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Books on the topic 'We-intentionality'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 11 March 2023
Last updated: 26 July 2025

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1

Gopnik, Alison. How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Cambridge U. P., 1993.

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2

Textor, Mark. Intentionality Primitivism. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0004.

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Brentano endorsed (conceptual) primitivism about intentionality and the view that intentionality is fully revealed to us in its instantiations. The pros and cons of Brentano’s view that intentionality is a conceptually primitive property of every mental act are discussed. On the one hand, it makes clear why we need to distinguish between the immanent object (intentional correlate) and the external object. But, on the other hand, propositional attitudes turn out to be a major problem for intentionality primitivism. Meinong accepted Brentano’s Thesis as well as the existence of ‘propositional at
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3

Mendelovici, Angela. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001.

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Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of trac
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4

Mendelovici, Angela. Fixing Reference on Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0001.

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This chapter fixes reference on our target, intentionality. "Intentionality" is sometimes defined as the "aboutness" or "directedness" of mental states. While such definitions succeed at gesturing towards the phenomenon of interest, they are too fuzzy and metaphorical to fix firmly upon it. This chapter recommends an alternative ostensive way of defining "intentionality" as the feature of mental states that we at least sometimes notice introspectively in ourselves and are tempted to describe using representational terms like "of" or "about". This chapter argues that this definition does a bett
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5

Mendelovici, Angela. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0009.

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This chapter argues against the relation view of intentionality, on which intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing contents, and for the alternative aspect view, on which intentionality is a matter of having states with certain aspects. The relation view faces two problems: First, it cannot accommodate all the intentional contents we can manifestly represent without accepting a bloated ontology, which suggests that the view is wrong-headed. Second, it is not clear why being related to an item should make it perceptually represented, thought, entertained, or otherwise represented. Th
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6

Zahavi, Dan. Being We. Oxford University PressOxford, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780191915482.001.0001.

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Abstract What does it take to constitute a we with others and how does feeling, thinking, and acting as part of a we, transform one’s sense of self, one’s relation to others, and the way one experiences the world? Is individual subjectivity something that necessarily requires a communal grounding or does a we-relationship always presuppose a plurality of pre-existing selves? What kind of understanding of and relation to others is required if a we is to emerge? You can constitute a we together with somebody you hardly know, your partner, your family, your friends, your professional group, your
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7

Mendelovici, Angela. Goals and Methodology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0002.

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This chapter introduces the goals that will structure much subsequent discussion, as well as two theory-independent ways of knowing about intentionality. The overall goal of the book is to provide a theory of intentionality, which is a theory that describes the deep nature of intentionality—i.e., what it really is, metaphysically speaking. However, much of the discussion in later chapters is structured around the more modest goal of providing a theory that specifies what gives rise to actual instances of original intentionality. In order to meet this goal, it is helpful to have a theory-indepe
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8

Mendelovici, Angela. Nonconscious States. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0008.

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Nonconscious states, like standing beliefs and nonconscious states involved in early visual processing, pose a challenge for PIT: They seem to be intentional but not phenomenal. This chapter addresses this challenge. It begins by considering versions of PIT that take nonconscious states to have derived intentionality, arguing that none of the suggested derivation mechanisms is up to the task of generating new instances of intentionality. This chapter then recommends an alternative treatment of nonconscious states on which neither standing states nor most nonconscious occurrent states are genui
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9

Mendelovici, Angela. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0003.

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One prominent theory of intentionality is the tracking theory, on which original intentionality arises from tracking, where tracking is detecting, carrying information about or having the function of carrying information about, or otherwise appropriately corresponding to items in the environment. This chapter argues that tracking theories cannot accommodate certain paradigm cases of intentionality; in these mismatch cases, the contents ascribed by the tracking theory fail to match the contents that we have theory-independent reason to ascribe. This chapter focuses on one of the most obvious mi
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10

Furtak, Rick Anthony. Feeling Apprehensive. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190492045.003.0003.

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Our bodily states can affect our susceptibility toward emotional arousal; empirical research suggests that discrete patterns of somatic upheaval can be identified, at least for some emotions. Such findings correspond with the observation that there is something it’s like to feel a particular emotion: that the experience of emotion has a distinct subjective character. Rather than bodily feelings that are nothing but physical disturbances devoid of intentionality, they can be feelings about our surroundings, which have intentionality and are therefore capable of conveying significant information
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11

Winner, Ellen. “But My Kid Could Have Done That!”. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863357.003.0011.

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Many of us have a deep mistrust of abstract art. How can we tell if it is any good when we can’t use realism, subject matter, or narrative implications as a guide? In addition, abstract art looks superficially like paintings by preschoolers. This is why people say “My kid could have done that.” This chapter examines studies with adults and children showing that the untutored eye can distinguish works by children (and certain animals) from superficially similar works by abstract expressionist painters. We make this discrimination by perceiving intentionality. A computer can also be programmed t
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12

Carman, Taylor. Phenomenology. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.31.

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This article explores the role of phenomenology in philosophical inquiry. It begins by discussing Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reductions (the “transcendental” and the “eidetic”), the sharp distinction he draws between consciousness and reality, and his intuitive claims about intentionality. It then considers Martin Heidegger’s conceptions of phenomenon and phenomenology in relation to hermeneutics before returning to Husserl’s argument that we have a direct intuition, not just of entities, but of the phenomenal appearance of their being (and nonbeing). It also examines Heidegger’s claim
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13

Textor, Mark. The Intentionality of Enjoyment. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0010.

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Brentano sees a very close relation between enjoyment and perceptual consciousness. Enjoying an activity is, Brentano proposed, an intuitive model of awareness of an activity. The chapter outlines the Aristotelian background of Brentano’s view of enjoyment, highlighting four suggestions Aristotle made about pleasure. I will assess Brentano’s arguments for the view that the proper objects of enjoyment are only activities (Hedonic Energism), and defend this view against the claims of the Hedonic Objectivists and Subjectivists. In order to understand Brentano’s development of Hedonic Energism, as
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14

Zahavi, Dan. Intersubjectivity, Sociality, Community. Edited by Dan Zahavi. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.29.

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The chapter discusses how various early phenomenologists by starting from an examination of empathy and other forms of dyadic interpersonal relations went on to develop analyses of larger social units in order to address questions concerning the nature of our communal being-together. More specifically, it shows how an investigation of dyadic empathic encounters figures prominently in not only Husserl’s, but also Scheler’s and Walther’s subsequent analyses of experiential sharing and we-intentionality. Not all phenomenologists, however, agreed with this prioritization of second-person engagemen
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15

Heylighen, Francis, and Shima Beigi. Mind Outside Brain. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0005.

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We approach the problem of the extended mind from a radically non-dualist perspective. The separation between mind and matter is an artifact of the mechanistic worldview, which leaves no room for mental phenomena such as agency, intentionality, or experience. We propose to replace it by an action ontology, which conceives mind and matter as aspects of the same network of processes. By adopting the intentional stance, we interpret the catalysts of elementary reactions as agents exhibiting desires, intentions, and sensations. Autopoietic networks of reactions constitute more complex super-agents
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16

Linafelt, Tod. Poetry and Biblical Narrative. Edited by Danna Nolan Fewell. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199967728.013.6.

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Although virtually all other long narratives from the ancient world take the form of verse, biblical authors pioneered a prose style that, for reasons unknown, came to dominate ancient Hebrew narrative, relegating verse to nonnarrative genres. In other words, extended biblical Hebrew narrative always takes the form of prose, and biblical Hebrew poetry is nearly always nonnarrative. And yet, one finds authors and editors of the narratives dropping poems into the stories at key points, often because poetry provides literary resources unavailable in prose. By exploring both the form and function
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17

Lauria, Federico. The “Guise of the Ought-to-Be”. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0006.

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How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires. The second concerns the “death of desire” principle, i.e. the intuition that one cann
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18

Farkas, Katalin. Know-How and Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0004.

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This chapter addresses the question of whether know-how is non-propositional. The question is usually approached through asking whether “know-how” is distinct from “know-that”. The chapter proposes that we should narrow our question. It briefly recalls a certain tradition of talking about knowledge that sees it as a uniquely human cognitive achievement with a normative aspect. The central and paradigmatic case has been a certain kind of possession of truth. But is there another, similarly valuable and uniquely human cognitive achievement? The outlines of such a concept are presented: it’s an a
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19

Burazin, Luka. Legal Systems as Abstract Institutional Artifacts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198821977.003.0006.

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This chapter claims that legal systems are abstract institutional artifacts and that as such they existentially or ontologically depend on collective intentionality in the form of (a we-mode) collective recognition. It argues that this recognition, as a social practice accompanied with its participants’ particular attitude toward it, constitutes a social norm by which a group of people collectively imposes an institutional status of officials or make it the case that an institutional status of legal system exists. It further claims that legal systems often emerge gradually from standing rudime
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20

Persson, Ingmar. Reasons in Action. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845034.001.0001.

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The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinct
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21

Harris, Tina M. Dismantling Racism, One Relationship at a Time. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2023. https://doi.org/10.5040/9798881814243.

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Dismantling Racism: One Relationship at a Time inspires and challenges readers to think critically about racism and its impact on themselves and others in complex and nuanced ways. With a commitment to an inverted approach to racism, Tina M. Harris’ trickle-down theory illustrates the interconnection between racist ideologies and interracial relationships. The example of interracial romantic relationships as an illustration of how societal attitudes dictate interracial relationships shows how trickle-down theory brings to the surface a person’s and society’s true attitudes about race. The theo
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22

Mendelovici, Angela. Thought. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0007.

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Thoughts present a challenge for PIT. They seem to represent various contents, including rich descriptive contents, broad contents, and object-involving contents, but it is not clear how PIT can accommodate them. This chapter argues that thoughts have a largely neglected kind of content, immediate content, which is plausibly phenomenally represented and from which rich descriptive, broad, and object-involving contents can be derived. On the proposed view of derived mental representation, self-ascriptivism, thoughts derivatively represent their alleged contents because we ascribe them to our th
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23

Stahl, Titus. Immanent Critique. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2021. https://doi.org/10.5040/9798881812409.

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When we criticize social institutions and practices, what kinds of reasons can we offer for such criticism? Political philosophers often assume that we must rely on universal moral principles that are not necessarily connected to the particular social practices of our communities. Traditionally, continental critical theory has rejected this claim through its endorsement of the method of immanent critique. Immanent critique is a critique of social practices that draws on norms already present within these practices to demand social change, rather than merely conservatively reproducing them. Tit
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24

McDonough, Jeffrey K. Teleology. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190845711.001.0001.

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Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is the belief that, for example, eyes are for seeing and gills are for breathing. It is the belief that people go to the cinema in order to see films and that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn. The core idea of teleology is thus intuitive enough. Nonetheless, difficult questions arise as we dig deeper into the concept. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic—that is, is teleology inherent in its subjects or is it imposed on them from the outside? Does teleology necessarily involve intentionality—that i
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25

McNamara, Patrick, and Magda Giordano. Cognitive Neuroscience and Religious Language. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190636647.003.0005.

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Communication between deities and human beings rests on the use of language. Religious language has peculiarities such as the use of a formal voice, reductions in first-person and elevation of third-person pronoun use, archaistic elements, and an abundance of speech acts—features that reflect and facilitate the binding of the individual to conceived ultimate reality and value, decentering the Self while focusing on the deity. Explorations of the neurologic correlates of these cognitive and linguistic processes may be useful to identify constraints on neurocognitive models of religious language
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26

Bartlett, Becky. Badfilm. Edinburgh University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474450423.001.0001.

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This book examines badfilms, a subcategory of ‘bad cinema’ marked by incompetence and typically exacerbated by material poverty and restrictive production conditions. It establishes a framework through which the formal characteristics of failure can be established and analysed, and identifies intentionality as central to how badfilms are recognised and valued as cult texts. Drawing on debates about cult cinema, film form, cultural value and taste, and interrogating critical concepts such as ‘so bad it’s good’, the book investigates the impact of failure, incompetence, and ineptitude in post-pr
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27

Ratcliffe, Matthew. Real Hallucinations. The MIT Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262036719.001.0001.

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Real Hallucinations is a philosophical study of the structure of human experience, its vulnerability to disruption, and how its integrity depends on interpersonal relations. It focuses on the beguilingly simple question of how we manage to routinely distinguish between our experiences of perceiving, remembering, imagining, and thinking. This question is addressed via a detailed philosophical study of auditory verbal hallucinations (usually defined as hearing a voice in the absence of a speaker) and thought insertion (somehow experiencing one’s own thoughts as someone else’s). The book shows ho
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28

Peters, Mark A., and Reginald L. Sanders, eds. Compositional Choices and Meaning in the Vocal Music of J. S. Bach. Lexington Books, 2018. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781666988079.

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Compositional Choices and Meaning in the Vocal Music of J. S. Bach collects seventeen essays by leading Bach scholars. The authors each address in some way such questions of meaning in J. S. Bach’s vocal compositions—including his Passions, Masses, Magnificat, and cantatas—with particular attention to how such meaning arises out of the intentionality of Bach’s own compositional choices or (in Part IV in particular) how meaning is discovered, and created, through the reception of Bach’s vocal works. And the authors do not consider such compositional choices in a vacuum, but rather discuss Bach’
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29

Roelofs, Luke. Combining Minds. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190859053.001.0001.

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This book explores a neglected philosophical question: How do groups of interacting minds relate to singular minds? Could several of us, by organizing ourselves the right way, constitute a single conscious mind that contains our minds as parts? And could each of us have been, all along, a group of mental parts in close cooperation? Scientific progress seems to be slowly revealing that all the different physical objects around us are, at root, just a matter of the right parts put together in the right ways: How far could the same be true of minds? This book argues that we are too used to seeing
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30

Tomasello, Michael. What did we learn from the ape language studies? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0007.

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The ‘ape language’ studies have come and gone, with wildly divergent claims about what they have shown. Without question, the most sophisticated skills have been displayed by Kanzi, a male bonobo exposed from youth to a human-like communicative system. This chapter attempts to assess, in an objective a manner as possible, the nature of the communicative skills that Kanzi and other great apes acquired during the various ape language projects. The overall conclusion is that bonobos and other apes possess most of the requisite cognitive skills for something like a human language, including such t
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31

Clay, Zanna, and Emilie Genty. Natural communication in bonobos: Insights into social awareness and the evolution of language. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0008.

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Our capacity for language is a central aspect of what it means to be human and sets us apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Given that language does not fossilize, one way to understand how and when it first evolved is to examine the communicative capacities of our closest living relatives, the great apes. This chapter reviews recent research exploring natural communication in our least understood but closest living relative, the bonobo (Pan paniscus). It primarily focuses on what natural bonobo communication can tell us about their underlying social awareness and how this relates to the
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32

Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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33

Beyer, Christian, Frode Kjosavik, and Christel Fricke. Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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34

Beyer, Christian, Frode Kjosavik, and Christel Fricke. Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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35

Beyer, Christian, Frode Kjosavik, and Christel Fricke. Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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36

Strawser, Michael. Kierkegaard and the Philosophy of Love. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2015. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781666999587.

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Ironically, the philosophy of love has long been neglected by philosophers, so-called “lovers of wisdom,” who would seemingly need to understand how one best becomes a lover. In Kierkegaard and the Philosophy of Love, Michael Strawser shows that the philosophy of love lies at the heart of Kierkegaard’s writings, as he argues that the central issue of Kierkegaard’s authorship can and should be understood more broadly as the task of becoming a lover. Strawser starts by identifying the questions (How should I love the other? Is self-love possible? How can I love God?) and themes (love’s immediacy
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