Relevant bibliographies by topics / Oligopolic market

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Academic literature on the topic 'Oligopolic market'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 3 June 2025
Last updated: 22 June 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Oligopolic market"

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Ginevičius, Romualdas, and Algirdas Krivka. "The Model of the Integrated Competitive Strategy of an Enterprise in Oligopolic Market." Business: Theory and Practice 11, no. (2) (2010): 87–95. https://doi.org/10.3846/btp.2010.10.

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The article presents the original model of enterprise's integrated competitive strategy under the conditions of oligopolic market. The integrated strategy is considered to be the concerted set of partial (detailed) competitive strategies targeting on certain elements of internal and external environment of an enterprise and influencing its performance. The partial competitive strategies are derived and the model of the integrated strategy is based on generic business strategies, developed in theoretical sources of strategic management and adapted for oligopolic market, having regard to the models of analysing enterprise competitive potential and forming business strategy, proposed by other authors. The model is designed as a scientifically grounded framework for forming and improving competitive strategy of an oligopolic enterprise, with the further research being aimed at preparing the tools for quantitative evaluation (assessing expected contribution of the partial strategies to enterprise performance and estimating their scale in the integrated strategy), and empirical application to real-world enterprises.
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Ginevičius, Romualdas, and Algirdas Krivka. "Multicriteria Evaluation of the Competitive Environment in the Oligopolic Market." Business: Theory and Practice 10, no. (4) (2009): 247–58. https://doi.org/10.3846/1648-0627.2009.10.247-258.

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The formation and successful implementation of a modern enterprise's competitive strategy is directly related to effective analysis of the environment surrounding the particular enterprise. The environment of the enterprise is traditionally divided into internal and external – the most dynamic and hardly forecasted component of the latter is the competitive (market, industry) environment. The competitive environment is considered to be a complex phenomenon, characterised by multiple quantitative and qualitative indicators (criteria), making the multicriteria evaluation methods to be the most appropriate tool for the analysis. The article presents the model of the multicriteria evaluation of the competitive environment in the oligopolic market covering the selection of the criteria for comprehensive evaluation, the distribution of weights, the selection of the appropriate multicriteria evaluation methods, the calculations and the interpretation of the results. The model is applied for the comparative analysis of three Lithuanian oligopolic markets: cellphone connection service market, beer market and Internet connection service market.
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Krivka, Algirdas. "THE ELEMENTS OF COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT OF AN ENTERPRISE: A CASE OF OLIGOPOLIC MARKETS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS." Mokslas - Lietuvos ateitis 2, no. 2 (2010): 32–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/mla.2010.031.

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The article raises the problem of the complex analysis of competitive environment of an enterprise, which is considered to be the main source of factors, influencing enterprise‘s strategic behaviour and performance. The elements of competitive environment are derived from “traditional” market structure characteristics, developed by the scholars of classical economics and modern microeconomics, with additional factors coming from industrial organization, theoretical oligopoly models, M. Porter’s five competitive forces and diamond. The developed set of the elements of competitive environment is applied for the comparative analysis of three Lithuanian oligopolic markets. The results obtained confirm the potential for practical application of the developed classification for similar analysis.
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Bochan, Radosław. "Funkcjonowanie wybranych rynków oligopolistycznych w Polsce w aspekcie działań Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów." Gospodarka w Praktyce i Teorii 30, no. 1 (2012): 21–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1429-3730.30.02.

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The profile of some was introduced in the present article, discordant with the right workings, chosen enterprises act on Polish oligopolic markets the which became detects thanks to supervisory workings Office of Fair Trading (UOKiK). The cartel collusions which have the place on various, Polish oligopolic markets predominate the various kind in the objective catalogue of described delicts. Illegal agreements can concern the inflated price not only, but also the different elements of marketing mix tj. the product, distribution, if the promotion. The consumer from these cases, on the wasted position stands up in every one or /and competitive enterprises which are not the participants of this agreement. That is why proper workings subjects entitled to monitors, finds and limits practician monopolistic he is the key element of the existence of the free market. Last years show that the workings of UOKiK reconcile in the businesses of the dishonest businessmen who in the discordant way with the right desire to maximalize of one’s profits more and more painfully.
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Ginevičius, Romualdas, Algirdas Krivka, and Jolita Šimkūnaitė. "THE MODEL OF FORMING COMPETITIVE STRATEGY OF AN ENTERPRISE UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF OLIGOPOLIC MARKET." Journal of Business Economics and Management 11, no. 3 (2010): 367–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/jbem.2010.18.

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The article presents the original and scientifically brand new model of forming the integrated competitive strategy of an enterprise under the conditions of oligopolic market, followed by the cases of empirical application. The integrated competitive strategy of oligopolic enterprise is considered to be the concerted set of partial (detailed) competitive strategies targeting the certain elements of internal and external environment of an enterprise, determining its strategic position and influencing performance. The complex assessment of the estimated impact of partial competitive strategies on performance criteria is implemented (multicriteria evaluation methods are applied) in order to indicate the detailed strategies, having the highest potential influence on enterprise performance (to be selected to form the integrated competitive strategy), and to determine their scales (weights in the structure of the integrated strategy). The results of empirical application of the model are proposed to be employed to set up long-term goals and choose the main directions of business strategy of an enterprise, to distribute financial, human and other resources for strategic actions to be designed and implemented. Santrauka Straipsnyje skelbiamas originalus, moksliniu požiūriu naujas imones integruotosios konkurencines strategijos formavimo oligopolineje rinkoje modelis ir jo empirinio pritaikymo pavyzdys. Oligopolines imones integruotoji konkurencine strategija modelyje suprantama kaip suderintas rinkinys daliniu (detaliuju) konkurenciniu strategiju, nukreiptu i imones vidines ir išorines aplinkos veiksnius, turinčius itakos imones strateginei pozicijai ir veiklos rezultatams. Taikant modeli, atliekamas tiriamuju imoniu pasirinktu daliniu konkurenciniu strategiju lauktino poveikio veiklos detaliesiems rodikliams kiekybinis vertinimas (pasitelkiant daugiakriterio vertinimo metodus) ‐ palyginamas taikytinu strateginiu alternatyvu lauktinas poveikis finansiniam imones rezultatui, nustatant pranašiausias dalines strategijas (sudarysiančias integruotaja konkurencine strategija) ir ju taikymo masta (svori integruotojoje strategijoje). Modelio pritaikymo rezultatai naudotini priimant sprendimus del oligopolines imones konkurencines strategijos sudarymo, skirstant finansinius, žmogiškuosius ir kitus išteklius strateginiams veiksmams formuoti ir igyvendinti.
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Ikke Adelia Amanda and Muhammad Yasin. "Dampak Oligopoli terhadap Masyarakat dan Pertumbuhan Industri." Pajak dan Manajemen Keuangan 1, no. 5 (2024): 102–11. https://doi.org/10.61132/pajamkeu.v1i5.692.

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Oligopoly is a market structure controlled by a small number of companies that dominate market share. This research examines the impact of oligopoly on society and industrial growth, with a focus on economic, social and structural aspects. Economically, oligopoly can reduce price competition and lead to price regulation that is detrimental to consumers. Socially, this market structure can exacerbate economic inequality and limit the opportunities of small entrepreneurs. In terms of industrial growth, oligopoly can provide stability, but also reduce incentives for innovation. This research also discusses the role of government policies, such as antitrust regulations, in reducing the negative impacts of oligopolies. This research will also discuss the role of government policy in regulating oligopolies to ensure that the negative impacts of this market structure can be minimized. Policies such as antitrust and price regulation need to be implemented to maintain a balance between industrial stability and societal welfare.
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Dzobelova, Valentina B., and Natalya Yu Lebedeva. "Oligopoly models and their manifestation in the modern Russian economy." Vestnik of North-Ossetian State University, no. 2(2020) (June 25, 2020): 110–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.29025/1994-7720-2020-2-110-116.

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This publication discusses the characteristics of oligopoly as one of the most common market structures, due to the fact that the attention of economists is constantly attracted to the problems of the functioning of a firm in such market conditions, the article presents a statistical analysis of various oligopoly models. Each model is characterized by certain signs. Based on these signs, oligopolistic markets are assigned to one or another model, an assessment of the appropriateness of using oligopoly models to analyze the interaction of market entities is presented. Based on an analytical comparison, it was revealed that oligopolies continue to be one of the most common market structures in the Russian economy. The influence of oligopolistic enterprises on the state of the country’s economy is very large, so it is so important to understand the processes that occur in oligopolistic markets, to explain the reasons for this or that behavior of firms. The most unfavorable oligopoly model for consumers is the cartel model, since in this case the market situation is close to the sellers monopoly. Most preferable for consumers are models in which there are no clear leaders, several firms can have a significant impact on the market. In an effort to maximize profits by increasing their market share, firms offer the most advantageous offers to consumers.
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Briones, Juan, and Atilano Jorge Padilla. "The Complex Landscape of Oligopolies under EU Competition Policy; Is Collective Dominance Ripe for Guidelines?" World Competition 24, Issue 3 (2001): 307–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/359614.

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We find at present that there appear to be three different approaches to oligopolies and collective dominance under the EU competition policy: (i) the approach based on economic models of collusive behaviour, used predominantly under the Merger Regulation, (ii) the specific approach to maritime conferences, used predominantly under Article 82, and (iii) the approach followed in the Irish Sugar case, where collective dominance is applied to two firms in a vertical relationship, as opposed to a group of competitors. It has to be borne in mind that a very frequent configuration of supply in relevant markets shows leading groups of less than four suppliers accounting for a large combined share of output. And also that the Court of Justice has given the Commission a wide margin of discretion to assess the conditions of competition in oligopolistic markets. Finally, the decision in the Airtours/First Choice case has extended the boundaries of the situations under which the Commission may find an oligopoly to be in a collective dominant position, by focusing on a notion of rational incentives, and playing down other factors (transparency of the market, symmetry between the members of the oligopoly) that had been taken prominently into account in previous decisions. This combination of factors pleads for the adoption by the Commission of some sort of guidance on how it assesses oligopolies under competition rules. The Commission has made a considerable effort in clarifying its policy by adopting guidelines on market definition, and vertical and horizontal restrictions of competition, among others. These guidelines could usefully be completed with guidelines on the treatment of oligopolies under EU competition policy.
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Mingxing Wu. "Analysis of Multi-Oligopoly Games in the China’s Electricity Market." Journal of Electrical Systems 20, no. 10s (2024): 4101–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.52783/jes.5999.

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The electric power industry plays a crucial role in modern societies, with its effective operation closely tied to economic progress and environmental sustainability. As the world's largest, China's electric power industry operates as an oligopoly. Understanding the dynamics of competition and cooperation among multiple oligopolies in this market is essential for optimizing the industry. This study employs the Cournot and Stackelberg models to analyze the complex interactions among electricity producers. The Cournot model results indicate that while cooperation among oligopolies can yield significant benefits, total market output during cooperative periods is lower than in a competitive environment, which is detrimental to consumers. The pursuit of higher profits, however, challenges the state of cooperation, as each oligopoly seeks to expand its market share, potentially leading to a Nash equilibrium. Even as the market sees an increase in smaller stakeholders due to advancements in renewable energy, the same findings apply under the leader-follower dynamics modeled by the Stackelberg model. These insights aim to inform decision-making processes for electricity producers and relevant government regulatory authorities to improve the industry’s resource allocation and foster sustainable growth. The simulation results indicate that marginal cost has a negative impact on the equilibrium generation amount, with power producers having lower marginal costs achieving higher equilibrium profits.
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Zhou, Ziqi. "Market Competition and Monopoly Power: Insights from Oligopoly Structure." Highlights in Business, Economics and Management 24 (January 22, 2024): 188–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/vvg6pr04.

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In this context, the primary objective is to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the real-world implementation and impact of distinct economic models. Through the literature analysis, the paper sets out to examine product competition and corporate conduct within two contemporary markets. Through this meticulous approach, the aim is to unveil the nuanced distinctions and intriguing parallels that exist between Oligopoly and Oligopoly Competitive Markets. First, broad definitions and classifications of both oligopolistic and oligopolistically competitive markets are considered. Second, the subtle differences between the two markets will be shown through specific oligopoly examples (such as OPEC and mobile phone market). Third, detailed analysis of the features of the similarity between the two markets. Finally, the study found that, as two different market structures, the oligopoly market and the oligopoly competition market have completely different gaps in market control and price stability, but it is undeniable that the two markets have the same driving force in innovation.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Oligopolic market"

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Suárez, Carlos. "Essays on Regulation, Liberalization and Privatization in Energy Markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/669284.

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The general motivation of this research is to explore the effects of the coexistence of public and private companies on the allocative efficiency of the supply of electricity. In particular, this thesis investigates from an empirical perspective to what extent the distinction between private and public companies is relevant to understand the competition in the wholesale electricity generation markets. I apply several econometric techniques and theory advances in industrial organization branch on data of the firms of the Colombian market. The case of the Colombian electricity market is suitable to study this issues for four reasons: i) It is an oligopoly in which private and public companies compete under the same rules. ii) The most important firms in the Colombian electricity sector are mature organizations, with a conventional business vision. In fact, many of these companies belong to transnational capital that carry out activities in several continents. iii) The market setting have a conventional design similar to other liberalized electricity markets. It operates as a multi-unit uniform-price auction. iv) There is available information with daily and even hourly resolution of the generation market variables. I consider that these are key elements for justifying the external validity of the results. This thesis presents three essays that aim to answer three questions related to the interaction between competition in electricity markets and their ownership structure. Chapter 1 addresses the question: Do the switch from public to private management have impacts in the bidding strategy of specific generation assets? Chapter 2 explores the question: Do public and private generation companies respond the same to the incentives to relax competition? Chapter 3 focuses on the question: Do private companies have a greater propensity to establish coordination relationships in comparison to public firms? In the first chapter of this thesis I evaluate the impact of privatization on the bidding of electricity units participating in a liberalized wholesale electricity market. The results of this evaluation contribute to better understand whether privatization is the right decision in an environment of imperfect competition. In this essay I adopt a policy evaluation approach to estimate the impact of changes from public to private management on the bidding prices of electricity generation units. I use information of bidding prices of the Colombian wholesale electricity market and exploit the changes of management of generation units documented in the period 2006 - 2018. The methodologies and results presented in this thesis contributes to the literature of mixed oligopoly because they place special emphasis on the behavioral differences between private and public companies and studies a field experience in which they compete in the same relevant market. The empirical evidence resultant from the policy evaluation method is aligned with the theoretical predictions of comparative statics arising from the behavioral differences of mixed oligopoly models. The second chapter of this dissertation proposes a methodology in order to find differences between the reactions of private and public firms when they face incentives to exercises unilateral market power. Several common events in the electricity industry such as transmission restrictions, the concentration of generation property within specific areas, the non-storage capacity of electricity and the low elasticity of demand, provide opportunities to exert market power. That is why this issue has been widely studied and discussed theoretically and empirically. The novel element of this essay in relation to this strand of the literature is accounting for the distinction between private and public companies regarding competitive behavior. Chapter 3 investigates from an empirical perspective the role of disclosure information in the stability of informal coordination agreements. Particularly, this chapter focuses in the economic effects of the announcement and the put into effect of a non-transparency policy implemented in the Colombian wholesale electricity market in 2009. We propose an identification strategy for isolating the effect of a coordinating relation from the confusion factors related with unilateral market power. The characteristics of the reform of the transparency policy allow to link the simple announcement of the policy change with the collapse of a coordinated strategy of private firms in a repeated interaction context. We use several empirical tools to assess the impact of the simple announcement of a modification in the transparency conditions on the average bidding price of private firms. We present an empirical analysis of the average bidding price data over August 2008 - July 2009. Overall, the evidence presented in the three essays of this dissertation indicates that the distinction between public and private companies may be a relevant aspect for explaining the functioning of competition in liberalized industries.
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Kabré, Béné-Wendé Anicet. "Politiques environnementales et pollution dans des modèles d'oligopole bilatéral." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 10, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA100138.

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Les Gaz à Effet de Serre (GES) jouent un rôle crucial dans la régulation du climat. Le changement climatique, conséquence de l'accumulation de GES dans l'atmosphère, a de nombreux impacts tels que les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes (tempêtes, ouragans, cyclones, inondations, canicules, sécheresses), la disparition d'espèces animales et végétales, la prévalence croissante des maladies liées à la pollution atmosphérique (santé respiratoire par exemple). La pollution industrielle contribue au changement climatique. Par ailleurs, les firmes produisant un même bien sont en perpétuelle concurrence et leurs niveaux d'émission diffèrent selon leur technologie et leur pouvoir de marché. Compte tenu de ces effets néfastes croissants des agents économiques sur l'environnement, il est nécessaire que des politiques publiques soient mises en place pour réduire les émissions de GES.L'objectif de la thèse est triple. D'une part, elle vise à analyser la pollution dans des structures de marchés où tous les agents se comportent de manière stratégique (concurrence oligopolistique). D'autre part, elle vise à effectuer des exercices de statique comparative afin de mesurer les effets des variations de paramètres sur les équilibres stratégiques. Enfin, elle étudie différentes politiques publiques pour réguler les émissions liées à cette pollution. Notons ici que la thèse porte plus sur l'atténuation que sur l'adaptation au changement climatique.Le domaine exploré se situe au croisement de l'économie de l'environnement, et des jeux stratégiques de marché<br>Greenhouse gases (GHG) play a crucial role in climate regulation. Climate change, due to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, has many consequences such as extremes weather events (storms, hurricanes, cyclones, floods, heat waves, droughts), extinction of animal and plant species, the increasing prevalence in diseases related to air pollution (e.g.,health respiratory). Industrial pollution contributes to climate change. Moreover, firms which produce the same good are in constant competition and their emission levels differ according to their technology and market power. Facing these deteriorating effects of the behaviour of economic agents on the environment, it is necessary to implement public policies to alleviate GHG emissions.The objective of this thesis is threefold. On the one hand, it aims to analyze pollution in market structures where all agents behave strategically (oligopolistic competition). On the other hand, it aims to carry out comparative static exercises in order to capture the effects of parameter variations on strategic equilibria. Finally, it studies different public policies to regulate emissions related to this pollution. It should be noted here that the thesis focuses more on mitigation than adaptation to climate change.The explored domain is at the junction of environmental economics, and strategic market games
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Strážnický, Matúš. "Application of Game Theory principles in the oligopoly-characterized industry." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-113005.

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The goals of the master thesis are describing the strategic oligopoly environment of chosen industry of Czech telecommunications, together with introducing basic game theory principles with their possible real case application. It mentions historical shifts in Czech telecommunications sector which influence the actual industry conditions. The thesis briefly describes the individual players in the market and turns its attention towards the industry characterization through standard oligopoly models. Following, it introduces theoretical insight on possible market entry strategies into oligopoly industries. The application part focuses on game-theory in pricing strategies, market entry and entry deterring scenarios with examples. Final part summarizes the objectives in detail and provides final comments on the thesis.
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Chioveanu, Ioana. "Strategic Pricing in Oligopoly Markets." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4053.

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La tesis contribuye a la teoría del oligopolio. Analiza la competencia en precio cuando hay interacción estratégica entre las empresas. Me interesan particularmente las situaciones en que las empresas toman otras decisiones antes de competir en precios o cantidades.<br/>El capítulo "La Publicidad, la lealtad de marca y los precios" analiza los efectos estratégicos de la publicidad persuasiva en mercados con productos homogéneos. Utiliza un modelo de competencia bidimensional en publicidad y precios. Las empresas primero invierten en publicidad con el fin de inducir lealtad de marca entre consumidores que, en la ausencia de la publicidad, comprarían la marca más barata. Después las empresas compiten en precios para los consumidores que quedan indiferentes entre las marcas existentes. En equilibrio los precios proceden de distribuciones asimétricas. La variación en las distribuciones de precios se refleja en los beneficios esperados y, como consecuencia, los gastos en publicidad de las dos empresas son asimétricos. Una empresa elige una inversión menor en publicidad, mientras las otras eligen el mismo nivel, más alto de inversión. Por este perfil de inversiones, hay una familia de equilibrios de precio con al menos dos empresas utilizando estrategias mixtas. El modelo propone una manera de modelar mercados con productos homogéneos donde la publicidad genera diferenciación sujetiva y cambia la naturaleza de la competencia en precios.<br/>El capítulo "¿Es la venta conjunta anticompetitiva?" analiza las consecuencias de la venta conjunta sobre los precios en un mercado con productos complementarios. Tramite un modelo de competencia imperfecta con diferenciación espacial, identifica los incentivos para elegir la venta conjunto de complementos, por dos tipos de función de demanda, y se estudia como cambian con el número de complementos. Con una demanda inelástica, la venta conjunta proporciona una ventaja frente a competidores que venden componentes separados. Además, los competidores no pueden mejorar su situación a través de la venta conjunta. Con una demanda elástica, los incentivos para venta conjunta son mayores, y cuando existen, el resultado del mercado es venta conjunta simétrica - el más competitivo. El análisis del bienestar muestra que los incentivos para venta conjunta son excesivos. Sin embargo, la venta conjunta simétrica genera un excedente del consumidor mayor y beneficios menores que la venta conjunta asimétrica (el resultado del mercado con una demanda inelástica). El potencial anticompetitivo de la venta conjunta es particularmente sensitivo a la elasticidad de la demanda.<br/>El capítulo "La innovación en un modelo asimétrico: Comparando los equilibrios de Cournot y Bertrand" compara los resultados de mercado y la eficiencia dinámica de dos tipos de equilibrios en un duopolio diferenciado con bienes sustitutivos, en que solo una empresa puede reducir su coste marginal antes de competir en el mercado. Se muestra que, si la diferenciación es baja y los costes de I&D bajos: (i) la innovación puede ser mayor cuando las empresas compiten en precios si la difusión es baja; (ii) la cantidad producida, el excedente del consumidor y el excedente total pueden ser mayores cuando las empresas compiten en cantidades y la difusión es alta. Un nuevo resultado de este análisis es que, con reducción de coste, tanto los consumidores como los productores pueden estar mejor cuando se compite en cantidades. Se presentan ejemplos numéricos que muestran que estos resultados no dependen de la asimetría del modelo. Se identifica también una equivalencia de parámetros que extiende los resultados a modelos con innovación de la calidad. En efecto, los incentivos para mejorar la calidad pueden ser mayores cuando las empresas compiten en precios, si la diferenciación es baja.<br>My Ph.D. Thesis is intended as a contribution to oligopoly theory. It deals with the analysis of price competition when there is strategic interaction amongst firms. I am especially interested in situations where product market competition is preceded by another strategic decision.<br/>In the chapter entitled "Advertising, Brand Loyalty and Pricing", I study the strategic effect of persuasive advertising in homogenous product markets. For this purpose, I construct a model of two-dimensional competition in non-price advertising and prices. Firms, first, invest in advertising in order to induce brand loyalty within consumers who otherwise would purchase the cheapest alternative on the market. Then, they compete in prices for the remaining brand indifferent consumers. I define the outcome of this two-stage game and show that firms invest a positive amount in advertising and prices exhibit dispersion being random draws from asymmetric distributions. The variation in the price distributions is reflected by the expected profits and, in consequence, the advertising levels chosen by the firms are asymmetric. There is one firm choosing a lower advertising level while the remaining firms choose the same higher advertising. Given this profile of advertising expenditure, there are a family of pricing equilibria with at least two firms randomising on prices. The setting suggests a way of modelling homogenous product markets where persuasive advertising creates subjective product differentiation and changes the nature of subsequent price competition.<br/>In "Is Bundling Anticompetitive?", I analyse the implications of bundling on price competition, in a market with complementary products. Using a model of imperfect competition with spatial product differentiation, I identify the incentives to bundle for two types of demand functions and study how they change with the size of the bundle. With an inelastic demand, bundling creates an advantage over uncoordinated rivals (selling separate complementary components). Moreover, the rivals cannot improve by bundling. I show that this no longer holds with an elastic demand. The incentives to bundle are stronger and, whenever they exist, the market outcome is symmetric bundling, the most competitive one. I perform the related welfare analysis and show that the incentives to bundle are socially excessive. However, bundle against bundle competition (the market outcome with an elastic demand) generates higher consumer surplus and lower profits than bundle against component competition (the market outcome with inelastic demand). This analysis shows that the potential anticompetitiveness of bundling is particularly sensitive to the price elasticity of the demand function.<br/>The last chapter is "Innovation in an Asymmetric Setting: Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria", a joint work with Ugur Akgun. This paper compares the outcomes and the dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods, where only one firm can reduce marginal cost before product market competition. We show that, with high substitutability and low innovation costs: <br/>-R&D levels can be higher under price competition if spillovers are low;<br/>-output, consumer surplus and total welfare can be larger under Cournot if spillovers are high.<br/>A new result of this article is that with process innovation, both consumers and producers can be better off under quantity competition. We provide well-defined numeric examples showing that these findings do not depend on the asymmetry of the model.
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Zanaj, Skerdilajda. "Competition in successive oligopolies." Université catholique de Louvain, 2008. http://edoc.bib.ucl.ac.be:81/ETD-db/collection/available/BelnUcetd-04222008-124532/.

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Successive markets constitute a natural framework to study the value chain. This chain is built through the technological linkage between markets where inputs and the corresponding outputs are produced. If goods pass through a chain of imperfectly competitive markets, in excess of the value markups are also added, at each step, to the costs. This thesis firstly proposes a unified framework to analyze competition in successive oligopolies. Analyzing and developing such a general framework forms a basis for the analysis of entry of new firms and of collusive agreements in the same market, like horizontal mergers, or through different markets, like vertical integration. The results bring new insights on equilibrium outcomes of both collusive agreements and entry of new firms.
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Spagnolo, Giancarlo. "Essays on managerial incentives and product-market competition." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 1999. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/500.htm.

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Sun, Wei S. M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/39211.

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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Computation for Design and Optimization Program, 2006.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-110).<br>The price of anarchy quantifies the inefficiency that occurs in the total system objective in the user optimization as compared to the system optimization setting. It is well known that this inefficiency occurs due to lack of coordination among the competitors in the system. In this thesis, we study the price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market by comparing the total profits in the two settings. The main contribution of this thesis is a lower and an upper bound for the price of anarchy that only depends on the price sensitivity matrix characterizing the demand sellers face. We first derive these bounds for a symmetric affine demand model. Using the same approach, we also provide a lower bound for asymmetric affine demand as well as a lower and an upper bound for nonlinear demand. These bounds are easy to compute. In addition, we illustrate that the worst-case price of anarchy value occurs for a uniform demand model when quality differences do not exist among sellers. This implies that in many real-world instances where quality differences exist, the performance under the user optimization may in fact be close to what is achieved under system optimization. We illustrate several insights on the bounds we present through simulations.<br>by Wei Sun.<br>S.M.
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Fik, Timothy Joseph. "Price variation in spatial oligopolies." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184708.

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As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations in space there has been a considerable amount of renewed interest in the issues pertaining to the geography of price. In the short time since Hay and Johnston (1980) lamented the insufficient attention being given to the theoretical background of geographic pricing, there has been impressive amounts of progress in certain analytical areas. However, within this bulk of literature, we still know remarkably little about the determinants of geographic price variation in spatial markets containing numerous sellers (firms) and buyers (consumers). Perhaps this should not be surprising given that much of the current research is being carried out by economists (who generally tend to emphasize market process in classically constructed structural-conduct-performance modes) rather than geographers (who tend to emphasize market description and locational patterns/properties arising from spatially defined economic and behavioral market processes). This dissertation focuses on geographic price variations in competitive oligopolies, where firms react under alternative pricing conjectures/strategies. Using computer aided simulation, the analytics of equilibrium price levels are examined in one-dimensional bounded and unbounded markets to uncover the algebraic properties of spatial markets, the effects of firm density, firm location, and demand elasticity on prices, the perversities associated with consumer-related transportation costs, and the distorting effects of mixed or asymmetrical rivals' pricing strategies. The modeling of spatial price competition is regarded as essential in the evaluation of equilibrium price as a function of boundary complications, market description, and the spatial arrangement of interdependent rivals. Long-run implications of spatial price competition are discussed with the intention of developing a model (beyond the scope of this dissertation) that not only recognizes rivals' price reactions, but also stresses locationally competitive strategies. Some empirical evidence on the nature of spatial price dependence amongst rival food chains in a metropolitan area is also examined.
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Kabré, Béné-Wendé Anicet. "Politiques environnementales et pollution dans des modèles d'oligopole bilatéral." Thesis, Paris 10, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA100138.

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Les Gaz à Effet de Serre (GES) jouent un rôle crucial dans la régulation du climat. Le changement climatique, conséquence de l'accumulation de GES dans l'atmosphère, a de nombreux impacts tels que les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes (tempêtes, ouragans, cyclones, inondations, canicules, sécheresses), la disparition d'espèces animales et végétales, la prévalence croissante des maladies liées à la pollution atmosphérique (santé respiratoire par exemple). La pollution industrielle contribue au changement climatique. Par ailleurs, les firmes produisant un même bien sont en perpétuelle concurrence et leurs niveaux d'émission diffèrent selon leur technologie et leur pouvoir de marché. Compte tenu de ces effets néfastes croissants des agents économiques sur l'environnement, il est nécessaire que des politiques publiques soient mises en place pour réduire les émissions de GES.L'objectif de la thèse est triple. D'une part, elle vise à analyser la pollution dans des structures de marchés où tous les agents se comportent de manière stratégique (concurrence oligopolistique). D'autre part, elle vise à effectuer des exercices de statique comparative afin de mesurer les effets des variations de paramètres sur les équilibres stratégiques. Enfin, elle étudie différentes politiques publiques pour réguler les émissions liées à cette pollution. Notons ici que la thèse porte plus sur l'atténuation que sur l'adaptation au changement climatique.Le domaine exploré se situe au croisement de l'économie de l'environnement, et des jeux stratégiques de marché<br>Greenhouse gases (GHG) play a crucial role in climate regulation. Climate change, due to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, has many consequences such as extremes weather events (storms, hurricanes, cyclones, floods, heat waves, droughts), extinction of animal and plant species, the increasing prevalence in diseases related to air pollution (e.g.,health respiratory). Industrial pollution contributes to climate change. Moreover, firms which produce the same good are in constant competition and their emission levels differ according to their technology and market power. Facing these deteriorating effects of the behaviour of economic agents on the environment, it is necessary to implement public policies to alleviate GHG emissions.The objective of this thesis is threefold. On the one hand, it aims to analyze pollution in market structures where all agents behave strategically (oligopolistic competition). On the other hand, it aims to carry out comparative static exercises in order to capture the effects of parameter variations on strategic equilibria. Finally, it studies different public policies to regulate emissions related to this pollution. It should be noted here that the thesis focuses more on mitigation than adaptation to climate change.The explored domain is at the junction of environmental economics, and strategic market games
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Linnosmaa, Ismo. "Essays on product market competition and managerial incentives in oligopoly firms /." Kuopio : Kuopion yliopisto, 2001. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy035/2002507609.html.

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Books on the topic "Oligopolic market"

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Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh. Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality. Springer Japan, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55396-0.

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Dunnett, Andrew. Understanding the market. Longman, 1987.

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Jacquemin, Alex. The new industrial organization: Market forces and strategic behavior. MIT Press, 1987.

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Gehrig, Thomas. Natural oligopoly in intermediated markets. LSE Financial Markets Group, 1990.

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1977-, Hagiu Andrei, and Harvard Business School, eds. Strategic interactions in two-sided market oligopolies. Harvard Business School, 2009.

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1977-, Hagiu Andrei, and Harvard Business School, eds. Strategic interactions in two-sided market oligopolies. Harvard Business School, 2008.

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Greenberg, Joseph. A simple proof of the equivalence theorem for oligopolistic mixed markets. Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 1986.

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Acemoglu, Daron. Competition and efficiency in congested markets. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

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Acemoglu, Daron. Competition and efficiency in congested markets. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.

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Acemoglu, Daron. Competition and efficiency in congested markets. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.

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Book chapters on the topic "Oligopolic market"

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Chakravarty, Satya R. "Oligopolies and Aggregate Market Power." In Mathematical Modelling in Economics. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78508-5_35.

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Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh. "Introduction." In Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality. Springer Japan, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55396-0_1.

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Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh. "Allocation of Scarce Resources." In Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality. Springer Japan, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55396-0_2.

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Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh. "Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process." In Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality. Springer Japan, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55396-0_3.

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Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh. "On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions." In Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality. Springer Japan, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55396-0_4.

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Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh. "Some Specific Market Quality Issues in Emerging Economies." In Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality. Springer Japan, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55396-0_5.

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Rothschild, K. W. "Oligopoly: Walking the Sylos-path." In Market and Institutions in Economic Development. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22526-2_10.

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Walter, Michael. "Der Markt für mobile Telekommunikation." In Enge Oligopole und Wettbewerbspolitik. Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-81047-2_6.

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Harks, Tobias, and Max Klimm. "Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market Access." In Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_16.

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Potters, Jan, and Sigrid Suetens. "Oligopoly Experiments in the Current Millennium." In A Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118790700.ch4.

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Conference papers on the topic "Oligopolic market"

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Ginevičius, Romualdas, and Algirdas Krivka. "The model of the integrated competitive strategy of an enterprise under the conditions of oligopolic market." In The 6th International Scientific Conference "Business and Management 2010". Vilnius Gediminas Technical University Publishing House Technika, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/bm.2010.132.

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Hong-Yan, Shi, Xu Zhen, and Chen Zhongju. "Analysis on Betrand model of oligopoly market." In 2010 2nd IEEE International Conference on Information and Financial Engineering (ICIFE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icife.2010.5609489.

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Ghosh, Arnob, and Saswati Sarkar. "Secondary spectrum oligopoly market over large locations." In 2016 Information Theory and Applications (ITA). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ita.2016.7888200.

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Goehlich, Robert. "Ticket Price Strategy for Oligopoly Space Tourism Market." In 54th International Astronautical Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, the International Academy of Astronautics, and the International Institute of Space Law. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/6.iac-03-iaa.3.2.02.

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Hesamzadeh, M. R., D. Biggar, N. Hosseinzadeh, and P. J. Wolfs. "Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming." In Energy Society General Meeting (PES). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pes.2009.5275636.

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Belsnes, M. M., G. Warland, and O. Wolfgang. "Simulating equilibrium prices in oligopoly power markets." In 2011 IEEE PES PowerTech - Trondheim. IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ptc.2011.6019238.

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Abozariba, Raouf, Md Asaduzzaman, and Mohammad N. Patwary. "Optimal Auctions in Oligopoly Spectrum Market with Concealed Cost." In 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC-Fall). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/vtcfall.2018.8690552.

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Charmaison, B. "Long-term contracts in a successive oligopolies industry: the issue of price indexation." In 2009 6th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2009). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2009.5207133.

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Matsumoto, Akio, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. "Environmental Effect of Ambient Charge in a Cournot Oligopoly Market." In 2017 2nd International Conference on Humanities and Social Science (HSS 2017). Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/hss-17.2017.104.

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Zhang, Xinhua, and Feng Chen. "Delayed Dynamic Model for Electric Power Bidding in Oligopoly Market." In 2009 Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/appeec.2009.4918253.

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Reports on the topic "Oligopolic market"

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Ben-Zvi, Shmuel, and Elhanan Helpman. Oligopoly in Segmented Markets. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2665.

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Brander, James, and Barbara Spencer. International Oligopoly and Asymmetric Labour Market Institutions. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2038.

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Kim, Dae-Wook, and Christopher Knittel. Biases in Static Oligopoly Models? Evidence from the California Electricity Market. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10895.

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Juarez, Leticia. Buyer Market Power and Exchange Rate Pass-through. Inter-American Development Bank, 2025. https://doi.org/10.18235/0013557.

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AuthorJuarez, LeticiaDate issuedJun 2025Read: English (0 downloads) DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013557SubjectSmall Business; Export; Exchange Rate; Competitiveness; Export Activity; Import ; Export MarketJEL codeD43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; E31 - Price Level • Inflation • Deflation; F31 - Foreign Exchange; F32 - Current Account Adjustment • Short-Term Capital MovementsCountryColombiaCategoryWorking PapersI derive a model-based equation relating pass-through to buyer size and estimate it on the micro transaction level data for Colombia. I find that after an exchange rate shock, sellers connected to larger buyers face more moderate changes in their prices in the seller currency (i.e., lower exchange rate pass-through) than those connected to small buyers. Pass-through ranges from 1% for firms connected with the largest buyers and up to 17% for firms connected with the smallest buyers. I use the estimates from the empirical analysis to calibrate the model and propose a counterfactual where buyer market power is eliminated. Under this scenario, sellers' revenues increase; however, the price in seller currency is more responsive to exchange rate shocks. I study the impact of buyer market power on international price responses to exchange rate changes. In markets with high buyer concentration, larger foreign buyers secure marked-down prices that adjust flexibly to exchange rate shocks. Using a novel dataset of Colombian export transactions, I estimate an open economy oligopsony model with endogenous markdowns, revealing that sellers connected to larger buyers experience milder price changes (1% impact) compared to those connected with smaller buyers (15% impact). These findings highlight a trade-off: while larger buyers reduce seller revenues, they also reduce sellers' exposure to exchange rate volatility, emphasizing the strategic importance of buyer relationships in international markets.
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Alviarez, Vanessa, Michele Fioretti, Ken Kikkawa, and Monica Morlacco. Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade. Inter-American Development Bank, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004746.

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We develop a quantitative theory of prices in firm-to-firm trade with bilateral negotiations and two-sided market power. Markups reflect oligopoly and oligopsony forces, with relative bargaining power as weight. Cost pass-through elasticities into import prices can be incomplete or complete, depending on the exporters and importers bargaining power and market shares. In U.S. import data, we find that U.S. importers have substantial market power and disproportionate leverage in price negotiations. The estimated model produces accurate predictions of the impact of Trump tariffs on pair-level prices. At the aggregate level, ignoring two-sided market power could exaggerate tariff pass-through by about 60 percent.
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Nesheim, Lars, Martin O'Connell, and Rachel Griffith. Sin taxes in differentiated product oligopoly: an application to the butter and margarine market. Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.cem.2010.3710.

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Carranza, Juan Esteban, Alejandra Ximena González-Ramírez, Juan Sebastián Vélez-Velásquez, and Alex Perez. Exchange rate pass-through in the Colombian car market. Banco de la República, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/be.1240.

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The incomplete pass-through of exchange rates to prices is a well-documented phenomenon. Firms respond optimally to exchange rate shocks by adjusting margins and buying inputs from regions with more advantageous terms of trade. Consumers, in turn, substitute goods that become more expensive for relatively cheaper goods after an exchange rate shock. We use data from the market for new cars in Colombia to empirically analyze the determinants of incomplete pass- through after a large depreciation of the local currency. We estimate a structural oligopoly model that nests the optimal reactions of firms and consumers to as- sess their relative importance in explaining the lack of response of retail prices to the exchange rate shock. We find that, in relative terms, the most important factor explaining incomplete pass-through is consumer substitution, followed by strategic interaction between sellers.
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Elbehri, Aziz, and Thomas Hertel. A Comparative Analysis of the EU-Morocco FTA vs. Multilateral Liberalization. GTAP Working Paper, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.21642/gtap.wp30.

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An applied general equilibrium model with oligopoly and scale economies, based on detailed plant-level data, is used to contrast the impacts of the Morocco-EU free trade area (FTA) to multilateral trade liberalization on Morocco’s economy. Simulation results show that the FTA agreement is likely to have adverse effects on Morocco due to: (a) deteriorating terms of trade, (b) reductions in output per firm in industries dominated by scale economies, (c) diversion of imports away from relatively low cost, non-EU suppliers, and (d) potentially adverse effects on the aggregate demand for labor which could exacerbate already high levels of unemployment. We contrast this FTA with a multilateral liberalization scenario along the lines of those proposed under the Doha Development Round and find this to be more beneficial to Morocco, despite the associated income transfer from the EU to Morocco. The difference may be attributed to: (a) lesser terms of trade losses, (b) positive scale effects, (c) non-preferential liberalization of imports into Morocco, and (d) a positive impact on aggregate labor demand and hence unemployment. We conclude that Morocco would be better off pursuing trade liberalization in the multilateral arena. JEL classification: F12, F14, F15 Keywords: Applied general equilibrium; Market Structure; Trade liberalization; Developing economies; Morocco
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