with Turkey in the center and its main rivals–partners arrayed around it at each point. Ankara, by shifting closer to one or another rival–partner, can effectively bargain with others using threats.
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46

Tasleem, Alia, Javed Akhtar Salyana, and Muhammad Shafiq. "The Great Powers Interests in Afghanistan: Impacts on Pakistan Post - 9/11." Global Strategic & Securities Studies Review VI, no. II (June 30, 2021): 75–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2021(vi-ii).08.

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Afghanistan has a unique politico-strategic position on the world map. There are multiple reasons that always draw the attention of regional and foreign players for their national interests. The event of 9/11 again turned Afghanistan into an arena of competition for self-interests of regional and international powers. The study observes the great powers USA, China and Russia’s convergence and divergence of interests in Afghanistan in the merrier of “Offensive Realism” theory. This aim of the study is to analyze the involvement of great powers in Afghanistan and its impacts on Pakistan.This qualitative research work analyze through content analysis. The study finds out that Afghanistan’s good and bad situation always affects Pakistan.
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47

Arseno, Ary. "Containment Amerika Serikat terhadap Fenomena Rise of China dalam Perspektif Hegemoni Realisme." Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 12, no. 1 (August 2, 2019): 167. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jhi.v12i1.12442.

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This paper explains about the United States’ containment strategy towardChina, the argue that the United States’ strategy of containment aimsto contain the China’s rise phenomenon. After the Cold War, China hasdeveloped as a powerful country which has capability to threaten theUnited States’ ‘sole hegemon’ status. Containment is the chosen strategy tokeep Washington at the top of the hierarchy of international system. Theauthor divide this paper into three sections, the first show the relationsthe United States builds to make containment works. Then in the sectiontwo, the author explain the United States’ containment strategy withJohn Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory. The last section, I end thispaper with conclusion that consists of important points of the paper.
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48

Li, Xiaoting. "Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the neighboring states." International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 16, no. 2 (September 14, 2015): 241–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcv019.

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49

Claude, Inis L. "The balance of power revisited." Review of International Studies 15, no. 2 (April 1989): 77–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500112938.

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In 1962 I published Power and International Relations, a book in which I undertook to analyse, criticize, and compare balance of power, collective security, and world government, treating these as the three leading theoretical approaches to the management of power in the global arena. Each of these approaches had its band of adulators and advocates who doubtless found my efforts at critical appraisal offensive. For a young American scholar of that era the adoption of an irreverent attitude toward balance of power was particularly problematic, because that approach figured prominently in the prevailing orthodoxy of Political Realism. It would have been safer to assume, rather than to examine, the merits of balance of power. I gave balance of power, like its two competitors, a mixed review.
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50

Memišević, Hamza. "Bosnia and Herzegovina in John Mearsheimer’s Concepts." Uprava 13, no. 2 (December 9, 2022): 28–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.53028/1986-6127.2022.13.2.28.

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Starting from the analysis of the texts of the American political scientist J. Mearsheimer created during the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the central theme of the paper is Mearsheimer's view on the Bosnian issue. The political-administrative organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a relevant topic that takes the form of a permanent political crisis. The paper presents a synthesis of Mearsherimer's conceptions immanent in the theory of offensive realism, as well as a breakdown of post-Cold War political processes which, according to the principle of causality, can be viewed as a catalyst for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Understanding the current dynamics of world political movements with an emphasis on Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the fundamental components of this work.
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