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Journal articles on the topic 'Principal (in relation to agent)'

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Published: 30 May 2022

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Masse, Claude. "L'abus des fonctions dans la relation préposé-commettant en droit civil québécois." Les Cahiers de droit 19, no. 3 (2005): 595–642. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042259ar.

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The following article deals with the problem of « misuse of office » in the principal-agent relationship under Quebec civil law. Despite the abundance of case law, solutions to the problem are not well defined especially in cases involving personality defects of the agent. The law concerning « misuse of office » is generally to be found in article 1054(7) of the Quebec Civil Code concerning the liability of principals. This controverted article not only deals with the liability of masters for servants, but also with the problem of torts committed by agents (art. 1731 C.C.). It also has an effe

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2

Petkovšek, Veronika, Nevenka Hrovatin, and Primož Pevcin. "Analysis of principal-agent relationship in Slovenian water and wastewater management." Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 8, no. 6 (2024): 3801. http://dx.doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i6.3801.

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The paper at hand analyses the principal-agent relationship, where comparative perspective between principals’ (municipalities) and agents’ (public utility providers) in the field of water and wastewater management is scrutinized. The goal of the paper is twofold: firstly, to present empirical results validating principal-agent relationships that emerged due to the reorganization process of public enterprises; secondly, to highlight the similarities and differences between the perspectives of principals and agents regarding motives, advantages and disadvantages, and price-setting in relation t

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3

Hanretty, Chris. "Agents and Patients: The Principal-Agent Perspective." European Political Science 9, no. 4 (2010): 481–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/eps.2010.57.

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Lalević, Nina. "Character of principal: Agent problem in corporate setting." Megatrend revija 20, no. 1 (2023): 197–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/megrev2301197l.

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Problems of conflict, motivation and motive are traditionally studied by social psychology and rational choice theory. One can decide whether to cooperate with others. In other case, person will act independently. When people decide to cooperate, they start a specific social interaction, known as a game. That game is familiar with a phenomenon named principal - agent problem. The core of this problem is linked to gradual drift between motives of principal and agent. Over time, agent will stop working for the principal's interest. Principal and agent roles are found in all systems with hierarch

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Maggetti, Martino, and Yannis Papadopoulos. "The Principal–Agent Framework and Independent Regulatory Agencies." Political Studies Review 16, no. 3 (2016): 172–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929916664359.

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The goal of this contribution is to discuss the application of the principal–agent framework to the study of interactions between elected politicians – the principal – and independent regulatory agencies – the agent. Through a review of recent research we suggest that the principal–agent framework, despite its parsimony and analytical leverage, requires considerable refinement to make sense of these relations. Indeed, evidence on the functioning of independent regulatory agencies shows that some of their key practices tend to deviate from expectations based on the principal–agent framework. Fi

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Worsham, Jeff, and Jay Gatrell. "Multiple Principals, Multiple Signals: A Signaling Approach to Principal-Agent Relations." Policy Studies Journal 33, no. 3 (2005): 363–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2005.00120.x.

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Salim, Sandra, Jessica Lioe, Sandy Harianto, and Yang Elvi Adelina. "The Impact of Corporate Governance Quality on Principal-Agent and Principal-Principal Conflict in Indonesia." Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan 24, no. 2 (2022): 91–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.9744/jak.24.2.91-105.

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This study analyzes the effect of corporate governance (CG) quality on principal-agent (PA) and principal-principal (PP) conflict in Indonesia while also controlling for potential endogeneity through the use of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. The results for PA conflict (measured by operating expense ratio and asset utilization ratio) are consistent with the notion that better CG quality leads to a lower level of PA conflict. However, the result for PP conflict is inconclusive. While a higher CG quality is positively related to a higher dividend payout ratio, which indicates a lower

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CARRUBBA, CLIFFORD J., and TOM S. CLARK. "Rule Creation in a Political Hierarchy." American Political Science Review 106, no. 3 (2012): 622–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000305541200024x.

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Principal-agent relations are replete in politics; politicians are agents of electorates, bureaucrats are agents of executives, lower courts are agents of upper courts, and much more. Commonly, principals are modeled as the rule-making body and agents as the rule-implementing body. However, principals often delegate the authority to make the rules themselves to their agents. The relationship between the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court is one such example; a considerable portion of the law (rules) is made in the lower federal courts with the Supreme Court serving primarily as the ove

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9

Fahmi, Ujang, Canggih Puspo Puspo Wibowo, and Faturahman Yudanto Yudanto. "Mapping The Principal-Agent Relation In Social Media: A Data Mining Approach." Jurnal Administrasi dan Kebijakan Publik 3, no. 2 (2019): 158–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.25077/jakp.3.2.158-178.2018.

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Most of the research on social media is conducted to comprehend and to exploit the presence of public opinion in it. Meanwhile, there has been limited research that explores the engagement process and interaction results from social media accounts. Therefore, this study aims to map the interaction between government and society in social media in principal-agent context. Exploration made from tweets posted by @KemenDesa and citizens' tweets which are mentioning @KemenDesa dated from 1 October 2014 to 31 September 2017. The results give an idea of the engagement process and the content of the i

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10

Jaeckel, Johann K. "Inside the Capitalist Firm: An Evolutionary Theory of the Principal-Agent Relation." Review of Political Economy 27, no. 2 (2015): 240–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2015.1010741.

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11

Boghossian, Nayiri. "Recent Amendments to the Commercial Agencies Law of the United Arab Emirates." Business Law Review 28, Issue 1 (2007): 8–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula2007003.

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This article examines the recently issued amendment to the Commercial Agencies Law, which reduces the level of protection given to commercial agents in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”). The article starts with a brief review of the main provisions of the law prior to amendment and their protective nature. It highlights the requirements of an agency agreement as per the applicable law and the constraints imposed on a principal who wishes to terminate or refuses to renew the agency agreement. The author then sheds some light on the inconveniences caused by the provisions of the applicable law wh

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12

Larsén, Magdalena Frennhoff. "Principal?Agent Analysis with One Agent and Two Principals: European Union Trade Negotiations with South Africa." Politics & Policy 35, no. 3 (2007): 440–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00068.x.

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13

Coletta, Damon. "Principal-agent theory in complex operations." Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 306–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778016.

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14

Gauld, Robin. "PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE." Policy Studies 28, no. 1 (2007): 17–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01442870601121395.

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15

Brychko, Maryna. "Governance of stakeholder’s financial relationships: evidence from Ukrainian banking." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 1 (2013): 706–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i1c7art7.

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This paper makes two related contributions to corporate finance theory and stakeholder theory. First, the author intend to examine relationship between sustainability of stakeholders’ financial relations and efficiency of corporate governance, taking into account lagging of decision-making corporate governance in banks to it financial performance. Second, the author seeks to prioritize stakeholders’ financial relations of the emerging stakeholder model of corporate governance at banks by analyzing two relevant dimensions of this model: contribution valued resources to the bank and power that t

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Chun, Se-Hak, and Jeong-Yoo Kim. "Vicarious Liability Under a Strict Liability Rule." Asian Journal of Law and Economics 12, no. 3 (2021): 287–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2021-0045.

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Abstract In this article, we extend the model of Newman, H., and D. Wright. 1990. “Strict Liability in a Principal-Agent Model.” International Review of Law and Economics 10: 219–231 and strengthens their result that the strict liability can attain social optimum in a principal-agent relation to the situation in which the court appreciates any contractual terms regarding apportionment of damages between an employer and an employee under vicarious liability rule. Our model also generalizes and extends vicarious liability to the negligence-based liability rule.

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Kotlubay, O. M., and O. A. Lypynska. "ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF FORWARDING COMPANIES AS CARGO AGENTS." Economic innovations 19, no. 1(63) (2017): 103–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.31520/ei.2017.19.1(63).103-109.

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The article deals with the peculiarities of the activity enterprises of transport-forwarding, which are in the legal field as the principal of the principal. Examples are given when the forwarding-agent delegates his responsibilities to the subagent, then the specifics of distributing responsibility between the agents. The rationale will be for the need to consolidate forwarding agents into multinational organizations that operate in different countries and assume responsibility for a separate company in its composition. Questions are raised about the economic-legal relations between the forwa

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18

Poth, Stephan, and Torsten J. Selck. "Principal Agent Theory and Artificial Information Asymmetry." Politics 29, no. 2 (2009): 137–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2009.01349.x.

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19

Wegrich, Kai. "Policy-Analyse und das Principal-Agent-Modell." Swiss Political Science Review 11, no. 2 (2005): 131–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2005.tb00358.x.

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Helgesson, Karin Svedberg. "Public-Private Partners Against Crime: Governance, Surveillance and the Limits of Corporate Accountability." Surveillance & Society 8, no. 4 (2011): 471–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.24908/ss.v8i4.4183.

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Recent risk-based regulation on anti-money laundering emphasises the need for private business actors to be more actively engaged in preventative efforts. This proposed public-private partnership against crime raises important questions of how to balance values and interests as it situates business actors in an intricate position at the centre of conflicting claims and attributions. Based on an interview study of the banking industry in Sweden, this article analyses how surveillance for the state in relation to anti-money laundering is implemented into the business-as-usual of business actors.

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21

Sebald, Alexander, and Markus Walzl. "Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal-Agent Relations." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 116, no. 2 (2014): 570–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12045.

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22

Mejia, Santiago. "Weeding Out Flawed Versions of Shareholder Primacy: A Reflection on the Moral Obligations That Carry Over from Principals to Agents." Business Ethics Quarterly 29, no. 04 (2019): 519–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/beq.2019.18.

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ABSTRACT:The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issue is necessary to identify the moral obligations within “shareholder primacy” (i.e., “shareholder theory”), which conceives of managers as agents of shareholders. My main claim is that the principal-agent relation requires agents to fulfill nonelective obligations, but it does not always re

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Pazdan, Jadwiga. "UMOCOWANIE DO ZAWARCIA UMOWY O ARBITRAŻ." Zeszyty Prawnicze 3, no. 2 (2017): 299. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/zp.2003.3.2.13.

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Power to Conclude an Arbitration Agreement on Behalf of Another PersonSummaryThe legal character of an arbitration agreement is disputable in the Polish doctrine. However, it is undisputable that such an agreement may be concluded by an agent. I mean here a power of attorney of the substantive law, and not the power to represent in the court proceedings.A principal may expressly authorize an agent to conclude a particular arbitration agreement (a specific power of attorney) or to conclude all arbitration agreements (a generic power of attorney).A question, however, arises, whether an agent aut

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Neads, Alex. "Rival principals and shrewd agents: Military assistance and the diffusion of warfare." European Journal of International Security 6, no. 2 (2021): 233–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.1.

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AbstractMilitary assistance is a perennial feature of international relations. Such programmes typically aim to improve the effectiveness of local partners, exporting the donor's way of war through the provision of training and equipment. By remaking indigenous armies in their own image, donors likewise hope to mitigate the profound agency costs associated with the transfer of military capability. But, while technical and organisational transformations can provide notable battlefield advantages, the philosophies underlying such innovations are not so easily propagated. Instead, new tactics, st

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25

Banker, Rajiv D., Masako N. Darrough, Rong Huang, and Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich. "The Relation between CEO Compensation and Past Performance." Accounting Review 88, no. 1 (2012): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50274.

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ABSTRACT: This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a chief executive officer's (CEO's) ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993–2006. Consistent with the predictions, we find that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs. We also find that while current salary is positively associated with future performance, current bonus i

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Bruno, Esien Eddy. "Principal-Agent Relation and Contracting-out for Employment Case Management to Enable Third-Country Nationals’ Transition to Work." NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 12, no. 2 (2019): 9–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2019-0012.

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AbstractThis paper analyzes the role of public and private employment-service agencies in contracting-out for employment case management under principal-agency relation to understand young third-country immigrants’ transition to work in Czechia, Poland, and Hungary. Existing research pointed to contracting-out as a major trend in public-service reforms when the government (principal) hires private employment agencies (agents) to perform service delivery, but overall the control of standards and the accountability to the public remains with the authority. Although the principal-agency relation

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Nurwati, Ammy, Bevaola Kusumasari, Agus Pramusinto, and Ahmad Maryudi. "Principal-Agent Relation in Conserving the Kali Putih Area in the Reconstruction and Mitigation Zone of Merapi Mountain National Park." Policy & Governance Review 4, no. 1 (2020): 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.30589/pgr.v4i1.279.

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This article aims to observe the dynamics of policy implementation involving various stakeholders in the effort of conserving one of the National Parks in Indonesia, particularly Merapi Mountain National Park (Taman Nasional Gunung Merapi – TNGM). Following the Zoning Policy implemented in the TNGM area, there is a zone that should have been protected from mining activities, namely the reconstruction and mitigation zone. However, in its implementation, the conservation collaboration agreement of one of the areas in the zone, namely the Kali Putih Area, is instead used by some parties to engage

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Kudin, Larisa. "Internal corporate control and CEO’s dual position." Теоретическая и прикладная экономика, no. 3 (March 2020): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-8647.2020.3.33170.

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The subject of this research is the relations emerging between the participants of corporate management and control, such as board of directors, CEO, and employees of the organization. Special attention is given to such relations with regards to administration of internal and external corporate control, as well as dual position of CEO as an object and subject of corporate control and management. The author systematizes the concepts of corporate control, as well as reveals the factors of internal corporate control. The participants of corporate management are viewed from the perspective of agen

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Cook, Brian J., and B. Dan Wood. "Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy." American Political Science Review 83, no. 3 (1989): 965–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962069.

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In the March 1988 issue of this Review, B. Dan Wood invoked a principal-agent perspective to establish the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping the outputs of public bureaucracies. He tested the model with air pollution enforcements of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) between 1977 and 1985. His results suggested some limitations on bureaucracies' responsiveness to elected political institutions, consistent with a principal-agent perspective with emphasis on the agent. Brian J. Cook challenges features of the design and empirical testing of Wood's hierarchical model. He ques

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Purnomo, Wahyudi, Novita Putri Rudiany, and Citra Hennida. "Private actor accountability on international regimes." Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik 30, no. 4 (2017): 323. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/mkp.v30i42017.323-332.

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Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have emerged along with the growing role of corporations in global development. One of the largest forms of PPP today is the UN Global Compact. The UN Global Compact involves of companies, NGOs, IGOs and state governments. All of them are trying to realize globalization with a more humanist face with attention to the protection of human rights, environment, labor standards and anti-corruption. Engaging private actors in global governance, The UN Global Compact raises many issues such as power, authority, and legitimacy. The effort to tackle it all is to incre

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Kwong, Charles C. L., and Pak K. Lee. "Business‐Government Relations in Industrializing Rural China: A principal‐agent perspective." Journal of Contemporary China 9, no. 25 (2000): 513–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713675949.

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Braun, Dietmar. "Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making." Journal of Public Policy 13, no. 2 (1993): 135–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00000994.

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AbstractThe role of semi-public intermediary institutions is underestimated in political research. This paper elaborates the dynamics of the interaction pattern of mission-agencies, promoting and conducting research in the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. The principal-agent-model serves as the organizing theoretical concept. By stressing the role of the third party, usually neglected in the model, it is shown that intermediary agencies in policy-making are drawn into cooperative and almost symbiotic relationships with the recipients of programs. The use of intermediary agenci

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Schnedler, Wendelin. "You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income and Effort." German Economic Review 12, no. 1 (2011): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2010.00508.x.

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Abstract Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. This paper provides conditions such that no success bonus induces the agent to exert more effort and the optimal contract is independent of success. Moreover, success bonuses may even reduce effort and thus the probability of success. The reason is that bonuses increase the perceived income of the agent and can hence reduce his willingness to exert effort. This perceived income effect has to be weighed against the incentive effect of the bonus. The tradeoff is determined by the

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Katica, Emina, and Semra Boga. "Principal-Agency Relations in Organizational Networks." International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences 7, no. 4 (2016): 35–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijsds.2016100103.

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The authors introduce the application of agency theory within organizational networks in order to offer some new insights for organizational and economic sciences. Previous research has neglected the presence of agency problem in these relatively new structures in favor of examining the nature of principal-agent relationship from behavioral and economic side. They emphasize the constraints such relationship can cause in networks and offer adequate propositions to solve it, referring to present solutions in agency theory. A set of new implications was derived from the theory as well as from cas

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Syam, Aldo Redho, Syarifan Nurjan, Rido Kurnianto, Lilis Sumaryanti, and Safitri Windi Handayani. "Kepemimpinan Visioner Kepala Sekolah dalam Meningkatkan Pendidikan Pariwisata." Jurnal Pendidikan Nusantara 1, no. 3 (2022): 139–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.55080/jpn.v1i3.18.

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This study aims to understand and analyze the visionary leadership of school principals in improving tourism education. Using this type of qualitative research with a phenomenological approach, the research target is at SMK Negeri 2 Ponorogo. Data collection techniques included in-depth interviews, participant observation, and documentation study. Data analysis techniques include data collection, condensation, data display, and drawing and verifying conclusions. The results showed that the principal's visionary leadership in improving tourism education at SMK Negeri 2 Ponorogo has been running

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Duff, Megan, and Priscilla Wohlstetter. "Negotiating Intergovernmental Relations Under ESSA." Educational Researcher 48, no. 5 (2019): 296–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/0013189x19854365.

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The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) has generated considerable buzz in education circles and the general media. But how much has really changed, and what does this mean for states as they begin the process of implementing a new federal education law? In this article, we apply principal-agent theory to explore intergovernmental relations under ESSA, focusing specifically on the relationship between the federal government (the principal) and state governments (the agents). First, we review power dynamics under No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and ESSA, exploring implications of changes in the subst

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Chen, Yanjun. "The Agency Problem: Examining the Dilemma Between Shareholder and CEO Bonus Structures." Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 30, no. 1 (2023): 255–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/30/20231484.

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The principal-agent problem is a well-known issue that arises when one party hires another party to act on their behalf, but the interests of the two parties are not perfectly aligned. When there is information imbalance between the principal and the agent, or when one party has more or better information than the other, this frequently occurs. The principal-agent dilemma in relation to information asymmetry is the main topic of this essay, which is a pervasive issue in various industries and has significant impacts on firm performance and dividend policies. By analyzing and synthesizing previ

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Taylor, Andrew J. "Congress as Principal: Exploring Bicameral Differences in Agent Oversight." Congress & the Presidency 28, no. 2 (2001): 141–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07343460109507750.

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POWELL, ROBERT. "Why Some Persistent Problems Persist." American Political Science Review 113, no. 4 (2019): 980–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000364.

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Recent work on counter-insurgency, client states, foreign aid, and proxy wars uses a principal–agent framework to study the principal’s ability to induce an agent to exert effort on the principal’s behalf. This work broadly emphasizes the moral hazard problem and the actors’ limited commitment power. The latter is usually addressed through the logic of repeated games in which reneging on an agreement triggers future punishment. This study analyzes a related incentive problem that undermines the principal’s ability to induce an agent to exert effort on its behalf. The repeated-game’s enforcemen

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Shaukat, Zahir Shah, and Afzaal Amin. "Governance and Recurrent Military Takeover Prospects: A Case Study of Pakistan." Global Political Review IV, no. I (2019): 62–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2019(iv-i).07.

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Civil-military relations in developing countries are at the heart of a central concern of democracy. In Pakistan, the same has not only been turbulent throughout our history; it has also been an uneasy relationship with frequent military interventions. However, in Pakistan military has come to identify itself with the state rather than just one of the key components of a constitutional state. The Agency Theory, based on Principal-Agent relation, has been applied by many to explain the 1999 Musharraf takeover in Pakistan. The intervention is justified on many grounds. But what is more interesti

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Bhargava, Hemant K., and Olivier Rubel. "Sales Force Compensation Design for Two-Sided Market Platforms." Journal of Marketing Research 56, no. 4 (2019): 666–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022243719825818.

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The authors study the use of sales agents for network mobilization in a two-sided market platform that connects buyers and sellers, and they examine how the presence of direct and indirect network effects influences the design of the sales compensation plan. They employ a principal–agent model in which the firm tasks sales agents to mobilize the side of the platform that it monetizes (i.e., sellers). Specifically, the presence of network effects alters the agency relationship between the firm and the sales agent, requiring the platform firm to alter the compensation design, and the nature of t

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Dariia, Iarmolovych. "Economic interests of participants in the agency process and maritime agency companies." Economic journal Odessa polytechnic university 2, no. 8 (2019): 66–73. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3591958.

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The article is devoted to the study of the activities of maritime agents, both in Ukraine and participants in the agency process, which is not an integral part of this process. The location of the maritime agency company with respect to other participants in the process of maritime agency and communication is shown in the course of the agency activity. The main components of the economic interest of these companies were identified. The actions of the maritime agent for the reception and departure of the vessel shall include compliance with all necessary formalities related to the vessel's

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Grower, Julius A. W. "On the Relations between Agent and Principal: Angove's Pty Ltd v Bailey." Modern Law Review 81, no. 1 (2018): 141–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12320.

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Goodsell, Charles T. "Relations between Political Appointees and Career Officials: Principal-Agent or Moral Equals?" Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2006): 323–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00306.x.

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Salehyan, Idean, David Siroky, and Reed M. Wood. "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities." International Organization 68, no. 3 (2014): 633–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002081831400006x.

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AbstractAlthough some rebel groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces incentives to “win the hearts and minds” of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike other lucrative resources, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals—namely, democracies and states with strong human rights lobbies—are more concerned with atrocities in the confli

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Hamazaki, Risa, and Yoshihiro Uesawa. "Characterization of Antineoplastic Agents Inducing Taste and Smell Disorders Using the FAERS Database." Pharmaceuticals 17, no. 9 (2024): 1116. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ph17091116.

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Taste and smell disorders can worsen the nutritional status of patients receiving chemotherapy and potentially affect drug treatment. However, there is limited knowledge on antineoplastic agents that induce taste and smell disorders. Therefore, we used the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Adverse Event Reporting System database to analyze the characteristics of patients and antineoplastic agents in relation to taste and smell disorders. No gender differences related to the onset of taste and smell disorders were found, whereas older age was identified as a possible risk factor. Among the anti

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Höfer, Andreas, and Andreas Oehler. "Sell-side security analysts in the nexus of principal-agent relations: An information economics perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 10, no. 2 (2013): 267–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv10i2c2art6.

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In this paper we investigate in depth the contractual partner relationships between sell-side security analysts and the correspondently involved parties, where the sell-side security analyst is considered as both principal and agent. We break the activities of security analysts down into a nexus of principal-agent relationships where the most striking contractual partner relationship in this network appears among sell-side analyst and the (to be) assessed company (evaluand). By analyzing the research question in this fashion we find considerable potential for information and moral hazard risks

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Galušková, Johana, and Petr Kaniok. "I Do It My Way: Analysis of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union." Politics in Central Europe 11, no. 2 (2015): 23–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pce-2015-0009.

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Abstract This article analyses development of the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the European Union (PermRep) from 2004, when the Czech Republic joined the European Union, until 2013. Its main aim is to test four concepts related to the three neoinstitutionalist theories – firstly, the path dependency and critical junctures models related to the historical neo-institutionalism, secondly principal-agent relation typical for the rational neo-institutionalism and the concept of the logic of appropriateness related to the sociological institutionalism. The authors try to determi

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Maraire, Fungayi Promote, Mohd Azizuddin Bin Mohd Sani, and Siti Darwinda Binti Mohamed Pero. "LIMITED DELEGATION AND FIRM CONTROL: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ACCOUNT OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) DECISION-MAKING ON ZIMBABWE’S LAND ISSUE." Journal of International Studies 17 (December 30, 2021): 157–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.32890/jis2021.17.7.

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This paper accounts for Southern African Development Community (SADC) decision-making on Zimbabwe’s land issue from the year 2000 onwards. Guided by the principal-agent model, this paper argues that the delegation and control dynamics emerging from SADC’s principal-agent institutional structure and relationships shaped the regional organisation’s (RO’s) decisions on Zimbabwe’s land issue. This study adopted a qualitative methodology to explore this proposition utilising both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were collected through semi-structured key informant interviews and

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Reykers, Yf, and Daan Fonck. "No wings attached? Civil–military relations and agent intrusion in the procurement of fighter jets." Cooperation and Conflict 55, no. 1 (2019): 66–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010836719850203.

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This article studies civil–military relations in defence procurement. Applying insights from the principal–agent model, we argue that decision-making about defence procurement is inherently vulnerable to agency problems. Given the technical nature of these dossiers, governments and parliaments are often heavily dependent upon military expertise, creating leeway for defence administrations to steer decision-making towards their preferences. By means of a case study of the replacement of the F-16 fighter jets in Belgium, we examine whether and how complex defence procurement dossiers allow for e

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