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Journal articles on the topic 'We-intentionality'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 11 March 2023

Last updated: 26 July 2025

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1

Giovagnoli, Raffaela. "Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals." Proceedings 47, no. 1 (2020): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2020047065.

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The notion of “habit” is at the center of a lively philosophical debate that shows how some ideas from classical thought are still plausible and useful to understand human behavior in ordinary life. Following Aristotle, we can intend habits through the process of “habits learning”, which is a central topic in neuroscience and neurobiology. We investigate the dimensions of habitual behavior and its extension to the social world.

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Giovagnoli, Raffaela. "Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals." Proceedings 47, no. 1 (2020): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings47010065.

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The notion of “habit” is at the center of a lively philosophical debate that shows how some ideas from classical thought are still plausible and useful to understand human behavior in ordinary life. Following Aristotle, we can intend habits through the process of “habits learning”, which is a central topic in neuroscience and neurobiology. We investigate the dimensions of habitual behavior and its extension to the social world.

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3

Zahavi, Dan. "We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood." Journal of Social Ontology 7, no. 1 (2021): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-0076.

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Abstract The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to addr

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Horgan, Terry, and John Tienson. "Phenomenal Intentionality and Intentionality Holism." ProtoSociology 40 (2023): 60–75. https://doi.org/10.5840/protosociology2023406.

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A number of philosophers, ourselves included, advocate the Phenomenal Intentionality thesis, which asserts that the fundamental kind of intentionality or aboutness is the intentionality of occurrent conscious states or processes. We take this to imply that phenomenal intentionality is both intrinsic and basic. We ourselves also maintain that phenomenal intentionality of the kind instantiated in humans can only occur within the context of a wider cognitive system with the capacity to undergo a whole range of distinct phenomenal/ intentional states/processes. There is a prima facie tension here.

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Choi, Se Yeon, Goo Hyeok Chung, and Jin Nam Choi. "Why are we having this innovation? Employee attributions of innovation and implementation behavior." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 47, no. 7 (2019): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.8124.

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We used attribution theory to explain employee behavior toward innovation implementation. We focused on employee innovation attributions to organizational intentionality as employees' sensemaking of why their organization has adopted an innovation. We identified two types of employee attributions: to constructive intentionality and to deceptive intentionality. We collected data from 397 employees and 84 managers of Chinese and Korean organizations. Results showed that employee attribution to constructive intentionality enhanced innovation effectiveness by increasing active implementation and d

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Kiverstein, Julian, and Erik Rietveld. "Skilled we-intentionality: Situating joint action in the living environment." Open Research Europe 1 (September 27, 2021): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.13411.2.

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There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation

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Arruda, Caroline T. "What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality." Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, no. 1 (2016): 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12162.

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Bian, Xiaoying, Yifang Wang, and Xiaolu Zhong. "Development of understanding of intentionality and moral judgments in preschoolers." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 45, no. 5 (2017): 859–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.6296.

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To explore the development of preschoolers' understanding of intentionality and moral judgments, we administered 3 tasks (classic intentionality, skill intentionality, and awareness intentionality) to 344 children aged between 3 and 6 years. The results showed that children's understanding of intentionality and moral judgments developed with increasing age. That is, the intentionality and moral judgments made by 3- to 5-year-olds were generally based on behavioral outcomes. In contrast, 6-year-old children started to make judgments by combining behavioral outcomes with intentionality condition

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9

Nörnberg, Henning. "Elementary Affective Sharing." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018, no. 1 (2018): 129–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108080.

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This paper contributes to the current discussion on collective affective intentionality. Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature ofamore general form of we-intentionality being already in place. In contrast to this view, the paper attempts to explicate a more elementary form of affective sharing that does not simply presuppose other forms of we-intentionality, but amounts to a primitive form of we-intentionality of its own. The account presented here draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: prereflective we-intentionality on the one hand

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Calabi, Clotilde, and Alberto Voltolini. "Should Pride of Place be Given to the Norms? Intentionality and Normativity." Facta Philosophica 7, no. 1 (2005): 85–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/10.3726/93519_85.

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Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this paper, we discuss Brandom and McDowell’s thesis and the arguments they provide for its defence. In contrast to what they hold, we argue that neither refer

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11

Kiverstein, Julian, and Erik Rietveld. "Skilled we-intentionality: Situating joint action in the living environment." Open Research Europe 1 (May 21, 2021): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.13411.1.

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There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation

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12

Plotkin, H. C. (Henry C. ). "We-Intentionality: An Essential Element in Understanding Human Culture?" Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46, no. 2 (2003): 283–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pbm.2003.0028.

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Bradley, Deborah. "Imagining Music Education in the “We-Mode”." Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education 20, no. 1 (2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.22176/act20.1.1.

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In this article, I explore the “we-mode,” a concept under investigation by social cognition researchers that emerged from John Searle’s concept of collective Intentionality. Wemode thinking captures the viewpoints of individuals engaged in social interactions and expands each individual’s potential for social understanding and action. This access to the knowledge and understandings of those with whom they collaborate creates shared knowledge and understandings that may lead to collective Intentionality or we-mode. The discussion begins with a look at how living and working in groups affects id

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Vasylchenko, Andriy. "Intersubjective approach to intentionality and internal objects." Filosofska dumka (Philosophical Thought) -, no. 6 (2021): 27–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/fd2020.06.027.

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Intentionality — the orientation of mental states to objects (things, properties, states of things, events) — has been considered a hallmark of the psyche since Brentano’s time. In this article, we consider the problem of intentionality from the second-person approach, or the standpoint of intersubjectivity. Our analysis shows that intentionality is intrinsically projective. The projective nature of intentionality is related to internal objects that play a crucial role in fixing the person’s subjective experience and serve as a fulcrum in the development of the person. The internal object can

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MacKenzie, Matthew. "Reflexivity, Intentionality, and the Embodied Subject: A Phenomenological Reflection in Honor of J. N. Mohanty." Philosophy East and West 75, no. 3 (2025): 487–509. https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2025.a965458.

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Abstract: In The Concept of Intentionality , J. N. Mohanty identifies two significant conceptions of consciousness in both India and the West: "(i) the concept of consciousness as that which exhibits a peculiar property called 'intentionality' or saviṣayakatva ; and (ii) the concept of consciousness as that which is characterized by a peculiar property called 'reflexivity' or svayamprakāśatva " (Mohanty 1971, p. 153). Following Mohanty's lead, we may ask how we should understand reflexivity and intentionality as aspects of the conscious life of an embodied subject. On the view I articulate, re

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PLANT, ROBERT, and JEN REN. "A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MOTIVATION AND ENTREPRENEURIAL INTENTIONALITY: CHINESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES." Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 15, no. 02 (2010): 187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1084946710001506.

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In this paper, we compare the intentionality of students in graduate business programs in the United States and China toward becoming entrepreneurs. We utilize Amabile's Work Preference Inventory (WPI) to examine the motivational dimension of entrepreneurial intentionality and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to compare the impact of gender and family history of self-employment on employment intentionality. Our results suggest there is a positive relationship with entrepreneurial intent in both the intrinsic challenge characteristic and extrinsic compensation characteristic. Results also s

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Choudhury, Pooja. "Searle's Collective Intentionality: A Defence." Philosophical Readings XIV, no. 3 (2022): 109–13. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7455544.

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This paper concerns social ontology. At the heart of the discussion of social ontology are <em>institutional facts</em>. These are indispensable to sustain harmoniously in a society. The focal point of this paper is <em>collective intentionality </em>or <em>we-intentionality</em> that is used to create institutional facts. It is one of the building blocks in the creation of institutional facts. There is a debate within the social ontological arena whether the collective intentionality can or cannot be reduced to individual intentionality. Primarily, I will deal with th

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Kuhlmeier, Valerie A., and Susan A. J. Birch. "Steps toward categorizing motivation: Abilities, limitations, and conditional constraints." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, no. 5 (2005): 706–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x05380125.

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Tomasello et al. have not characterized the motivation underlying shared intentionality, and we hope to encourage research on this topic by offering comparative paradigms and specific empirical questions. Although we agree that nonhuman primates differ greatly from us in terms of shared intentionality, we caution against concluding that they lack all aspects of it before other empirical tools have been exhausted. In addition, identifying the conditions in which humans spontaneously engage in shared intentionality, and the conditions in which we fail, will more fully characterize this ability.

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Soares, Maria Luísa Couto. "Notas sobre Referência e Intencionalidade: Frege e Husserl." Phainomenon 20-21, no. 1 (2010): 25–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2010-0002.

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Abstract This paper aims to present an approach to Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning in order to integrate meaning in the broader context of intentionality. Intentionality and reference are two notions with affinities, despite their pertaining to different but not separated areas. . . When comparing Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning and intentionality we may provide a fruitful and enriching perspective: some problems and concepts of Husserl’s thought may be elucidated if confronted with those of Frege. On the other hand, Husserl’s theories of meaning and intentionality provide a br

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Leite Bastos, Cleverson, and Tomas Rodolfo Drunkenmolle. "Intentionality: A philosophical-cognitive approach to mental representations." Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26, no. 39 (2014): 819. http://dx.doi.org/10.7213/aurora.26.039.ao06.

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This article critically analyses the notion of intentionality from several philosophical cognitive points of view. The authors argue that the notion of mental representation in the wider sense and intentionality in the narrower sense remains elusive despite accommodated paradoxes, improved semantic precision and more sophisticated strategies in dealing with intentionality. We will argue that different approaches to intentionality appear to be coherent in their inferences. However, most of them become contradictory and mutually exclusive when juxtaposed and applied to borderline questions. Whil

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Becchio, Cristina, and Cesare Bertone. "Wittgenstein running: Neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode." Consciousness and Cognition 13, no. 1 (2004): 123–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2003.07.002.

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Heras-Escribano, Manuel, and Daniel Martínez Moreno. "The Emergence of Ur-Intentionality: An Ecological Proposal." Philosophies 9, no. 3 (2024): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9030054.

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Radical enactivism supports radical embodied cognition (REC), which is the idea that basic or fundamental cognition (perception and action) does not need to be understood in representational, contentful terms. REC departs from the idea that the mind can be naturalized through biological functions, but rejects the idea that mental content, which is understood as having a representational nature, can be naturalized. For REC, the natural origins of content (or NOC) is a program based on the following hypothesis: first, we depart from basic cognitive processes that are target-based and guided by a

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Helm, Bennett W. "Emotions as Evaluative Feelings." Emotion Review 1, no. 3 (2009): 248–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073909103593.

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The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of the bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and coming to see emotions as a distinctive

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Heal, Jane. "On Discussing What We Should Do." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 95 (May 2024): 127–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135824612400002x.

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AbstractMany of the good things which make human life worthwhile are essentially social, cannot be enjoyed by one person unless they are enjoyed together with others. And it is obvious that thinking in terms of the first-person plural, we/us, plays a large part in everyday life as people consider puzzlements (‘What should we do?’) and remark on the success of what they decided on (‘That worked out really well for us!’). Analytic philosophers should accept this at face value, recognising that human beings are often co-subjects with each other, that there is irreducible plural intentionality. Th

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Liu, Hao. "Intentional Directedness and Immanent Content." International Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2020): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202013144.

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This paper will investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle’s theory of perception and assess the accuracy of Brentano’s proposed location of intentionality in Aristotle. When introducing intentionality into contemporary philosophy, Brentano attributed it to Aristotle, whose theory of psychology he believed to reveal the characteristics of intentional inexistence. After setting up a working definition of intentionality that stresses such features as immanent content and intentional directedness, I will then clarify Aristotle’s theory of perception with regard to these two characterist

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Poznanski, Roman R., Jan Holmgren, Lleuvelyn A. Cacha, Eda Alemdar, and Erkki J. Brändas. "Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience." Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience 2, no. 2 (2023): 280–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.56280/1575836389.

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We define precognitive affect, composed of information holding dispositional states, as noncontextual, rudimentary building blocks of subjective intentionality. We take on a psychodynamic approach to intentional agency. Intentions unfold into actions in animate thermodynamics reducing subjective uncertainty by negentropic action. They are intentions in action carrying meaning in species having complex protein interactions with various regulated gene sets. In particular, the unfolding of intentionality in terms of biological purpose introduced by subjective functioning allows for a satisfactory

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Gulick, Robert Van. "How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness?" Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214222.

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Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. "How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality and ‘We-Mode’ Social Cognition." Topoi 35, no. 1 (2015): 301–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9306-7.

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Blomberg, Olle. "We-Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective Intentionality." Journal of Social Philosophy 49, no. 1 (2018): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12221.

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Summa, Michela. "On the Role of Attention and Ascription in the Formation of Intentions within Behavior." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018-2: Modes of Intentionality. Phenomenological and Medieval Perspectives 2018, no. 2 (2018): 177–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108208.

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This article explores the roots of action in behavior. Departing from the standard understanding of action as ‘intentional behavior’, we argue that this view is often based on the underestimation of the intentional structures that are already operative within behavior. Distinguishing between a broader and a narrower meaning of intentionality, we then elaborate on the processes that lead from the diffuse and operative intentionality of behavior to the focused intentionality of action. In order to properly appreciate these processes, we show that a reassessment of the phenomenon of attention – w

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Overgaard, Nicholas. "A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change." Scientonomy: Journal for the Science of Science 1 (May 19, 2017): 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/js.v1i0.28234.

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Although we accept that a scientific mosaic is a set of theories and methods accepted and employed by a scientific community, scientific community currently lacks a proper definition in scientonomy. In this paper, I will outline a basic taxonomy for the bearers of a mosaic, i.e. the social agents of scientific change. I begin by differentiating between accidental group and community through the respective absence and presence of a collective intentionality. I then identify two subtypes of community: the epistemic community that has a collective intentionality to know the world, and the non-epi

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Klaver, Irene. "Phenomenology on (the) Rocks." Research in Phenomenology 31, no. 1 (2001): 173–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691640160048612.

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Abstract"Phenomenology on (the) Rocks" shows how an interest in the natural realm can be congruent with globalization if we conceive this globality in a vernacular way. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty first developed a tentative conceptual instrumentarium for this direction of thought. Through a broadening of traditional phenomenology as a philosophy of primordial constitution based upon intentionality of the subject, they began thinking in terms of co-constitution and operative intentionality. In the rest of the paper I mainly show how operant intentionality works in and through the way we take up

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Martínez, Sergio F., and Alejandro Villanueva. "Musicality as material culture." Adaptive Behavior 26, no. 5 (2018): 257–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712318793123.

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From an enactive perspective, one should be able to explain how perception and actions, constituted in patterns of interactions with the world, evolve into the capacities for social coordination and social understanding distinctive of human beings. Traditional accounts of our social understanding skills, focusing on the role of intentionality as the “aboutness” associated with the use of symbolic language, make this sort of explanation difficult to articulate. A satisfactory explanation should start with the recognition that intentionality is not a monolithic phenomenon and that more basic kin

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Val Danilov, Igor, Araksia Svajyan, and Sandra Mihailova. "Computerized Assessment of Cognitive Development in Neurotypical and Neurodivergent Children." OBM Neurobiology 06, no. 03 (2022): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2203137.

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This study aims to observe the differences in the shared intentionality magnitude in mother-child dyads with neurotypical (NT) children and neurodivergent (ND) children aged 3-6 years. The quality of shared intentionality in infancy is associated with cognitive development. Our results showed that ND children scored six times higher (on average) in quiz-test than NT children. Children with difficulties in interaction (ND children) are more likely to use shared intentionality in conversation than NT children. We believe that this knowledge can contribute to developing computerized assessment me

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Morrow, Mary R., and Rothlyn P. (Rorry) Zahourek. "Studying Intentionality and Healing: A Dialogue with Dr. Rothlyn P. Zahourek." Nursing Science Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2025): 135–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/08943184241311897.

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Nurse scholar Dr. Zahourek is a retired clinical specialist in psychiatric-mental health nursing and an advanced holistic nurse. As a result of her 30+ years of clinical work in numerous clinical settings using various modalities, she decided to study the process of healing and the role of intention and intentionality in healing for her PhD grounded theory research. She has revised her theory of intentionality: the matrix of healing and presents it in this issue of Nursing Science Quarterly . In this article, we dialogue with her regarding the influences underpinning her theory, intentionality

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Alicke, Mark, and David Rose. "Culpable control or moral concepts?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, no. 4 (2010): 330–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10001664.

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AbstractKnobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.

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Clark, Cory J., Christopher W. Bauman, Shanmukh V. Kamble, and Eric D. Knowles. "Intentional Sin and Accidental Virtue? Cultural Differences in Moral Systems Influence Perceived Intentionality." Social Psychological and Personality Science 8, no. 1 (2016): 74–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550616663802.

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Indians and U.S. Americans view harmful actions as morally wrong, but Indians are more likely than U.S. Americans to perceive helping behaviors as moral imperatives. We utilize this cultural variability in moral belief systems to test whether and how moral considerations influence perceptions of intentionality (as suggested by theories of folk psychology). Four experiments found that Indians attribute more intentionality than U.S. Americans for helpful but not harmful (Studies 1–4) or neutral side effects (Studies 2 and 3). Also, cross-cultural differences in intentionality judgments for posit

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Lekic, Kristina. "Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”." Filozofija i drustvo 30, no. 1 (2019): 135–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1901135l.

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The paper aims to shed light on Searle?s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of ?we-intentionality?. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat f

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Feilberg, Casper, Annelise Norlyk, and Kurt Dauer Keller. "Studying the Intentionality of Human Being." Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 49, no. 2 (2018): 214–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341347.

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Abstract Based upon a brief outline of existential-phenomenological ontology we present a theoretical and practical understanding of human being, which is suited for a methodologically reflected approach to qualitative research. We present the phenomenological distinction between three dimensions of corporeal intentionality (structural, generative and dialectic intentionality) that form elementary events and structures of meaning. Various aspects of human being are better scrutinized with these concepts of intentionality, such as the association of individual being or collective being (e.g. gr

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Chater, Nick, Hossam Zeitoun, and Tigran Melkonyan. "The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining." Psychological Review 129, no. 3 (2022): 415–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rev0000343.

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Clotilde, Ubeda, Galante Mariana, Perinetti Andrea, and Peltzer Raquel. "What do we understand by undetermined intention deaths? Injuries patterns' intentionality identification." Injury Prevention 18, Suppl 1 (2012): A242.2—A242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/injuryprev-2012-040590w.60.

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Abdel Rahim Dahiyat, Emad. "Intelligent agents and intentionality: Should we begin to think outside the box?" Computer Law & Security Review 22, no. 6 (2006): 472–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2006.09.001.

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McClung, Jennifer Susan, Sarah Placì, Adrian Bangerter, Fabrice Clément, and Redouan Bshary. "The language of cooperation: shared intentionality drives variation in helping as a function of group membership." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 284, no. 1863 (2017): 20171682. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1682.

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While we know that the degree to which humans are able to cooperate is unrivalled by other species, the variation humans actually display in their cooperative behaviour has yet to be fully explained. This may be because research based on experimental game-theoretical studies neglects fundamental aspects of human sociality and psychology, namely social interaction and language. Using a new optimal foraging game loosely modelled on the prisoner's dilemma, the egg hunt, we categorized players as either in-group or out-group to each other and studied their spontaneous language usage while they mad

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Gardner, Danielle M., and Ann Marie Ryan. "Does Intentionality Matter? An Exploration of Discrimination With Ambiguous Intent." Industrial and Organizational Psychology 10, no. 1 (2017): 77–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/iop.2016.104.

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Although intentionality may be a valuable spectrum on which to categorically distinguish instances of discrimination, we consider whether or not differences on this construct actually reveal differing impacts for targets. Specifically, we wonder whether intentionality is very relevant to the experiences of targets of discrimination or whether the negative consequences stemming from the discriminatory interactions occur regardless of the perpetrator's intent. Further, we explore the potential consequences related to a target attempting to confront discrimination of ambiguous intent. Finally, we

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45

Hill, Jonathan, Lynne Murray, Vicki Leidecker, and Helen Sharp. "The dynamics of threat, fear and intentionality in the conduct disorders: longitudinal findings in the children of women with post-natal depression." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363, no. 1503 (2008): 2529–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0036.

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This paper considers how environmental threat may contribute to the child's use of avoidant strategies to regulate negative emotions, and how this may interact with high emotional reactivity to create vulnerability to conduct disorder symptoms. We report a study based on the hypothesis that interpreting others' behaviours in terms of their motives and emotions—using the intentional stance—promotes effective social action, but may lead to fear in threatful situations, and that inhibiting the intentional stance may reduce fear but promote conduct disorder symptoms. We assessed 5-year-olds' use o

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LAN, Mei, Yumin SHI, and You ZHANG. "Exploring John Searle’s Analysis of Intentional Satisfaction: Sociological Implications for the Concept of Intentionality." Revista de Cercetare si Interventie Sociala 86 (September 15, 2024): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.33788/rcis.86.9.

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This paper delves into the concept of intentionality, which is deeply ingrained in the representation of consciousness, and its significance in comprehending human behavior and societal dynamics. Specifically, it examines John Searle’s analysis of intentional satisfaction and contrasts it with the theory of Intentionality put forth by Husserl. Searle’s perspective, particularly his exploration of conditions of satisfaction and intentional consciousness, sheds light on the intersection of the mind and reality. At the heart of Searle’s framework lies the crucial connection between intentional sa

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Strang, Veronica. "Contributaries. From confusion to confluence in the matter of water and agency." Archaeological Dialogues 21, no. 2 (2014): 165–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1380203814000191.

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I am happy to see that my essay has generated a lively discussion, and am most grateful to the respondents for their insightful contributions. Their comments express varying levels of agreement regarding the agency of things. Vernon Scarborough revisits anxieties about whether agency implies intentionality. Using the term ‘agency’ is indeed problematic if we assume that it entails sentience or intentionality (and I do not), but if we define it more precisely as a capacity to act (upon), it is possible to excise intentionality from the equation. This simultaneously allows us to acknowledge the

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Wiese, Wanja, and Karl J. Friston. "Examining the Continuity between Life and Mind: Is There a Continuity between Autopoietic Intentionality and Representationality?" Philosophies 6, no. 1 (2021): 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies6010018.

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A weak version of the life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described

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Ruess, Miriam, Roland Thomaschke, and Andrea Kiesel. "Intentional Binding for Unintended Effects." Timing & Time Perception 8, no. 3-4 (2020): 341–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10005.

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We execute most of our movements in order to elicit an intended effect. This kind of intentionality is commonly assumed to drive a temporal illusion, referred to as Intentional Binding (IB): Stimuli intentionally elicited by one’s own action (i.e., effects) are perceived as temporally earlier compared to unintentionally occurring stimuli (not elicited by one’s own action). It is currently under debate whether intentionality is necessary for IB to occur, or whether causality might be sufficient for IB to occur. In the present study, we investigated the importance of an intention for the occurre

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Takács, Ádám. "Intentionality and objectification: Husserl and Simmel on the cognitive and social conditions of experience." Filozofija i drustvo 25, no. 2 (2014): 42–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1402042t.

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Husserl?s transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the Logical Investigations, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a structure of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of consciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper 42 argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of histor

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